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Abstract 
This thesis provides an account and feminist critical analysis of the Australian Government's 
approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years (1996 - 2007). This 
thesis uses a feminist theoretical schema which locates male violence against women in a 
complex web of structural (macro), institutional (mezzo) and individual (micro) factors that 
interact with, and are interdependent on, each other. It argues that understanding policies 
and policy processes requires consideration of the significance of: ·policy actors or 
participants; structures or policy machinery; and discourse. The thesis therefore employs 
Anna Yeatman's (1998, p.4) 'policy activism', Louise Chappell's (2002a; 2002b) 'political 
opportunity structures', and Carol Bacchi's (1999b) 'What's the Problem?' approach to 
make sense of this period. 
The empirical study for this thesis was divided into two stages. Stage one involved semi-
structured interviews with thirty key informants supplemented by a review of over two 
hundred relevant texts to develop a detailed account of this period. Stage two examined two 
Howard Government initiatives, Partnerships Against Domestic Violence and Violence 
Against Women - Australia Says No, as in-depth case studies of policy process and policy 
content respectively. 
The research examines the ongoing salience of the femocrat strategy during the Howard 
years and found that feminist approaches and the femocrat strategy dominated national 
male violence against women policy during this period. It also found that feminists 
continued to be key players in the policy process; however the Howard Government 
challenged and reduced their discursive power. As such, the thesis explores how new 
policy machinery and processes reflect continuities and discontinuities with the past. This 
thesis also suggests that approaches to male violence against women were consistent with 
the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda. It argues the Howard 
Government's approaches can be characterised as both policies of chivalry and policies of 
cooption but I also introduce and develop a new way of describing these approaches as 
policies of transformistic hegemonic masculinity. The thesis concludes that the Howard 
Government's approaches transformed policies and practices which seem counter-
hegemonic into instruments of hegemonic domination and were thus far from "saying no" to 
male violence against women. 
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Howard Government: 
This refers to the various federal Coalition Governments under the leadership of Liberal 
Prime Minister John Howard from 1996 to 2007. This thesis uses the singular term in 
recognition of the consistency of approach and leadership throughout all governments in 
this period even though the specific ministerial leadership changed. This Government 
increasingly used the term 'Australian Government' to refer to itself and I use the terms 
interchangeably as appropriate. 
Howard Years: 
The period between 1996 and 2007. During this period, Prime Minister John Howard had 
the leadership of the Coalition between the Liberal and National political parties which 
formed the Australian Government. 
Male violence against women: 
This thesis uses this term interchangeably with domestic violence, sexual assault, violence 
against women, family violence, and sexual abuse as appropriate. It adopts a broad 
definition of male violence against women which refers to "violence women suffer because 
they are women or ... forms of violence women suffer disproportionately" (Bond & Phillips, 
2001, p.484). It also defines male violence against women as: any physical, visual, verbal 
or sexual act or behaviour by a man/men that is adopted to control a woman/women, take 
away her ability to control intimate contact and which she experiences as a threat, invasion, 
or assault that has the effect of hurting, degrading or damaging her physically, sexually, 
psychologically or through social isolation, economic deprivation or leaving her living in fear 
(Adapted from: Kelly, 1988, p.41; National Committee on Violence Against Women, 1992, 
p.45). 
This definition and the term 'male violence against women', rather than the mor.e common 
'violence against women', reflects the feminist positioning of the thesis. This definition offers 
a gendered, feminist understanding inclusive of women's diverse experiences along the 
continuum of violence (Kelly, 1988, 1996a) which includes sexual harassment, sexual 
assault, child sexual assault, rape, domestic and family violence, trafficking, and femicide. 
In a feminist context where all forms of male power are potentially definable as violence 
(Kelly, 1988, p.39), it is also narrow enough to be useful for a feminist analysis of policy and 
xii 
practice. The qualifier male violence against women also reflects an active rather than 
passive voice making visible the man/men's agency, action and intention and its effect on 
the woman/women. 
States: 
The thesis uses this term as short hand to refer to Australian States (Queensland, New 
South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia) and Territories 
(Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory). 
Perpetrator and Victim: 
The thesis uses the term 'perpetrator' to describe men who use violence against women 
and 'victim' to describe women who have experienced violence from men. Although some 
feminists have critiqued such terms as being disempowering and as essentialising people's 
identities (Chung, 2002) other options such as 'men who use violence' or 'women who 
experience violence' are clumsy and do not taken into account the criminal nature of this 
type of violence. They also obscure responsibility. I agree with Sharon Lamb's (1999) 
assessment)hat throwing .out the label 'victim' is not necessary and her advocacy for a 
conceptualisation of the term 'victim' that takes into account women's strength and agency, 
empowerment and the ubiquity of abuse. Similarly, I argue for a conceptualisation of the 
term 'perpetrator' that is not pathologising and recognises men's capacity to challenge their 
own violent behaviour while also holding them responsible for the crimes they have 
committed. In using the terms 'perpetrator' and 'victim' I do not intend any negative 
connotations of helplessness or pathology or to be essentialising. I instead embrace the 
broader and more empowered conceptualisation of these terms advocated for by others 
(Donovan & Vlais, 2005, p.3; Lamb, 1999). 
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Australia Says No?: 
Policy, politics and the Australian Government's approaches to 
male-violence against women during the Howard years 
(1996- 2007) 
' 
1.1 Introduction 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis provides a feminist critical analysis of Australian Government approaches to 
male violence against women during the Howard years (1996 · 2007). The thesis seeks to 
explore the question: What was the nature of the Australian Government's approaches to 
male violence against women during the Howard years? This question initially arose out of 
curiosity about how and why a sustained and comparatively well-funded public policy 
response to male violence against women was provided by the conservative Howard 
Government between 1996 and 2007. 
There has conventionally been a close association between Australian governments' 
responses to male violence against women and the theories and practices of feminism. 
There is an extensive body of literature exploring policy process and the nature of feminist 
engagements with Australian governments, particularly the femocrat strategy. Prominent 
amongst this literature is the work of feminists such as Louise Chappell (2000; 2001; 2002a; 
2002b), Marian Sawer (1990; 1993; 1999), Hester Eisenstein (1985; 1990; 1996) and Anna 
Yeatman (1994; 1998). Femocrats were Australian feminist policy activists working inside 
the bureaucracy and across the boundaries between government and community or non-
government feminists and organisations. The literature suggests the femocrat strategy 
played a significant role in advocating for and shaping Australian governments' approaches 
to issues of particular importance to women, including male violence against women. 
' On the Australian political landscape, the term 'Howard years' refers to the various federal 
Coalition Governments under the leadership of Liberal Prime Minister John Howard from 
1996 to 2007. The term recognises a consistency of approach and leadership throughout 
this period. Significantly, the Howard Government explicitly rejected feminism as a 
perspective, and feminists as legitimate players in the policy process in many areas of 
public policy. It also pursued a social policy agenda which reflected a particular mix of neo-
2 
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liberalism, social conservatism and political opportunism that was inconsistent with feminist 
values and activism. The literature on feminist engagements with the state and the Howard 
Government's broader social policy agenda suggests the Howard years were a period of 
decline for the femocrat strategy. In particular, it suggests the Howard Government 
increasingly excluded feminists from the development of public policy. This period is 
therefore usually represented in the literature as a constraint, rather than a "political 
opportunity structure" (Chappell, 2002a, 2002b}, for femocrats and feminist activists working 
within or with the federal public service. At the same time, however, the Howard 
Government's approaches to male violence against women were generally not subjected to 
the same level of feminist critique or scrutiny as the Howard Government's broader social 
policy agenda. Given this history, I was curious to explore the Howard Government's 
engagement with feminism and in this thesis I seek to understand how best, from a feminist 
perspective, the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women may 
be understood. 
In the Australian federal system of governance, the constitutional division of powers 
between different levels of government means Australian state and territory governments 
have traditionally played the most significant role in responding to male violence against 
women. These state responses have included: providing criminal and civil justice responses 
(e.g. police, courts, criminal laws, and apprehended violence or domestic violence orders); 
health, counselling and support services; and social and community housing. Since the 
1970s, however, Australian federal governments have increasingly developed public policy 
responses to male violence against women. Federal government responses to this issue 
have historically been differentiated from state responses by concentrating on the effects of 
male violence against women such as poverty, homeless, and family breakdown (Weeks & 
Gilmore, 1996). These policy responses were important in enhancing the capacity of 
women to set up an 'autonomous·household' independent of their violent partner (Ramsay, 
2004; Weeks & Gilmore, 1996). They included such programs as: the Supported 
Accommodation Assistance Program (SAAP) which funded refuges; social security benefits 
including crisis payments; no-fault divorce; and other family law policies. 
Between 1987 and 1990 the Hawke Labor Government expanded federal responses to 
male violence against women by developing the National Domestic Violence Education 
Program (NDVEP). NDVEP was the first federal response specifically targeting the issue of 
male violence against women rather than its effects. It was coordinated by a 
Commonwealth/State Taskforce which also included intergovernmental and sector 
3 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
representatives (Earle, Herron, Secomb, & Stubbs, 1990; Erika, 1990). The Hawke 
Government replaced the NDVEP Taskforce with the National Committee on Violence 
Against Women (NCVAW) in 1990 (Chappell, 2001, p.63; Earle et al., 1990, p.5). The 
NCVAWincluded greater Commonwealth, state, and.NGO representation than the previous 
Taskforce (Chappell, 2001, p.63; Earle et al., 1990, p.5; NCVAW, 1992, p.vi). It developed a 
number of "valuable resources" including the National Guidelines for Training in the Area of 
Violence Against Women and the 1993 Stop Violence Against Women national campaign 
(Nancarrow & Struthers, 1995, p.46). In 1992 the then Prime Minister Keating launched the 
National Strategy on Violence Against Women (NSVAW) developed by the NCVAW 
(Nancarrow & Struthers, 1995, pp.45-46). This significant increase in Australian 
Government responses to male violence against women during the Hawke and Keating 
years suggests that this is a policy area that is increasingly viewed as the responsibility of 
federal as well as state governments. 
The Coalition's victory in the federal election on 2 March 1996 and the formation of the 
Howard Government which maintained power until 24 November 2007 represented a new 
epoch in the cultural and political history of Australia. A number of commentators argue that 
the Howard Government was characterised by a particular mix of economic nee-liberalism, 
social conservatism and political opportunism, which they describe as the political genius 
which kept Howard in power for over a decade (see for example Brett, 2005, p.45; Brett, 
2007, p.62; Kelly, 2006, p.1 0; Milne, 2006, p.46; Shanahan, 2006, p.40; Singleton, 2005). 
They also suggest that these characteristics of the Howard Government had a profound 
effect on the social policy agenda of the Australian Government during the Howard years. In 
particular, they argue these characteristics were an important part of the Howard 
Government's "culture wars"; which refer to what commentators describe as Howard's 
reactionary crusade against the political Left utilising strategies of 'wedge' and 'identity' 
politics in defence of a perceived mainstream consensual centre. 
In terms of public policy responses to male violence against women, Louise Chappell 
(2001, p.64) argues that following the 1996 election of the Howard Government, the 
NCVAW and the NSVAW "languished under the incoming government". At the same time, 
however, in 1996 the Howard Government started to develop what was to become a 
sustained and comparatively well-funded federal public policy response to male violence 
against women. Following the lead of the Hawke Government, the Howard Government 
developed federal government responses which dealt specifically with male violence 
against women rather than its effects alone. These responses lasted throughout the entire 
4 
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Howard years (1996-2007). They included the policy and program responses Partnerships 
Against Domestic Violence (1997-2005), the National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault 
(2000-2005), and the Women's National Safety Agenda (2005-2007). Although providing 
some policy frameworks, these responses were largely grants programs funding research 
and program development (pilot programs)throughout Australia. Significantly, Partnerships 
Against Domestic Violence was also coordinated by a Taskforce composing federal and 
state government representatives from all Australian jurisdictions. During this time the 
Howard Government also developed two national community education campaigns 
responding to male violence against women. The first was No Respect;· No· Relationship 
(2001-2003) which was developed but then cancelled by the Government shortly before it 
was launched. The second was Violence Against Women- Australia Says No (2004-2007). 
Federalism has not been a central issue for Australian feminists (Chappell, 2002b, p.151), 
particularly those concerned with male violence against women. Those feminists interested 
in Australian government responses to male violence against women have historically 
focussed on state governments given their historical responsibilities for this issue. Since 
1972, however, Labor and Coalition federal governments have enthusiastically embraced 
what Alan Fenna (2004, p.173) calls "constitutional expansionism". This refers to the 
increasing involvement of federal governments in public policy areas traditionally dominated 
by the states by virtue of the external affairs powers granted to the Commonwealth in the 
Constitution. The increasing federal activity responding to male violence against women by 
the Hawke, Keating and Howard Governments is illustrative of this constitutional 
expansionism. (A timeline and summary of these approaches and of the Office of the Status 
of Women which coordinated these is provided in Appendices 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3.) This 
increased activity suggests that feminists interested in Australian government responses to 
male violence against women need to turn much greater attention to Australian federal 
governments. This thesis offers a contribution to the feminist research that is gradually 
starting to fill the gap in the literature by examining federal government responses to male 
violence against women. 
There is a small body of literature that specifically explores and analyses the Howard 
Government's responses to male violence against women (Chappell, 2001; Donovan & 
Vlais, 2005; FitzRoy, 1999; Jones, 2004; McKenzie, 2005; Morley & Macfarlane, 2008; 
Murray, 2005; Murray & Powell, 2009; Phillips, 2004, 2006, 2008b; Summers, 2003b; 
Webster, 2006a, 2006b; Winter, 2007). This literature tends to focus on the content of the 
Howard Government policies and criticises the Howard Government's responses from a 
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feminist perspective for reflecting a socially conservative approach to male violence against 
women. With the exception of Chappell's {2001) interest in Australian federalism and Anne 
Summers (2003a; 2003b, pp.92-96) and Bronwyn Winter's (2007) criticism of the 
Government's diversion of funding from these programs, there has also been no attention to 
policy process. This neglect is important because policy process can have a significant 
impact on the nature and content of policies (Considine, 1994, p.73; Weeks, 1996, p.12) 
It is useful to briefly outline the themes in the literature on the Howard Government's 
approaches to male violence against women because these provide an important 
foundation on which this thesis is based. The literature is predominantly feminist literature 
which concentrates on the specific initiatives Partnerships and Australia Says No and is 
particularly critical of these initiatives for what the authors argue is their failure to reflect 
complex feminist understandings of male violence against women. The literature also 
criticises these initiatives for their relationship with, and contribution to, racism in Australia 
as well as briefly exploring some aspects of the Partnerships policy process. 
One of the major criticisms of both Partnerships and Australia Says No in the literature is 
what a number of authors argue is the shift away from feminist understandings and 
approaches to male violence against women at a structural level (FitzRoy, 1999; McKenzie, 
2005; Morley & Macfarlane, 2008; Murray & Powell, 2009; Phillips, 2004, 2006; Webster, 
2006a, 2006b; Winter, 2007). In particular, they are critical of the impact of conservative 
political ideology and policy objectives which they argue manifest themselves in these 
initiatives in two main ways. 
The first way the literature suggests conservative political ideology and policy objectives 
manifest themselves in these initiatives was by the Howard Government representing male 
violence against women as a gender neutral problem or as "non-gendered". They argue the 
Government does this in their initiatives by: containing no information about the gendered 
nature of this violence; using gender-neutral language; and focusing on families and 
individuals rather than the social context in which their violence occurs. They suggest that 
this representation denies the role of gendered power relations, social context and men's 
advantages under patriarchy inherent in feminist understandings of violence. Ruth Phillips 
(2008b, p.59), for example, contends that: 
While there is an absence of leadership in public discussion about gender power relations 
between men and women, the cultural and social context that allows, and in some cases 
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supports, women's insecurity will remain intact, continuing to ensure that many women live 
with violence or in fear of violence. 
Taking this critique further, Phillips (2004, p.29) argues that the gender neutral and 
individualised understanding of violence in Partnerships and Australia Says No are an anti-
feminist backlash. She contends that the Howard Government's adherence to social 
conservatism and rejection of feminist analyses evident is these initiatives is "legitimized 
hostility" to the foundation of domestic violence as a public policy issue which had a 
powerful impact on domestic violence policy and its implementation (Phillips, 2006). 
Similarly to Phillips, other authors (McKenzie, 2005; Morley & Macfarlane, 2008, p.34; 
Winter, 2007, p.33) contend Australia Says No was either anti-feminist or reflected the 
Howard Government's cooption of feminist approaches to serve the Government's own 
political agenda. Mandy McKenzie (2005), for example, argues that Australia Says No was 
an example of partisan political advertising which was strategically delayed to coincide with 
campaigning for the 2004 federal election. She also argues that the accompanying helpline 
was more a "marketing exercise rather that a serious attempt to assist victims of violence" 
(McKenzie, 2005, p.4). Supporting this, Bronwyn Winter (2007, p.33) and Christine Morley 
and Selma Macfarlane (2008, p.34) argue that although the funding committed to 
community education in Australia Says No was positive, the deliberate exclusion of feminist 
services from tendering for the helpline was: anti-feminist; an incredible waste of money; 
and undermined existing domestic violence and sexual assault services and the quality of 
the helpline itself. Morley and Macfarlane {2008, p.34) further criticise the services provided 
by the helpline as "disturbing and dangerous" because of the individualised, psychological 
and gender-neutral understandings of violence against women informing the staff's 
practices. 
McKenzie (2005, p.t) compares Australia Says No unfavourably with No Respect, No 
Relationship (No RespecO which was the campaign developed by the Howard Government 
but then cancelled 10 days before it was due to be launched. McKenzie (2005) argues No 
Respect was a "serious and innovative attempt" to prevent violence in future relationships 
by reaching young people as they are beginning to form relationships. She argues it was a 
multi-faceted and targeted strategy that didn't "shy away from teenage sexuality, provided a 
model for respectful relationships, and addressed the full spectrum of abusive behaviours" 
(McKenzie, 2005, p.4). This analysis is supported by a VicHealth review of national and 
international communications and marketing activity to address violence against women 
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(Donovan & Vlais, 2005; VicHealth, 2006). This review found that No Respect reflected a 
number of features of recommended practice for community education campaigns. 
McKenzie criticises Australia Says No for its inconsistency with the developmental research 
that underpinned No Respect. She argues: "it is relatively easy for governments to 'say no' 
to violence against women. But ultimately, this achieves little. If we are to prevent violence 
in future generations, we need to reach young people as they are beginning to form 
relationships" (McKenzie, 2005, p.4). 
The second way the literature suggests anti-feminist, conservative political ideology and 
policy objectives manifest themselves in these initiatives are in their focus on family. A 
number of authors (FitzRoy, 1999; Jones, 2004; McKenzie, 2005; Murray, 2005; Murray & 
Powell, 2009; Phillips, 2004, 2006; Webster, 2006a, 2006b) suggest the Howard 
Government's focus on "strengthening families" in these initiatives promotes a family 
reunification approach that seeks to restore the 'family harmony' disrupted by a man's 
violence. They also contend such approaches reflect 'pro-family' New Right and men's 
rights groups' approaches to this issue and argue these: ignore social context; pathologise 
domestic violence as an individual crime perpetrated by 'angry', 'bad' or 'sad' men having 
relationship difficulties; undermine men's responsibility and the criminal nature of their 
violence; an.d shift responsibility for male violence onto female victims who engage in 
"unsafe behaviours" and their families and friends. They also suggest it denies what 
feminist would argue are the links between domestic violence, sexual assault, and 
gendered power relations including traditional views of masculinity and male dominance in 
family relationships. Lee FitzRoy (1999, p.168), for example, argues the focus on families in 
Partnerships: 
... reproduces a conservative ideology. and traditional theoretical analysis of violence against 
women. It is not disputed that the majority of violence perpetrated against women and children 
is perpetrated by men in their immediate or extended families. However, a focus on the family 
per se, is a major discursive and theoretical shift back to a traditional analysis of dysfunctional 
families, rather than a broader cultural and societal analysis of why violence occurs. 
Further, Morley and Macfarlane (2008) argue Australia Says No also constructs families in 
conservative terms which undermine the legitimacy of non-heterosexual and single-parent 
families and infers that Well-functioning families are heterosexual, nuclear, and patriarchal. 
Amy Webster (2006a; 2006b), Ruth Phillips (2006) and Lee FitzRoy (1999) argue the 
Howard Government linked this violence with certain types of families. In particular, they 
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argue that the Howard Government's approaches in Partnerships and Australia Says No 
suggest that male violence against women is mainly a problem for vulnerable families (for 
example poor, unemployed and homeless families), Indigenous communities, and other 
cultural and ethnic minorities. Webster (2006a; 2006b) in particular suggests that racism 
and nationalism are prominent in Australia Says No. She argues that for people or 
communities who feel isolated from the mainstream such as Indigenous communities and 
newly arrived migrants, the Australia Says No "slogan sounds more like a racist threat than 
an acknowledgement of the prevalence of such violence in the Australian community" 
(Webster, 2006b, p.46). Webster (2006a, p.17) criticises the Howard Government for 
employing nationalism to "construct domestic violence as un-Australian". She argues that 
the slogan "Australia Says No" slogan perpetuates the misunderstanding that "'real' 
Australians do not commit violence against women (a starkly inaccurate historical 
insinuation)" (Webster, 2006a; 2006b, p.42). She also suggests that the Howard 
Government employed a politics of division in Australia Says No to exploit: 
... the ideological sub-trend of anti-political correctness. In this way nationalism, and the idea of 
national identity, is used to ostracise the occurrence of domestic violence into 'un-Australian' 
households or communities. Domestic violence is thereby associated with ethnic and cultural 
minorities (Them) enabling the irresponsibility of the mainstream for the occurrence of such 
violence in Australia (Us) whilst consolidating Australian nationalism (Webster, 200Gb, pp.29-
30). 
For Webster (2006b, p.46), the targets of the Australia .Says No campaign are thus "non-
majority, culturally 'othered' Australians", both Indigenous people and migrants, rather than 
Australians generally. 
Beyond feminist criticisms of the content of the Howard Government's approaches to male 
violence against, there is very little in the literature that explores the policy process 
concerning Australian Government responses to male violence against women during the 
Howard years. The two exceptions are Louise Chappell's exploration of Partnerships in the 
context of Australian federalism and Anne Summers and Bronwyn Winter's criticisms of the 
Howard Government for what they argue is the misuse of Partnerships funding. 
Chappell (2001) explores Partnerships in the context of Australian federalism and the 
femocrat strategy. In her article critiquing the longstanding view that federalism stymies the 
development of progressive social policies, Chappell (2001) argues that feminists made 
progress on domestic violence policy with Partnerships despite the Howard Government's 
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social conservatism. She argues this was due to the political opportunity structure of 
Australian federalism and the interplay between federal institutions, political parties and the 
bureaucracy. In particular, Chappell argues that the Partnerships Taskforce was valuable 
because it provided a formal intergovernmental mechanism with representation from 
different federal and state jurisdictions (including progressive governments). According to 
Chappell (2001, p.66), the Partnerships Taskforce facilitated significant autonomy for state 
governments and commonwealth agencies in project development which created an 
ongoing "degree of commitment to feminist approaches to domestic violence". Chappell 
concedes the nature of the projects approved by the Partnerships Taskforce, with their 
particular emphasis on 'family' and 'perpetrator' projects, reflected the strong influence of 
conservative discourse. Nevertheless, '1he presence of competing ideas between the 
federal and certain state governments about domestic violence policy suggests that 
federalism does not inevitably lead toward conservatism" (Chappell, 2001, p.67). Thus, for 
Chappell, the Partnerships structures and presence of competing ideas between federal 
and state governments facilitated progressive social policy and the maintenance of 
competing feminist discourses and ideas during this period despite Howard Government 
conservatism. 
Anne Summers (2003b) and Bronwyn Winter (2007) make brief comments about policy 
process in their criticism of what they describe as the Howard Government's under-
spending and misuse of Partnerships funding. Summers (2003b, p.92), for instance, argues 
that in 2001 alone the under-spending for Partnerships was $4.3 million. She also criticises 
the significant amount of Partnerships funding used for consultancy fees while "those 
women at the coalface who run the services that provide refuge and other support for 
women and children victims of domestic violence are struggling under budgets that have 
scarcely increased in years"(Summers, 2003b, p.96). Further, Winter (2007) criticises the 
Howard Government's reallocation of unspent Partnerships funds. She reports: 
On May 17, 2003, Nicola Roxon, then [ALP Shadow Minister for Women, Children and Youth] 
... revealed to the Australian media that AU$1 0.1 million of supposedly "unspent funds relating 
to the Women's programmes" (Commonwealth of Australia 2003b) were diverted in the 
national budget to the National Security Public Information Campaign (the fridge magnet 
campaign) ... The programs in question were Partnerships Against Domestic Violence (PADV: 
$7.5 million unspent) and the National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault (NICSA; $2.5 million 
unspent) (Winter, 2007, pp.29-30). 
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Referring to this use of Partnerships funding Summers (2003b, p.93) argues: "that the 
government could raid the domestic violence piggy bank to pay for a dubious (and, many 
thought, politically motivated) scare campaign on terrorism speaks volumes about how 
seriously it takes the question of eliminating domestic violence". Thus, both Summers and 
Winter express concerns about what they argue is the misuse of Partnerships funding. 
Although the literature outlined above provides an important foundation for this thesis, on 
the whole the analyses within this literature tend to be rather limited in scope. The most 
significant gap is that the existing literature tends not to be based on empirical studies of the 
period. This is evident in two shortfalls in the literature. First, analyses of the content of the 
policies are not adequately covered and commentators draw on isolated moments or policy 
products or outcomes to make sense of the period. These analyses of content tend to focus 
on Partnerships and are usually brief and taken out of context. There is also no study which 
explores and draws together the Howard Government's approaches to male violence 
against women as a program of policies. Second, there is a lack of knowledge or 
understanding of the policy process in the Howard Government's approaches to male 
violence against women. In particular, there is no detailed study of policy process which 
explores the perspectives of the stakeholders and policy participants in this program of 
policies and the nuances involved in producing the Australian Government's male violence 
against women policies during the Howard years. This means that the Howard years have 
been a period of male violence against women policy development which has not hitherto 
been documented in much detail. 
To fill this gap in the literature, this thesis seeks to produce an account and feminist 
analysis of the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women 
during the Howard years (1996-2007). To produce this account and feminist analysis, the 
thesis reports on an empirical study undertaken in two stages. Stage one involved semi-
structured interviews with thirty key informants who had been involved in, or had particular 
expertise in, the development of the Howard Government's responses to male violence 
against women. These key informants included: federal and state public servants; two 
Howard Government Members of Parliament (MPs); an ALP/Opposition MP; 
representatives of relevant peak bodies; academics; and Partnerships evaluators. These 
interviews explored: key informants' experiences, memories, and interpretations of the 
policy process; key informants' assessments and perceptions of the content of Howard 
Government responses; and key informants' perceptions of the broader social and political 
context in which these responses were developed. 
11 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The purpose of the key informant interviews was to develop as broad and detailed account 
as possible of the development, nature and content of Australian government responses to 
male violence against women during the Howard years to fill the gap in the literature. To 
achieve this objective, in stage one the data collected from key informant interviews was 
supplemented with a review of over two hundred relevant texts from the period. These texts 
included: publicly available official documents and texts of the Australia Government and 
Australian Parliament between 1996 and 2007; departmental working documents; and 
media reports (newspaper, television and radio). In the study I coded and analysed these 
texts thematically. 
Stage two of the study involved two in-depth case studies of Australian Government 
approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years. Partnerships 
Against Domestic Violence (Partnerships) is explored as a case study of policy process. 
The national community education campaign Violence Against Women- Australia Says No 
(Australia Says No) is explored as in-depth case studies of content. 
This thesis contains significant new data on the Australian Government's approaches to 
male violence against women during the Howard years. The empirical study produced a 
detailed account of the policy machinery developed during this period, the nature of the 
policy process, and an understanding of the content of the policies and policy outputs 
including the construction of the problem of male violence against women. This material 
provides an original contribution to knowledge in the fields of political science, social policy, 
government responses to male violence against women, and feminist theory and practice. 
In particular, this contribution includes understandings of: political and policy processes; 
how male violence against women is constructed and understood in Australian policy 
contexts; the role of feminists and feminism in Australian policy production; and policy 
development during the Howard Government years. 
1.2 Outline of Chapters 
Chapter One has outlined the literature to which this thesis makes a significant contribution 
to knowledge, the empirical study conducted for this thesis, the chapters in the thesis, and 
the role of the author. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the thesis and 
contextualise it in a broader context. 
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Chapter Two explores contemporary feminist understandings of male violence against 
women including: the theoretical schema used in this thesis to categorise feminist 
understandings; intersectionality and difference; and hegemonic masculinity. The purpose 
of this chapter is to explore concepts that are valuable for analysing the findings from the 
empirical study and offer a theoretical foundation to make sense of current feminist 
understandings of male violence against women and develop new ways of understanding 
the Howard Government's approaches. 
Chapter Three outlines women's social policy and policy-making processes in Australia. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical and historical framework to 
contextualise the study in the Australian political and policy context. It introduces four 
important concepts that assist in understanding policy process including: policy activism; 
the femocrat strategy; political opportunity structures; and intergovernmental cooperation. It 
also explores feminist analyses of public policy responses to male violence against women 
with a particular focus on feminist conceptualisations of policy as chivalry and policy as 
cooption. These concepts are important because they assist to make sense of the Howard 
Government's responses to male violence against women and provide a theoretical 
foundation on which to develop a new way of understanding this period. 
Chapter Four outlines the nature of the Australian Government during the Howard years 
and the neo-liberalism, social conservatism and political opportunism that some 
commentators argue characterised the Howard Government. The purpose of this chapter is 
to explore the broader social policy context in which the Howard Government's approaches 
to male violence against women were located. This is particularly important in my 
discussion of whether or not the Howard Government's approaches to male violence 
against women were consistent with their broader social policy agenda. 
Chapter Five introduces the study by summanstng the empirical research design. It 
explains both the data collection and analysis completed in stages one and two of the 
study. It also outlines important issues in the research process including reflectivity, 
reflexivity and ethical considerations. The purpose of this chapter is to convey how the 
empirical data for this thesis was collected and analysed to respond to the re~earch 
question: What was the nature of the Australian Government's approaches to male vioience 
against women during the Howard years?. 
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Chapter Six provides an account of the Howard Government's policy and program 
responses to male violence against women including: Partnerships, the National Initiative, 
the Women's Safety Taskforce, and the Women's Safety Agenda. Its purpose is to provide 
as comprehensive an account as possible of both the policy process and content of the 
Howard Government's policy and program initiatives based on stage one of the empirical 
study. 
Chapter Seven provides a detailed account of the Howard Government's community 
education campaigns No Respect and Australia Says No. Its purpose is. to provide as 
comprehensive an account as possible of both the policy process and content of the 
Howard Government's community education campaigns based on stage one of the 
empirical study. 
Chapter Eight outlines four additional themes from stage one of the empirical study. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide a more detailed analysis of the themes that arose from 
stage one of the study that extend beyond the accounts provided in the previous two 
chapters. This chapter also provides the evidence and discussion from which I argue the 
Howard Government's approaches may be conceptualised as policies of chivalry and 
policies of cooption. 
Chapter Nine explores Partnerships as a case study of policy process. This includes 
continuities and discontinuities in the femocrat strategy with particular attention to policy 
activism, political opportunity structures and intergovernmental cooperation. The purpose of 
this chapter is to develop an analysis of policy process in the Australian Government's 
approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years. 
Chapter Ten explores Australia Says No as a case study of content including analysing 
what the problem is represented to be during this period. The purpose of this chapter is to 
develop an analysis of the content of the Australian Government's approaches to male 
violence against women during the Howard years. The chapter also provides the .evidence 
and discussion from which I introduce the new concept of policies as transformistic 
hegemonic masculinity and explain how the Howard Government transformed feminist 
counter-hegemonic practices into instruments of hegemonic domination. 
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Chapter Eleven provides a summary of the thesis including the key findings from the 
empirical study. The purpose of this chapter is to conclude the thesis and summarise the 
original contribution to knowledge provided by the thesis. 
1.3 The Personal is Political 
A number of feminists (e.g. Ford, 2001; Jones, 2004; Mason, 1995, p.21) argue that, as a 
result of feminist and post-structuralist rejection of positivist positions on objectivity, the 
subjectivity of the researcher must be regarded as an intrinsic aspect ofteminist research. 
This is because the social identity and position of the researcher can profoundly impact the 
production of knowledge and underpins all aspects of the research including priorities, 
experiences and interpretations. Mason (1995, p.21) explains it is therefore "not unusual for 
feminist researchers to refer to their own positionality, include their own experience, or to 
acknowledge their position on various theoretical aspects of the research". The feminist 
ethics governing this research, particularly those grounded in feminist post-structuralism 
require self-reflexivity, constant reflection and the visibility and acknowledgement of the 
researcher in the research process. It is therefore important to briefly articulate my own 
identity. 
As a woman and a feminist I am sensitised to the issue of male violence against women 
and the feminist recognition of the role of violence in gender relations. This sensitivity arises 
from the lived reality of all women's lives where managing the dangers, risks and 
consequences of oppression and male violence is an integral part of being a woman in a 
patriarchal society regardless of individual experiences of violence. In the hierarchal 
relationships that characterise patriarchal societies, my identity as a woman is one of 
disadvantage compared to men. Various other aspects of my identity, however, such as 
class, heterosexuality, whiteness, education, physical ability and so on also afford me 
privileges within this hierarchy and I believe it is important to utilise my position of relative 
privilege to challenge the existing dominant social order and the inequalities on which it is 
based. 
As a social worker, my professional experiences have mainly been in counselling, service 
development, community development, and policy positions responding to male violence 
against women. Before becoming a social worker, I also worked in women and children's 
domestic violence refuges. Although I have made few references to social work theory or 
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practice in this thesis, my identity as a social worker with these experiences subtly and 
implicitly underpins much of this thesis. This includes key considerations such as the choice 
of topic, my feminist positioning, and the intent of my research. 
Beyond this acknowledgement of my identity, the nature of this thesis and its focus on 
social policy, policy process, and politics, makes the explicit recognition of self and use of 
reflexivity and reflection difficult. Although therefore not explicitly reflected in the thesis, a 
number of important concepts and practices underpinned my empirical data collection, 
analysis and the composition of this thesis. These included: acknowledging my own values 
and biases including those arising from my political and professional allegiances and 
challenging these throughout the process; judging myself and the progression of the 
research against the values of the feminist political project; using first person at times to 
locate myself in the research process; and being open to reflecting on findings and 
changing not just the content but also the nature and structure of the research project in 
response. 
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Chapter Two 
Contemporary Feminist Understandings of 
Male Violence Against Women 
Male violence against women is a significant social issue which has been the subject of 
extensive feminist activism. This chapter provides an overview of feminist theories of male 
violence against women. The chapter starts with an outline of feminism and feminist 
understandings of male violence against women. The chapter then explores some feminist 
perspectives on the intersectionality of race, sexuality and other aspects of identity in 
understanding male violence against women before also exploring the concept of 
hegemonic masculinity. The concepts explored in this chapter are valuable for making 
sense of findings from the empirical study and offer a theoretical foundation to develop new 
ways of understanding the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against 
women. 
2.1 Feminism 
Feminism has played a significant role defining, theorising and responding to male violence 
against women (Mikhailovich, 1998; Phillips, 2008a). Feminism is not a monolithic or unified 
theory or political perspective and is often grouped into categories such as: liberal; radical; 
socialist; black; ecofeminism; cultural; political; lesbian; psychoanalytic; academic; post-
modern; post-structural; and Foucauldian (Mason, 2002, p.119; Phillips, 2008a, p.58). 
These categories represent ideal types, however, and often overlap in practice despite 
some tensions between them. The feminisms most drawn upon for this thesis are radical, 
liberal and post-structural perspectives. This is mainly due to the role of these feminisms in 
particular types of research on male violence against women. That is: feminist responses to 
men's violence in practice have largely been shaped by radical feminists; feminist analysis 
of men's violence at the level of theory are increasingly influenced by post-structuralism; 
and feminist interactions with the state and involvement in social policy tend to emphasise 
both liberal and post-structural feminism (Bailey, 2006, p.2). 
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Common features of feminist practice and research unite the different categories of 
feminism. These include: some theory of gendered power relations; challenges to 
patriarchal 'truths', interest in knowledge and power; and a commitment to improving 
women's lives as individuals and a group through individual interventions, community 
development, policy and research (Finch, 1993; Jupp & Norris, 1993; S. Mason, 1997; 
Mies, 1993; Ramazanoglu, 2002). Although it is important to acknowledge the diversity 
within the different categories of feminism, this thesis refers to feminist understandings of 
male violence against women in a singular manner. This reflects the common features 
characterising feminist theory and my attention to only those feminist approaches that have 
a particular relevance to this thesis. 
There is an extensive and burgeoning feminist literature and research on male violence 
against women which includes differing emphases and perspectives from the diverse 
categories of feminism. What is common to the various feminisms represented in this 
literature is an understanding of male violence against women as an act and choice of 
individual men within a socio-political and cultural context that supports and maintains their 
violence (Morris, 2008, p.43). In this way feminist approaches have generally differed from 
mainstream psychological and psychiatric explanations that attribute violence to the 
psychopathology of individuals using or experiencing violence or their interaction with each 
other (Jasinski, 2001, p.6; Morris, 2008, p.43). The following sections outline a selection of 
feminist literature and understandings of male violence against women of particular 
relevance to this thesis. 
This thesis adopts a theoretical schema to organise understandings of male violence 
against women which adapts Anne Morris' (2008) approach to maternal alienation; a form 
of gender violence she identifies as occurring within families alongside domestic violence 
and sexual abuse. This schema locates male violence against women in·a complex web of 
structural (macro), institutional (mezzo) and individual (micro) factors which interact with, 
and are interdependent on, each other. The interaction of these three levels explains the 
emergence and continuation of male violence against women and a single level cannot be 
conceptualised in isolation from the other two. 
Anne Morris' (2008) approach is particularly useful because it offers a clear and concise 
approach that is specifically relevant to feminist understandings of male violence against 
women. Maternal alienation is a form of male violence against women which "refers to a 
range of tactics used mainly by male perpetrators to deliberately undermine and destroy the 
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relationship between mothers and their children" (Morris, 2008, p.1 ). Morris (2008, pp.2-1 0) 
argues there are substantial connections between micro, organisational and macro 
processes, practices, beliefs and attitudes in maternal alienation. She suggests that 
maternal alienation occurs within families and households (micro) but also has connections 
to the macro social order of the social, cultural and political arenas via practices of 
organisations. Although she focuses on only one form of male violence, Morris' approach 
has been adapted to provide a conceptual schema for this thesis. To adapt this approach I 
first moved Morris' 'micro' category to the middle of the theoretical schema and used the 
term 'institutional' rather than 'organisational' to reflect this change. I also added a new 
micro level that addresses the practices of individual men perpetrating violence against 
women rather than Morris' focus on men's relationships and practices within families. This 
change enables my research to focus on male violence against women generally compared 
with Morris' focus on male violence within families. 
Morris (2008, p.11) refers to Australian social theorist R.W. Connell's notion of a "gender 
order" as related to her theoretical schema. Connell's· (2000) "gender order" provides a 
comprehensive model for undertaking gender analysis that examines the overall gendered 
structures and patterns within societies. Her approach provides a significant theoretical and 
conceptual basi·s for feminist policy analysis. Although Morris' specific focus on male 
violence against women makes her approach more appropriate to adapt for this thesis, 
Connell's "gender order'' nevertheless provides some useful concepts relevant to my 
theoretical schema. Compared to the "gender order", in my schema: the macro level 
equates to Connell's "power relations"; the mezzo level equates to her ·:productive relations" 
(gendered divisions of labour); and the micro level equates to her "emotional relations" 
(interpersonal relations). Instead of Connell's fourth feature in the "gender order'', 
"symbolism", I use Carol Bacchi's (1999b) term "representation". Significantly, rather than 
including it directly in my theoretical schema, I use "representation" as an overarching 
concept to help analyse and make sense of the Howard Government's approaches to male 
violence against women. 
2.2 Feminist Understandings of Patriarchy (rhacro) 
Many feminists argue that male violence against women is located within a gendered 
system of patriarchal power relations. Patriarchy is "an 'umbrella' term for describing men's 
systemic dominance of women" and "institutionalised male power" (Bellman, 2005, p.23), 
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Men's subjugation of women in this social system is historically rooted in political, 
educational, economic, religious, familial, medical, legal and social institutions as well as 
being contemporarily reinforced (Bellman, 2005, p.268; Cameron, 1990, p.13). Patriarchy is 
not ahistorical, however, and 'there has been significant movement towards lessening 
gender inequality in western countries over the past century (Bellman, 2005, p.119). 
Within the system of patriarchal power relations, men and masculinities theorists argue all 
men do not benefit equally since dominant men use hierarchical social power and violence 
to establish the "pecking order" amongst men and control non-dominant men as well as 
women (Bellman, 2005, pp.23). Bellman (2005, pp.23), for example, argues men who do 
not conform to hegemonic masculinity and the dominant discourse (e.g. gay or effeminate 
men) pay a considerable price and are often targets of violence, ostracised or otherwise 
punished in the structure of patriarchal relations. 
A structural model of patriarchal power provides a feminist conceptual framework for 
understanding male violence against women. Feminist research suggests this violence 
reflects "long-standing problems of massive cross-national proportions, intricately linked to 
each other through culturally specific patterns of female subjugation and male hegemony" 
(Mason, 2002, p.38). The use and threat of force is thus located within broader regimes of 
gender inequality including between individual men and women and within families. In these 
regimes of inequality, feminists argue, violence reflects and reinforces the oppression, 
exploitation and subordination of women (Flood, 2002, p.2; Hanmer, 1996, p.7; Mason, 
2002, p.38; Murray, 2005, p.29; Patton, 2004, p.299; Shea Hart, 2006, p.77). 
Feminists argue that male violence against women is therefore "a 'men-thing', evidenced 
empirically as what normal, ordinary men do routinely on a very substantial scale because 
they want to, because they think they have the right to, and because nothing effective is 
done to stop them" (ltzin, 2000, p.378). Further, they argue hegemonic masculinity and 
androcentrism encourage men to dominate those less valued, disempowered, weaker or 
more vulnerable than themselves to maintain the patriarchal order (Bellman, 2005, p.288; 
Radford & Stanko, 1996, p.65; Shea Hart, 2006, p.83). Male violence against women is one 
expression of this dynamic. This understanding links different types of male violence 
against women such as sexual assault and .domestic violence in a common purpose to 
control, dominate and express authority and power over women (Hanmer, 1996, p.8). It 
suggests that although the precise behaviours may vary, there are substantial links 
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between different forms of male violence against women including domestic violence, rape, 
sexual assault, pornography, and child sexual assault. 
Within this understanding, male violence against women is an instrument of gendered 
power and social control maintaining male dominance and female subordination regardless 
of individual experiences of this violence (Phillips, 2004; Russo, Koss, & Goodman, 1995, 
p.125; Yllo, 1993, p.54) . The threat and reality of male violence against women in 
patriarchal societies oppress all women and restricts their psychic and physical freedom 
regardless of individual experiences of violence. As Gail Mason (2000, p.76} argues, 
women's awareness of their vulnerability to men's violence, particularly rape and sexual 
assault, shape their perceptions and practices of personal safety. Similarly, Jill Radford and 
Elizabeth Stanko (1996, pp.72-78) argue: 
... men's sexual violence is part of the backdrop of all women's lives and not something 
experienced by a minority who can be labelled as inadequate and helpless victims. Managing 
sexual danger is an integral part of being female ... far from being an aberrant experience in 
our lives or the experience of aberrant women, [violence] is in fact the backdrop against which 
women's lives are lived. We have come to see male sexual violence as one of the defining 
characteristics of patriarchal societies. 
Feminists also argue that patriarchal discourses justify women's disadvantages and shift 
blame and responsibility for violence from the perpetrator to the victim (Shea Hart, 2006, 
p.78). These patriarchal narratives minimise the extent or harm of violence, obscure men's 
responsibility, and may construct perpetrators as 'victims' of the system or of women's 
'equal' violence. 
The experiences of male victims of sexual assault illustrate how this violence is gendered at 
a structural level beyond the individual gender of the perpetrator or victim. Terry Gillespie, 
who analysed the experiences of male victims of sexual assault, argues: 
... men who have been sexually assaulted by other men claim that one of the most traumatizing 
effects of rape is feminization ... For women to be raped by men is deemed 'normal' while for 
men it is abnormal, an experience which 'feminizes' men, and one which is viewed as 
somehow more shocking and horrifying ... . It is men who are raping women and men. So a 
rape victim is not merely a victim; a victim of sexual assault, whether male or female, is a 
victim of the gendered power relations between women and men, acted out in everyday life 
(Gillespie, 1996, pp.160-162). 
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Similarly, Chris Atmore (1999, pp.197-198) argues rape is a masculinizing act for the rapist 
and a feminizing act for the victim regardless of the gender of victim or perpetrator: 
... we are not surprised when a man. who has been raped attributes some of the trauma to 
being "made to feel like a woman", while it is highly unlikely that a female rape survivor would 
describe her experience in "opposite gender" terms. Rape is something that involves and even 
creates gender, independent of, or at least partly autonomous from, the bodies of the rapist 
and raped. 
These arguments suggest male violence against women is gendered at a-structural level. 
They acknowledge the complex relationship between gender, power and violence, and the 
fundamental role of gender and inequality in shaping the exercise of power in society. 
2.3 The Patriarchal Institutions Underpinning Violence (mezzo) 
2.3.1 The State 
At the institutional (mezzo) level, feminists have argued that the modern western state is a 
gendered and patriarchal one that entrenches male power and privilege in a system of 
hierarchies over·women and some men (Franzway, Court, & Connell, 1989; MacKinnon, 
1989a; Pateman, 1988, 1989). Feminists may argue either that the state is an agent of 
p_atriarchy and operates in the interests of men or the state is itself a core part of patriarchy 
and oppressor of women (Franzway et al., 1989, pp.27-28). Suzanne Franzway and her 
colleagues argued that the state compromises a complex set of institutions and 
organisations rather than unified body. Yet, Franzway (1989, p.1 0) and her colleagues also 
describe multiple connections between the state, patriarchy and gender order: 
These connections appear in the basic constitution of the realm of the state; in the composition 
of the controllers of the state apparatus; in the staffing of the state machinery and in its internal 
organisation; in what the state does, who it impinges upon and how. Clearly, the state is deeply 
implicated in the overall social advantaging of men and subordination of women. The evidence 
reveals not just a sexual division of labour but, more decisive, men's greater access .to power 
through the state. 
There is a large, complex body of literature exploring feminist theories of the state (e.g. 
Franzway et al., 1989; MacKinnon, 1989a; Pateman, 1988, 1989; Sawer, 1993; Yeatman, 
1994). The way feminists argue the state creates and reinforces a public I private dichotomy 
is, however, of particular relevance to this thesis. 
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Feminists argue the state excludes women from citizenship by constructing a distinction 
between the public as a regulated space and the private as an unregulated space free from 
state interference. According to Carole Pateman ( 1989, p.3), in classical social contract 
theory philosophers argue that citizens of a polity entered a social contract where they gave 
up certain rights and freedoms under the governance of law and social norms to obtain the 
benefits and protection of society. She criticised such theories, however, as based on the 
assumption that the subject in this social contract exists within the spheres of economy and 
state and not in the realm of domestic, familial and sexual relationships. That is, according 
to Pateman, the 'abstract liberal individual' who freely enters contracts· is inherently a 
masculine individual and women are only admitted to the public sphere only insofar as they 
are capable of emulating masculine ways of being. Pateman (1988) also argues the other 
side of the social contract is a "sexual contract" for men who have agreed to regulation in 
the public sphere to ensure their orderly access to women's sexual and domestic labour in 
the private sphere without state interference. The modern state facilitates this "sexual 
contract" by its adherence to the public/private dichotomy and the concept of the negative 
state where it presumes governments best promote freedom when they stay out of existing 
private social arrangements (MacKinnon, 1989b, pp.161-165). 
This perspective of the state is extremely important to feminist understandings of male 
violence against women since this violence predominantly occurs within the private sphere. 
Historically, feminists argue the state's separation of public and private has shielded male 
violence against women from government interference. As Catharine MacKinnon (1989a, 
pp.193-194) argued: 
Through this perspective the legal concept of privacy can and has shielded the place of 
battery, marital rapes, and women's exploited domestic labor [sic]. It has preserved the central 
institutions whereby women are deprived of identity, autonomy, control, and self-definition. It 
has protected a primary activity through which male supremacy is expressed and enforced . 
... It polices the division between public and private, a very material division that keeps the 
private beyond public redress and depoliticizes women's subjection within it. 
A substantial focus of feminist activism has thus been to challenge the public/private 
dichotomy maintained by the state. This explains the importance of the feminist catch-cry 
"the personal is political" in feminist activism. In the context of male violence against 
women, this feminist activism has focused on naming and publicising women's experiences 
of domestic violence and sexual assault and demanding state intervention to stop this 
violence (Morris, 2008, p.47). 
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These feminist understandings of the important role of the state in creating and maintaining 
women's subordination to men has generated significant questions amongst feminists about 
the role of the state in responding to male violence against women. MacKinnon {1989a, 
p.161 ), for example, asks: "Can such a state be made to serve the interests of those upon 
whose powerlessness its power is erected?". Similarly, Anna Yeatman (1994) argues the 
state can work to both ameliorate and compound the stresses of women's lives which arise 
out of their exploitation by men. She continues that the state conferring rights on women is 
both a paradox and liability: 
This is a paradox because this very benevolence of the State - its protective power in respect 
of women - indicates that it is a corporate patriarch willing to sanction the uncivilised 
behaviours of individual patriarchs. It is a liability, because what is given by the State can not 
be just taken away but given in ways which underwrite the social dependency of women rather 
than empower them to operate out of their own capacities. Hardly any right women 'enjoy' is 
unalloyed in this way. For example, the State's 'protection' of women in policies and programs 
which work against domestic violence do not effectively redistribute gender power in society 
but merely give the State further power to harass the men it has already type-cast as those 
most likely to engage in such uncivilised behaviours (Yeatman, 1994, p.187). 
This complex /relationship between feminism and the state and revisions to this 
understanding particularly offered by post-structural feminists is fundamental to this thesis 
and addressed further in the feminist interactions with the state and critiques of public policy 
outlined in Chapter Three. 
2.3.2 Traditional family and heterosexuality 
Some feminists argue the state has facilitated and condoned patriarchal oppression, 
including men's violence against women, by creating and reinforcing a public/private 
dichotomy. Feminists also contend that this dichotomy, which has allowed men to 
perpetrate violence against women with relative impunity, has largely operated in the 
interests of particular types of men. These feminists claim the state has historically 
intervened in the private sphere and regulated particular types of families including 
Aboriginal, poor or working-class, gay and lesbian, single-parent, and migrant families 
(Bacchi, 1999b, pp.166-169; Ferraro, 1996; Laing, 2008, p.74; Morris, 2008, pp.47-48). 
Further, while the state's public/private .dichotomy masks how government policies shape 
relations between men and women, the rise of nee-liberalism in western democracies has 
also made the distinction between public and private increasingly unclear (Hearn & McKie, 
24 
Chapter 2: Contemporary Feminist Understandings of Male Violence Against Women 
2008, p.81; Morris, 2008, p.46). Traditional family and heterosexuality are two key related 
social institutions supported and promoted by the state in the private sphere. For many 
feminists, traditional family and heterosexuality are significant social institutions that 
reproduce the patriarchal gender order, women's inequality and male violence against 
women. 
Many feminists consider the patriarchal family symbolic of patriarchal authority, inequality 
and deference of women to men (Bellman, 2005, p.287). This dominant patriarchal model 
of family retains strict gender roles for women as nurturers of their male partners and 
children while men are primary protectors and providers (Ruthchild, 1997, p.4). This model 
of family promotes a discourse of men's ownership of women and the related patriarchal 
assumptions that men protect, correct, control ·and dominate women in relationships 
(Bellman, 2005, p.287). In her cross-cultural analyses of domestic violence, Jalna Hanmer 
{1996) found this was the most common feature constituting the framework fully or partially 
legitimating violence against women. She argues "the boundaries that specify correct family 
behaviour for women are not those that bind men to society and cultures, however diverse 
cultures may be in other ways" (Hanmer, 1996, p.11 ). Similarly, Radford and Stanko (1996, 
p. 78) argue: 
The family, and the institution of heterosexuality which underpins it, is a central institution in 
patriarchal society, one in which private struggles around patriarchal power relations are 
enacted, and hence one in which violence frequently features as a form of control of the 
powerless by the powerful. 
This comment also raises the important complementarity of heterosexuality in power 
relations which enable and authorise male violence against women. 
Most conceptual frameworks theorising human relations rely implicitly upon naturalised 
heterosexuality institutionalised as stable, universal and monolithic heterosexual forms of 
family structure and identity (Richardson, 1996, p.2). Some feminists argue family is a 
hegemonic social and political institution which endorses compulsory heterosexuality and 
multiple levels of violence against women (Bailey, 2006, p.34). Critiques of heterosexuality 
as a hegemonic institution by feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon (1989a), Susan 
Brownmiller (1975) and Andrea Dworkin (1997), have been central to feminist analyses of 
male violence against women. These feminists argue the widespread use and threat of 
force/violence "is a key strategy in maintaining women's participation in heterosexual 
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relationships" (Atmore, 1999, p.198). Further, those women perceived as outside of 
dominant heterosexuality such as lesbian women are especially vulnerable to men's sexual 
violence, abuse and harassment inside and outside of the family (Radford & Stanko, 1996, 
p. 78). Hegemonic heterosexuality is therefore crucial to understanding male violence 
against heterosexual and lesbian women (Mason, 1995, p.56) since feminists argue this 
violence acts as a social control mechanism .whether women are in traditional heterosexual 
family structures or outside them. 
Gail Mason (1995) critiques feminist analyses of male violence against women for 
neglecting lesbian experiences. Mason (1995, p.62) argues these analyses reflect an 
assumption of heterosexuality that does not incorporate lesbian experiences of rape and 
domestic violence. She argues that analyses of yiolence theorising only men's subjugation 
of women ignore the ways heterosexism operates to subjugate homosexual men (Mason, 
1995, p.64). Research on gay and lesbian experiences of violence, particularly by Mason 
(1997; 2000; 2002}, thus demonstrates the complex interplay of patriarchy, hegemonic 
masculinity, hegemonic heterosexuality and heteronormativity. Researchers on homophobic 
violence explore how violence is used to maintain social control and police the borders and 
boundaries of a particular patriarchal and heteronormative social order (Mason, 2002, p.46; 
Ruthchild, 1997, p.4; Tomsen & Mason, 1997). They also discuss the way social policy is 
an instrument of disciplinary power; normalising and enacting heterosexuality as the natural 
and acceptable form of sexuality against which others are judged (Carabine, 1996, p.73). 
Mason's work provides useful insights on the interplay and construction of difference. It 
shows that despite the historical tendency to bring together gay and lesbian experiences of 
violence within the conceptual framework of homophobic violence, there are many 
commonalities between lesbian and heterosexual women's experiences of violence. 
Lesbian experiences of violence therefore offer a challenge to conventional thinking and an 
opportunity to consider and extend understandings of power, control, heterosexual 
. dominance, homophobia and social constructions of gender and sexuality (Bagshaw & 
Chung, 2000, p.12). This suggests that it is appropriate to theorise lesbian experiences of 
violence within the broader context of male violence against women in a way that 
consciously includes lesbians rather than assimilating them and assuming equivalence with 
heterosexual women. Taken together, the feminist arguments explored above thus suggest 
that institutions such as the state, traditional family and heterosexuality entrench male 
power and privilege over women in a way that enables and facilitates male violence against 
women. 
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2.4 The Personal is Political (micro) 
At the individual (micro) level, some feminists argue that male violence against women is a 
choice made by individual men and used in a way that is intentional, strategic, controlled, 
and intended to dominate and control a woman. Breaking the silence, consciousness· 
raising groups, naming strategies and giving voice to women's experiences of violence as 
well as tracing the dimensions and characteristics of this violence have been a significant 
part of feminist activism (Breckenridge, 1999; Kelly, 1996b; Morris, 2008, p.41). Further, 
much knowledge about men's individual use of violence and the strategies they use against 
victims has been obtained from research directly with abusive men and comparisons 
between their reports of their violence and those of their victims (Bagshaw & Chung, 2000; 
James, 1999; Laing, 1996, 2002; Morris, 2008, p.71). Consequently, there is an extensive 
body of feminist literature delineating the nature of male violence against women at the 
individual (micro) level. Of particular interest is research highlighting the way individual male 
perpetrators strategically draw upon patriarchal narratives to: minimise their violence and 
invalidate their victims' experience of the violence; shift responsibility for their violence onto 
their victims; and construct themselves as victims of either the system, the violent 
relationship or the woman's 'equal' violence. 
Male perpetrators of violence against women and their supporters have employed a range 
of strategies to minimise the nature, extent or impact of their violence and invalidate the 
experiences and credibility of their female victims. These include: drawing upon rape and 
domestic violence mythologies about what constitutes 'real' rape or what is a·nd is not 
considered domestic violence'; suggesting some types of violence (e.g. with a weapon, or 
against children, older women or virgins) are more serious or harmful than others; 
minimising their violence as 'not that bad' or as exaggerated or invented; and trivialising 
women's injuries (Doyle & Barbato, 1999; Kelly & Radford, 1996; Morris, 2008, p. 71 ). 
Further, according to Fiona Rummery (1996, p.152), women's "sane, average, even self-
preserving responses to situations of abuse are often used as evidence of their own lack of 
mental health". That is, perpetrators and others including the medical profession often 
invalidate women's experience of male violence by constructing their responses as 
evidence of a mental health impairment of a 'disordered' or 'sick' woman. 
1 Based on these mythologies perpetrators and their supporters tend to assert that 'real' rape is only 
that which occurs in a public place by a stranger and often with a weapon while domestic violence is 
only extreme physical violence. 
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Accompanying the invalidation of women's experiences of male violence are a range of 
strategies that shift responsibility for the man's violence to the woman victimised. Male 
perpetrators draw upon a rich tapestry of mythology which suggests women deserved or 
instigated the violence against them. Thus, perpetrators hold women responsible for the 
violence they committed by arguing the woman brought it on herself by, for example, 
wearing a short skirt; nagging, or not conforming to gendered stereotypes such as the good 
wife, heterosexual woman, or the chaste and non-promiscuous virgin. Perpetrators may 
also strategically utilise some of the early theoretical explanations of male violence, 
particularly from the psychiatry and psychology disciplines; which argue ·the personality 
characteristics and psychopathology of the victim are responsible for the violence (Jasinski, 
2001, pp.B-1 0). Challenges to these strategies by feminists in recent years mean that, while 
they still exist, their deployment to shift responsibility for violence away from individual men 
is much more subtle. 
One way perpetrators subtly invoke these strategies is their use of the passive voice to 
describe their violence (Ehrlich, 2001; Greer, 2007; Lamb, 1991 ). The passive voice, or 
passive language, refers to how a sentence is structured so the subject of a verb is 
undergoing rather than performing an action (Greer, 2007). An example of respective active 
and passive statements are: "In the US a man rapes a woman every 6 minutes" compared 
to "In the US a woman's rape occurs every 6 minutes" (Ehrlich, 2001, p.40). The passive 
V()ice.is often used in media and academic representations of male violence against women 
and realigns the importance and ~gency of subjects and objects within a sentence or can 
make the agent of the action disappear altogether (Greer, 2007, p.251; Lamb, 1991 ). 
Susan Ehrlich (2001) and Sharon Lamb (1991) describe passive representations of men's 
violence against women as the "grammar of non-agency" and "acts without agents" 
respectively. They argue these representations obscure and shift responsibility and blame 
from the actor (the man using the violence) and positions female victims as the problem 
(Ehrlich, 2001; Greer, 2007; Lamb, 1991 ). Ehrlich (2001, p.40) cites research that when the 
passive voice is used to describe cases of violence against women people attribute greater 
causality or responsibility to patients (victims) over agents (perpetrators) and imputed less 
harm to the victim. The use of passive language thus shifts responsibility away from male 
perpetrators to female victims and minimizes the harm caused by male violence against 
women. Further, Ehrlich also argues such passive representations of violence can both 
operationalise and reinforce hegemonic masculinity. 
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Another way perpetrators shift responsibility is by representing violence as 'family 
dysfunction' and thus as a mutual act in a way which creates a "zone of uncertainty" 
(Towns, 2005, p.2). Due to this zone of uncertainty, women are held to be just as 
responsible as men for the man's violence in the relationship (Towns, 2005, p.2). Alison 
Towns (2005, pp.3-4) argues perpetrators often employ mutual responsibility accounts of 
their violence using the language of 'dysfunctional families', 'conflict' or 'relationship 
problems'. She argues these men actively exploit the ambiguity zones of uncertainty create 
about what is violence, who is the perpetrator and who is the victim. For the perpetrator, 
these accounts of their violence and the zones of uncertainty they create are a tactic which 
minimises the nature and harm of their violence and shifts responsibility for their actions 
onto the targets of their violence. 
A final relevant way perpetrators shift responsibility for violence away from themselves is by 
constructing themselves as victims. There are a range of theoretical explanations of male 
violence against women that focus on the personality characteristics and psychopathology 
of male perpetrators. These construct violent men as the victim of some sort of 'problem' 
such as mental illness, a personality disorder, alcoholism, bad parenting, a history of 
violence, the inability to communicate, or physiology or biology (Jasinski, 2001, pp.8-1 0). 
Perpetrators may strategically draw upon these explanations to elicit sympathy from their 
victim or others or to justify and excuse their violence. In recent years, however, this 
construction of perpetrators as victims has been modified and extended particularly by 
members of father's and men's rights groups. These men claim men and women equally 
violent in relationships and represent men as victims of feminist gender bias operating 
through institutions of the state such as family law and sexual assault and domestic 
violence services (Bagshaw & Chung, 2000; Gillespie, 1996; James, 1999; Morris, 2008, 
p.118). In her research on maternal alienation, Morris (2008) describes these as 
displacement strategies and argues that a fundamental aspect of male violence is its 
technique of projection. Morris (2008, pp.80-81) argues this makes it possible for individual 
"perpetrators to masquerade as victims and portray their victims as perpetrators". 
2.5 Feminist Solutions to Male Violence.Against Women 
The feminist understandings of male violence against women at the macro, mezzo and 
micro levels as outlined above are important because they form the basis on which 
feminists propose solutions to male violence. Feminists usually locate their proposals to 
29 
Chapter 2: Contemporary Feminist Understandings of Male Violence Against Women 
respond to male violence against women within understandings of systematic patriarchal 
gendered power relations. Catherine Bettman's (2005) research with male perpetrators of 
domestic violence and anthropological exploration of the Waorani and Iroquois communities 
illustrates this. Bettman argues women's position in a society, rather than the perspective 
towards violence generally, moderates the level of male violence against women. She 
suggests domestic violence was most likely to occur when patriarchal ideology was 
dominant and when it defined women as inferior to men, held women's attributes in 
contempt and devalued women's intrinsic worth. 
This means that societies do not necessarily have to eschew violence totally for domestic 
violence to be absent or infrequent. In societies where egalitarian and respectful attitudes 
towards women are enshrined in discourse, and upheld by social institutions, domestic 
violence will be considered taboo. It seems clear that in Western societies, membership of 
different cultural groups, be they class, ethnic, religious, sporting or otherwise, allows for 
variation in beliefs, attitudes and behaviour but that patriarchal principles of hegemony, 
androcentrism and the consequent subordination of women, are pivotal and all-precedent 
(Bellman, 2005, p.297). 
For many feminists the solution to male violence against women has been to promote 
egalitarianism and challenge male domination and the inequalities between men and 
women in society (Bettman, 2005, p.295; Ferraro, 1996; Patton, 2004, p.299; Phillips, 
2008a, p.65). 
These feminists also believe it is important to attend to the macro, mezzo, and micro levels 
of male violence against women. They argue most responses to male violence target 
individuals at a micro level such as through counselling, men's programs, support groups 
and incarceration which deals with symptoms rather than the cause of violence. Yet, as 
Bettman (2005, p.296) argues: 
Men are socialised into a culture of violence from the top, through the overarching hetero-
patriarchal society and the structures that support it. Individual men then link themselves to the 
ongoing process as they replicate the culture and hand it down to future generations .. The men 
in this study, who spoke of their patterns of violence, of falling back· into their old ways and 
needing to come back to the men's program, are clear evidence of this. For change to take 
place, to be meaningful and long-lasting, it has to occur at both the macro and micro-levels of 
society, for in a circular way, these reproduce and sustain each other. 
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Similarly, pro-feminist men such as Michael Flood (2002) argue there need to be profound 
changes in men's lives to challenge gendered power relations. Flood argues men 
themselves need to take part in this project by challenging their own violent behaviour and 
joining with women to challenge the cultural and institutional underpinnings of this violence 
in their communities (Flood, 2002, p.11 ). 
2.6 lntersectionality and Difference· 
Questions of intersectionality and difference have been a significant issue and cause for 
debate within feminism and are of particular relevance in helping to develop new ways of 
understanding the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women. Gail 
Mason (1995, p.58) argues: 
Much feminist writing locates the source of violence in concepts of patriarchy, misogyny and 
sexism, in analyses of power differentials that focus exclusively on the binary opposition of 
man/woman, masculinity/femininity. Such discourse frequently fails to consider the subjugation 
wrought through racist, ethnocentric or heterosexist (just to name a few) constructions of 
identity and the importance of these in the subjectivity of all women. 
A complex understanding of patriarchy acknowledges that it creates a number of 
hierarchical dichotomies reflecting a superior/inferior relationship in "hierarchical 
constructions of difference" (Mason, 2002, p.63). These include categories such as 
men/women, adult/child, black/white, heterosexual/homosexual, ability/disability, 
wealth/poverty, educated/uneducated and strong/weak. These dichotomies help explain 
why women with different identities have varied experiences and levels of oppression under 
patriarchal social systems. It also explains why this system privileges some women (e.g. 
white heterosexual women) and victimises some men (e.g. black, gay or effeminate men). 
In response to such criticisms, feminists have increasingly embraced the concept of 
intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1991 ). Challenging gender as the primary explanatory model 
for oppression, intersectionality focuses on multiple and interlocking systems of power and 
oppressions based on individual features of identity which intersect and modify each other 
(eg race, class, culture, and disability) (Bettman, 2005, p.B; Crenshaw, 1991). 
lntersectionality is an 'anti-essentialist' tool which assists in the recognition and 
representation of difference "in multiple rather than singular terms; for example, to 
recognise the ways in which difference of gender and race, rather than gender or race, 
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shape certain types of violence" (Mason, 2002, p.59). Some feminists argue that 
intersectionality has made contemporary feminism more inclusive of diversity and difference 
amongst women while still acknowledging male violence against women as a common 
experience grounded in structural circumstances (Atmore, 1999, p.202; Phillips, 2008a, 
p.58). 
Mason (2002), however, rejects the concept of intersectionality to understand the 
relationship between violence and difference since she argues it does notfully encapsulate 
the highly interactive way categories of identity are articulated through each other. Mason 
(2002, p. 77) argues intersectionality makes it difficult to "move beyond an essentialist notion 
of both the subject who enacts, and the subject who experiences, violence". Mason (2002, 
p.77) proposes instead the concept of "mutual constitution" rather than interlocking 
oppressions of race, class, sexuality and various other aspects of identity. Mason's "mutual 
constitution" offers an alternative explanatory framework to represent the way difference is 
articulated through and within each other. In this approach 'the oppositions of sexual 
preference, ethnicity, race and class that are productive of our knowledge of violence must 
be brought to the forefront of feminist commentary" (Mason, 1995, p.66). Mason offers three 
theoretical concepts to do this: the hierarchical construction of difference; territory; and the 
cultural body. 
Mason argues that it is possible for a given incident of violence to be dominated by one 
prejudice or one facet of identity. Yet she also suggests: 
... we need to recognise, on the one hand, that racist, homophobic and gendered violence are 
all undergirded by particular constructions of difference and, on the other hand, that these 
constructions are produced through other forms of specificity that preclude such violence from 
being reduced to a single or universal category (Mason, 2002, p.77) 
She therefore argues that categories of identity such as gender, sexuality and race do not 
simply intersect but are "vehicles of articulation" (Mason, 2002, p.61) for each other. This 
understanding links different kinds of violence (such as racist, homophobic and gendered) 
so that difference provides the rudimentary context distinguishing one form of violence (e.g. 
sexual assault) from the other (e.g. racist violence). Yet difference also provides a broad 
connecting link between these types of violence that pivot on "a sense of superiority and 
concomitant devaluation of the personal integrity of the racial or gendered other" (Mason, 
2002, pp.63-64). From this understanding of the hierarchical construction of difference, 
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Mason encourages connections between types of violence and recognises the 
shortcomings of homogenous formulations based solely on gender, race or sexuality. 
Masons links her concepts of territory and the cultural body to this understanding of the 
hierarchical construction of difference. She adopts the notion of territory, in terms of both its 
material and discursive aspects of diversity and identity, to explain violence. Territory "refers 
to particular locations about which people have a sense of ownership or belonging (as in 
'my' neighbourhood or 'my' nation), and the conceptual categories through which people 
achieve this sense of belonging (as in categories of whiteness, femininity, heterosexuality); 
each is dependent on the other" (Mason, 2002, p.60). Mason argues that since 
constructions of difference grounded in bodily specificities underpin violence, the 
relationship between violence and difference must be an embodied one. In her model of the 
cultural body, she argues violence emerges from the difference between embodied 
constructs rather than any property intrinsic to a particular body. Combining these concepts, 
she continues: 
... violence erupts out of the hierarchical, and visible, relation between bodies, the connections 
and disconnections, the values that this relation attributes to particular bodies, the way that 
some bodies are assumed to be superior to others and so on. This sense of superiority 
requires others to be managed to a certain degree. Violence provides one means of doing this. 
Hence, it is not coincidence that violence is so often patterned by systems of gender, sexuality 
and race. These patterns reflect some of the most normative and value-laden lines of 
difference betw"een human subjects (Mason, 2002, p.77). 
Through these explanatory concepts of hierarchical constructions of difference, territory and 
the cultural body, Mason offers a complex theoretical framework for understanding violence 
that is useful for analysing representations of male violence against women in this thesis. 
These concepts form an important part of the theoretical foundation I use to analyse 
Australia Says No in Chapter Ten and particularly to make sense of the Howard 
Government's complex use of race, heterosexuality, and gender in that campaign. 
2.7 Hegemonic Masculinity 
Hegemonic masculinity is another important concept underpinning the development of new 
ways of understanding the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against 
women in this thesis. Antonio Gramsci's conception of hegemony is the most relevant here. 
Gramsci's hegemony refers to an intrinsically relational and complex social process in which 
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one social group attains social ascendancy over another group through negotiation and the 
subordinate group's consent rather than coercion, domination, or force (Connell, 1987, 
p.184; Demetriou, 2005, p.264; Finkelstein & Goodwin, 2005, p.159; Forgacs, 1988, p.423). 
Gramscian hegemony "did not mean violence, although is could be supported by force; it 
meant ascendancy achieved through culture, institutions, and persuasion" (Connell & 
Messerschmidt, 2005, p.832). This hegemony also refers to a social ascendancy where 
other groups or patterns are subordinated rather than eliminated (Connell, 1987, p.184). 
Hegemonic masculinity is a theoretical concept developed over the last two decades which 
has considerably influenced studies of men, gender, masculinities and gender relations 
(Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p.829). While not strictly a feminist theory, pro-feminist 
men have mainly been responsible for developing this concept. Introduced by Australian 
social theorist Raewyn Connell, hegemonic masculinity has subsequently been used widely 
as a framework for research and debates about men and masculinities and has been 
applied in diverse cultural contexts to a range of practical and theoretical issues (Connell & 
Messerschmidt, 2005, p.834). 
Hegemonic masculinity is the culturally and historically idealized form of masculinity in a 
given setting which ideologically legitimates the global subordination of women to men 
(Connell, 1987, p.185; Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p.832; Messerschmidt, 2005, 
p.198). It is constructed in relation both to women and to subordinated masculinities 
(Connell, 1987, p.186). Although a minority of men enact hegemonic masculinity, it is a 
normative concept requiring all men to position themselves in relation to it and through 
which all men benefit from the "patriarchal dividend" (real social and/or material 
advantages) (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p.832). Hegemonic masculinity also requires 
compliance from women through 'emphasised femininity' (Connell, 1987, pp.183-188). 
Further, hegemonic masculinity is not static in its operation of power since and there may 
be a struggle where older forms of masculinity are replaced by new ones (Connell & 
Messerschmidt, 2005, p.833). Hegemonic masculinity thus offers a dynamic theoretical 
conceptualisation complementary to feminist explorations of operations of gender and 
power. 
In what they describe as their "renovated analysis of hegemonic masculinities" Raewyn 
Connell and James Messerschmidt (2005, pp.847-854) outline aspects of hegemonic 
masculinity. First, they argue hegemonic masculinity may incorporate non-hegemonic 
patterns of masculinity and emphasised femininity into the functioning gender order (Connell 
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& Messerschmidt, 2005, p.848). Second, that gender is always relational and emphasised 
femininity reinforces compliance to patriarchy and contributes to the construction of gender 
amongst men. Third, is the geography of hegemonic masculinity and the importance of 
place and context at three levels: local (families, communities, organisations); regional 
(nation-state); and global (transnational business, media, international relations) (Connell & 
Messerschmidt, 2005, p.849). Finally, they suggest bearers of hegemonic masculinity may 
"actively attempt to modernize gender relations and to reshape masculinities" to maintain 
hegemony in a way that is not necessarily negative (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, 
p.853). 
2.7.1 Transformistic hegemonic masculinity 
In his 'new sociology of hegemonic masculinity' Demetrakis Demetriou's (2005) provides a 
detailed critique of the inconsistencies in Connell's theorisation of hegemonic masculinity. 
Connell and Messerschmidt (2005, pp.844-845) appear to acknowledge Demetriou's 
arguments in their reformulation of hegemonic masculinity and recognition of the potential 
incorporation of subordinate masculinities and emphasised femininities into a functioning 
gender order. Nevertheless, they also dismiss his critique and reconceptualisation of 
hegemonic masculinity as applying only at local (not regional or global) level. 
Demetriou (2005, p.258) argues that dominant concerns in readings of Gramsci's concept 
of hegemony have focussed on the notion of the outcome of 'consent' and the "contextually 
specific and constantly shifting 'force-consent relationship"'. Demetriou (2005, p.275) 
advocates looking to the complexity of the process through which this outcome is achieved 
instead of focussing on outcome alone. Consequently, Demetriou's (2005, pp.257-258) 
focus is Gramsci's understanding of "the process of group formulation; the complexity of 
interest articulation, on relationship constructions, on situated struggles and on the 
contingency of historical situations" as well as the formation of 'historic blocs"'. For 
Demetriou, historic blocs are flexible and formed through internal negotiation with elements 
of subordinated groups appropriated into the historic bloc; particularly those elements 
consistent with the project of domination. Demetriou combines these understandings with 
theoretical tools from social theorists he describes as "Gramsci-inspired" to develop his 
'new sociology of hegemonic masculinity'. These include Judith Butler's 'redeployment' and 
'politics of resignification', Stuart Hall's 'historic bloc' as expressed in his analysis of 
'Thatcherism', Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffee's work on 'socialist strategy' and Honi 
Bhabha's 'translation' and 'hybridity'. 
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Demetriou's reconceptualisation of hegemonic masculinity argues that this is a concept 
where negotiation, manoeuvring, flexibility, concealment, reconfiguration, heterogeneity, 
and unrecognizability are central in a hybrid and internally incoherent historic bloc: 
The collective interests of particular groups of men may be articulated through forms of 
political practice that do not oppose, marginalise and annihilate oppositional interest-based 
groupings (e.g. 'black men' or 'women') but redeploy the effects of their practices (e.g. 'gay 
signifiers or styles'; 'black men's culture') in order to conceal the objective oppositions of 
interests and to ensure their continuity (Demetriou, 2005, p.255). 
Describing this as "dialectical pragmatism", internal negotiation and redeployment it is, for 
Demetriou, not a simple appropriation or absorption of oppositional demands or practices 
into the hegemonic bloc as Connell and Messerschmidt suggest. Rather, it is a 
'transformistic practice' that "produce[s] hybrid, unrecognizable and potentially deceptive 
configurations of social practice" (Demetriou, 2005, p.264). To explain this, Demetriou 
argues that transformistic negotiation is negotiation at the level of political practice 
designed to guarantee that inequalities remain intact by concealing connections between 
interests and the political articulation of social practice designed to guarantee those 
interests. He continues: 
When such an understanding of negotiation is utilised to theorise the formation of 
hegemonic blocs, it becomes possible to grasp the unrecognizability of power and its 
potentially deceptive character: in so far as 'negotiation' is not a simple inclusion/exclusion 
dialectic (a Ia Smith, 1994b: 17) in which an oppressive regime incorporates some 
oppositional elements and marginalizes others but it is a process of hybridization that 
translates the familiar into something new, it is a very deceptive process that transforms 
what appears counter-hegemonic into an instrument of hegemonic domination. 
Negotiation does not 'incorporate' or 'embrace' oppositional elements. It translates them 
into something novel and, in doing so, it 'alienates our political expectations' and the 'very 
forms of our recognition' of domination and resistance (Demetriou, 2005, pp. 262 & 267). 
Thus, Demetriou's 'new sociology of hegemonic masculinity' provides a sophisticated 
reconceptualisation of this concept as a non-oppositional and yet effective strategy 
emphasizing the flexibility, situationality and hybridity of masculine domination. 
Demetriou provides a detailed case study of gay masculinities in western societies and the 
incorporation of these into the hegemonic historic bloc to demonstrate his argument. He 
argues that patriarchy suffered a crisis of legitimacy and identity in western societies from 
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the late 1960s due to women's liberation and the emerging visibility of subordinate 
masculinities (e.g. gay liberation and black men). In answer to this crisis, he argues that 
gay culture and practices which were closer to dominant forms of femininity than 
masculinity, were transformitively redeployed into the hegemonic bloc 'to make the gender 
division of patriarchy less visible and thus win women's consent" (Demetriou, 2005, p.292) 
for continued patriarchal domination. Demetriou (2005, p.289) suggests there was no 
substantial change in gay men's oppositional demands related to their interests or rights 
with appropriation of only those elements of political practice which, ''when translated, could 
prove useful for the legitimation and reproduction of patriarchy". He concludes that the 
reproduction of patriarchy needs not be associated only with white or heterosexual 
masculinities since it is the hybrid and apparently contradictory articulation of hegemonic 
masculinity that enables it to reproduce itself. He continues: 
It is in fact a hybrid masculine bloc that is made up of both straight and gay, both black 
and white elements and practices. Furthermore, whereas in Connell's empirical analysis 
the existence of non-white or non-heterosexual elements in hegemonic masculinity is a 
sign of contradiction and weakness, for me it is precisely its internally diversified and 
hybrid nature that makes the hegemonic bloc dynamic and flexible. It is its constant 
hybridisation, its ·constant appropriation of diverse elements from various masculinities 
that makes ihe hegemonic bloc capable of reconfiguring itself and adapting to the 
specificities of new historical conjunctures (Demetriou, 2005, pp.296-297). 
Thus, Demetriou (2005, p.297) shows how hybridization transformed "what appears to be 
counter-hegemonic and progressive into an instrument of backwardness and patriarchal 
reproduction". Demetriou's 'new sociology of hegemonic masculinity' encouraged me to 
consider how transformistic practice might operate within government policies. It provided 
an important theoretical foundation from which I develop new ways of understanding 
Australian Government responses to male violence against women during the Howard 
years. 
2.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has explored contemporary feminist understandings of male violence against 
women. It has introduced and outlined a number of concepts that form the theoreiical 
foundation for the analysis of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence 
against women in this thesis. First, the chapter has explained the theoretical schema 
adopted for this thesis that locates feminist understandings of male violence against women 
37 
Chapter 2: Contemporaiy Feminist Understandings of Male Violence Against Women 
at structural (macro), institutional (mezzo) and individual (micro) levels. It has also outlined 
the solutions feminists propose to respond to male violence against women that are 
grounded within these understandings. Second, the chapter explored intersectionality and 
difference, hegemonic masculinity and Demetriou's 'new sociology of hegemonic 
masculinity'. These concepts are particularly important because they form the theoretical 
foundation to develop new ways of understanding the Australian Government's responses 
to male violence against women during the Howard years. 
/ 
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Chapter Three 
Australian Social Policy and the Femocrat Strategy 
This thesis examines the Australian Government's women's policy generally and male 
violence against women policy specifically during the Howard years. This chapter explores 
literature from the disciplines of policy studies and political science concerning 
understandings of women's social policy and policy-making processes in Australia. It also 
explores feminist analyses of public policy responses to male violence against women. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical and historical framework to contextualise 
the study in the Australian political and policy context. The chapter starts with a discussion 
exploring Australian feminism and the femocrat strategy. This includes an outline of policy 
activism which js a key concept used in this thesis to help make sense of policy process. 
The chapter 'then explores feminist critiques of government policy responses to male 
violence against women with a particular focus on feminist conceptualisations of policy as 
chivalry and policy as cooption. Finally, the chapter briefly explains why this thesis focuses 
on the Australian Government given the historical responsibility of Australian state 
governments for public policy responses to male violence against women. 
3.1 Australian Feminism and the Femocrat Strategy 
Understanding feminist policy activism and the femocrat strategy is important because of 
the significant role of feminists in Australian governments' responses to male violence 
against women. The term 'femocrat' is an Australian neologism describing feminist women 
entering paid positions in designated women's policy agencies in the bureaucracy 
(Chappell, 2000, p.263; Ford, 2001, p.244; Sawer, 1993, p.1 ). First entering the Australian 
bureaucracy under the Whitlam Labor Goverqment in 1972, Julie Nyland (1998, p.216) 
identifies the 'femocrats' as a notable group of Australian policy activists. Since femocrat 
policy activism played such an important role in government responses to male violence 
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against women and policy activism is an important concept in understanding policy process 
in this thesis, this concept is outlined below before outlining the femocrat strategy. 
3.1.1 Policy activism 
Wendy Weeks (1996, p.12) argues that it is important to grasp "the organisational and inter-
organisational context in which specific policy proposals are developed". Policy machinery 
and the actions of policy actors can impact on the way policy problems are represented and 
the way policies develop. As Mark Considine (1994, p.73) argues, "institutions not only 
provide a regulated structure through which new proposals travel, but confer advantage on 
some approaches and restrict others". The concept of policy activism is therefore a useful 
concept to analyse policy machinery and policy processes. 
Janet Ramsay's (2004) research on domestic violence policy making by the Commonwealth 
and NSW State Governments between 1970 and 1985 offers an important background for 
this thesis. Ramsay's research focuses on four key themes through which she identifies 
patterns of domestic violence policy process. Her first theme, the importance of policy 
activism, is particularly relevant. According to Ramsay (2004, pp.212-213): 
As the study proceeded, further reasons for the greater suitability of the policy activism 
approach also became evident. These included the-spontaneity of the initial feminist lead into 
domestic violence activism and then policy, the arrival of the issue in the policy context before 
the development of a representational analysis or even a name, and the continuing 
spontaneous pragmatism of the strategies which followed. It can be added that the more 
traditional policy process approaches also have difficulty in placing a process which moves 
with equal fluidity across the political boundaries of changing governments, and the 
constitutional limits of distinct, in this case Commonwealth and state, government jurisdictions. 
Ramsay thus argues that traditional, rationalist or structural policy cycle or framework 
models of understanding policy processes are inadequate in explaining the development of 
Australian policy responses to domestic violence. 
Ramsay also identifies the following distinctive and determining features of domestic 
violence policy process as a narrative of policy activism during her period of study: 
... the roles and identities of, and the relationships between, the players driving the process; the 
lack of contest from established professionals in the field in the early stages of the insertion of 
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domestic violence into the policy arena; and ... the unique role and position of the refuge 
movement and refuge feminists in the process (Ramsay, 2004, p.2t 3). 
In sharing a similar subject matter and concern with developing policy across 
commonwealth and state jurisdictions, Ramsay's conclusions are significant. Her work 
indicates the potential value of policy activism to make sense of emerging themes around 
policy process from this study's interview data. It also raises the question of what relevance 
her conclusions would have, and what changes might be apparent, when applied to the 
later period of study in this thesis (1996-2007). Ramsay's research therefore offers both an 
historical background and important framing concept in policy activism. 
Anna Yeatman's (1998) description of 'policy activism' was adopted for this thesis. Yeatman 
(1998) argues policy is a contested process where the agency of individual actors, the 
impact of institutional structures and policy machinery, and the role of discourse all play a 
role shaping policy. For Yeatman, activism is political action wed to participatory 
conceptions of democracy that displace paternalistic models where some sort of 
professional elite (e.g. a politician, bureaucrat or service-deliverer) makes decisions on 
behalf of subjects to their authority. Yeatman's (1998, pp.34-35) definition of a policy activist 
is therefore anyone who champions a conception. of policy which opens up the process to 
all those who are involved in the "conception, operational formulation, implementation, 
delivery on the ground, consumption and evaluation" of a given policy. 
Adding to Yeatman's understanding of policy activism, Deborah Brennan (1998, p.81 & 
1 03) contends that "not all lobbying or pressure group activity is policy activism". She 
argues policy activism "is distinguished by the 'insider' status attained by those involved in it 
and by their efforts to transform fundamental assumptions and practices of the dominant 
policy agenda" (Brennan, 1998, p.103). Brennan (1998, p.103) suggests activism can be 
grounded in the promotion of new ideas or resistance to change. These observations are 
important in undermining common associations between policy activism and progressive 
social movements. Further, Julie Nyland (1998, p.217) and Paul Dugdale (1998) argue that 
policy activists tend to observe fluid boundaries and rely on informal networks··across 
government agencies and with outsiders that enable them to step out of the confinement of 
traditional roles of 'bureaucrat' and 'community activist' to achieve desired reform goals. 
Nyland (1998, p.233) also notes the impact of context and argues that on entering the 
public sector, policy activists became "increasingly conformist with the requirements of 
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public sector management" and risk becoming policy elites and '1he guardians of the new 
dominant agenda" once their authority over the policy process is established. 
Significantly for this thesis, Dugdale (1998, p.1 07) notes that policy activists risk sacrificing 
bureaucratic advancement to activist commitments and/or may be constrained in their 
activism due to their position as a bureaucrat or member of an NGO receiving government 
funding. He suggests these constraints determine the division between insider policy 
activists and community-based activists (Dugdale, 1998, p.111 ). Dugdale (1998, p.119) also 
explores cooption: 
For activists who are inside government, it is important to be seen to be trying to promote the 
organisation and its mission, in order to gain a better reception for their ideas by other people 
in the organisation. It may also enhance their capacity to deploy the organisation's processes 
for policy and strategic planning. Such deep insider work may seem to drown policy activism 
within the demands of organisational loyalty- a classic case of 'co-option'. But this perspective 
denies the possibility of ethical co-operation, and refuses to appreciate that what is being 
promoted by the activist can give a legitimate advantage to the institution. 
Dugdale (1998, p.120) suggests the importance of security and structural location for policy 
activists where working with the organisation is central to pursuing the activist's cause. He 
also highlights the inherent tension for policy activists who "straddle the divide" between the 
bureaucracy which requires an "immanent, pragmatic ethics" (Dugdale, 1998, p.121) to 
identify and seize opportunities within both contexts. 
3.1.2 The femocrat strategy 
As mentioned above, the Australian femocrats were a notable group of policy activists who 
straddled this divide between the bureaucracy and the community; particularly feminists or 
the women's movement. To advance their goals, the femocrats developed an innovative 
model of governance, labelled the 'hub and spokes' model, addressing gender and 
accountability throughout government and key issues of concern to women such as male 
violence (Sawer in Chappell, 2002b, p.87; Eistenstein, 1996; Sawer, 1999). At the federal 
level this model consisted of a centralised women's coordinating unit, the Office of the 
Status of Women (or similar) in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (the hub) and 
a network of departmental women's policy units (the spokes). Sawer (1999, p.40) lists 
defining characteristics of the femocrat model as: the location of the central unit in the chief 
policy coordination agency; the Prime Minister taking port1olio responsibility, assisted by a 
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woman Cabinet Minister; focal points in other government agencies; clear separation of 
women's and equal employment opportunity policy; gender audits of Cabinet submissions 
and Budget outlays; reinforcement of bureaucratic monitoring by a parliamentary party 
committee; funding women's advocacy groups and women's services; community 
representation on policy advisory bodies; and use of intergovernmental bodies to share best 
practice. 
The femocrat strategy was a unique model of policy machinery since it was developed by 
the women's movement rather than the government or bureaucracy (Sawer, 1999). This 
model, and descriptions of the femocrats as "inside agitators" (Eistenstein, 1996) and 
"watchers within" (Sawer, 1999), illustrate their insider policy activism. This strategy and 
willingness of feminists to take policy positions in the bureaucracy to advocate for the 
democratic rights of all women was a hallmark of Australian feminism (Carmody, 1995, 
pp.46-47). 
The successes and challenges of feminist policy activism within the bureaucracy and 
femocrats' work straddling the divide between the bureaucracy and women's movement 
has been well-documented (Carmody, 1995; See for example: Eistenstein, 1996; Franzway 
et al., 1989; Sawer, 1990, 1993, 1999; Sawer & Groves, 1994; Watson, 1990; Yeatman, 
1990). It is therefore not necessary to repeat this history in detail. Significantly, however, 
references to Australian femocrats in this thesis focuses mainly on what Chappell (2002b, 
p.17) calls "majoritarian feminist activists" who are usually white and middle-class since: 
The same political opportunity and constraint structures cannot be assumed for all women in 
any single state; rather, we need to acknowledge that the racial aspects of the state have 
meant that women from different backgrounds have faced different opportunities and 
constraints. The Anglo-majoritarian feminist movements ... have been in a relatively privileged 
position compared to their Aboriginal and non-Anglo contemporaries vis-a-vis political 
institutions. 
This thesis therefore does not cover all feminist engagement with the state and any 
generalisations mainly apply to Australian majoritarian feminist activists and femocrats. 
The activities of femocrats sparked strenuous debate in the Australian feminist movement 
about whether feminists working inside the state would be coopted or compromise feminist 
demands (Goodwin, 1999, p.52; Nyland, 1998, p.216). Many Australian feminists took a 
relatively hostile position to the state early on and advocated separatism and the 
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destruction of state structures instead of insider activism (Chappell, 2002b, p.23). They 
argued feminists would be co-opted and lose their identity and autonomy within the 
patriarchal structures of the state (Ryan, 1990, p.81 ). The Australian feminist literature of 
the 1970s, 1980s and, to a lesser extent, 1990s is dominated by this question of co-option 
(Goodwin, 1999; Sawer, 1993; Watson, 1990). This Australian debate also tapped into 
broader feminist theorising about engagement with the state which is well-documented (see 
for example Chappell, 2002b; Sawer, 1993; Watson, 1990). 
Femocrats therefore walked a "fine line between taking advantage of openings while still 
being accessible and answerable to the concerns of those lobbying from outside" (Chappell, 
2002b, p.85). Femocrat Anne Summers (1986) argued this was not easy since feminists 
were distrusted as missionaries by other bureaucrats and as mandarins by the women's 
movement. Despite this tension, Australian feminists nevertheless centred their lobbying on 
bureaucrats rather than politicians (Eistenstein, 1996, p.200). As femocrat Sara Dowse 
(1984, p.139) recalls: 
What has intrigued me throughout my life as a feminist activist is the fact that, despite my 
philosophical abhorrence of the modern capitalist state, when I want something done I look just 
to that arena. ,My expectations are low but my directions are clear. And despite the claims to 
the cont~ary, so do most of my .feminist sisters. even the most radical among them. 
Ec;hoing Dowse's comments, Roselyn Melville (1998, p.18) argues that despite seeing the 
state as patriarchal and hostile to their purpose, Australian feminists' belief in the primacy of 
state responsibility tended to outweigh these concerns. 
The apparent successes of femocrats and emerging post-modern and Foucauldian 
analyses caused some feminists to reject broad and homogenising designations such as 
"the patriarchal state" or "malestream policy" to describe public institutional processes 
(Goodwin, 1999; Schofield & Goodwin, 2006, p.23). Rosemary Pringle and Sophie Watson 
(1990, p.242), for example, advocate ior the necessity of feminist engagement with the 
state, the inappropriateness of treating the state as a unitary whole, and the subsequent 
redundancy of strategies to "bring it down". Louise Chappell (2002b) rejects conventional 
debates casting the relationships between gender interests and the state in either/or terms 
(inherently patriarchal or beneficial to women's emancipation). Engaging with the structure-
versus-agency debate, Chappell (2002b, pp.3-4) takes a "mid-position that sees the 
interaction between gender interests and the state as dynamic and co-constitutive 
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... [where] agents and structures [are] continuously informing one another". As Toni 
Schofield and Sue Goodwin (2006, p.22) argue: 
... gender dynamics in policy making are not played out in a uniform and generalised way that 
stifles opportunities for resistance and change. Nor, however, are they random and contingent. 
There are various structures of gendered policy-making practice that suggest both possibilities 
for, and obstacles to, the advancement of gender equality in policy making. 
These perspectives challenge views of the state as inherently patriarchal and suggest state 
institutions are instead culturally marked as masculine and operate ''largely as the 
institutionalisation of the power of men" (Franzway et al., 1989, p.41 ). This perspective 
offers a framework to understand the value of feminist interactions with the state and 
exposes possibilities and opportunities for resistance and change. 
These more complicated analyses of state power have opened up an understanding of the 
state "as a site of struggle between different interests, including feminist interests" 
(Goodwin, 1999, p.54). Goodwin (1999, p.SO) thus suggests: 
... analyses of women's policy machinery should focus on the way that ideas about what 
women's interests are and how they should be addressed through policy are produced, 
negotiated, refracted and transformed in the interactions that occur within specific 
organisational locales at specific points in time ... These shifts have widened the gaze of 
feminist political analyses to hitherto neglected sites of political interaction and policy 
production. 
In these. more complicated analyses, the state has become "conceptualised as the site of 
competing discourses" (Carmody, 1995, p.47). These feminist perspectives are consistent 
with the policy as discourse understanding adopted for this thesis discussed later in this 
chapter since it is through "discursive strategies" in policy and the policy process that 
"interests come to be constructed and represented in certain ways" (Pringle & Watson, 
1990, p.230). As the key problematic dominating contemporary feminist political analyses, 
this theorising of the complex relationship between feminism and the state also underpins 
this thesis. It provides a theoretical framework to acknowledge and explain the resistance, 
activism and localised successes of feminists operating within the state including the 
apparent successes of the femocrats in progressing male violence against women policy 
during the Howard years. 
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3.2 Political Opportunity Structures and Intergovernmental Cooperation 
The femocrat strategy and its successful engagement imprinting feminist demands on the 
state is a distinguishing feature of Australian feminism (Chappell, 2002b; Eistenstein, 1996; 
Goodwin, 1999; Sawer, 1993, 1999; 1990; Yeatman, 1990). This success is particularly 
notable concerning male violence against women since Australian governments have been 
responsive to feminist demands for government action (McGregor and Hopkins 1991 in 
Weeks, 1994, p.3; Weeks & Gilmore, 1996). 
Chappell offers the useful ·concept of political opportunity structures (POS) to explain 
Australian feminist engagements with the state: POS are the "consistent - but not 
necessarily permanent - dimensions of the political environment that provide incentive for 
collective action by affecting people's expectations for success or failure" (Tarrow, 1998, 
p. 77) . POS for Chappell refer to how policy actors take advantage of existing opportunities 
and create new ones and she argues both ideology and political institutions are central in 
shaping feminist POS. Australian bureaucratic norms and Australian institutional structures 
including political parties and federalism were, for Chappell (2000; 2002a), POS that 
strongly influenced the development of the femocrat strategy. Sawer (1993, p.2), who 
similarly anribu\.es femocrat successes to political tradition and political opportunity, adds to 
these features the lack of effective organised opposition. Both authors identify two main 
POS that were particularly relevant and useful to the femocrat strategy. 
The first, "bureaucratic norms" (Chappell) or "political tradition" (Sawer), refers to the 
Australian bureaucratic history, context and political culture. Chappell (2002b, p.6 & p.1 04) 
argues feminists took such a "pro-statist" position because of the unique tolerance for, and 
culture of, advocacy on behalf of sectional interests in the Australian bureaucracy. She 
describes Australia's weak neutrality norms and long-standing traditional of certain social 
groups - such as trade unions, farmers and ex-soldiers - adopting a successful utilitarian 
position towards the bureaucracy to meet their demands (Chappell, 2000, p.265; 2002a, 
p.90). This history sensitised feminists to the potential of the bureaucracy to achieve their 
goals and created a bureaucratic tolerance countering traditional public service neutrality in 
Westminster parliamentary systems (Chappell, 2000, p.265). Sawer (1993) also argues 
Australian political tradition facilitated feminist engagement with the state. As a philosophy 
advocating an .ethical role for the state in advancing social and wage justice, Sawer 
suggests social liberalism in Australian politics was a POS fo·r femocrats. She argues social 
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liberalism provided a sympathetic framework for feminists to empower women through anti-
hierarchical or separatist organisational practices. In particular, was '1he tradition of radical 
social movements looking to governments to meet their demands and the tradition of 
administrative innovation in response to those demands" (Sawer, 1993, p.2). Australian 
political tradition thus offered an important POS for femocrats. 
Chappell and Sawer both refer to a history of political pragmatism and the absence of 
ideological purism amongst Australian radical social movements which was adopted by 
feminists and enabled them to embrace a pragmatic ideological middle-ground (Chappell, 
2002b, p.22; Sawer, 1993, p.3). Through the femocrat strategy feminists "began to blend 
radical theory with reformist strategies in order to develop a pragmatic feminist position in 
relation to the state" (Chappell, 2002b, p.28). These authors thus attribute the successes of 
the Australian women's movement imprinting their demands on government to "the 
pragmatic willingness to settle for half a loaf rather than no bread at all" (Sawer, 1993, p.4 
paraphrasing Summers 1990). 
The second POS, "Australian institutional structures" (Chappell) and "political opportunity" 
(Sawer), refers to the Australian political party system and federalism. Chappell and Sawer 
agree that since tlie Whitlam Labor Government (1972-1975) the ALP has been a 
significant political opportunity structure for feminists at state and federal levels. According 
to Chappell, "femocrats have tended to do better under ALP governments than Liberal 
ones, both in terms of their institutional position and policy influence" (2000, p.263). She 
argues: 
... when in government it [the ALP] has proved to be an important ally for feminists. Most 
important, it has helped to create opportunities for feminists within another key arm of the state 
- the bureaucracy. It has been the interaction between the bureaucracy and the (relatively) 
progressive ALP that has set the groundwork for the Australian 'femocrat' strategy- the central 
inside strategy of the Australian women's movement (Chappell, 2002b, p.28). 
Chappell (2000, p.264) notes, however, that success has not been guaranteed under Labor 
governments and has come at the· cost of the ALP using femocrats to 'sell' its policies to 
Australian women. The importance of the ALP as a POS for the femocrat strategy is also 
identified by other writers including Hester Eisenstein (1990, p.102) and Anna Yeatman 
(1994, p.190). For Yeatman (1990, p.89), the "significance of the party in power for the 
development and tenor of the femocracy cannot be underestimated". Eisenstein (1990, 
p.1 02) does add, however, that "this strategy relies upon a willingness to accept the 
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constraints of what is politically expedient, that is, saleable to the electorate of the Party". 
ALP governments at state and federal levels, nevertheless typically offered a significant 
POS through which feminists where able to advance their agendas. 
Australian federalism is an important part of this second POS. Louise Chappell (2002b, 
p.151) argues "federalism has not been an issue central to Australian feminist discourse". 
For this thesis, however, federalism and the roles and responsibilities of Australian state 
and federal governments provide important insights into the nature of the Howard 
Government's approaches to male violence against women. Federalism in Australia is an 
adapted North American system of government. It facilitated federation in 1901 by providing 
an institutional framework for combining the previously self-governing states and colonies to 
form a new national government (Parkin & Summers, 1996, p.9). Three key features of 
federalism are enshrined in the Australian Constitution: a specified •division of powers 
between Commonwealth and State governments; a Senate as parliamentary house of 
review with equal State representation; and judicial review independent of elected 
government (Parkin & Summers, 1996, pp.9-12). Australian federalism is often referred to 
as 'cooperative federalism' because of the necessity of Australian federal and state 
governments negotiating working relationships in many policy areas. According to Fenna 
(2004, p.171 ), however, this inaccurately describes a relationship as often characterised by 
conflict and coercion as cooperation. Fenna (2004, p.171) argues that tensions within 
federalism have been exacerbated by the increasing centralisation of successive Australian 
federal governments. 
By facilitating a 'dual democracy', Chappell (2002b, p.150) argues Australian federalism 
was an important POS for femocrats to manoeuvre, exploit openings and play off different 
levels of government. This was particularly important when governments were from different 
political parties (Chappell, 2002a, p.93; 2002b, pp.9-1 0). Following the 1975 dismissal of 
the Whitlam Government Chappell (2002b, p.29) and Sawer (1993, p.4) describe how the 
femocrats increasingly turned to progressive state governments and intergovernmental 
arrangements established under Whitlam to progress feminist agendas. They argue this 
was critical to avoid and minimise constraints created by the incoming conservative Fraser 
Government where the femocrat position was more about '"holding the line' than 'breaking 
new ground'" (Chappell, 2002b). Thus, when progress is blocked at the federal level 
femocrats turned to progressive state governments, particularly ALP governments, and their 
femocrat policy machinery (Chappell, 2002b; Sawer, 1993). Progressive state governments 
were important for femocrats because of their "political capacity and willingness (on 
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occasion) to 'go it alone' in a range of policy areas, including abortion, equal employment 
opportunity, domestic violence, sexual assault, and childcare" (Chappell, 2002b, p.163). For 
Chappell and Sawer federalism is thus an important POS underpinning the femocrat 
strategy with its 'dual democracy' enabling feminist activists to shift focus between levels of 
government to progress their agendas. 
Increasing conservatism from governments of both political persuasions, however, presents 
an ongoing challenge for feminists. Following the 1993 re-election of the Keating Labor 
Government, Summers (2003b, p.123) argues "'women' started to be depjcted as an 
annoying lobby group that the ALP ought not to be seen pandering to". Consequently, she 
argues by the 1996 election campaign it seemed ''women had been expunged from Labor's 
political agenda" (Summers, 2003b, p.123). It is thus the conservatism of the government in 
power, not just their political identity, which determines whether they provided a POS or 
constraint to feminists and the femocrat strategy. This is an important observation given the 
ideological shifts in Australian politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During this time 
Australian governments replaced social liberalism with conservative ideologies including a 
radical shift to market liberalism and economic rationalism. This shift included privileging 
economic interests over social goals, dismantling the Australian welfare state, and 
privatising human services (Weeks & Quinn, 2000, p.5; Yeatman, 1994, p.191 ). 
The abdication of the social liberal state in favour of the 'self-regulating' markets of market 
liberalism means that, instead of a state which is responsive at least in part to both male and 
female citizens and instead of public policy at least monitored for gender effects, we will have a 
market society dominated by international economic interests with no accountability to women 
or anyone else (Sawer, 1993, pp.20-21 ). 
This ascendancy of individualism, self-reliance and market (not social) citizenship (Weeks & 
Quinn, 2000, p.5) delegitimised feminism as an acceptable influence on government 
policies and programs (Yeatman, 1994, p.191). It is in this ideological context and shift from 
social to market liberalism that the federal Howard Coalition Government was elected in 
1996. 
This literature on the Australian social policy context and feminist activism provides 
important background for this thesis. Historically, the femocrat strategy was significant for 
feminists in providing the policy machinery to assist them progress policy responses to male 
violence against women. Yet, in more recent feminist work on this issue, Carole Ford (2001, 
pp.245&258) also notes: 
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The pace of conservative 'reform' demands an assertive and sustained response by 
feminists to ensure policy formulation and implementation that is pro-women and does not 
contribute further to regressive gender relations. The femocrats' 'quiet revolution' ... may 
have had some application to the Australian political process in the 1970s and 1980s, but 
how relevant and how potentially successful will it be in the new millennium? 
By responding to Ford's question, this thesis offers a significant new insight into how 
femocrats can work within existing policy machinery when significant POS are thwarted as 
happened under the conservative Howard Government. In particular, this thesis extends the 
literature by exploring the continued salience of the femocrat strategy in the Howard years. 
3.3 Public Policy Responses to Male Violence Against Women 
As illustrated by the above discussion of the femocrat strategy and the political opportunity 
structures exploited by feminists, Australian feminists have a complex relationship with the 
state. This relationship consists of feminists simultaneously distrusting the patriarchal nature 
of the state and its role in male violence against women while demanding the state respond 
to this violence in public policy. Australian governments have been responsive to feminist 
demands for action and have developed a range of public policy responses to male 
violence against women. Two of the ways feminists have criticised and conceptualised 
these public policy responses to male violence against women, as policies of chivalry and 
policies of cooption, are of particular relevance to this thesis. Before exploring these 
feminist conceptualisations of male violence against women policy it is, however, useful first 
to explain public policy as a concept and the policy as discourse understandings of policy 
adopted for this thesis. 
3.3.1 Policy as discourse 
Public policy is commonly defined in the policy studies literature as the action or inaction by 
governments to achieve certain aims or purposes that express their values (Bessant, Watts, 
Dalton, & Smyth, 2006, p.5; Considine, 1994, p.4; Fenna, 2004, p.3; Vromen & Gelber, 
2005, p.123). This thesis adopts Bacchi's {2000) policy as discourse approach and in doing 
so departs from dominant approaches to studying public policy that focus on articulated 
social problems and their policy solutions. Policy as discourse theorists define policy as "a 
set of shifting, diverse and contradictory responses to a spectrum of political interests" 
(Edelman, 1988, p.16). This approach refutes notions of policy making as a rational, morally 
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neutral and value free enterprise by the state (Williams, 2000, p.157). Policy is instead 
recognised as part of a highly contested strategic political process constituting the shape of 
the issues under consideration and imposing constraints on social vision (Bacchi, 1999b, 
p.5; Bessant et al., 2006, p.37; Carmody, 1995, pp.42-43). It is therefore important to 
understand the social and political context in which a particular social policy operates. 
Behind a policy as discourse approach is the premise that governments do not respond to 
'real' or existing social problems that are discovered in the community but rather create or 
give shape to social problems in the solutions offered (Bacchi, 2000, p.48). Social policy is 
thus "a contested process defined as much by the efforts of those involved in making social 
policy to identify or 'construct' social problems as it is about attempts to solve or address 
them" (Bessant et al., 2006, p.37). The representation of a problem is thus crucial to 
subsequent policy development (Bessant et al., 2006, p.38). This approach emphasises the 
role of language and discourse in constructing social problems and setting limits on policies. 
A key focus for policy as discourse analysts is therefore representations of the problem and 
seeking to reveal how discursive constructions of problems make change difficult and 
reinforce the status quo (Bacchi, 2000). 
Consistent with a policy as discourse approach, this research features problematisation and 
deconstruction as a focus of analysis. Modelled on Bacchi (1999b, p.60), this is a starting 
point lor exploring what is not problematised, to draw attention to silences in existing 
political agendas such as power and gender relations, and to expose the impact of problem 
representations on shaping political agendas broadly. Bacchi also warns of the importance 
of investigating the problematic aspects of the framing and construction of social problems 
"because of the way these get picked up and reworked to advance neo-liberal claims" 
(1999a, p.66). This draws attention to the highly political and shifting nature of problem 
representation, the importance of deconstructing and situating problem representations in 
context, and the potential unintended consequences of these representations. 
Understanding policy as discourse is particularly important as a theoretical foundation for 
the case studies of Partnerships and Australia Says No in stage two of the study. 
3.3.2 Policies of chivalry 
Consistent with a policy as discourse approach which perceives policy as a highly 
contested strategic political process, some feminists have criticised government responses 
to male violence against women. Two broad categories of these criticisms are of particular 
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relevance to this thesis. The first category includes conceptualisations of these policies as 
policies of chivalry where some feminists argue that governments provide a highly visible 
and active policy response to male violence against women focussed on "rescuing" and 
"protecting" the victim. Janet Ramsay (2004, p.220) explains: 
The policies· of chivalry focus on rescuing the victim but do little to address the roots of her 
subsequent victimisation or address the roots of her oppression ... Wife battering may be 
providing governments with a convenient, safe and popular way to respond to the demands for 
greater equality for women without seriously tampering with the institutions which perpetuate 
inequality. The high visibility of wife battering policy may be providing a smokescreen for the 
lack of progress in establishing effective programs to guarantee women an equal place in our 
societies. 
Australian feminist Helen L'Orange (1985 cited in Ramsay, 2004, p.221) also argues: "I 
think it was easier to get progress on areas where men felt chivalrous. Domestic violence, 
child sexual assault, rape ... Male politicians felt good about that and felt very unthreatened 
by it". 
Ramsay's research on Australian domestic violence policies suggests that the policies 
during her period of study (1970-1985) may be considered policies of chivalry. For Ramsay 
(2004, p.221 ), a framing dilemma inherent in domestic violence policy during the time she 
studied ·was "that policing and justice system responses are inadequate unless the 
escaping woman has access to an autonomous household". She argues adequate policy 
responses to domestic violence therefore depend on achievement of the entire women's 
policy enterprise that underpin the causes and consequences of men's victimisation of 
women. Policies of chivalry, however, do not address this broader policy enterprise such as 
combating institutional and structural inequality between men and women or facilitating 
women's capacity to establish an "autonomous household" independent of a violent man 
(Ramsay, 2004). Ramsay concludes that policy practitioners during this period had an 
unspoken awareness and tacit care about these issues and the danger of responses being 
policies of chivalry. She argues that this was illustrated by: feminists refraining from making 
emotive use of domestic violence as a publicity driver for the broad women's policy 
enterprise; persistent acknowledgement in policy documents of the life survival needs of 
women escaping violent partners; and the strength of accompanying statements of the 
feminist social construction of domestic violence (Ramsay, 2004). 
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Ann Genovese (2000) briefly explores the concept of policies of chivalry in her discussion 
about the politics of naming and genealogy of 'domestic violence' in Australia. Genovese 
(2000, p.124) locates policies of chivalry within a broader concern with the impact of 
liberalism on the Australian state and she argues: 
... despite the importance, and success, of the feminist refuge movement and the emerging 
femocracy in forging a pathway for domestic violence into 'the public', feminism itself was still 
hamstrung and problematised by a philosophical context imbued with liberalism and 
correlatively (as far as issues like domestic violence were concerned) a chivalrous liberalism, 
capable of misreading the aims of feminism while delivering state support. 
Genovese's link between chivalry and liberalism is important given the prominent role of 
nee-liberalism in the Howard Government as explored in Chapter Four. 
Related to the conceptualisation of policies of chivalry, Jeff Hearn and Linda McKie (2008) 
argue that policies which focus on rescuing and protecting women as victims create an 
"absent presence" of men in dominant representations of domestic violence in social policy. 
They argue that since men's practices reproducing gender inequality, such as male 
violence against women, are heavily embedded in social, economic and cultural relations, 
governments often equate these with what is considered normal. Although this can take the 
form of governments presenting violence as gender-neutral, even when gender is explicit in 
domestic violence policy they argue the focus is typically policy users (women) rather than 
problem creators (men) (Hearn & McKie, 2008, p.79). Hearn and McKie (2008, p.79) 
propose government policy representations and practices should 'gender men's violence': 
Gendering men's violence entails linking abuse to practices, values and assumptions that are 
widely accepted as normal, i.e. challenging the construction of men in ways that include power 
over and violence towards women .... A broad notion of gendering policy means unpacking 
policy to reveal the dynamics of gender power (and the structures that support these 
dynamics) concealed within, which the policies may reproduce, and refocusing efforts, in 
'policy' and practice, on 'problem creators' (in this case, men) rather than 'policy users'. 
Thus, Hearn and McKie (2008, pp. 76-79), suggest that government policy should locate 
male violence agairist women as a gendered crime that is part of a system of patriarchal 
power relations. They also argue that government policy should therefore require significant 
shifts on the part of all men rather than presuming men's violence in intimate relationships 
is atypical and only concerns identified 'perpetrators'. 
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Although not strictly representing themselves as policy of chivalry conceptualisations, a 
number of authors criticise some Australian approaches to prevention and community 
education in a way that is consistent with these policy of chivalry arguments. These 
criticisms are particularly important given that the community education campaign Australia 
Says No is explored as a case study of the content of the Howard Government's 
approaches to male violence against women in Chapter Ten. According to Moira Carmody 
(2003b, p.202), prevention approaches which focus on protecting women create a totalizing 
emphasized femininity which constructs women as weak, dependent and unequal. She 
argues that approaches such as these "rob women of any agency or ability-to exert power, 
express desire, take control, resist, prevent or avoid their victimization in intimate sexual 
encounters with men. Prevention is a virtual impossibility within this theoretical framework" 
(Carmody, 2003b, p.202). 
As a corollary of this, Carmody (2003b, p.202) argues such approaches that focus on 
protecting women produce an equally totalizing concept of traditional masculinity which 
constructs men as powerful, independent and in control. This is particularly important since, 
according to Michael Flood (2002, p.3), men who perpetrate sexual assault not only identify 
with traditional images of masculinity and male gender role privilege but also "see being 
male as carrying the right to discipline and punish women". This idea is important in the 
context of an understanding of hegemony through consent and negotiation where women 
are offered protection in exchange for acquiescence to male authority, heterosexuality, and 
dominant models of family. It suggests that prevention efforts which create these totalizing 
concepts of masculinity and femininity may actually increase women's vulnerability to male 
violence. 
VicHealth (Donovan & Vlais, 2005) and Suellen Murray and Anastasia Powell (2009) argue 
that many Australian crime prevention campaigns also potentially undermine prevention 
efforts by focusing on protecting vulnerable women in the same way policies conceptualised 
as policies of chivalry do. They argue that these campaigns are problematic because they 
only specifically identify criminal forms of physical and sexual violence. This leads men who 
conduct non-prosecutable forms of violence (e.g. emotional abuse) to minimise their 
behaviour and distance their violence from the criminal acts perpetrated by "brutal, cowardly 
men who are not like me" (Donovan & Vlais, 2005, p.15). Other authors also argue that in 
addition to protecting vulnerable women, such approaches focus only on the behaviour of 
individuals and in doing so fail to consider broader community, organisational and social 
contents or environments through which violence is facilitated and condoned (Carmody, 
54 
Chapter 3: Australian Social Policy and the Femocrat Strategy 
2003a; Family Violence Prevention Fund, 2003, pp.1 0-11; Lawson & Crookes, 2003; 
VicHealth, 2006, p.35). Thus, according to Carmody (2003a), "while current prevention 
strategies continue to focus solely on attempting to control or regulate unethical desire, acts 
and pleasure they will fail to achieve non-violent communities". 
A policies of chivalry conceptualisation of policy is therefore useful in raising two questions 
of specific interest to this thesis that are explored further in Chapters Eight and Ten. The 
first is the question of whether the Howard Government's policy and program approaches to 
male violence against women may be considered policies of chivalry. The second is the 
question of where Australia Says No fits with the criticisms and concerns about prevention 
and community educations approaches discussed above. 
3.3.3 Policies of cooption 
A second, alternative way that some feminists conceptualise public policy responses to 
male violence against women is as policies of cooption. Australian feminists' engagement 
with the state caused significant debate about the potential for cooption. These tensions 
and feminist fears of cooption are apparent in Ludo McFerren's (1990, p.204) discussion of 
the relationship between the refuge movement and feminists working inside the Australian 
bureaucracy: 
Part of the failure to adapt has been an ongoing tendency to see the state as a fixed monolith. 
Refuge workers have remained unclear about the role of feminists in the state apparatus, and 
their relationship with these 'femocrats'. When confronted with a problem with the state, the 
refuges will concentrate their attacks on the bureaucrats. It has often left refuges beating their 
heads against the wrong brick wall. ... Early radical statements about the co-optive role of the 
state, the need for refuge autonomy, the contradictions of feminists in the system have become 
fixed in a type of refuge mythologY, They are often repeated religiously without criticism or 
further examination, as are references to grand old struggles and epic debates. 
According to Louise Chappell (2002b, p.29) this tendency to look towards bureaucrats 
rather than politicians meant that when working with conservative governments the gulf 
between 'inside' and 'outside' feminist activists usually widened with "much recrimination on 
both sides over funding cutbacks and negative policy decisions". 
Contemporary feminist theorists maintain their concern about cooption in the interaction 
between feminism and the state. Regarding male violence against women, these concerns 
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can be conceptualised on a continuum from the absence of remedy through to the severity 
of harm towards women in government policy. At one end of the continuum feminists argue 
state responses have had limited efficacy and have largely failed to reduce the incidence 
and impact of male violence against women (Phillips, 2008a, p.66). Some feminists also 
highlight the complex and contradictory role of the state in recognizing harm and providing 
care and protection, while also controlling the lives of women and children subjected to 
violence through government policy such as welfare policies (Hanmer, 1996, p.17). 
Further along the continuum, Genovese (2000) argues the relationship between feminism 
and the state is problematic. She argues it is critical to rethink and re-examine current 
domestic violence policies, acknowledge the limitations of the state, and ask questions such 
as "'what constraints do we accept?" or "whose safety or future do we sacrifice for an 
investment in seeking solutions to the difference dilemma?" (Genovese, 2000, p.125). 
Genovese's position thus moves tacitly into acknowledging potential harm in feminists 
interactions with the state regarding male violence against women. 
Further along the continuum, Donna Coker (2001) argues that in the context of domestic 
violence mandatory arrest policies, feminists have overestimated the state's capacity to 
provide a positive response to abused women and has underestimated the state's capacity 
to control and harm these same women. Consistent with this criticism, Lesley Laing (2008, 
p.74) notes criticism by women colour and lesbian women about second wave feminist 
engagement with the state. She argues these groups criticise feminists for challenging the 
public/private dichotomy of the state and advocating the state recognise male violence 
against women as a public and political issue particularly because racial and homosexual 
oppression begin as public events (Laing, 2008, p.74). Thus, for Laing (2008, ·p.74), the 
feminist agenda of making 'private' male violence against women a 'public' crime "can result 
in harmful intrusions of the state into the lives of women who are already experiencing 
(often unacknowledged) oppressions in the public realm". 
The next perspective on the continuum moves from the harm caused to specific women to 
concerns about the effects on all women. Some feminists express concern about the 
cooption of issues of importance to feminism to reinforce the interests of the patriarchal 
state. For these feminists, the state only responds to male violence against women to repair 
or reinforce the patriarchal status quo. According to Jill Radford and Elizabeth Stanko 
(1996, p.78), the state's concern with male violence against women is an attempt at policing 
the family and heterosexuality, what they describe as the "sacred institutions of patriarchy", 
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to restore their legitimacy as safe institutions for women. They argue that state responses to 
this violence preserve institutions such as the family and heterosexuality and reaffirm, 
reproduce and represent patriarchal gendered power relations as in the best interests of 
women and children. They continue: 
Achieving this requires a silencing of any feminist politics which asks disturbing questions 
about whether heterosexuality is the natural, normal and only possibility for women, whether it 
is indeed voluntary or compulsory for women living under conditions of patriarchy and whether 
it is in our best interests ... is this new concern with violence to women on the part of the state's 
police and professional carers ... a last ditch attempt at reinstating the patriarchal status quo by 
restoring an apparently respectable face to its central institutions, the family and 
heterosexuality? (Radford & Stanko, 1996, p.78). 
These feminists thus suggest the state coopts feminist language, strategies and research in 
a way that does not reflect the feminist commitment that gave them meaning and which 
waters down and undermines feminist projects (Hawthorne, 2004, p.9; Radford & Stanko, 
1996, p.69). Thus, although the state appears to be responding to feminist demands, they 
argue it has done so in a way that "negates feminist definitions, politics, research and 
provision of support services" (Radford & Stanko, 1996, p.77) and such state responses are 
thus harmful to women generally. 
/ 
Consistent with this position on policy as cooption, Linda Gordon (1988), argues that 
deviant behaviour such as male violence against women only became a "social problem" 
when social policy makers perceived it as threatening social order. According to this 
argument, government concern with family violence only arises when traditional family 
norms are threatened and there is anxiety about gender relations, particularly increasing 
signs of autonomy on the part of women and corresponding decline of men's power over 
family members (Bacchi, 1999b, pp.166-167; Gordon, 1988). When grounded in these 
conservative fears, Bacchi argues that representations of family violence expressed within a 
'family breakdown' discourse can work against the best interests of victims by containing 
certain assumptions about "good" families: 
Violence within heterosexual married couples challenges the idealized image of harmonious 
and continuous pairing and hence is addressed with the goal of restoring these idealized 
conditions. Violence is a 'problem' particularly if it threatens to break up self-sufficient pairs and 
throw a number of dependent mothers on welfare support services. Given this logic, we are 
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offered, not an analysis of the problematic dynamics of family relationships, but strategies 
aimed at 'restoring' family harmony (Bacchi, 1999b, p.167). 
Similarly, Kathleen Ferraro (1996) suggests family and community preservation or 
reunification approaches to male violence against women are founded on women's 
subordination to their husbands. These authors thus argue policy as cooption approaches 
have the potential to cause significant harm to women. 
The next position on the continuum suggests the state has coopted feminism in a way that 
uses anti-violence interventions to win support for oppressive "law and order"· policies of 
right-wing populist governments (Bacchi, 1999b, pp.173-176; Laing, 2008, pp.74-77; 
Radford & Stanko, 1996, p. 77). Laing (2008, p. 75), for example, argues that state framings 
of domestic violence as a criminal problem are consistent with conservative 'tough on crime' 
policies and undermines alternative empowering representations such as of violence being 
a problem of women's unequal access to resources. Laing (2008) and Bacchi (1999b, 
pp.173-176) argue these representations of the problem create a range of effects and 
consequences that were not what feminist activists anticipated or desired. These include: 
punitive and disempowering policies such as mandatory arrest or prosecuting perpetrators 
against the woman's wishes; casting women who fight back or do not cooperate with the 
state's prosecution of their partner as unworthy or uncooperative victims and discounting 
future requests for protection; facilitating harmful intrusion by the state into the lives of 
marginalised women (e.g. black women); and individualising the victim and perpetrator and 
deflecting attention from the role of gendered power relations as central to this violence. 
This argument about the link between male violence against women public policy and "law 
and order" policies is important since, according to Michelle Jones (2004, pp.78-82}, crime 
control discourses had a significant impact on the Howard Government's domestic violence 
policies. Similarly, Murray and Powell (Murray, 2005; Murray & Powell, 2009) argue that 
conservative family harmony and law and order discourses feature prominently in Australian 
responses to domestic violence. Australian governments' use of crime control discourses 
also offers an interesting link between policy as cooption and policy as 'chivalry 
conceptualisations by feminists. That is, some feminists argue that crime control discourses 
represent the problem as being about individual violent men who need disciplining because 
they have committed crimes against passive women who need protection (Bacchi, 1999b, 
p.175; Ferraro, 1996; Jones, 2004, pp.78,84). This representation constructs male violence 
against women as a criminal/legal issue where this violence is framed as assault and 
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proponents argue that it should be treated like other forms of violence (Bacchi, 1999b, 
p.17 4). These discourses thus undermine women's empowerment and changes to the 
wider social structures including ongoing gender inequalities (Murray, 2005, p.32; Murray & 
Powell, 2009). Further, Kathleen Ferraro (1996) argues that crime control discourses also 
carry with them: 
... the traces of racism and class ism permeating the desire to discipline those who 
transgressed Anglo·Saxon definitions of the "family ideal". Crime control rhetoric not only 
eclipsed feminist efforts to alter the misogynistic foundations of that ideal. It also reinforced the 
boundaries between "good" and "bad" families, between men who batter and those who simply 
enforce a normative order.of male-dominated households. 
Ferraro (1996, p.78) thus suggests that crime control discourses establish the parameters 
of acceptable male dominance within relationships. As well as making links between racism, 
classism and male violence, this argument extends the policy as cooption conceptualisation 
by suggesting government responses to this violence may be in the governments own 
interests and harmful to women at a macro level. 
Dawn Currie (1990) further suggests that the representation of domestic violence as a law 
and order issue. occurred through rather than against feminist discourse; meaning feminist 
discourse was coopted by conservatives to advance their agendas. Similarly, Murray (2005, 
p.30) argues that although domestic violence is articulated in public policy as a gendered 
issue, it is necessary to go beyond the rhetoric of naming and consider the discourses 
through which policies are operationalised. Echoing these concerns more broadly, Carol 
Johnson (2000, pp.151-152) argues that Australian governments have incorporated the 
challenges posed by feminism into more traditional political discourse and have adapted 
grand narratives to current conditions to maintain male dominance. 
Meghana Nayak and Jennifer Suchland's (2006) link between gender violence and 
hegemonic projects is the final position on the continuum which conceptualises policies as 
cooption. Nayak and Suchland argue that hegemonic projects of the state constitute~ enact, 
produce and require gender violence rather than gender violence being an example or 
effect of male domination alone. Their article focuses on three key issues: 
(I) how hegemonic discourses of neo-liberalism, masculinity, feminism, citizenship, borders 
and the state operate through gendered violence; (2) how dominant political institutions, ideas 
and discourses determine what 'counts' as gender violence; and (3) how responses to gender 
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violence engage meta-narratives about gender, race, class and nation/state, both resisting and 
sustaining hegemonic projects (Nayak & Such land, 2006, pp.468-469). 
Nayak and Suchland's critique links with traditional feminist critiques of the state that 
suggest state responses to male violence against women may be conceptualised as 
policies of cooption. They argue that an insidious and deceptive element of resistance is its 
potential to be coopted by the state to legitimise the hegemonic position of dominant actors. 
"Thus, those who address gender violence in the same way as the hegemonic actor, are 
actually supporting and endorsing the hegemonic project even if they are resisting gender 
violence itself" (Nayak & Suchland, 2006, p.497). Nayak and Suchland's critique provides 
an important grounding for my development of new ways of conceptualising the Howard 
Government's approaches to male violence against women. In particular, their argument 
extends Ferarro's connection between policy responses and racism by also exploring 
nationalism and connections between cooption and hegemony. 
These arguments about the potential of governments, particularly conservative ones, to 
coopt feminist agendas, language and discourse for their own purposes are important for 
this thesis. They raise the possibility that Howard Government responses to male violence 
against women can be conceptualised as policies of cooption. Further, Nyland and 
Such land's link between policies of cooption conceptualisations and hegemony is important 
in helping me to develop new ways of understanding the Howard Government's approaches 
from a feminist perspective later in this thesis. 
3.4 Australian Government Policy Responses to Male Violence Against 
Women 
This chapter has thus far explored state responses to male violence against women 
generally within Australia and has not explored the differences between Australian state 
and federal governments. Although the discussion in this chapter is relevant to both 
Australian state and federal governments, government responses to male violence against 
women in Australia have largely been the responsibility of the state governments. It is 
therefore important to briefly explore why this thesis concentrates on the Australian 
Government's (that is, the Australian federal Government's) responses to this issue during 
the Howard years. 
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Section 51 of the Constitution grants specified legislative powers to the Commonwealth and 
the States retained all residual powers (Parkin & Summers, 1996, p.11 ). Since many State 
powers involve direct service provision such as health and welfare services, criminal law, 
police and corrections, States have traditionally played the most significant role responding 
to male violence against women. Since 1972, however, Labor and Coalition federal 
governments have enthusiastically embraced what Alan Fenna (2004, p.173) calls 
"constitutional expansionism". Section 51 of the Constitution grants the Commonwealth 
'external affairs' powers. Consequently, "once Commonwealth legislation in any policy field 
is validated by reference to international commitments, it overrides any conflicting State 
legislation by virtue of Section 1 09"2 (Fenna, 2004, p.169). In women's policy these external 
affairs powers are significant since Australia has become a signatory to a number of United 
Nations agreements on the status of women such as CEDAW3 (J. Summers, 1997; 
University of Minnesota, 1998). Due to these international obligations, Australian federal 
governments have taken increasing responsibility for a range of social policies specifically 
impacting on women, including male violence against women. 
Chappell (2002b, p.162) argues Australian federal governments have used constitutional 
powers of external affairs (s. 51[xxix]) and conciliation and arbitration (s.51 [xxxv]) to 
legislate on a number of state issues of particular relevance to women (e.g. sexual 
discrimination, equal pay, pensions). She also highlights the role of the Commonwealth's 
fiscal dominance in constitutional expansionism. The High Court's 1942 Uniform Tax Case 
decision gave the Commonwealth fiscal dominance due to their role collecting income tax 
(Fenna, 2004, p.173). The Commonwealth subsequently used this fiscal dominance 
"unilaterally, or jointly with the states, to gain a foothold in policy areas that are not 
enumerated under the Constitution .. Such areas include women's refuges and domestic 
violence, women's health and childcare" (Chappell, 2002b, p.162). Due to this constitutional 
expansionism, Australia has become the most centralised of all western federal systems 
(Bessant et al., 2006, p.212). This has exacerbated the complexity of Commonwealth-State 
financial and political relations and created interdependency between the tiers of 
government. It is therefore increasingly difficult to disaggregate responsibilities of each level 
of government. 
2 Section 109 provides that where there is any contradiction or inconsistency between a 
Commonwealth and State law, the Commonwealth law prevails. 
3 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
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Given the historical responsibility of the states for many areas of women's policy, research 
on male violence against women policy has concentrated on Australian state governments. 
Research into federal government social policy areas that have traditionally been the 
responsibility of the states has, however, become increasingly important due to 
constitutional expansionism. This thesis therefore contributes to the small, emerging body 
of literature that focuses on federal government responses to male violence against women. 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided important theoretical concepts for this thesis from the policy 
studies and political science literature. It introduced four important concepts that are of 
particular relevance to the research: policy activism; the femocrat strategy; political 
opportunity structures; and intergovernmental cooperation. These concepts are important 
for exploring and making sense of policy process through the in-depth case study of 
Partnerships in Chapter Nine. They provide important background from which to explore the 
ongoing significance of feminists in national male violence against women policy and 
continuities and discontinuities in the femocrat strategy during the Howard years. The 
chapter also explored feminist analyses and criticisms of government responses to male 
violence against women with a particular focus on conceptualisations of policies as chivalry 
and policies of cooption. These are important to make sense of the Howard Government's 
responses to male violence against women and provide a theoretical foundation on which to 
develop a new way of understanding this period. Finally, the chapter also contextualised 
this thesis in Australian federalism and constitutional expansionism to explain why this 
thesis focuses on the Australian Government during the Howard years when state 
governments have traditionally dominated this social policy area. 
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Chapter Four 
Government under Howard: Neo-liberalism, 
Social Conservatism and Political Opportunism 
A number of commentators characterise the Howard years (1996-2007) as a distinct epoch 
in Australia's cultural and political history whose specificities had a significant impact on the 
social policies of the Howard Government. This chapter outlines the arguments of these 
commentators to provide a social, economic and political context in which to locate the 
Howard Government's social policies generally and their policy responses to male violence 
against women specifically. The chapter starts by briefly outlining what these commentators 
identify as the Howard Government's marriage of economic liberalism, social conservatism, 
and political opportunism which they argue was the stroke of political genius sustaining 
Howard in office for over a decade (Brett, 2005, p.45; 2007, p.62; Kelly, 2006, p.1 0; Milne, 
2006, p.46; Shanahan, 2006, p.40; Singleton, 2005). The chapter then focuses on the 
Howard Government's social policy agenda and their 'culture wars' as identified by these 
commentators by exploring five key aspects of the government's approaches which are of 
particular relevance to male violence against women. Further, since Howard dominated the 
Coalition for 11 years following his 1996 election success "his longstanding political goals 
and values shaped the government's and his convictions and prejudices limited its room to 
move" (Brett, 2007, p.6). It is therefore impossible to separate out discussion of the Howard 
Government from one of the Prime Minister himself. 
4.1 Nee-Liberalism 
Economic nee-liberalism was one of the key characteristics of the Howard Government 
identified by commentators and the government itself. Economic nee-liberalism is an 
ideological preference for a minimalist state and small government, hostility to the public 
sector and social welfare, and advocacy for individualism and free markets (Clarke, 2004; 
Larner, 2000). For Gwyneth Singleton (2005, p.4) Howard's fundamental political 
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philosophy was based on the importance of the individual and generating the free market 
conditions in which individual commitment to hard work and enterprise can allow 
achievement of self-reliance. Although much of the economic nee-liberal agenda was 
achieved under the Hawke and Keating governments (Brett, 2007, p.62), Howard reportedly 
extended the nee-liberal agenda in three main ways. 
First was a massive increase in the tempo of privatisation (Manne, 2004, p.11) where 
government owned, funded and/or provided services were substituted with non-government 
(particularly Christian) agencies and private funding mechanisms (Aulich, 2005, p.58). Chris 
Aulich (2005, p.58) identifies five main ways that privatisation occurs: divestment (selling 
public industries); withdrawing public sector service delivery; outsourcing public services to 
private agencies; abolishing or relaxing public monopolies and encouraging competition 
against government agencies; and applying user-pays systems to public services. Aulich 
(2005, p. 73) details the substantial acceleration of privatisation across all five areas under 
the Howard Government and concludes: "the Howard Governments have nurtured values 
that give primacy to the worth of private over government (or collective) activity". 
Second, commentators argue the Howard Government ex1ended the nee-liberal agenda 
through a sustained attack on the public sector and Non-Government Organisations 
(NGOs). Clive Hamilton and Sarah Maddison (2007) argue that this was part of a systemic 
strategy to mute opposition to the government's policies and control public opinion. 
Regarding the public service, a number of authors argue the Howard Government 
increasingly politicised the public sector by employing strategies which created a climate of 
uncertainty and fear, increased greater government control, and undermined public sector 
independence and neutrality (Barker, 2007; Ester, 2007; Halligan, 2005, p.35; Kelly, 2006, 
p.9). Regarding NGOs, Hamilton and Maddison (2007) and Margot Kingston (2004) argue 
the Howard Government silenced dissent through an unprecedented attack which included: 
public criticism; withdrawal or threatened withdrawal of government funding .or access; 
changes to tax legislation; and establishing a government run peak NGO. For these authors 
the Howard Government thus extended nee-liberalism and undermined democracy with a 
detailed and deliberate strategy to silence, coopt and intimidate the public sector and 
dissenting NGOs. 
Third, commentators argue the Howard Government advanced the economic nee-liberal 
agenda through labour market deregulation by dismantling the centralised arbitration 
system and attempting to weaken trade union power (Manne, 2004, p.1 0). This included: 
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jettisoning the Accord between government and ACTU4 ; direct anti-union intervention in the 
Waterfront dispute; and introducing the Workplace Relations Act (Manne, 2004, pp.1 0-11 ). 
After winning control of the Senate in 2004, Howard used his fourth term to overhaul the 
Australian industrial relations system through WorkChoices, a legislative and policy program 
which, according to Brett (2007, pp.62-63), was the pinnacle of Howard's career-long 
commitment to neo-liberallabour market deregulation. 
4.2 Social Conservatism 
The Howard Government's electoral success depended on a careful balance between nee-
liberalism and social conservatism as illustrated by Howard's comment: 
The point is that liberalisation in economic policy and a modern conservatism in social policy 
are not only appropriate to Australia's national interests as we enter the twenty-first century. 
They are mutually reinforcing as well. The values and priorities we bring to social policy 
issues provide important "points of anchorage" in a period of rapid and ongoing economic 
change. Economic policy liberalisation and a modern conservatism in social policy share 
important common values and objectives (Howard 1999 cited in Rudd, 2006b). 
Carol Johnson (2000, p.150) describes this position as Howard's "politics of economic 
transformation and social nostalgia". According to ALP politician Kevin Rudd5 (2006b), 
these ideological positions are ultimately unsynthesisable. Brett (2007, p.62) argues 
Howard's refusal to recognise the contradiction between these perspectives was, 
nevertheless, a key political strength. As lmre Salusinsky (2006, p.206) also argues: "by 
reassuring the electorate that its traditional values have been reclaimed from the social 
engineers, Howard has created the climate in which potentially unsettling liberal economic 
policies could proceed". 
Social conservatism refers to a system of values promoting tradition, continuity, social unity, 
and social cohesion over radical social change or diversity (Singleton, 2005, p.5). Howard's 
social conservatism is divided in the literature into two parts. First was a 'pure' social 
conservatism reflected in: assertions about the centrality of the traditional family to 
Australian society and support for traditional family values; opposition to the republican 
movement; discomfort with multiculturalism, Aboriginal reconciliation and identity politics; 
4 Australian Council of Trade Unions. 
5 Soon after this article was published Kevin Rudd became leader of the Opposition and then 
succeeded Howard as Prime Minister after leading the ALP to an election victory in November 2007. 
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and denial of climate change (Brett, 2003, p.185; 2007, pp.28 & 62; Kelly, 2006, p.5). 
Second was Howard's 'conservative populism' (Melleuish 2000 in Kelly, 2006, p.5) reflected 
in: appeals to the '1950s white picket fence' and homely past; assimilationist and 
exclusionary nationalism; and his defence of certain Australian social and cultural icons 
(Brett, 2003, p.185; 2007, p.62; Irving, 2004, p.113; Kelly, 2006, p.5; Legge, 2006). Given 
its significance to the social policies of his Government, the social conservatism 
championed by Howard is discussed further in the context of the social policies of the 
Howard Government below. 
4.3 Political Opportunism 
Howard's political opportunism and electoral pragmatism often eclipsed his ideological 
commitments to nee-liberalism and social conservatism (Kelly, 2006, p.1 0). Brett (2007, 
pp.6-12) argues Howard's leadership style meant he was: all about winning; divisive; would 
not admit mistakes; not good at policy; determined to keep control of the agenda; willing to 
sacrifice good policy for his reputation; and outward looking and defensive against external 
threats and enemies. She also argues that the primary opposition structuring Howard's 
thinking was party-based, between Labor and Liberal, rather than ideological (Brett, 2005, 
p.41 ). Thus, "for Howard, if something is championed by Labor, then this is sufficient reason 
to oppose it, no matter what the merits of the case" (Brett, 2005, p.41 ). A significant 
exjlmple of this for Brett (2005, p.41; 2007, pp.60-61) was Howard's impatience with the 
constraints of federalism and his enthusiastic embrace of constitutional expansionism which 
broke the Liberal Party's traditional commitment to states' rights. 'What more is needed to 
explain his sudden abandonment of the Liberal Party's commitment to states' rights than 
that all states and territories currently have Labor governments?" (Brett, 2005, p.41 ). Brett 
argues the Howard Government consequently created a policy vacuum in many areas as 
good policy became hostage to Howard's reputation (Brett, 2007, pp.11 & 57). Similarly, for 
Mungo MacCallum (2004, pp.62-63), Howard's obsession with winning at all costs meant 
"he sees politics not as a way of creating a better world, but a world in its own right - the 
only world that matters. It is not a question of the end justifying the means; the means has 
in fact become the end. The reason for gaining political power is power itself". 
Singleton (2005, p.16) argues that Howard's ideological commitments to economic nee-
liberalism and social conservatism were therefore subsumed to political pragmatism and 
political opportunism when necessary. Brett (2005, pp.42-45) similarly contends that 
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Howard's political pragmatism and dichotomous opposition to Labor meant he ruthlessly 
seized opportunities and exploited them for political advantage without concern for long-
term costs. She argues that the Howard Government convinced themselves of their own 
righteousness and was willing to bend, if not break, the rules if it served the ultimate 
purpose of keeping Labor out of office. 
One example of Howard Government political opportunism is government advertising which 
has been described as an "abuse of incumbency" (Kelly, 2006, p.13) and an 
"unprecedented shamelessness about using public funds to support their position" (Lewis, 
2006, p.190). Australian Governments have traditionally used large-scale advertising with 
bipartisan support for social marketing campaigns focussed on explaining policy or for 
health and welfare (Young, 2007, p.438). The Howard Government, however, "rort[ed] the 
public purse on an unprecedented scale" (Marr, 2007a, p.127) by using government funding 
for partisan political advertising promoting and defending the government (Young, 2007, 
p.438). Between 1996 and 2007 the Howard Government spent over $1 billion dollars on 
campaigns on issues such as the GST and WorkChoices and campaign spending spiked 
just before elections (Faulkner & Tanner, 2008; Kelly, 2006, p.13; Lewis, 2006, p.190; 
Young, 2007, p.438). This critique of the Howard Government's advertising is particularly 
important because Australia Says No was one of the campaigns criticised as partisan 
political advertising as discussed in Chapters One and Eight. 
4.4 The Howard Government's Social Policy and the Culture Wars 
A number of commentators argue the Howard Government's social policy agenda reflects 
their nee-liberalism, social conservatism and political opportunism (Mendes, 2005, p.148; 
Singleton, 2005, p.B). Influenced by nee-liberalism, Singleton (2005) argues the Howard 
Government discursively constructed social problems as the problems of individuals and 
not society. Clive Hamilton (2006, p.44) argues this had a deeply conservative political 
effect which replaced understandings of structural disadvantage, social justice and 
exploitation with those of individuals' poor choices, failures, lack of character, or other 
inadequacies. Further, Brett (2005, p.25) argues Howard fused this nee-liberal ideology with 
a socially conservative emphasis on family and nation in the 'culture wars'. 
The 'culture wars' refer to what commentators describe as Howard's reactionary crusade 
against the political Left utilising strategies of 'wedge politics' and politics of identity in a 
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defence of a perceived mainstream consensual centre. This mainstream included working 
class 'Howard battlers' against 'special interest groups' (e.g. feminists, immigrants, 
multiculturalists, Aboriginal people, environmentalists, republicans and gay people) and 
'elites' (educated social progressives labelled 'the chardonnay set' or 'chattering classes') 
(Brett, 2004; 2007, p.12; Johnson, 2000; Manne, 2004, p.7; Rudd, 2006b, p.1). The culture 
wars were embodied in the 1996 campaign slogan "For all of us" which refashioned 
Menzies' "forgotten people", the "silent and silenced majority" (Brett, 2005, p.29; Rundle, 
2001, p.24) as illustrated in the following quote: 
There is a frustrated mainstream in Australia today which sees government decisions 
increasingly driven by the noisy, self-interested clamour of powerful vested interests with scant 
regard for the national interest ... For the past twelve years Labor has governed essentially by 
proxy through interest groups (Howard 1995 cited in Brett, 2005, p.23). 
Brett (2007, p.BB) argues "For all of us" thus had an inherently divisive partisan edge 
directed against "political correctness". 
These commentators, particularly Brett, suggest Howard never provided an explicit 
definition of the 'mainstream' or 'special interests'. They suggest Howard intentionally left 
the concepts .vague and strategically positioned 'Them' as whatever minority most 
aggrieved someone or were the subject of Government attack (Brett, 2005; Johnson, 2000, 
p.40). For Maddox (2005, p.78), 'Them' was therefore a strangely shifting category in which 
almost everyone ended up being part of the "mysterious, dangerous 'Them"'. Brett (2004, 
p.82) argues this slogan opened a space for grievances about various "'Them' who were 
preventing a mainstream 'Us' from receiving our fair share of resources and recognition". 
She continues that Howard's focus on national interests rather than sectional interests also 
allowed him to collapse national interests into the mainstream consensual centre (Brett, 
2004, p. 77; 2007b, p.50). Expanding this point, David Marr (2007b, pp.49-50) critiques the 
Howard Government's "party-political assault on Australia's liberal culture" in the name of 
"balance between contending forces". Marr details how many majority opinions, values and 
positions in Australian society were strategically excluded from Howard's "mainstream", 
which he argues only reflected the Liberal Party's agenda. 
Some commentators suggest this sustained attack on politically and socially progressive 
values reflected an American Republican Party style electoral strategy where Howard 
disempowered people through fear and then offered the "healing balm of certainty" (Evans, 
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2005, p.54; Rudd, 2006b, p.1; Rundle, 2001 ). Rudd argues Howard did this with a series of 
falsely dichotomous arguments, such as tradition versus modernity, in the public debate. 
Similarly, for Johnson (2000, pp.38-50) "many of the issues he [Howard] brought forward 
were seen as 'wedge' or 'culture war' issues, designed to divide, confuse and embarrass 
his opponents, play upon hostility to unpopular groups, and gain the support of voters who 
would otherwise tend to support the Labor Party". These arguments suggest Howard's 
culture wars were more about political opportunism than ideological belief. 
The culture wars had two primary purposes according to Johnson (2000, p.42). First was to 
respond to what Ghassan Hage terms 'the discourse of Anglo-decline'. The culture wars 
assisted the Howard Government maintain privileged forms of identity (e.g. white or male) 
by subordinating marginalised identities to the 'mainstream'. Cultural warriors constructed 
"attempts to redress the effects of discrimination and exclusion experienced by migrants 
and Indigenous Australians" as 'discrimination' against Anglo-Australians (Johnson, 2000, 
p.42). Thus, for Johnson (2000, p.42), "the ultimate revenge of the 'mainstream' is to steal 
the identity of victim". The second purpose of the culture wars was to police the 
'mainstream' and: 
... encourage Anglo-Celtic heterosexuals and other members of the 'mainstream' to construct 
their own identity as unquestioningly central and other identities as 'special interests'. It is 
about" discouraging Anglo-Celts, heterosexuals and others who do not wish to privilege their 
identity by denouncing them as 'politically correct', elitist, social engineers who are 
disempowering their compatriots (Johnson, 2000, p.43). 
Alternatively, Rudd (2006a, p.1; 2006b, p.1) argues the culture wars were used by Howard 
to mask "a deeper, more unsettling reality: that the socially conservative values at the core 
of Howard's cultural attack on the Left are in fact under siege from the forces of nee-
liberalism that he himself has unleashed from the Right". Whatever their purpose, the social 
conservatism the culture wars championed profoundly impacted on Howard Government 
social policies as illustrated by five areas of Howard's political offensive against the Left 
outlined below which are particularly relevant to male violence against women. 
4.4-1 Christianity and the campaigns of the religious Right 
Rudd (2006a, p.1; 2006b, p.1) argues that right wing Christian extremism was "John 
Howard's religious handmaiden in his political project to reshape Australia". Marion Maddox 
(2005, pp.198 & 230) details how Howard's promotion of the Christian Right was 
69 
Chapter 4: Government Under Howard 
disproportionate to their representation in the Australian community. She argues that 
Howard's primary achievement was importing the political marriage of nee-liberalism and 
social conservatism practised by the American fundamentalist Christian Right. Howard did 
this by mobilising "half-submerged religious sentiments without being specific enough to 
either arouse secular anxieties or provoke a theological rebuttal" (Maddox, 2005, p.200). 
This enabled the Howard Government to champion policy positions normally associated 
with the American Christian right including: 
Tightened censorship, opposition to gay and lesbian marriage and parenting, reopening the 
debate on abortion and capital punishment, overturning euthanasia law, a preference for faith-
based over government welfare and schools, intolerance of Muslims, suspicion of outsiders, 
hostility to 'activist' judges and a claim to exclusive, inside knowledge of 'values' (Maddox, 
2005, pp.145-147). 
Maddox (2005, pp.145-147) also argues Howard utilised the strategies as well as the 
policies of the American Christian Right such as cultivating those with more ex1reme views 
than his own or branding opponents as 'extreme' to make himself look moderate in 
comparison. 
Maddox (2005),and Amanda Lohrey. (2006, p.47), argue that Howard's use of Christianity 
was solely for political purposes as illustrated by his rejection of other Christian 
commitments such as· to social justice. Lohrey (2006, p.48) argues that when prominent 
Christians including conservatives Cardinal George Pell and Archbishop Peter Jensen 
objected to Howard Government social policies on the grounds of social justice or human 
rights, Howard "dismissed [them] as naTve interlopers out of their field of expertise. Where 
they do not suit the Howard agenda, the churches are hung out to dry: Howard sucks up the 
moral conservatism and spits out the rest". Thus, for these commentators, a significant part 
of Howard's political strategy in the culture wars was importing the beliefs, politics, and 
strategies of the American Christian fundamentalist Right and adapting them to the more 
secular Australian audience. 
Closely associated with Right wing Christian extremism is, according to these 
commentators, Howard's promotion of traditional nuclear families and "family values". They 
argue culture wars attempted to reframe political rhetoric, language and discursive 
strategies to shape public perception and gain popular support. Lohrey {2005, p.9) argues 
that a Christian Right strategy to gain wider community support is to downplay Christian 
identity and avoid language that might alert secular voters to a Christian crusade. The use 
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of deceptively coded conservative discourse like 'family' and 'values' facilitates a "religious 
dog-whistle politics" enabling political leaders to reach religious and conservative secular 
constituencies simultaneously (Lohrey, 2006, p.48; Maddox, 2005). The use of 'family' and 
'family values' discourse was thus integral to the Howard Government's social policy 
agenda according to these commentators. 
4.4.2 Nuclear families and traditional 'family values' 
For Singleton (2005, p.9), a "defining element of Howard's conservative approach to 
government has been.his ongoing iteration of the importance of the family to the welfare of 
the community and Australian society". The Howard Government described the family as 
the key social institution of Australian society (Johnson, 2006, p.3; Newman, 2000, p.81 ). 
Announcing their 'Strengthening Families' policy in 1996 Minister Judi Moylan (cited in 
Thomson, 2000, p.67) commented: "The family is the core social unit in our society ... The 
Coalition is absolutely committed to ensuring that the needs of families remain at the centre 
of public policy". Guy Rundle (2001, p.40) also argues the Howard Government 
"sentimentalise the family and idealise family life, viewing it as the source of all possible 
meaning (aside from the nation) - in a deliberate defiance of everything that can go wrong 
with families". Johnson (2006) suggests Howard used this idealised conception of the family 
to evoke 'mainstream' traditional values, security and certainty. She also argues Howard 
blamed many problems, such as poverty or crime, on the breakdown of this idealised family 
and advocated social policies designed to prevent family breakdown (Johnson, 2006, p.3). 
Howard's social policies promoted a particular type of family based on a neo-conservative 
interpretation (Donaghy, 2003, p.15). This was a traditional, conservative, patriarchal family 
comprising a heterosexual couple with children and a gendered division of labour. This is 
illustrated by the Howard Government's support for this type of family in tax and welfare 
policies which mainly benefited two-parent, heterosexual, single-income families and 
advocated male primary breadwinners and female responsibilities for children: 
The traditional 'family' remains the touchstone of Howard's socially conservative politics of 
identity and his government's social policy. This is the government that paid single income 
families $2.6 billion per annum in non means-tested benefits but rejected Pru Goward's 
proposal of government funded paid maternity leave (casted at $213 million per annum). 
Meanwhile, the government's proposed changes to sole parents' benefit would penalise those 
affected by around $100 per week (Johnson, 2006, p.3). 
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Howard's social conservatism thus promoted nuclear families, "male breadwinners and the 
importance of mothering over career-centred feminists" (Brett, 2004, p.75; Legge, 2006, 
p.140). 
For Johnson (2006, p.3) and Lohrey (2006, p.56) Howard's social policy agenda reflects 
George Lakoff's concept of the conservative 'strict-father model' which is a tough, 
masculine and authoritarian approach to leadership. This model of leaderships promotes 
the view '1he nation is best run like a family by a strict father who can protect the family and 
teach what is right and wrong" (Johnson, 2006, p.3). For Lohrey this explains Howard's 
opposition to issues such as women's equality, abortion, and same-sex marriage which 
"directly contest and undermine the traditional authoritarian father figure and in doing so 
constitute a threat to the conservative value system as a whole. It is why they are front-line 
issues in the culture wars" (Lohrey, 2006, p.57). 
Rundle (2001, p.42) argues that in addition to promoting a particular type of family, the 
Howard Government used advertising to train "families to behave as families, as if they 
could longer be trusted to perform that duty without prompting". According to Rundle (2001, 
p.42), the Howard Government's anti-drugs advertisements were a form of social discipline 
where people were told what to think and how to talk about drugs as well as being sold a 
"set of values and way of thinking about values". In this campaign he suggests the family 
"was reconstructed as an arm of the state, to whom was subcontracted the role of shaping 
the behaviour of the young, in a manner scripted by professionals" (Rundle, 2001, p.42). 
Further, Rundle (2001, p.43) argues: 
Howard's desire to control how people talk to their children, to hold stubbornly to the idealised 
familial doctrines of a bygone dispensation, is of a piece with his larger defensiveness. Having 
decided the social and economic values that obtained a certain time and in a certain context 
are ideal and eternal, conservatism attempts to re-establish these values with all the means at 
its disposal. Such an imperative can license an almost unlimited attack on the present 
institutions of society - and particularly on minority groups within it - in the name of past 
cultures and meanings .... They start with Mum and Dad, the kids and the picket fence, and 
they end up with Fortniss Australia, in which everyone is encouraged to distrust the Muslim 
asylum seeker. 
Rundle's argument suggests the anti-drugs campaign was a 'practice' or 'technique' of 
governmentality (Johnson, 2000, p.152) used by the Howard Government to construct and 
reinforce types of family that behaved in an idealised way. This analysis is particularly 
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important because of the significant similarities between anti-drugs and other Howard 
Government campaigns on social issues such as male violence against women. 
4.4.3 Gender and women's equality 
The Howard Government's opposition to equality for women formed another important front 
of the culture wars. According to Sumrners (2003, p.125), ''with John Howard Australia got 
its most reactionary prime minister for at least thirty years. Howard is a self-confessed 
social conservative who believes women belong in the home". Commentators argue 
Howard positioned feminists as a 'special interest' (Chappell, 2002b; Sawer, 2004, p.30) 
and, according to Summers (2003b, p.126) launched a simultaneous two-pronged attack on 
women's equality and independence. The first prong of this attack identified by Summers 
was that the Howard Government dismantled successes of the women's movement and 
welfare state. This included funding for childcare, welfare policies and other programs that 
helped women achieve independence and maintain an autonomous household. The second 
prong of this attack identified by Summers was that the Howard government began a roll-
back of programs safe-guarding women's equality. She argued this involved reducing the 
funding, authority and prestige of government and non-government organisations or policy 
machinery that promoted women's equality or ensured women's interests were protected. 
Summer's account of Howard's attack on women's equality is apparent in the government's 
approach to the Office of the Status of Women (OSW) and women's NGOs. Although a key 
component of the femocrat strategy, the centralised location of OSW as the women's 
coordinating agency was easily abolished by incoming governments hostile to the femocrat 
strategy (Chappell, 2002b). Although Howard did not immediately relocate OSW, it did 
suffer a 40 per cent budget cut in 1996, creating significant staff losses that affected all 
aspects of their work (Sawer, 1999, p.43). Marian Sawer (1999, pp.43-48) also describes 
how the Howard Government abolished various other gender accountability mechanisms 
including the women's budget process. She argues OSW subsequently withdrew from 
coordinating women's policy across government and, Summers (2003b, p.127) argues, this 
made OSW politically impotent. 
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During the Howard Government's first term femocrats were unable to engage in the 
'federalism foxtrot'6 because Liberal or Coalition governments were in power in all States 
except NSW (Chappell, 2002b, p.30). Chappell (2002b, p.30) argues that the Howard 
Government changes to OSW therefore left "the femocrat strategy in tatters". Howard finally 
moved OSW from Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet to the Department for Families 
and Communities in 2004 and, symbolically removing "Status" from its title, renamed it 
Office for Women (OFW). 
Sawer (1999) argues that early in their first term the Howard Government also reduced or 
eliminated funding for all organisations espousing a feminist philosophy. Sawer argues 
Minister Jocelyn Newman, the Minister for the Status of Women, was "responsible for a 
rapid deterioration in relations between government and NGOs, exacerbated by funding 
issues and exertion of close control over agendas for Ministerial round tables 
[representatives of national women's NGOs]" (Sawer, 1999, p.44). Minister Newman 
reduced by half the grants program available to NGOs and administered by OSW. This 
included ceasing funding to the Coalition of Australian Participating Organisations of 
Women (CAPOW), a national women's NGO coordinating advocacy work after they 
produced "an unflattering report to the United Nations" (Manning in Kingston, 2004, p.269; 
Sawer, 1999, p.44j. Those women's organisations that maintained funding under the OSW 
grants program were required to sign a contract preventing them making public comment 
without the written permission of the Prime Minister or OSW (Summers, 2003b, p.129). For 
Sawer (1999, p.44), "all of these changes effectively reduced the ability of women's groups 
to make input into the policy process and to support those watching policy from within", thus 
further dismantling the femocrat strategy. 
Tahnya Donaghy (2003, p.15) argues the Howard Government consistently framed 
women's issues within family discourse which led to a regressive shift of the gender agenda 
in politics. Similarly, Johnson (2000, p.78) argues "Howard's conception of women's role as 
citizen is closely related to his conception of the role of the family". Further, Summers 
(2003b, p.140) argues: 
Howard's government had succeeded in a remarkably short time in pushing women off the 
political agenda. They have been relegated to the kitchens and bedrooms of the discourse. 
Women have ceased to matter. All the prime minister and government talked of were 'families'. 
6 That is, changing focus between state and federal governments and playing governments off 
against each particularly when different parties were in power at each level of government. 
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Canberra had stopped caring about women except in their roles as mothers, and the rest of the 
country seemed to be falling into .line. The sad thing is that this was so effective that people 
have largely stopped noticing, stopped commenting. 
For Jane Thomson (2000, p.69) this approach to family "re-enshrine[d] women as wives 
and mothers first, citizens second". Johnson (2000, p.78) argues it also shifted the burden 
of care from the public sector to the domestic sphere of '1amilies", or more accurately 
women, and in doing so further dismantled feminist aims of equality. 
The Howard Government's active resistance to feminist goals for equality was illustrated by 
their relationship with anti-feminist men's and fathers' rights groups (Flood, 2004a). The 
history and nature of the men's rights movement in Australia is well documented (see for 
example Dunn, 2004; Flood, 2004a; Maddison, 1999). They involve a number of anti-
feminist, often misogynistic, groups mobilised in an organised opposition against feminism 
(Flood, 2004a; Maddison, 1999). Often linked closely to conservative Christian 
organisations, men's rights groups support traditional patriarchal family structures and are 
instrumental in right-wing backlashes against 'political correctness' (Dunn, 2004; Flood, 
2004a, pp.264 & 268). Despite their claims of discrimination and bias against men, 
commentators argue these groups enjoyed unprecedented access to powerful political 
figures including Howard himself as well as funding from the Howard Government (Dunn, 
2004; Flood, 2004a, p.267; Summers, 2003b, p.98). 
Michael Flood (2004a) argues that the men's rights agenda is focused on defending 
patriarchal masculinity and revalidating male identity with particular attention to family law 
and child custody. He delineates their prominence in lobbying for a rebuttable presumption 
of joint custody in Australian family law and their significant over-representation in public 
submission processes in family law reform. Common claims of men's rights groups 
concerning family law include: there are widespread false allegations of domestic violence 
and child abuse against men in the context of separation; children who allege abuse are 
encouraged to make false claims by their mothers as a result of 'Parental Alienation 
Syndrome'7 ; men and women are equally violent in relationships; domestic violence doesn't 
exist; and family law courts are biased against men (Dunn, 2004; Flood, 2004a; Shea Hart, 
2006; Shea Hart & Bagshaw, 2008). Men's rights groups have achieved the most success 
with the Howard Government in family law (Flood, 2004a). In 2006 the Howard Government 
7 PAS as it is commonly known is a false 'syndrome' originating in the United States which despite 
being discredited and not officially accepted in American or Australian courts is widely explicitly and 
implicitly referred to and successfully used by alleged perpetrators of violence in family law cases . 
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introduced the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act to include a 
range of measures championed by the men's rights movements such as a legal 
presumption of equal shared parental responsibility as well as making it more difficult for 
women to disclose experiences of domestic violence by their ex-partners (NSW Standing 
Committee on Law and Justice, 2006). These changes to the Family Law Act reflect the 
significant influence of the men's rights movement on the Howard Government. 
For many women's groups and domestic violence specialist service providers, the changes 
to the Family Law Act under the Howard Government substantially increased women's 
vulnerability to violence before and after separation. In particular, they argue these reforms 
discourage women from disclosing experiences of violence by their ex-partner for the 
Court's consideration since they. may be penalised as an "unfriendly parent" thereby 
potentially losing residence of their children and/or being financially penalised. After 
conducting an inquiry into the new Family Law Act the Chair of the NSW Standing 
Committee on Law and Justice Committee, the Hon Christine Robertson MLC, reported: 
The possibility that these amendments may expose women to family violence and may 
subordinate the best interest of the child to the interests of the parents is the most concerning 
element of this-Inquiry. The Committee has made recommendations to the NSW Government 
that will attempt to address these concerns (NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 
2006, p.x). 
This finding supports the claims from feminists and domestic violence service providers that 
the Howard Government's family law changes undermined women and children's safety. 
According to commentators such as Johnson (2000; 2006) and Donaghy (2003), many of 
the mainstream policies pursued by the Howard Government, particularly related to social 
welfare and workplace protections, exacerbated rather than remedied gender-based 
disadvantage. The ability to set up an autonomous household with their children reduces 
women's vulnerability to violence and facilitates leaving a man who is violent (Costello, 
Chung, & Carson, 2005). For women experiencing violence any employment is often 
disrupted by their partner's violence during and after the relationship and there is 
substantial research demonstrating links between domestic violence, poverty and 
homelessness (Thomson, 2000, p.89). Women escaping violence also often have 
immediate needs such as establishing a new household, ensuring the safety of themselves 
and their children, and dealing with the trauma of the violence. These needs often create a 
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particular reliance on the welfare system over. paid employment. The welfare system is thus 
significant in maintaining or reducing women's vulnerability to this violence since: 
The glib criticisms levelled at women who stay with violent partners ignores the reality they 
face, of being damned if they do leave and damned if they don't. Many women do not have 
equal access to household income, even when they are residing with a male partner. 
Economic dependency and the insufficiency of government benefits means that many women 
do not have a genuine choice in relation to staying or leaving a marital relationship (Thomson, 
2000, p.89). 
Thomson (2000) argues the Howard Government, however, implemented a welfare reform 
agenda reflecting narrow notions of individualism and self-reliance and promoting a welfare 
system that was pejorative, punitive, paternalistic, conditional, and demanded one-sided 
participation and mutual obligation from welfare recipients. Given their concentration 
amongst the poor, this argument suggests Howard Government welfare reform was likely to 
have a disproportionate negative impact on women, especially those experiencing violence. 
Commentators suggest women's already inequitable access to the benefits of paid 
employment was ~lso exacerbated by the Howard Government's industrial relations 
agenda. The 1907 Harvester Judgement entrenched in Australia a male-breadwinner and 
female homemaker model of the wage-earner's welfare state. Men's historical and 
institutional advantages in this system and comparative workplace power have meant 
poverty, low status and lower paid employment are still mostly concentrated amongst 
women (Thomson, 2000). The Australian workforce continues to be highly gendered with 
unequal rates of pay between men and women, increasing casualisation of women's work, 
and the negative impact of the inequitable distribution of the burden of caring for children 
and other family members (Brennan, 1999; Disney, 2004). Women were therefore 
substantially more vulnerable than men to the negative impacts of the Howard 
Government's industrial relations agenda, particularly WorkChoices. Further, the Howard 
Government's social policies in the tax and welfare systems discouraged women from 
working any1hing but minimal part time hours. 
Another policy area commentators suggest illustrates the Howard Government's erosion of 
women's rights and women's equality was international relations. Australia has historically 
played a leadership role in international advocacy for women's rights such as through 
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CEDAW8. The Howard Government, however, refused to sign the second option protocol 
(Baldino, 2005, p.195) which would have strengthened CEDAW by allowing individual 
women to take grievances against their government to the International community if all 
domestic avenues had been exhausted. In 1997 Australia was also officially censured by 
CEDAW for its "retreat from international leadership on gender equity issues and for the 
erosion of women's policy at home" (Sawer, 1999, p.49). These criticisms received wide 
media coverage at the time and "provoked a furious government reaction" (Sawer, 1999, 
p.50). As a result of this and criticism of Australia's record on asylum seekers and 
Indigenous Australians, Howard rejected Australia's traditional activist role. internationally 
and instead advanced a program of non-cooperation with international agencies (Baldino, 
2005, p.195; Manne, 2004, pp. 33-34). This included withdrawing from the International 
Court of Justice in March 2002 and refusing to sign the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. 
In international relations, as in their domestic policies, the Howard Government was 
therefore criticised for their withdrawal from the UN and erosion of women's rights and 
equality. 
There is general consensus amongst feminist writers that Australian women were worse off 
by the end of his term than when Howard first came to power (Maddison, 2004, p.42). As 
Maddison (2007) argues: 
Australia was once-a world leader in efforts to improve equality between women and men . 
... Today, after a decade of a federal government overtly hostile to these·goals, Australia's 
standing as a leader in the global struggle for gender equality is much diminished. The recently 
published Gender Report for the Democratic Audit of Australia paints a worrying picture of 
Australia's Progress towards gender equality. Many achievements of an earlier period have 
now been undone. 
Thus, these arguments suggest the Howard Government failed to address women's 
gendered disadvantages and actively dismantled Australian achievements towards equality. 
4.4.4 Sexuality 
Another important issue in the culture wars according to commentators was sexuality. 
Queer theorists argue that the classical liberal individual citizen is heteronormative, if not 
actively homophobic (Johnson, 2000, p.44). Carol Johnson (2000, p.45) argues that 
8 Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
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discourses on equality and tolerance can deny and further oppress difference rather than 
affirm it. She suggests Howard publicly endorsed and financially rewarded traditional, 
heterosexual family types in tax and social policies while simultaneously constructing non-
heterosexual relationships and families as 'private'. For Howard, according to Johnson 
(1997b), "'sexual preference apparently only refers to 'deviant' sexualities"' and this 
approach is part of the wedge politics of the culture wars. Howard defines the 'mainstream' 
(i.e. heterosexuality) as a public good to be defended and reinforced while simultaneously 
defining the 'other' (i.e. homosexuality) as a minority 'private' matter to be 'tolerated'. This 
approach to sexuality is illustrative of what Mason (1997, p.31) refers to as the "homophobic 
mind" since: 
... homophobic minds do not really care that lesbians and gay men exist, nor do they 
genuinely care about what takes place in private. The homophobic mind does not want to 
abolish homosexuality. Indeed, the very existence of lesbian and gay sexualities gives the 
homophobic mind something to rally against -a way of defining itself within a hetero/homo 
hierarchy .... the real struggle is being fought over the question of visibility: how and when 
lesbians and gay men are visible. The homophobic minds in our society do care when 
lesbians and gay men argue for legal rights or social rights .... they care when lesbians and 
gay men want to be visible and blatant- on their terms. 
This argument suggests Howard's rhetoric and social policies supported traditional nuclear 
families and actively discriminated against gay men and lesbians while simultaneously 
representing non-heterosexual sexualities as the 'private choice' of individuals. 
Gay, Lesbian and women's rights are particular targets of the Christian Right because they 
undermine the conservative strict-father patriarchal model of leadership adopted by the 
Howard Government. Tamas Pataki (2006) argues some of the conservative hatred of gay 
men is related to sexism against women. He suggests that, for conservatives, gay men 
undermine patriarchy since "the passive, receptive homosexual is seen as not unlike a 
woman" (Pataki, 2006, p.1 04). It is therefore not surprising that some of Howard's culture 
war attacks on gay and lesbian rights, such as opposition to same-sex marriage and 
adoption or undermining the Sex Discrimination Act so single and lesbian women cannot 
access fertility services available to heterosexual partnered women (Hansard, 2004j; 
Johnson, 2000, pp.45 & 81; 2006, p.3), have also impacted negatively on heterosexual 
women. Johnson (2000, p.81) argues: 
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Howard's own attitudes to issues of 'mainstream' sexuality ... throw considerable light on his 
support for particularly narrow, and heteronormative, constructions of masculinity and 
femininity .... His view that homosexual relations should stay a private matter and that gay and 
lesbian relationships should not receive the same legal status as heterosexual marriage, draws 
attention to a point ... the marriage contract was not just about patriarchy but also about 
constituting the citizen as someone with an, at least predominantly, heterosexual identity. 
Howard's approach to gay rights is therefore consistent with his broader strategy as 
identified by Johnson of both reinforcing ihe oppression of 'minority' groups such as gay 
men and lesbians at the same time disciplining the 'mainstream' heterosexual population. 
4.4.5 Race, culture and nationalism 
Howard's approach to race, culture and nationalism is the last "culture wars" issue identified 
by commentators that is of particular relevance to this thesis. As one of the most espoused 
and publicly identifiable aspects of' the culture wars, Howard's political and strategic use of 
race and culture in wedge politics is explored extensively in the literature (e.g. Brett, 2007; 
Dodson, 2004; Jupp, 2005; Maley, 2004; Manne, 2004; Marr, 2007b; Megalogenis, 2006; 
Rintoul, 2006; Rundle, 2001; Sanders, 2005). Examples of the Howard Government's 
political use of race and culture identified by these commentators include: immigration (e.g. 
the Tampa incident, 'children overboard', and their approach to asylum seekers); anti-
terrorism legislation; their approach to Aboriginal reconciliation; mainstreaming Indigenous 
programs; and abolishing ATSIC9. 
Commentators describe Howard's approach to race and ethnicity as 'assimilationist 
nationalism', 'xenophobic cultural populism' or 'integrationist' (Brett, 2005, p.25; Johnson, 
2006; Singleton, 2005, p.13). This approach invokes a taken for granted nostalgic 
conservative symbolism of the "flag, monarchy and triumphalist history" of the white 
Australian way of life (Rundle, 2001, p.53). It also reflects Howard's 'with us or against us' 
dichotomy. Howard constructs what he perceives as secondary associations and loyalties 
as barriers to individual freedom as illustrated by his comment: "I don't like hyphenated 
Australians, I just like Australians" (Howard cited in Johnson, 2006, p.4). Howard (cited in 
Johnson, 2006, p.5) also explicitly defines Australian values as "Judea-Christian ethics, the 
progressive spirit of the Enlightenment and the institutions and values of British political 
9 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (an elected federal Indigenous representative 
body). 
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culture". Further, Howard's failure to tackle the overt racism incited by Pauline Hanson and 
his approach to Indigenous Australians "maintain[ed] racism as a core value of Australian 
society" (Dodson, 2004, p.141; Jupp, 2005, p.182; Manne, 2004, p.16; Rundle, 2001, p.25). 
Brett (2005, p.41) argues Howard's nationalism is an exclusive nationalism of "insiders and 
outsiders". He demands that Indigenous Australians and "newcomers to this country must 
embrace our values" and "appear as part of the Australian community" (Howard cited in 
Johnson, 2006, p.7). Ironically targeting both the oldest and newest Australians, 
commentators argue Howard's nationalism constructs the 'other' or 'them' as ·the problem 
and repeatedly downplays structural disadvantage and racist views. David Marr provides 
insight into the connection between Howard's divisive nationalism and the arms length 
strategies of the Christian Right. He argues John Howard constructed himself as a 
"moderating public voice" and carefully "rode a culture of vilification that coarsened the 
public and intellectual life of the country" (Marr, 2007b, p.62). He also argues Howard's 
racist and exclusionary nationalism, like his approach to sexuality, sought to discipline both 
white and non-white Australians by "silencing people who are out of step with Australian 
values" (Marr, 2007b, p.48). Marr suggests this approach to race and ethnicity exemplified 
Howard's use of the politics of identity and divisive "us and them" tactics for political gain. 
Further, under the. Howard Government Marr (2007b, p.46) argues the defining mood was 
an uneasy fear of each other and the elusive 'them' which the Howard Government used to 
discipline the population and maintain conservative power. 
Significantly for this thesis, Winter (2007) and Phillips (2008b) argue that the Howard 
Government used male violence against women as a wedge issue to progress their agenda 
on race including their 'assimilationist nationalism' and 'xenophobic cultural populism', 
Winter (2007, p.40), for example, argues the Government used the "protection of 
Indigenous women and paternalistic care of indigenous Australians more generally as a 
justification for the removal of indigenous people's rights" (Winter, 2007, p.40). In particular, 
she argues the Howard Government used sexual assault allegations as a smokescreen to 
justify dismantling the elected Indigenous representative body, the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC). Further, according to Winter (2007, p.41), the Howard 
Government mobilized the concept of "respect for women" as a wedge issue to "defen~ 
Australian values"; the implied target of which was migrants from Muslim backgrounds. 
Winter provides an excellent example of this in her discussion of Sheikh Taj-al Din Hilaly, 
whose sexist comments that women are responsible for rape generated media uproar in 
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October 2006. Many critics of Hilaly, including Muslim critics, condemned his comment as 
offensive to women. Winter notes, however, that Howard's main concern was that Hilaly's 
comments were un-Australian: "I can say without fear of contradiction that what he said is 
repugnant to Australian values" (Howard 2006 cited in Winter, 2007, p.41). In this example 
Howard thus seems more concerned with promoting the concept of 'un-Australian' values 
rather than promoting respect for women or anti-violence messages. 
Winter (2007) and Phillips (2008b) also argue that the Howard Government used the issue 
of male violence against women to support and justify their involvement in the 'War on 
Terror'. Winter (2007, pp.27-28) argues the Howard Government used "protecting our 
women and liberating other women [to] provide a veneer of morality to warmongering" such 
as the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. For Winter (2007, p.46), the war on terror and the 
Howard Government's response to male violence against women are inextricably linked: 
If the war on terror is largely a fiction endorsed and embellished by the masculine Australian 
state to keep the population fearful and submissive, then the protection of women - a class 
kept insecure, docile, malleable, and both subservient to and grateful to its demon lover, in 
short, a class kept firmly bound within femininity- is integral to the maintenance of that fiction. 
Winter (2007) and Phillips (2008b) argue that, by drawing on discourses and policies to 
"safeguard Australia" and "protect women", 'the Howard Government mobilized a politics of 
fear and demanded submission to a protective authoritarian power" (Winter, 2007, p.28). 
Phillips (2008b, p.60) argues this dynamic parallels how men's power works at other (micro 
and mezzo) levels in society. Specifically, it silences and disempowers women by: 
subordinating women as citizens; repressing or excluding discourses such as feminists 
ones which challenge its authority as 'protector'; and asserts that only the nationalist 
protector and not women themselves can say what is and is not good for them (Phillips, 
2008b, pp.60 & 68; Winter, 2007, p.28). 
Winter (2007, p.26) further argues that the Howard Government' approach to this issue also 
drew upon a totalizing concept of masculinity and discourses of male chivalry and strength 
in which protection and punishment are complementary and inseparable concepts; 'two 
sides of the same coin of male domination". In this way the Howard Government modE)IIed 
and reinforced on a macro level the heterosexual male patriarch's responsibility to protect 
women under his authority and punish women who do not submit to his authority at the 
mezzo and micro levels (Ruthchild, 1997, p.3). Simultaneously, Winter also argues the 
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Howard Government's promotion of the 'protector state' was strategic obfuscation which 
separated men's power to punish and to protect She argues "the discursive 
compartmentalization of masculinity into either aggressive or protective only serves to 
reinforce male domination by preventing one from seeing it in its entirety and complexity" 
(Winter, 2007, pp.26-27). Thus, Winter and Phillips suggest the Howard Government 
strategically utilised male violence against women as a wedge issue to progress their 
agendas on race, culture, nationalism and the 'War on Terror' while simultaneously 
increasing women's vulnerability to male violence. 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has explored the nature of the Australian Government during the Howard 
years between 1996 and 2007. In particular it has explored the mix of neo-liberalism, social 
conservatism and political opportunism that a number of commentators argue characterised 
the Howard Government It has also explored the expression of these key characteristics in 
practice through the Howard Government's social policies and their "culture wars". 
Specifically, it outlined five areas of the Howard Government's social policy agenda 
identified by commentators that had a particular relevance to male violence against women: 
Christianity and campaigns of the religious right; nuclear families and traditional family 
values; gender and women's equality; sexuality; and race culture and nationalism. This 
chapter is important since it provides an outline of the broader social policy context in which 
the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women were located. 
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Introducing the Study 
Chapter 5: Introducing the Study 
To produce an account and feminist analysis of the Howard Government's approaches to 
male violence against women I conducted a two stage study. This study sought to answer 
the research question: What was the nature of the Australian Government's approaches to 
male violence against women during the Howard years (1996-2007). This question arose 
from an interest in how and why the conservative Howard Government provided a 
sustained and comparatively well-funded public policy response to male violence against 
women between1996 and 2007. To explore this research question, stage one of the study 
involved semi-structured interviews with thirty key informants who had particular 
experiences or expertise in the development of the Howard Government's approaches. The 
aim of the key informant interviews was to develop a broad and detailed account of the 
development, nature and content of the Australian government's responses to male 
violence against women during the Howard years. The interview data was supplemented 
with a review of relevant texts from the period to assist filling any gaps. Stage two involved 
two in-depth case studies of the Australian Government's approaches to male violence 
against women during the Howard years. The first case study was of Partnerships and 
focused on policy process. The second case study was of Australia Says No and focused 
on content. Alter detailing each of the study's stages, this chapter briefly explores reflectivity 
and reflexivity in the research process as well as some ethical considerations guiding the 
research. 
5.1 Stage One: Key Informant Interviews and Texts 
5.1.1 Key informant interviews 
Semi-structured interviews with key informants was the main data collection method for 
stage one of the study. The purpose of these interviews was to develop a broad and 
detailed account of the development, nature and content of the Howard Government's 
approaches to male violence against women. The use of semi-structured interviews was 
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important since, iri feminist research practice, it enables an interactive interview style and 
challenges traditional power and research hierarchies (Finch, 1993, p.174). It also allowed 
participants to describe their experiences freely while allowing the researcher to ascertain 
specific information concerning the research question. This approach balanced the benefits 
of structured and unstructured interviews by allowing structure and focus on the research 
question while facilitating the emergence of the participant's own themes, frames and ideas: 
This study replicated Ramsay's (2004, p.30) approach of 'key player' or 'elite' interviews 
and used non-probability purposive sampling (Llewellyn, Sullivan, & Minichiello, 1999, 
pp.178-180) to recruit participants. I selected and approached 'key informants' to be 
interviewed based on their experience or knowledge about the Howard Government's 
responses to male violence against women. Possible key informants were identified through 
a range of strategies such as reading reports from the period, word of mouth, and my 
knowledge and. experience as a social worker and policy officer in the field of male violence 
against women. I also planned to interview at least one key informant from each Australian 
state and territory who had participated on the Partnerships Taskforce1° Consequently, a 
range of possible participants were approached including Howard Government ministers, 
members of parliament, federal and state public servants, academics, and members of 
relevant peak organisations. All except three of the people approached for an interview 
agreed to participate in the study and there were a total of twenty-nine interviews completed 
with thirty key informants. Almost all of the key informants had direct experience with either 
Partnerships, the National Initiative, No Respect, and/or Australia Says No. The two 
exceptions were 'expert outsiders'; who were state public servants who had run their own 
state-based violence against women prevention campaigns and provided general 
comments on Australia Says No based on their expertise. 
The interviews were approved by the University of Sydney Human Research Ethics 
Committee. The information sheet and participant consent forms are provided in 
Appendices 5.1 and 5.2. The ethical considerations and obligations adhered to throughout 
this research included: minimising potential harm; ensuring freely given informed consent 
and easy withdrawal from the research; and ensuring privacy and confidentiality including 
through coding and the safe storage of raw data (Bryman, 2001, p.479; University of 
Sydney Research Office, nd). 
10 I was unable to interview a representative on the Partnerships Taskforce from the Northern 
Territory. I did, however, interview three key informants from the Northern Territory with a working 
knowledge of Partnerships. 
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Between September 2006 and October 2007 I conducted twenty-nine face-to-face 
interviews and one telephone interview with key informants. I completed research trips to 
each Australian state and territory during this time and interviewed eighteen participants in 
their workplace, six in their homes, and six in .cafes. Each interview involved one key 
informant, the exception was one interview where two key informants were interviewed 
together at their request. In two interviews with politicians an adviser was present for the 
interview. Interviews were approximately an hour long. The shortest was 45 minutes and 
the longest was 2 hours and 11 minutes. I taped twenty-eight interviews with a digital 
recording device and took written notes. In one interview I only took written notes at the 
request of the key informant. In two interviews I turned off the recording device during a 
short part of the interview at the request of the key informant when they shared information 
they did not wish to be recorded. 
I developed an initial open-ended list of questions which are provided in Appendix 5.3. 
Consistent with semi-structured interviews, these questions were not prescriptive and were 
only used as needed to help guide conversation in the interviews. In the interviews the key 
informants discussed: their experiences, memories and interpretations of the policy 
process; how the Howard Government's responses were established and developed; and 
their perceptions of the social and political context. I responded to key informant's reactions 
and recollections through further questioning, discussion, and clarification during the 
interview. In two cases (with their prior permission), I recontacted key informants by email to 
clarify or obtain further information. 
Given the sensitivity of some interview topics, I followed Chappell's (2002b, p. 17) approach 
of enabling the interviewees to be as frank as possible by promising to protect their 
identities in any published work. To protect the anonymity of key informants through 
transcription, data analysis and thesis writing I allocated each a code number (K1.1 to Kl.30) 
based on the sequence of interviews. A number of the key informants held more than one 
position between 1996 and 2007 related to the areas researched or were no longer in a 
relevant position (or retired) at the time of interview. The thirty key informants occupied a 
total of 46 different roles that were relevant to this research. During the process of writing 
this thesis I originally referred to key informants within the thesis using their code number. It 
became clear, however, that this coding system created the potential to reveal the identity 
of certain key informants. 
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To ensure key informants could not be identified in the thesis I developed a new system of 
allocating numbered roles and identities. The categories allocated to key informants 
included: Academic (those employed in universities, research positions or clearinghouses); 
Taskforce Member; Peak Body Representative; Federal Public Servant; State Public 
Servant; Government MP; Opposition MP; MCGC Member (Ministerial Council on 
Government Communications); and Evaluator (member of the Partnerships .Meta-
Evaluation). This system was generic to prevent revealing a key informant's identity but also 
numbered to differentiate between participants. I allocated the majority of key informants 
more than one numbered descriptor in this coding system. This was because they occupied 
two roles simultaneously (for example State Public Servant and Taskforce Member) or 
occupied two different positions during this period. When a key informant is cited or quoted 
in this research I refer to the most appropriate position allocated to that key informant that is 
relevant to the quote cited". 
5.1.2 Supplementary texts 
To supplement the key informant interview data, I reviewed over two hundred relevant 
documents or texts related to the Howard Government's responses to male violence 
against women: The term 'text' here refers to a "linguistic cultural artefact" which includes: 
written texts; visual images; sound recordings; and multi-semiotic texts such as television 
commercials or web-pages (Fairclough, 1995, p.4; 2003, p.3). The primary purpose of 
reviewing these texts was to verify, clarify or contribute to facts or information provided by 
key informants and to fill gaps in the data. In particular, they assisted in constructing 
comprehensive timelines and describing the content of the Howard Government's 
approaches. 
A hierarchy of value was applied to assess the quality of the texts reviewed for stage one of 
the study based on Alan Bryman's (2001, pp.370-371) approach so that texts higher up the 
hierarchy were give greater weight in the study particularly in the case of contradictions in 
the information. This hierarchy included the criteria of authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness, meaning, relevance, supporting evidence or consistency, and 
frequency of mention. The texts reviewed for stage one were divided into three different 
11 Where key informants were members of the Partnerships Taskforce I tended to refer to them 
through this role unless doing so would compromise their identity or they occupied another role that 
had much greater relevance to the quote or argument cited. 
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categories based loosely on types identified by Bryman (2001, pp.369-385) and roughly 
corresponding to the hierarchy of value above. 
The first category was publicly available (published) official documents and texts of the 
Howard Government and of the Australian Parliament between 1996 and 2007. These texts 
included: Partnerships annual reports (Partnerships Taskforce, 1999, 2000, 2001); 
Partnerships meta-evaluation reports (e.g. Strategic Partners, 2003b); OFW and OSW 
websites; relevant speeches and media releases from the Government, Opposition (ALP), 
Democrats and the Greens; the Parliamentary Hansard; and selected national research 
reports from Partnerships and the National Initiative (e.g. National Crime Prevention, 2001; 
OSW, 2004a). 
The second category was departmental working documents of the Howard Government. 
These included: OSW briefing notes; National Relationship Violence and Sexual Assault 
Campaign Communication Strategy (OSW, 2003a); advertisements from No Respect, No 
Relationship; unpublished evaluations; memos; emails; and National Sexual Assault 
Roundtable documents. 
The third categoiy was media reports about Partnerships, the National Initiative, No 
Respect or Australia Says No. These included: 99 newspaper articles from a variety of 
Australian local, state and national papers sourced from the database Factiva; one radio 
interview on Triple J's Hack program (Cannane, 2004); and two ABC 7.30 Report stories 
(Bowden, 2004a, 2004b). 
5.1.3 Data coding 
The empirical data collected for stage one of the study, both the key informant interviews 
and relevant texts, were coded and analysed in a cyclical and continuous process repeated 
until the completion of the thesis. This process had a number of stages developed by 
adapting the approaches to coding and analysis described by Dale Bagshaw (2004, pp.114-
115) and Margaret Alston and Wendy Bowles (2003, p.207). These were: 
1 . Data reduction - organising the data and categorising it into codes. 
2. Data organisation- assembling the information around identified themes. 
3. Data interpretation - identifying categories of meaning; recurring ideas or 
language; patterns, trends and explanations; and salient themes. 
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4. Testing emergent hypothesis against the data and further literature. 
5. Searching for alternative explanations of the data. 
6. Interpreting the data and writing the thesis. 
These stages were not linear. Rather, they were repeated in a circular pattern, and often 
out of order, until the completion of the thesis. For ease of explanation in this chapter, 
however, they are divided these into two sections; data coding and data analysis. 
Each interview was transcribed from the digital recording and read in full b!Jfore importing it 
into NVivo. NVivo is a computer program designed to assist researchers analysing and 
auditing qualitative data and for seeking and exploring associations and relationships in 
qualitative data (Bazeley, 2007; Bellman, 2005, p.87). In the study, NVivo was particularly 
valuable for managing and querying data in the process of data reduction and, to a lesser 
extent, organisation and interpretation by managing ideas through program functions such 
as memos. 
In addition to the interview data, I imported into NVivo all texts from stage one of the 
research that were Jn an appropriate form. These were mainly smaller documents and 
included: 101 media texts {99 newspaper articles and 2 television transcripts); 34 
parliamentary speeches from Hansard; 36 Howard Government documents including media 
releases, speeches, and bulletins; and 17 non-Government political parties' media releases 
(ALP, Australian Democrats and Greens). 
Data coding has the pragmatic goal of sorting an unwieldily body of text into manageable 
chunks (Bagshaw, 2004, p.95). It is a process of data reduction and organisation (the first 
two stages in the list above). NVivo allows a researcher to code data from imported sources 
into categories called "nodes" which are storage areas for references to coded text 
(Bazeley, 2007, p.15). I coded all interview transcripts and texts imported into NVivo loosely 
around the research question and the additional themes which emerged from the data. I 
reviewed coded transcripts and texts numerous times to ensure consistency in coding with 
emerging themes and I occasionally receded passages of text into more appropriate nodes 
that had emerged in coding other sources. During this process of coding, nodes were often 
also read, re-read, reviewed, broken up or re-structured as appropriate. At the conclusion of 
coding there were a total of 77 nodes which were divided into the following categories: free 
nodes; broader Government policy agenda; funding; personal experiences and 
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perspectives; political and bureaucratic involvement; and policies and campaign process 
and development policies and campaign evaluation and critique. 
After completing coding for each transcript, I assigned key informants generic attributes in 
predetermined categories including: current position; relevant experience (i.e. Partnerships, 
the National Initiative, and/or Australia Says No); whether they were on the Partnerships 
Taskforce; their type of position (e.g. State Government, Federal Government, NGO, Peak 
body); their actual positions relevant to the research; and the state or territory they were 
from. These attributes allowed responses from different key informants to be compared and 
contrasted. 
5.1.4 Data analysis 
Data analysis refers to stages three to six of the list above. The aim of qualitative data 
analysis is to find meaning in the information and data collected and to find, interpret and 
explain shared themes in the data (Patton, 2004, p.117). This stage of the research process 
allows the researcher to move beyond data management and description to explanatory 
theory. It is the part ofthe research where themes and concepts in the data can be linked 
together in theoretical models (Ryan & Bernard, 2000, p.782). Data analysis in the study 
was an inductive, cyclical and continuous process rather than a linear progression. This 
means the data analysis began with detailed observations and large volumes of data. I then 
managed the data into themes, concepts and descriptive accounts before developing 
explanatory accounts linked to theory. The process of data analysis used in this thesis is 
best explained by the concept of the analytic hierarchy developed by Liz Spencer and her 
colleagues (Spencer, Ritchie, & O'Connor, 2003) which is reproduced in Figure 5.1 below. 
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A depiction of the stages and proceaes Involved In qwolltativ. """lysis 
Seeking applications 
to wider theory/ 
policy strategies 
Developing EXPtANTORY Iterative process 
explanatoons ACCOUNTS tfvoughovt analysis 
(answering how and 
why questions) Assigmng data to 
refined ooncept:s to 
portray meaning 
Detecting patterns 
1 
(associative analysis 
and identification of 
clustering) 
Establishing Refining and diStilling 
typologies more abstract con~pts 
Identifying elements DESCRJI'TIVE 
1 and dimenslons. ACCOUNTS refining categories, classifying data 
Assigning data co 
themes/concepts to 
Summarising or -~r~ synthesising data 
Sorting data by 
theme or concf!pt 
(in cross-sectional 
analysis) Ass1gnmg meaning 
labf!lling or tagging DATA 
1 data by concept or MANAGEMENT them., 
Identifying initial 
Gen.,~ting thefflf!S and 
conapr:s 
themes or concepts 
RAW DATA 
Figure 5.1 - The Analytic Hierarchy 
(Reproduced from Spencer et al., 2003, p.212) 
This analytic hierarchy is a conceptual scaffolding to guide data analysis which provides a 
series of viewing platforms, each of which involves different analytical tasks to help the 
researcher make sense of the data (Spencer et al., 2003, p.213). Spencer and her 
colleagues explain that the analytic process in this framework is not linear and is shown as 
a ladder to enable movement up and down the structure during the research process. This 
structure provides building blocks enabling the researcher to look 'down' on what is 
emerging, revisit original or synthesised data to develop new concepts or theories, check 
assumptions, or identify underlying factors (Spencer et al. , 2003, p.213). Within this 
framework, I used two main approaches to data analysis. 
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First, were strategies for working directly with the data. Similarly to Michelle Jones (2004) 
and Catherine Bettman (2005), I used a number of tools from the grounded theory 
methodology although my approach did not actually follow the grounded theory approach. 
The tools I used from this approach to assist analyse my research data included: memos, 
comparison, some aspects of theoretical sampling, and the incorporation of negative cases 
(Ryan & Bernard, 2000, pp. 782-783). 
Memos are analytical notes to help researchers think theoretically about findings and can 
include notes recording theoretical questions, concepts, hypotheses, insights,. and thoughts 
about future data collection (Alston & Bowles, 2003, p.208). Following the completion of 
coding for each interview, I developed a memo attached to each key informant 'case'. This 
included: a summary of details about the key informant and interview (e.g. position, why 
they were interviewed, and date and time of interview); a summary of the key themes in the 
interview; reflections on the interview; topics for further consideration; and links to theory. In 
addition to case-based memos, I used two other types of memos. First, I developed memos 
attached to nodes that linked with, and helped develop, theory. Second, I developed a 
journal memo that provided a higher level of abstraction, reflections, and links to theory 
through the research process. 
Another tool I used for data analysis was comparison (Ryan & Bernard, 2000, p. 783). In 
coding and receding the nodes and structuring them within hierarchal structures in tree 
nodes, I read and reviewed the content of each node many times. As my coding categories 
became clearer and I sought to link these themes to theories, I compared and contrasted 
the interviews, the nodes and emerging themes. I also compared and contrasted these 
themes to theory and broader theoretical frameworks informed by the literature. 
Theoretical sampling refers to theory-guided data collection (Alston & Bowles, 2003, p.11 ). 
Although I did not strictly follow a theoretical sampling approach, this concept did influence 
my data analysis. The comparisons I had made between interviews, concepts, nodes and 
themes generated new questions and queries which were included and clarified in 
interviews with other participants. Further, my analysis of interviews and emergent themes 
directed my attention to potential key informants to approach for interviews because of their 
particular knowledge or experience in the area or theme emerging from the data. Bettman 
(2005, p.89) argues prominent grounded theorists "Strauss and Corbin encourage turning 
towards literature or experience to find examples of similar phenomena". Consistent with 
92 
' 
Chapter 5: Introducing the Study 
this, my data and analysis guided my ongoing searches for literature to assist develop 
theory and explanatory frameworks to make sense of the findings. 
I also noted and incorporated negative cases into emerging theory. Negative cases refer to 
those that don't fit the theoretical model developed and may suggest new connections need 
to be made (Ryan & Bernard, 2000, p.782). I was conscious of negative cases throughout 
the study and tried to ensure these were incorporated into theory development and given a 
voice in writing up the study. Incorporating and accommodating negative cases into 
analysis in this way reflected some of the key principles of qualitative data including 
encompassing diversity and demonstrating interest in the nature of the phenomenon 
studied rather than its statistical distribution (Lewis & Ritchie, 2003, p.277-278). 
The approach to research analysis in this study generated data-induced hypotheses. 
Nevertheless, some broad conceptual categories based predominantly on the research 
question and interview schedule had some influence on data analysis including on 
structuring the data and coding. This pre-determined schema was particularly influential on 
coding and analysing earlier interviews. These broad concepts reflected my interests in: 
policy context; the content of the Howard Government's responses; history and policy 
.• 
process; and the representation of the problem. These broad concepts were modified, 
adapted and developed in response to the data and emerging concepts and themes. 
The second way I operationalised the analytical hierarchy in the study was through writing. 
This approach to data analysis was particularly relevant to the case studies in stage two 
outlined below. It was, however, also significant for the analysis of the interviews and review 
of the texts in stage one. In particular, writing as a process of analysis enabled me to more 
fully incorporate insights from reading, rereading and coding the supplementary texts 
including some of the larger documents that were not able to be imported into NVivo. 
Keith Punch (1998) explains that, in the traditional model of research, writing is not done 
until the research is completed in its entirety. He argues a different view of research writing 
sees it as "a way of leaning, a way of knowing, a form of analysis and inquiry" (Punch, 
1998, pp.279-280). Writing in this model is part of thinking, analysing and interpreting. 
Punch also argues this understanding of writing as discovery, analysis and inquiry is more 
common in qualitative analysis. Writing was an extremely important part of analysis in this 
thesis. I commenced writing early in the research process and used it to test connections 
between data and developing concepts, themes and theories. This was a particularly 
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important part of ongoing literature reviews and developing theoretical concepts to make 
sense of the data. 
The process or writing as analysis involved constant drafting, writing, reviewing and 
rewriting of this thesis in a cyclical and inductive process which mirrored the general 
approach to data management and analysis. As data reduction and analysis progressed 
and clearer explanatory accounts emerged, the structure and content of the thesis were 
substantially reworked to reflect changes in emerging theories and hypotheses. In this 
process I had a system of placing sections of data, quotes, or other evidence either 
supporting or contradicting a specific theme in the relevant place within the thesis 
highlighted in blue at the time it came to my attention again. When I later came back to that 
point or theme in the thesis to rewrite it I would consider all the sections highlighted in blue 
and incorporate these into the argument or theme. This process assisted in verification in 
the research analysis and enabled me to continuously ground the research in the data in a 
way consistent with moving up and down the ladder on the analytic hierarchy. 
5.2 Stage Two: Case Studies 
Stage two of the study involved in-depth case studies of the Howard Government initiatives 
Partnerships Against Domestic Violence as a case study of policy process and Australia 
Says No as a case study of policy content. These case studies also sought to answer the 
research question: What was the nature of the Australian Government's approaches to 
male violence against women during the Howard years (1996-2007). Whereas the first 
stage of the research focused on producing an account of this period, this second stage 
was developed to conduct a more detailed analysis of policy process and content through 
the two case studies. 
5.2.1 Partnerships Against Domestic Violence 
The first in-depth case study explored Partnerships and focused on policy process .. 1 chose 
Partnerships as a case study for this purpose because of the significant experiences of key 
informants with this initiative and the large volume of empirical data generated in stage one 
about Partnerships. I also chose Partnerships because it was the most sustained and well-
funded of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women. It was 
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therefore highly representative of the Howard Government's approaches and had the 
largest available body of texts for analysis. 
The case study of Partnerships used the same empirical data (key informant interviews and 
supplementary texts), data coding and data analysis techniques as stage one. In stage one, 
the focus of the analysis was to develop a detailed account of the Howard Government's 
approaches to male violence against women. In stage two, however, the focus shifted to 
look in significant detail and seek to explain the nature of the policy process and roles of 
individuals during this period. I did this first by returning to those aspects of the empirical 
data that specifically focussed on policy process and the role of individuals and I applied the 
same techniques of data coding and analysis as in stage one. In the approach to data 
analysis and theory development, however, I also incorporated themes, concepts and 
theory from the literature outlined in Chapters Three and Four on Australian feminist 
engagements with the state and the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda. 
This literature helped me to make sense of this period and develop explanatory theory. 
5.2.2 Violence Against Women -Australia Says No 
The second case study explored Australia Says No and focused on content. I chose 
Australia Says No as the case study of content because it had the largest amount of 
published text and material from which to conduct an analysis of this type. Australia Says 
No was also sustained over a number of years and was the Howard Government's most 
public and well-known response to male violence against women. Further, Australia Says 
No was funded by, and closely linked to, Partnerships, the National Initiative and the 
Women's Safety Agenda. The Howard Government also had close oversight of this 
campaign and excluded input from outside of the federal government. Australia Says No 
was therefore highly representative of the Howard Government's approaches to male 
violence against women and thus a valuable subject for an in-depth case study of content. 
Unlike the first case study, the empirical data collected for stage one did not provide a 
sufficient foundation to explore the content of Australia Says No. I therefore developed a 
method of empirical data collection, coding and analysis to explore content in this case 
study based on Carol Bacchi's (1999b) 'What's the Problem (represented to be)?' 
approach. 
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Bacchi's 'What's the Problem?' approach departs from current approaches to policy studies 
that are limited to describing what governments do or refuse to do. Bacchi (1999b, pp.1 0-
31) conceptualises policy as a strategic, inherently political process constituting the shape 
of the subject under construction. Her approach addresses: 
... how every proposal necessarily contains presuppositions and assumptions which often go 
unanalysed, how these representations shape an issue in ways which limit possibilities for 
change. It also offers a framework for examining gaps and silences in policy debate by asking 
what remains unproblematized in certain representations (Bacchi, 1999b, p.12). 
Starting from the premise that problematizations are a central focus of analysis, Bacchi 
(1999b, p.60) seeks to broaden the political agenda by directing attention to what does not 
get problematised in existing policy and to silences such as those of gender and power 
relations. Bacchi (1999b, pp.1-2) also argues that policy interpretations and constructions 
are themselves interventions since they contain implicit and explicit diagnosis of a 'problem' 
which has programatic outcomes. Thus, the effect or outcome of policy is an inseparable 
part of policy analysis in this methodology. 
Discourse, rather than rhetoric, is the focus of the 'What's the Problem?' approach (Bacchi, 
1999b, pp.39 & 60). This approach provides conceptual tools to interrogate representations 
of 'problems' (Bacchi, 1999b, p.13) and is a research technique which conducts 
methodology, method, data collection and data analysis simultaneously. This methodology 
allows the researcher to identify and evaluate policy representations including: their effects 
on programatic orientations; its impact on the subjects/objects of policy; and its impact on 
shaping the political agenda (Bacchi, 1999b, p.1 0). Bacchi (1999b, pp.12-13) recommends 
five frames containing the following questions be asked by the researcher analysing policy: 
1. What is the problem of (domestic violence, abortion, etc) represented to be whether in a 
specific policy debate or in a specific policy proposal? 
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underlie the representation? 
3. What effects are produced by this representation? How are subjects constituted within? 
What is likely to change? What is likely to stay the same? Who is likely to benefit from this 
representation? 
4. What is left unproblematic in this representation? 
5. How would 'responses' differ if the 'problem' were thought about or represented differently? 
Bacchi's 'What's the Problem?' approach thus provides a sophisticated framework to 
interrogate the content of Australia Says No. Based on Bacchi's approach I developed a 
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tool to conduct an analysis of texts from Australia Says No. Bacchi's 'What's the Problem?' 
approach offered a valuable foundation for this textual analysis tool and her five questions 
formed the over-arching framework for the tool. This tool is provided in Appendix 5.4. 
Before using this tool for the data analysis for the case study of content, I collected all 
available primary texts for Australia Says No. These included: Violence Against Women -
Australia Says No Booklet; Violence Against Indigenous Women - Time To Say No 
Booklet; posters aimed at mainstream and Indigenous audiences; a selection of four 
television advertisements; a pamphlet; magazine advertisement targeting women; the 
campaign website; and the Education Resource. Three of these texts were not in a simple 
written form and so I included these in the textual analysis by modifying them in the 
following ways. First, I transcribed the television advertisements from video tapes. Second, I 
printed out the material in the Curriculum Support Materials from the CD-ROM in the 
Education Resource Pack. Third, I watched the Loves Me, Loves Me Not DVD 
accompanying the Education Resource three times and took written notes. 
Once texts were in a tangible, written form, I read through this raw data multiple times, 
making notes and observations on the texts themselves and highlighting passages that 
were of particular interest or reflected common themes. I then used the textual analysis tool 
I had developed and wrote answers for each of the questions in this tool by frequently 
referring back to the texts themselves and my notes. I was careful to provide evidence such 
as direct quotes or page references for my answers to each question in the tool. 
Although this technique of data collection and analysis differed to the one adopted for the 
first case study, both used thesis writing as a form of data analysis. The completed textual 
analysis tool formed a significant foundation for the case study of the campaign's content. 
The process of writing as analysis, however, involved constantly drafting, writing, reviewing 
and rewriting large sections of this case study and incorporating explanatory theory and 
analysis. I also followed a cyclical and inductive approach by constantly referring back to 
the original raw data and the completed textual analysis tool to verify and further my 
analysis of the content of Australia Says No during the writing up process for this second 
case study. 
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5.3 Reflectivity and Reflexivity in the Research Process 
The use of writing as analysis highlights the important of reflectivity and reflexivity in the 
research process. It is, as Bettman (2005, p.87) argues, too simple to claim that the 
empirical data solely directed 'the organisation and analysis of data; the coding, selection 
and development of themes, categories and subcategories" or explanatory theory. Contrary 
to positivist models of research that claim research and researchers are objective, I agree 
with Bettman (2005, p.87) that it is impossible for any analysis to be totally free of bias. The 
opinions and perspectives of the researcher invariably become part of the empirical 
evidence of the research analysis and conclusions (Mason, 1995, p.22). Indeed, feminist 
researchers often argue that personal experience and perspective is a valuable asset for 
feminist research (Reinharz, 1992, p.258). 
As a feminist researcher I acknowledge my background, experiences, and social and 
political context are a valuable asset to this research project. Consequently, I am also 
committed to reflective and reflexive practice in the research process which locates the 
researcher as inextricably part of the data generation and interpretation process (Spencer 
et al., 2003, p.205). ·In this thesis I adopted a critically reflective and reflexive position by 
reflecting on .ali' aspects of the research process including the topic, concepts studied, 
theoretical perspectives, research practices, methodologies, analyses and conclusions. I 
also maintained awareness of the impact of my perspectives, experiences and values. I did 
this by: being self-critical and reflecting on my own biases and prejudices; trying to keep an 
open mind; listening carefully to key informants; trying not to make assumptions; checking 
and summarising responses; and seeking alternative evidence to my interpretations of data. 
Although I am a "privileged author" or "privileged editor" of participants' views (Bettman, 
2005, p.88), I also acknowledge the role of social interaction in producing meaning. As 
Bettman (2005, p.88) argues, meaning is co-produced through relationships and multiple 
perspectives of lived experiences and subjectivities are the product of social interactions. 
This research was a two-way process in which interaction and relationships, with the key 
informants and with the data, was fundamental. Although acknowledging this two-way 
relationship, where possible I attempted to use representative comments including the key 
informants' exact words to reflect the general trends, themes, concepts and theories from 
the data. Simultaneously, I acknowledge that as a feminist researcher only 'giving voice' to 
key informants or texts is an abdication of my responsibility to link this data with broader 
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theoretical frameworks and feminist paradigms to advance social change (Mason, 1995, 
pp.11-12; Patton, 2004, p.121 ). 
5.4 Limitations of the Study 
There are some limitations restricting the generalisability of this study's findings and the 
capacity to replicate it. First, it was impossible to interview all participants in the policy 
process for all of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women 
examined in this period. Second, stage one of the study relied on key informants' 
recollections of the policy process. Some key informants commented on their difficulty 
recalling key events or policy processes during this time. This highlights the importance of 
having completed this stage of the study while key informants were still able to provide 
detailed descriptions of the policy process. It also suggests, however, that while it may be 
valuable to replicate the methodology from stage one of the study, it would be difficult to 
replicate it on this exact topic given the further passage of time. Third, although this thesis 
contextualises the initiatives studied in the broader policy context, it was beyond the scope 
of this study to explore other Howard Government initiatives in detail. Howard Government 
initiatives that responded to this issue beyond those studied for this thesis may provide 
further insight )nto the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against 
women during the Howard years. Fourth, as argued above, the opinions and perspectives 
of the researcher invariably become part of the empirical evidence, research analysis and 
conclusions. Consequently, each individual text could be interpreted in many ways as a 
result of the perspectives, understandings and knowledge systems of those who produce 
the text as well as those who receive and analyse it. This thesis can therefore only 
represent a number of ways of understanding the Australian Government's approaches to 
male violence against women during the Howard years rather than being a definitive 
narrative or analysis of this period. Finally, consistent with qualitative approaches to 
research, this thesis makes no claims to generalisability. As discussed above, however, 
critical reflectivity and reflexivity were nevertheless an important part of the research 
methodology which sought to make transparent the role of the researcher within this thesis. 
5-5 Ethical Considerations 
Three ethical considerations guided this thesis in addition to the requirements of the 
University of Sydney's Human Research Ethics Committee. These included: ethical 
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responsibilities as a feminist researcher; professional ethics; and ethical principles in the 
research process. 
While there is little consensus on exactly what constitutes feminist methodology, there are 
distinctive features of feminist research methodologies. These include: doing research for 
rather than on women; incorporating perspectives, experiences, needs and interests of 
women as individuals and a group; and critiquing the role of power in society (Byrne & 
Lentin, 2000, pp.7-8; S. Mason, 1997, p.12; Mies, 1993, pp.71-71; Ramazanoglu, 2002, 
pp.2-16). Sally Mason (1997, p.11) argues that "feminist principles guide research but do 
not dictate the use of specific methods". She suggest that what characterises feminist 
research is how the methods are used rather than the methods themselves (S. Mason, 
1997, p.27). 
Feminist ethical considerations I have observed include: a choice of topic seeking positive 
change in women's lives; working with women rather than 'studying' them; celebrating the 
expertise of women on their own lives; and actively campaigning for positive change since 
in feminist inquiry ·~he point is to change the world, not only to study it" (Stanley, 1990, 
p. 15). James Messerschmidt (2005, p.197) argues that creating a more equal society 
requires examining men, their advantages, how men reproduce these advantages, men's 
/ 
interests in challenging these advantages, and promoting possibilities for change. Similarly, 
Catherine Bettman (2005) and Amanda Shea Hart (2006) challenge the traditional feminist 
focus on women. They argue oppression and violence can only be understood by studying 
those who exercise social power, whether they be men perpetrating violence (Bettman, 
2005) or powerful groups upholding the patriarchal social order such as family court judges 
(Shea Hart, 2006). By focusing on the Howard Government's approaches, my thesis 
observes this emerging importance of studying men, male institutions and male power in 
feminist work. 
As a woman in a patriarchal society I recognise that male violence against women is not an 
abstract research topic but a constant presence in women's lives restricting our freedom 
and violating our human rights. Consequently, I feel an ethical responsibility to be faithful to 
the strength, courage and experiences of all women affected by male violence. My 
approach to this thesis has therefore adopted the ethical positioning and moral commitment 
evident in Judith Herman's (2001, pp.134-135) discussion of the difference between 
technical and moral neutrality in therapeutic relationships with women affected by violence. 
Consistent with Herman's thesis, I strive for technical neutrality in the research process 
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while maintaining a morally committed stance in solidarity with women victimised. This 
stance recognises and affirms that violence is a crime, a fundamental injustice and a 
violation of human rights. As Liz Kelly (1988, p.73) states: 
Any researcher choosing to study sexual violence must begin with an ethical commitment, a 
commitment which includes not condoning abuse explicitly or implicitly, seeing the purpose of 
research as increasing understanding in order that more appropriate responses can be 
developed, and wanting to contribute to a long-term goal of ending violence in the lives of 
women and children. 
In this thesis I view these ethical obligations as fundamental to the research design. 
A second ethical consideration is the ethics of the Social Work profession. Similarly to 
Kayser-Janes and Koenig's (1994, p.21-30) conclusions about the tension between 
professional and research values in the nursing context, my role as a social worker 
supersedes that of researcher in certain circumstances. Specifically, the Australian 
Association of Social Workers (AASW) (2000, p.15) Code of Ethics require privacy and 
confidentiality (including in research) to be contravened in order to fulfil statutory obligations 
or to protect any individual whose safety is at risk. I explained to research participants these 
limitations to privacy and confidentiality to enable informed choice regarding disclosures I 
might be unable to keep confidential. The AASW (2000, p.20) also delineates ethical 
responsibilities specifically for research. Although many of these are consistent with 
requirements of university ethics committees, additional ethical considerations include: only 
using qualified practitioners for research requiring specialised techniques; informing 
research participants of the results of the research; and infomning relevant bodies of results 
that demonstrate social inequalities or injustices (AASW, 2000, p.20). 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduced the study by outlining its two stages, the importance of reflectivity 
and reflexivity in the research process, and ethical considerations observed. Through key 
informant interviews and supplementary texts, stage one aimed to develop a broad and 
detailed account of the development, nature and content of the Howard Government's 
approaches to male violence against women. Chapters Six and Seven provide this 
comprehensive account of the Australian Government's approaches during the Howard 
years (1996 to 2007). Chapter Eight explores key themes from stage one and how the 
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Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women might best be 
understood from a feminist perspective. Stage two provided two in-depth case studies of 
policy process and content respectively. Chapter Nine explores the first case study on 
Partnerships and policy process. Chapter Ten explores the second case study on the 
content of Australia Says No. The discussion at the end of each of these chapters seeks to 
make sense of this period and to explore how the Howard Government's approaches may 
best be understood from a feminist perspective. 
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Chapter Six 
Male Violence Against Women 
Policy and Program Development 1996-2007 
A key aim of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive account of the Australian 
Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years. The 
following chapter provides the first part of this account by documenting the history, content 
and development of the Howard Government's policy and program responses to this issue. 
This account was developed from stage one of the study and includes: Partnerships 
Against Domestic Violence (Partnerships) (1997-2005), the National Initiative to Combat 
Sexual Assault (National Initiative) (2000-2005), the Women's Safety Taskforce (2002), and 
the Women's Safety Agenda (2005-2007). This chapter is structured chronologically and 
addresses the history and development, policy machinery, and the content of each policy or 
program. 
6.1 Partnerships Against Domestic Violence (1997 - 2005) 
Partnerships was the first significant Howard Government policy/program response to male 
violence against women and the only one with significant involvement from state 
governments. Consequently, many key informants were personally involved in Partnerships 
and extensive documentation was available. The account of Partnerships is therefore more 
detailed than the account of the Howard Government's other policy and program 
approaches. Partnerships involved two distinct phases; Partnerships 1 from 1997 until 30 
June 2001 and Partnerships 2 from 30 June 2001 until 30 June 2005. Each phase differed 
in character, content, structure, funding, policy machinery and priority areas. 
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6.1.1 Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Phase One (1997 - 2001) 
Partnerships 1 History and Development 
On 16 February 1996 the Coalition released Opportunities and Choice for Women, which 
delineated proposed priorities for women for the 1996 federal election. Regarding domestic 
violence this document states: "in consultation with States and Territories, a Liberal/National 
Coalition will support cross-portfolio initiatives to prevent family violence" (Libesai/National 
Parties, 1996, p.25). The Coalition also promised to develop a more comprehensive 
approach to combating domestic violence by convening a National Violence Summit and 
supporting education programs emphasising that violence against family members would 
not be tolerated (Liberal/National Parties, 1996, p.25). On 2 March 1996 the Coalition 
defeated the Keating Labor Government in the federal election and formed government 
under the leadership of Prime Minister John Howard. 
On 23 and 24 September 1996 the Howard Government hosted a two day national forum 
for 130 domestic violence specialists at Parliament House, Canberra. In her opening 
speech the Ministl:)r/ Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women, Jocelyn 
Newman, read out a message from the Prime Minister including his request: 
... to see constructive recommendations which we, the Commonwealth and the States and 
Territories, can work on collaboratively to address this tragedy which is destroying too many of 
our families ... which I can assure you will be considered seriously by this government and will 
be on the agenda of future meetings between the Commonweatth and the States and 
Territories leading to a Summit in the middle of next year (Howard cited in Newman, 1996b). 
In her closing speech Minister Newman promised to circulate the forum's recommendations 
to relevant communities and groups and engage in "constructive talk" with the states and 
territories (Newman, 1996a). The Minister also suggested the forum had laid down 
important ground work for a National Domestic Violence Summit the Government had 
planned for the following year. 
Anne Summers (1997) reported that the Howard Government established a working group 
to process the domestic violence forum's recommendations. Federal Public Servant 4, and 
Taskforce Members 8 & 10 also made reference to this working group. They described it as 
a Commonwealth/State working group overseeing and authorising the upcoming National 
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Domestic Violence Summit. Summers noted that community groups and service providers, 
such as refuge workers, had no input into this working group or into the development of the 
National Domestic Violence Summit. As outlined in Chapter Three, the workers Summers 
refers to tended to be feminists who were traditionally at the forefront of domestic violence 
activism and heavily involved in previous state and federal government responses to 
domestic violence (Chappell, 2001, p.63; Earle et al., 1990, p.S; Erika. 1990; NCVAW, 
1992, p.vi). Summers argues that the Howard Government's early and deliberate exclusion 
of these groups was a significant shift in Australian governments' approaches to domestic 
violence policy machinery. 
On 7 November 1997 Prime Minister Howard held the National Domestic Violence Summit, 
in effect a one hour agenda item for the Heads of Government to discuss at the Council of 
Australian Governments meeting (A. Summers, 1997). At this Summit the Heads of 
Government released a domestic violence statement of principles (see Appendix 6.1 ). 
These principles acknowledge "domestic violence is an abuse of power perpetrated mainly 
(but not only) by men against women". Overall, however, the understanding of domestic 
violence in these principles is mainly located at the micro and mezzo levels as being a 
problem of individuals and within families. Although the principles acknowledge the 
responsibility of governments to respond to domestic violence, this appears to be limited to 
curbing an individual's violent behaviour and "demonstrating the unacceptability of all forms 
of domestic violence". Nothing in these principles suggests an understanding of domestic 
violence which acknowledges the role of the state or other social institutions in facilitating 
this violence (mezzo and macro levels). 
At the National Domestic Violence Summit, Prime Minister Howard announced 
Partnerships; a new initiative reportedly founded on the Summit principles and endorsed by 
the attending Heads of Government (Goward, 1999; Howard, 1997; PADV Taskforce, 2001, 
p.2). Howard (cited in OFW, 2005a) told the Summit: 
... we have agreed to launch a new initiative Partnerships Against Domestic Violence which 
provides a framework for innovation and sharing knowledge nationally. The lnitiativE7 will be 
supported by Commonweanh funds, not to supplement existing services, but to test new 
approaches and to show us how we can get better value from current resources and future 
commitments .... the Initiative should be seen as a substantial beginning to a new commitment. 
The reported reaction to the Summit was mixed. The Howard Government itself (OFW, 
2005a) unsurprisingly described it positively as: '1he first time all Australian Heads of 
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Government had come together in a united effort to address domestic violence and it 
marked the beginning of a new cooperative and mutually beneficial process for Australian 
governments". Media commentators, however, reported a negative response to the Summit. 
This included a report that ACT Chief Minister Carnell called the Summit "an insult to 
women" (Humphries & Peatling, 1997) and Liberal Senator Helen Coonan was reported to 
have described the Summit as having a 'lukewarm" response from women (Rollins & 
Davley, 1998). Summers (1997) also argued the Summit's outcomes were likely to be 
"buried in the news of the inevitable Commonwealth-state squabbling over revenue shares 
that usually dominate Premiers' conferences". 
Partnerships 1 Policy Machinerv 
At the Summit the Prime Minister announced a joint federal-state government Taskforce to 
oversee Partnerships. Membership of this Taskforce included two government 
representatives per jurisdiction nominated by their respective Premiers or Chief Ministers 
(Goward, 1999). Taskforce Member 6 argued this meant "representation varied significantly 
depending on which agency the relevant premier believed to be their key agency on 
domestic violence". Taskforce reports (Partnerships Taskforce, 1999, p.20; 2000, p.23) list 
representatives from a range of state and territory departments including: offices of 
women's policy; Attorney-General Departments; Departments of Human Services or Health; 
Departments of Families and Communities or Community Services; Departments of Justice; 
and Departments of Premier and Cabinet/Chief Minister. These reports also state Taskforce 
members included three federal representatives from the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet (OSW), the Attorney-General's Department and the Department of Family and 
Community Services. 
In line with Summers' (1997) initial observation above, three key informants suggested the 
Howard Government appeared to exclude some feminists and feminist policy activists from 
the Partnerships policy machinery. State Public Servant 5, Evaluator 2 and Taskforce 
Member 8 argued the Howard Government intentionally excluded NGO representatives 
from the Partnerships Taskforce. These key informants' comments are consistent with the 
argument outlined in Chapter Four that the Howard Government largely excluded feminists 
from the development of a range of social policies of significance to women. This issue is 
explored in more detail in the case study of Partnerships in Chapter Nine. 
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The Taskforce reportedly fulfilled an important strategic role in Partnerships. A Taskforce 
report (Partnerships Taskforce, 2001) states that the Taskforce set Partnerships policy 
frameworks and program directions, identified and developed project strategies, and 
advised on funding priorities and allocations within each representative's jurisdiction. These 
aspects of its functions and its structure are evident in the Taskforce Terms of Reference 
and the Partnerships structural framework in Appendices 6.2 and 6.3. In addition to these 
formal structures, the· Taskforce established a number of working groups with 
responsibilities for project development and the management of Partnerships priority areas 
(Academic 3, Evaluator 2, Taskforce Member 8, and State Public Servants 10 & 11). These 
key informants explained the membership of these working groups consisted of Taskforce 
members and other government and non-government representatives with specific relevant 
expertise. Further, as evident in the Partnerships structural framework (see Appendix 6.3), 
the Office for the Status of Women (OSW)12 provided administrative support and a 
Secretariat for the Taskforce and managed the Taskforce's budget. 
Partnerships 1 Content 
Partnerships was described as a national framework and strategic collaborative initiative 
between Australian federal, state and territory governments and the business and 
community sector (Partnerships Taskforce, 1999, 2000, 2001). For the Howard 
Government, Partnerships 1 was reportedly an important platform shaping policy with the 
Prime Minister referring to it as a "down-payment" directing future domestic violence policy 
(cited in Strategic Partners, 1999, p.1). The Howard Government also described 
Partnerships as "a major part of the Government's strategy for strengthening families, 
preventing family breakdown and creating healthy and safe communities" (Partnerships 
Taskforce, 2000, p.1). 
Partnerships' stated purpose in its public documents was to work towards the goal of 
preventing domestic violence, ameliorating its effects, and encouraging a more holistic 
response. According to the Office for Women (OFW) (2005h) Partnerships was to achieve 
this by developing "knowledge about what actually works best - testing and researching 
new ways of addressing domestic violence, enhancing and sharing knowledge, developing 
and documenting good practice and educating the community". Taskforce Member 6 
12 As discussed in Chapter 10, the Howard Government changed the name of the Office for the 
Status of Women to Office for Women in 2004. These names are used interchangeably in Chapter 7 
depending on the date of the publication referenced. 
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commented that Taskforce members focussed on "research and development with research 
commissioned to plug gaps in knowledge and included a number of areas such as best 
practice principles, standards for work in the area and so on". Thus, Partnerships' official 
aims are consistent with the reported aims of the Partnerships Taskforce. 
As well as the terms of reference, the Taskforce applied the statement of principles (the 
communique) from the Domestic Violence Summit (see Appendix 6.1) to guide Partnerships 
practice (Evaluator 2 & Taskforce Member 8). These key informants also said the Taskforce 
were bound by the following six priority themes announced at the Summit: 
• helping children and young people to develop healthy relationships and not to use violence 
-especially young people who are already at risk; 
• protecting people at risk; 
• helping adults to break free of violent behaviour- working with victims and perpetrators; 
• working with the community- educating against violence; 
• finding out what worksin responding to and preventing domestic violence; and 
• helping people in regional Australia (Partnerships Taskforce, 1999, p.1 ). 
The wording of these six priority areas changed subtly during Partnerships 1 and were later 
(Partnerships Taskforce, 2001, p.3) reported as: 
• Working with children and young people to break the cycle of violence between 
generations, 
• Working with adults to break patterns of violence: working with victims and violent men, 
• Working with the community, educating against violence, 
• Protecting people at risk: reforming legislation and improving responses by police and 
courts, 
• Information and good practice: finding out what works and researching areas whether new 
information is needed to support violence prevention, 
• Helping people in regional Australia; overcoming barriers to receiving assistance. 
The changes in these priority themes are subtle and did not obviously impact on the 
meaning or focus of Partnerships. The second group of priority themes do, however, reflect 
greater attention to detail and greater specificity. Both sets of priorities also use non-
gendered language, for example "protecting people at risk" instead of "protecting women at 
risk". This is consistent with criticisms that 'Partnerships reflected gender neutral and 
individualised understandings of violence (FitzRoy, 1999; Phillips, 2004, 2006; Webster, 
2006a, 2006b). 
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The Howard Government reported that it allocated Partnerships $25.3 million funding for 
the three years until 3 June 2001 (Howard, 1997; OSW, 2001a). In comparison to previous 
federal government policy responses to violence against women, as distinct from federally 
funded domestic violence related programs such as SAAP or the National Women's Health 
Program, this funding was significant. The Hawke Labor Government's National Domestic 
Violence Education Program, for example, had $2.2 million of funding (Earle et al., 1990; 
Erika, 1990). Similarly, although the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments' National 
Strategy to Reduce Violence Against Women (NSVAL!V), may have influenced other federal 
government funding, the Strategy itself did not fund any state or federal government 
programs {Chappell, 2001, p.63; Nancarrow & Struthers, 1995, p.45). Thus, the Howard 
Government's funding of Partnerships was significant compared to funding allocated by 
previous federal governments for similar types of policies and programs. 
OFW (2005h) reported that Partnerships funded a range of innovative research and 
development projects across a diversity of target groups and service sectors in accordance 
with its aims. $13.3 million of the Partnerships 1 funding was reportedly for projects in 
Australian Government departments, while the remaining $12 million was reportedly for 
cooperative work betw~en the Commonwealth, states and territories (Howard, 1997; OSW, 
2001a; Partnerships Taskforce, 1999, p.1). Of this $12 million, these sources report $8 
/ 
million was for the states and territories and $4 million was for national projects coordinated 
by OSW. Overall, Partnerships 1 funded over 100 separate national and state projects 
(Partnerships Taskforce, 2001). There is a list of these projects in Appendix 6.4. Consistent 
with some key informants' comments, this list suggests Partnerships was primarily a grants 
program (i.e. not ongoing funding) that allocated funding and contracted out most of the 
specific projects to external NGOs, state governments, private contractors, and in some 
cases other federal government departments or agencies. Further, it shows Partnerships 1 
comprised a diversity of state and national projects, research, resources and reports 
reflecting and addressing Partnerships' key priority areas as detailed in its annual reports 
(Partnerships Taskforce, 1999,2000, 2001). 
The Taskforce's focus on research and their stated commitment to gathering 'evidence' and 
evaluation is clearly evident in their activities and processes. The Taskforce established a 
requirement that each Partnerships 1 project would be individually evaluated. A number of 
key informants spoke of the importance of evaluation as the most significant feature of 
Partnerships 1. As Taskforce Member 8 commented: 
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... the evaluation was the most important thing because this wasn't recurrent money and as 
state bureaucrats we were all very keen that we didn't put it into recurrent service delivery 
because we were going to end up with that typical problem that you end up with 
Commonwealth funded programs is that they last for a, two years, and then the State's held, 
left holding the baby. So we didn't want to do that, that was very, very important and we said, 
right what we are going to get from this 25 million dollars is learning. We are going to really 
know what works for this group that hasn't had this level of investment before. So therefore the 
most important thing is the evaluation. So that became the priority for PAD VI. The priority was 
to try things out and to learn from them. 
This commitment to evaluation was consistent with the Taskforce's commitment to research 
and building an evidence base of good practice responses to domestic violence. As well as 
each Partnerships 1 project being individually evaluated, in November 1998 the Taskforce 
also contracted Strategic Partners and the Research Centre lor Gender Studies at the 
University of South Australia to undertake a Partnerships meta-evaluation (Partnerships 
Taskforce, 1999, p.14). This meta-evaluation was reportedly integral for planning, policy 
development, and documenting Partnerships projects and achievements (Partnerships 
Taskforce, 1999, p.14). 
The Taskforce describes the design of the meta-evaluation involving formative and 
summative elements. According to the evaluators (Strategic Partners, 1999, pp.8-9), this 
meant the meta-evaluation team immediately disseminated lessons learned from projects to 
influence future program and policy development as well as documenting outcomes and 
achievements. The meta-evaluation design reportedly covered the following lour key areas: 
technical analysis; process; theory development; and social policy input (Strategic Partners, 
1999, pp.?-8). According to the Taskforce brief, the evaluators had three main aims: 1) to 
document and evaluate the range of Partnerships 1 activities, promote good practice and 
disseminate knowledge about domestic violence; 2) inform the future direction of national 
action to prevent domestic violence; and 3) assist meeting Partnerships 1 accountability 
requirements (Partnerships Taskforce, 1999, p.14). 
The meta-evaluation was generally represented by key informants and official documents 
as an important component of Partnerships 1 in documenting learning, disseminating 
findings and influencing program and policy development. Some key informants described 
the meta-evaluation as an "invaluable structural achievement" and "very important" 
(Taskforce Members 8, 9 & 10). Two key informants, however, were sceptical about the 
evaluation and one argued: 
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The evaluation of PADV tended to show that everything worked. Now that's the nature of 
evaluation I find but I think PADV and the COAG trial have been booms for evaluation 
companies. You look at who the evaluation companies are, who do them and most of them are 
the same organisation and most of them· show that the huge amount of money that's gone in 
has had positive outcomes (State Public Servant 12). 
This quote illustrates two other significant issues and tensions in Partnerships identified by 
other key informants (e.g. Academics 1 & 3, Taskforce Members 4 & 5, State Public 
Servant 5, Opposition MP and Peak Body Representative 3) and the literature (e.g. 
Summers, 2003b; Winter, 2007). First was that Partnerships was "chronically underspent", 
diverted significant amounts of funding to private consultants rather than projects at the 
"coallace", and the Howard Government redirected Partnerships funding for terrorism fridge 
magnets. Second was the pilot, non-recurrent nature of Partnerships funding. A number of 
key informants argued this was a problematic model of funding which undermined the 
Taskforce members' stated commitment to embed Partnerships findings in practice. Despite 
these concerns, the meta-evaluation was nevertheless generally represented by key 
informants and official documents as an important and valuable component of Partnerships. 
One of the rationales lor extensive and ongoing evaluation was the Taskforce's desire to 
support projects. and interventions which would be sustainable and become embedded in 
policy and practice. The Taskforce explained this rationale as follows: 
The effectiveness of Partnerships Against Domestic Violence will be largely determined by the 
extent to which it is incorporated into policy, programmes and practice at a local, state and 
national level. The ongoing engagement of governments, community organizations, service 
providers, researchers and professional bodies is critical (Partnerships Taskforce, 2000, p.3). 
One of the key ways the Taskforce aimed to do this was through a communication strategy 
to share information from the evaluations with the broader community (Partnerships 
Taskforce, 1999, p.15). Taskforce Member 8 recalled that, for the Taskforce, the 
communication strategy was an integral part of the evaluation and of Partnerships. She 
stated: ''we decided not only to learn but we also decided it was going to be no good if we 
were the only ones who were learning and there needed to be a really broad, the whole 
sector needed to learn". Similarly, Taskforce Member 10 recalled: 
... we developed a sort of communication strategy ... 1 mean one of the things they wanted to 
do was to make sure there was sort of dissemination and learning that could occur outside just 
the key people. That's why they did these conferences and they did those road shows, trying 
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to. because at that stage it did have a view that it had a responsibiuty to try and disseminate 
the learnings that was happening- there's no point doing all this if Ws not going anywhere. 
Thus, an important component of Partnerships 1 was embedding learnings from the meta-
evaluation by disseminating information through the evolving communication strategy. 
Through the communication strategy the Taskforce (Partnerships Taskforce, 1999, p.15) 
also stated the evaluators were to facilitate extensive consultation with the community 
sector, women's sector and women escaping domestic violence and conduct field 
consultations through the Women's Emergency Services Network (WESNET). This 
commitment to consu~ation is significant given the Howard Government's exclusion of the 
sexual assault and domestic violence sector from representation on the Taskforce and 
other related government policy machinery. It seems likely this commitment to, and action 
on, consultation arose from the individual feminist policy activism of members of the 
Taskforce. The in-depth case study of Partnerships in Chapter Nine explores this kind of 
feminist policy activism in much greater detail. 
The Partnerships 1 communication strategy reportedly involved three components. First 
was publications and resources including newsletters, meta-evaluation bulletins, information 
sheets, case studies and the Partnerships website (Partnerships Taskforce, 2000, pp.3-5). 
There is a list of Partnerships 1 publications in Appendix 6.5. Second was showcasing 
seminars and forums in Australian metropolitan and regional centres (Partnerships 
Taskforce, 2000, p.5) which "brought people together from diverse sectors" (Taskforce 
Member 8). The stated aims of these showcases were to "promote greater awareness of 
the Partnerships initiative to improve the practice of frontline workers" (Newman, 1999c). 
Evaluators 1 and 2 described their experiences of these showcases as highlighting a 
diverse mix of local, state and national projects. Third was that the communication strategy 
included a series of national conferences in Australian capital cities on Partnerships key 
themes (OFW, 2005f; Partnerships Taskforce, 2000; 2001, p.21). These conferences 
reportedly focused on: children and young people (Melbourne), men and family 
relationships (Canberra), Indigenous family violence (Adelaide), and women's experiences 
of violence across the lifespan (Perth). 
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6.1.2 Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Phase Two (2001- 2005) 
Partnerships 2 History and Development 
On 7 October 1999 Minister Newman (1999c) stated the Howard Government was 
committed to "move swiftly to capitalise on the outcomes to date of Partnerships". According 
to Minister Newman (1999a), one way the Government was to do this was by announcing 
an additional $25 million for Partnerships in the 1999/2000 Federal Budget. The Taskforce 
(Partnerships Taskforce, 2001, p.4) reported that when the Partnerships 1 funding ceased 
in 2001 this additional $25 million was to be used to develop Partnerships 2. 
Key informants argued the Partnerships 2 policy machinery was centralised and 
relationships between Taskforce members deteriorated to be far less productive than under 
Partnerships 1. They also reported the relationships between the evaluators and OSW 
deteriorated during this time and consequently no meta-evaluation of Partnerships 2 was 
completed. This meant few of the key informants had direct experience of this program and 
there were few available texts about Partnerships 2. Consequently, less information was 
available to construct a comprehensive history for Partnerships 2 as was available for 
Partnerships 1. 
Partnerships 2 Policy Machinery 
OSW represented the Partnerships 2 policy machinery in official documents (e.g. OSW, 
2001e) as an intergovernmental Taskforce similar to Partnerships 1. This structure is 
illustrated in the diagram of the Partnerships 2 structural framework in Appendix 6.6. Many 
key informants (Taskforce Members 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10, Evaluator 1 & 2, and Federal 
Public Servant 4), however, discussed the Partnerships 2 policy machinery as differing 
substantially from Partnerships 1. These key informants' descriptions of Partnerships 2 
policy machinery differed markedly from the representation in the official documents. In 
particular, they described an active disengagement of the Commonwealth from the states. 
This included the Howard Government establishing a centralised structure and engaging 
consultants or communities directly to fund Partnerships 2 projects rather than allocating 
funding through the states. 
There were substantial differences in key informants' comments about the reason for these 
changes. Taskforce Member 6, a federal public servant, argued this centralised structure 
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was a natural progression from Partnerships 1 to Partnerships 2, with the latter's focus on 
more tangible outcomes and resources .. In contrast, Taskforce Members 1 and 7, who were 
state public servants, argued this was not an agreed progression amongst Taskforce 
members. They argued the Taskforce effectively, although not officially, became 
"dysfunctional" and ceased meeting, Taskforce Member 7 argued: 
Stage 1 where there was probably two components to that where they weren't as strategic as 
in the second half, state and territories were really at the table. The partnership was working. It 
was working well. There were clear priorities. There was communication. There was open 
involvement in this tender, this should be what should be put out to tender and this is the 
agreement of what should go up to the minister for, as the preferred tender to do the project 
... That shifted completely. Stage 2 they went to more research projects. Not that anybody 
would criticise the need for research but it became the working groups ceased to exist 
therefore and the Taskforce meetings became more and more problematic so it very much 
became a process of the Commonwealth determines what is going out. So decision-making 
shifted completely from what some would say is not a total partnership but was still quite a 
supportive partnership, to one where it was totally fractured and there was unable to be 
anything achieved. 
This discrepancy between key informants' understandings of the Partnerships 2 Taskforce 
suggests that in addition to relationships breaking down, the Howard Government's 
approach to policy development may have changed. Possible reasons for this shift in the 
policy machinery in Partnerships are explored further in the case study of Partnerships in 
Chapter Nine. 
Partnerships 2 Content 
Partnerships 2 was reported to be from 30 June 2001 until 30 June 2003, and was later 
extended to 30 June 2005 (OFW, 2005e; Partnerships Taskforce, 2001, p.4). The 
Taskforce (Partnerships Taskforce, 2001, p.4) states they intended Partnerships 2 to 
develop a strategic framework based on the meta'evaluation of Partnerships 1 with a focus 
on prevention. Similarly, according to OFW (2005c) the challenge for Partnerships 2 was 
consolidating Partnerships 1 findings and translating its "practical and theoretical 
understandings into a coherent and sustainable national strategy for the future". 
OFW's (2005c) stated goal for Partnerships 2 was "to establish a whole-of-government 
approach that reduces and prevents domestic violence in Australia". Accompanying this 
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goal was a commitment to: "1} Safe communities; 2} Coordinated and collaborative policy 
and service delivery; and 3} Commitment to evidence-based approaches" (OFW, 2005c}. 
Further, OFW's vision for Partnerships 2 was: "An Australian culture that will not tolerate 
violence and a community that will work together to eliminate violence" (OFW, 2005b). OFW 
lists principles and objectives to guide the development of Partnerships 2 which are 
provided in Appendix 6.7. These principles and objectives largely reflect the statement of 
principles agreed by the Heads of Government at the National Domestic Violence Summit 
in 1997 and some of the learning from Partnerships 1. The Partnerships 2 principles and 
priority areas also reflect an understanding of domestic violence based on micro and, to a 
lesser extent, mezzo levels. Despite some references to 'women' and 'violence against 
women' within these principles and objectives, most of the language is also gender neutral. 
In her Budget speech on 19 May 1999, Minister Newman {1999a} announced additional 
Partnerships funding to "focus on prevention in the key areas of children at risk, indigenous 
[sic] family violence, work with perpetrators and community education". The absence or 
exclusion of women as victims of domestic violence in these priority areas is notable and 
repeated in the Taskforce's Partnerships 2 priority areas in their final Partnerships 1 report 
(Partnerships Taskforce, 2001, p.4}. The Taskforce lists the focus for Partnerships 2 here 
as: community education, Indigenous Family Violence Grants Programme, Children and 
/ 
Perpetrators. This absence of women as a priority suggests a further shift from feminist 
understandings of domestic violence during the Howard years. Whereas feminists usually 
locate women and women's experiences at the centre of responses to male violence 
against women, the Howard Government's priority areas in Partnerships 2 marginalised 
women. The omission of women was addressed in later references to Partnerships 2 
priorities which include 'services for women' (e.g. OSW, 2001e}. No key informants or texts 
provided any insight into whether or not the Government's initial exclusion of women from 
Partnerships 2 priorities was deliberate or how women came to be included. 
Consistent with Partnerships 2 priority areas, the Howard Government allocated the $25 
million Partnerships funding to six main areas (OSW, 2001 d; Partnerships Taskforce, 2001, 
pp.4-5; Strategic Partners, 2003a; p.4} : 
• $10 million for national community awareness raising (community education}. 
• $6 million for the National Indigenous Family Violence Grants Programme. 
• $4.7 million for prevention and early intervention with children living with, 
witnessing and/or experiencing domestic violence. 
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• $2.7 million for working with perpetrators. 
• $1 million for a National Domestic and Family Violence Clearinghouse for 
disseminating findings of Partnerships projects and broader research. 
• $600,000 for work with women's services. 
There is a list of Partnerships 2 projects under each of these priority areas in Appendix 6.6. 
Further details of these projects were also provided in the Partnerships 2 evaluation report 
{Strategic Partners, 2004) which was incomplete and unpublished when Strategic Partners 
withdrew from evaluating Partnerships 2. 
Despite its stated commitment to evidence-based approaches, Partnerships 2 did not reflect 
a strong emphasis on evaluation. Although it produced reports about individual projects, 
these reports described the findings of the projects without actually evaluating them. 
Evaluators 2 and 3 explained that although the government planned a Partnerships 2 meta-
evaluation, the relationship between OFW and the meta-evaluators deteriorated so 
significantly that by 2004 they had withdrawn from evaluating Partnerships 2. The 
evaluators were reportedly not replaced from within OFW or externally and so no meta-
evaluation of Partnerships 2 was completed. This history helps explain why only individual 
project reports from Partnerships 2 are publicly available and neither a meta-evaluation nor 
Partnerships 2 annual reports we're published. 
6.1.3 Partnerships 1 and 2: relationships, tensions, and struggles over meaning 
The personal experiences and involvement of key informants in the development of 
Partnerships provided additional accounts of this period eX1ending beyond the categories of 
history and development, policy machinery, and content. These accounts offered particular 
insights into the Howard Government's engagement with feminism. They therefore provided 
a significant foundation on which to develop new insights into how best the Howard 
·Government's approaches to male violence against women may be understood from a 
feminist perspective. Since these additional insights applied across both Partnerships 1 and 
2, it is useful to explore them outside of, but also alongside, the separate accounts of 
Partnerships 1 and Partnerships 2. 
The first insight was the nature of Partnerships funding and the response of Taskforce 
members to this funding. Despite the stated emphasis on collaboration and co-operation, 
key informants described periods of tension and difficulties in relationships amongst 
116 
Chapter 6: Policy and Program Development 1996-2007 
Taskforce members. One of the earliest tensions reported was over funding. Evaluator 2 
reported the Commonwealth split funding evenly in Partnerships 1 with the $8 million for 
state projects allocated so that each state and territory received $200,000 per year over the 
three years. The Howard Government's decision to allocate Partnerships funding in this 
way was unlike the proportional, population-based funding in most Commonwealth-state 
funding agreements. Key informants reported this allocation of funding therefore generated 
tension amongst the Taskforce. 
Taskforce Member 8 recalled the Howard Government's departure from conventional 
models of funding allocation in Partnerships fuelled pre-existing tensions amongst 
Taskforce members: 
The first day was horrendous. . .. [we] walked into this meeting where there was so much 
tension and animosity. Pru Goward was chairing it and she left at 10 o'clock on the first 
morning and never ever came back. Never came back. And it was the most negative, 
destructive, there'd been all this politics that had gone on before in the lead up to the 
communique, people were carrying a whole lot of baggage from that process, it was all bizarre. 
Very tense, extremely tense meeting, sort of tense to the point of being hilarious ... people had 
decided what to spend the money on before I had got there, that was all decided at around 
about the communique time and the first year of PADV 1, ... everybody, every state did their 
own thing, bugger off Commonwealth we'll just do our own thing. So this first Taskforce 
meeting very tense and then we went out for dinner on that night ... and a few of us just said 
this is ridiculous. This is 25 million dollars that we don't have going into an area that so 
desperately needs it in terms of domestic violence that we've really got to try and make the 
best we possibly can of this money. And that night, that first night, I think a whole heap of us 
said right, let's put all of this aside and let's get the best we possibly can from this 25 million. 
This comment gives significant insight into pre-existing tensions in the Taskforce and the 
role of funding in exacerbating these tensions. This kind of tension in Commonwea~h-state 
relationships is not unexpected and illustrative of Partnerships' consistency with the broader 
social policy machinery. As discussed in Chapter Three, Fenna (2004, p. 171) argues that 
despite being called "cooperative federalism" Australian federalism is as often characterised 
by conflict and coercion as cooperation. This initial Partnerships Taskforce meeting reflects 
the conflict in Australian federalism. This key informant also suggests, however, that federal 
and state public servants transcended the jurisdictional allegiances and the animosities 
over funding that often characterise Australian federalism in favour of feminist commitments 
to challenging domestic violence. This aspect of Partnerships was significant in the context 
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of Howard Government's engagement with feminism and is therefore explored further in the 
case study of Partnerships in Chapter Nine. 
Another tension reported by key informants was the way Partnerships defined and 
conceptualised domestic violence. Key informants described substantial struggles over 
meaning and understandings of domestic violence amongst Taskforce members early in 
Partnerships. Taskforce Member 6, for example, discussed the shift in terminology from 
"violence against women" under previous Labor governments to "domestic and family 
violence" under Partnerships and the varied use of these terms across the individual state 
jurisdictions. She argued these differences caused tension between Taskforce members 
and in Taskforce meetings there was "often an endeavour to find common language with 
which to move forward" (Taskforce Member 6). 
Evaluators 1 and 2 talked about the challenges to the understandings of domestic violence 
presented by the nature of Partnerships. Evaluator 2 argued the Partnerships meta-
evaluation and communication strategy exposed domestic violence to a wider audience 
beyond the refuge and women's health sectors, that is feminists who have traditionally 
taken responsibility for providing specialist services. Evaluator 1 argued the diversity of 
Partnerships participants had implications for decisions about projects funded by 
Partnerships 1. She recalled: "one of the things that [the Taskforce] were struggling with in 
terms of where they funded projects that were meant to be about stopping domestic 
violence when in fact they might kind of not be doing that or not keeping women and 
children safe" (Evaluator 1). Evaluator 1 suggested the availability of Partnerships funding 
to projects and organisations without experience in responding to domestic violence and 
with no commitment to feminism had potentially detrimental implications for women and 
children. This was apparently an important implication of the Howard Government's 
disengagement with feminism. 
The evaluators (Strategic Partners, 2003b) also reported that since Partnerships engaged 
with a diversity of professional and interest groups, the Taskforce wanted to thoroughly 
examine explanations of domestic and family violence. Evaluator 2 argued the Taskforce 
sought to explore a variety of discourses and understandings of domestic violence beyond 
feminist ones: 
So we then had to deal with, well what do we mean by feminism, what does a feminist 
approach to domestic violence mean and we really had to go back and this lead us into PADV2 
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and talk about what we understood the implications of domestic violence and the impact of 
domestic violence to be and we had to have a framework that said these things do change in a 
positive way and these things are counter-productive and these things we don't know about 
yet. And that was a fabulous conversation although it was very painful for us at the time. 
Taskforce Members 1 & 6 and Evaluators 1 & 2 reported the Taskforce and evaluators 
directed significant attention to locating domestic violence as a social issue. They said that 
they did this through facilitated discussions and developing a working paper on guidelines 
for funding and the impact of different paradigms and language on projects and policy 
solutions. These reports suggest feminist understandings of male violence against women 
which previously had a prominent role in shaping government responses to this issue may 
have been challenged even by femocrats themselves during the Howard years. Rather than 
being solely a political opportunity structure for femocrats, the Partnerships policy 
machinery appeared to be a site through which the stnuggle over meaning and dominance 
between feminist and non-feminist understandings of male violence against women was 
played out. 
Key informants reported an outcome of these discussions was the meta-evaluation's 
categorisation of theoretical explanations and understandings of domestic violence into 
different areas. These areas were: biological determinism; theories of individual pathology; 
sociological theories of social stress and individual risks; early feminist; interactive systems; 
and individual. A brief description of each of these categories is in the Executive Summary 
of each meta-evaluation report (see for example Strategic Partners, 2003b, p.B}. Further, a 
table in an unpublished Strategic Partners Partnerships 2 report (2003a, pp.10·12} 13 
develops the theoretical categorisations from Partnerships 1 beyond simple definitions. This 
table is reproduced in Appendix 6.8. Accompanying the table, the authors explain the 
Partnerships 1 Taskforce concluded it was inappropriate to fund projects informed by 
biological determinism and individual pathology approaches. What is apparent in this table, 
however, is the absence of an explicit recognition of feminist understandings of male 
violence against women (although some feminist understandings are apparent in the 'power 
and oppression' category}. Paralleling the exclusion of women early in Partnerships 2, this 
table suggest that, in the struggle over meaning, feminist understandings of male violence 
against women had become marginalised. 
13 Although unpublished the influence and use of some aspects of this report by OFW is evident in 
some content on the Partnerships website including the Partnerships 2 framework. 
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This analysis of the role of Partnerships in marginalising feminist understandings of male 
violence against women was illustrated in the comments of key informants. Evaluator 2 & 
Taskforce Member 8 argued the Taskforce's final agreed understanding of domestic 
violence for Partnerships 1 was a "both and" approach. Described in the meta-evaluation as 
"post-feminist" and "post-modernist": 
... the 'both and' stance resists categorical dichotomies such as good/bad or victim/perpetrator 
without losing site [sic] of power differences or diminishing responsibility for violence acts or 
accountability (Goldner 1999). Adopting this position uses multiple perspectives in morally 
responsible ways and brings together the categories of moral, legal and relationship. This 
approach to domestic violence allows for differing responses, and recognises that while there 
is no one 'right' intervention or policy response for all groups there are some interventions that 
are not effective and may be counter-productive .... A number of funded projects were informed 
by explanations such as biological determinism and/or individual pathology and were seen to 
be limited in approach and benefit. There is an emerging agreement between policy advisors 
and practitioners that an holistic, integrated approach has the greatest potential for success 
(Strategic Partners, 2003b, p.8). 
Taskforce member 6 argued these theoretical explanations of domestic violence shaped 
funding criteria for Partnerships 2 projects. This suggests that, through the policy machinery 
of the Partnerships Taskforce, the prominent influence of feminism on government 
responses to male violence against women was diminished during the Howard years. 
Rather than being a political opportunity structure, this policy machinery was a vehicle 
through which feminist approaches and understandings of violence were challenged. The 
ongoing implicit influence of feminism, however, especially given its historical prominence in 
government responses to male violence against women, made the Howard Government's 
engagement with feminism particularly complex. This complex relationship is explored 
further in Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten. 
6.2 National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault (2000 - 2005) 
National Initiative History and Development 
In 2000 OSW began developing the National Initiative to run parallel with Partnerships 
(Federal Public Servant 5). According to Federal Public Servant 5, OSW started developing 
the National Initiative in response to consultations with women's representatives and their 
analysis of the findings of the 1996 Women's Safety Survey. She argued OSW realised 
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Partnerships was being 'tugged inappropriately into sexual assault" (Federal Public Servant 
5). Further, OSW (2001 b) reported that in 2000 'the Commonwealth, state and territory 
Ministers for the Status of Women then identified the need to develop a national approach 
to sexual assault and rape as a priority issue for women". 
National Initiative Policy Machinery 
The National Initiative did not have any formal policy machinery (Federal Public Servant 5 
and State Public Servant 5). OSW documents (2001b; 20011) show, however, that on 27 
June 2001 the Commonwealth hosted a Sexual Assault National Roundtable of 
Government Officials. This roundtable reportedly included delegates from federal and state 
portfolios responding to sexual assault. It sought to identify key issues in each jurisdiction 
and "identify better ways to prevent and respond to sexual assault" (OSW, 2001b, 20011). 
OSW (2001b) stated it sought to·work "collaboratively" with Roundtable representatives in 
an ongoing "dialogue" to determine the next steps of the National Initiative. This 
collaboration never eventuated according to State Public Servants 5, 6 and 8. 
The National Initiative's policy machinery differed significantly from Partnerships. Federal 
Public Servant 6 explained that the Women's Ministers' Conference rather than COAG ran 
the Nationa! Initiative. This meant "PADV had a much wider membership than NICSA 
generally" (Federal Public Servant 6). The National Initiative's governance structure was an 
inter-departmental committee of federal government representatives which took leadership 
on issues needing departmental coordination (Federal Public Servant 5). Federal Public 
Servant 5 explained that each National Initiative project usually had its own governance 
structure such as a reference group. These reference groups consisted of government and 
NGO representatives including peak bodies, the Australian Domestic and Family Violence 
Clearinghouse, and the Australian Centre for the Study of Sexual Assau~ (Peak Body 
Representative 1 and Academic 3). 
Similarly to Partnerships 2, the National Initiative's policy machinery was therefore largely 
internal to the Howard Government. The fact these two initiatives were contemporaries of 
each other may be significant. It suggests the centralised policy machinery and exclusion of 
state, sectoral and NGO representatives may have been a deliberate policy of the Howard 
Government during this period (2000-2005). Possible reasons for this apparent 
centralisation are explored further in the case study of Partnerships in Chapter Nine. 
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The National Initiative's centralised policy machinery meant few key informants had direct 
experience with this program. Federal Public Servant 5 argued that there were also few 
official texts outlining the National Initiative because it was as an internal funding program. 
She explained that this meant OSW did not publish strategic policy documents, principles or 
frameworks. As Federal Public Servant 5 further argued: 
PADV was largely a grants program. We put money out tor other people to do things so you 
have to have all that infrastructure so people know why they are being funded whereas NICSA 
was us spending money against some clearly defined objectives but that's about it. ... you 
didn't have all that infrastructure requirement. 
Apart from these insights, the limited sources of information made it difficult to provide a 
comprehensive account and detailed history of the National Initiative during this period. 
National Initiative Description and Content 
The National Initiative was "the Australian Government's commitment to reduce and prevent 
sexual assault" (OSW, 2004b). The aims of the National Initiative were to "lead and foster 
the development of an Australian culture that will not tolerate violence" by implementing 
strategies that address the increasing incidence of sexual assault in the community (OSW, 
2004b). These aims mirrored those of Partnerships and thus demonstrate a degree of 
internal consistency within the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against 
women. Consistent with this observation, OSW (2004c) stated the National Initiative "builds 
on the substantial achievements of the Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Program·. 
The Sexual Assault Roundtable provided OSW with a basic "roadmap of what we were 
going to do" and formed the basis of the National Initiative's four key objectives (Federal 
Public Servant 5). OSW (2003c) stated these four objectives were: 
1. To promote cuttural change in attitudes and behaviours to reduce the incidence of sexual 
assaun. 
2. To identify and address the immediate and long-term impacts of sexual assault on women, 
and the social and financial costs to the community. 
3. To establish a consistent and coordinated framework tor sexual assault reduction, 
prevention and interventions across all levels of government and the wider community. 
4. To develop an information strategy to: 
• Facilitate access to national, policy relevant data to inform strategies to more 
effectively prevent and respond to sexual assaun, and 
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• Establish a comprehensive evidence base incorporating both research and practice. 
OSW (2004b) also stated their initial focus for the National Initiative was establishing a 
sound evidence base to inform future policy development. The National Initiative was to 
"mak[e] better use of existing sexual assault data; collect new national data; and establish a 
research body to explore issues relating to sexual assault'' (OSW, 2004b). 
OSW (2001b) submitted a successful bid of $16.5 million for the National Initiative in the 
2001-2002 Budget. Media commentators reported this as follows: 
... the Na~onalln~iative to Combat Sexual Assault, will receive $16.5 million over four years to 
fund public awareness campaigns about rape and other forms of sexual violence, as well as 
community projects targeting the problem. The initiative will be run in tandem with the 
Government's $50 million Partnerships Against Domestic Violence strategy (Jackman, 2001 in 
The Courier Mail). 
It will establish cross-agency partnerships "to develop, test and implement strategies to 
address the alarming incidence of sexual assault in the community" (Martin, 2001 in The 
Sydney Morning Herald). 
This measure aims to increase women's safety and build safer communities by reducing the 
incidence of sexual assault, the Government said. (lllawarra Mercury, 2001 ). 
As with Partnerships, the Howard Government's funding for the National Initiative 
represented a significant increase in funding to specific policy responses to male violence 
against women compared to previous federal governments. 
Howard Government documents (OFW, 2005g; OSW, 2004b) show five key National 
Initiative projects. First, the Sexual Assault Information Development Framework (IDF) 
which commissioned the Australian Bureau of Statistics to look at current sexual assault 
information and data and plan strategies to address gaps in data. Second, the international 
VioJence Against Women Survey had National Initiative funding for its Australian 
component This United Nations survey intended to provide internationally comparable data 
on women's experiences of physical and sexual violence. Third, funding a full-time data 
analyst at the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) to work solely on sexual assault 
research. Fourth, the National Framework for Sexual Assault Prevention commissioned 
from Urbis Keys Young. Fifth, the National Initiative funded the Australian Centre for the 
Study of Sexual Assault (ACSSA) which was: "to improve access to current information on 
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sexual assault to assist policy makers and others interested in this area to develop 
evidence-based strategies to prevent, respond to, and ultimately reduce the incidence of 
sexual assault" (OSW, 2004b). 
6.3 Women's Safety Taskforce (2002) and Women's National Safety Agenda 
(2005 - 2007) 
The Women's Safety Taskforce (Safety Taskforce) and Women's National Safety Agenda 
(Safety Agenda) were the Australian Government's policy and program responses to male 
violence against women near the end of the Howard years. Only one key informant 
commented on the Safety Taskforce and no key informants commented on the Safety 
Agenda. This may be due to key informants' Jack of experience with these initiatives and 
since public servants approached for an interview who were currently working at OFW at 
the time of the interviews declined to participate in this study. Further, there was no 
reference to the Safety Taskforce beyond its establishment and the Safety Agenda was 
reportedly little more than a funding program. Consequently, it is only possible to provide a 
brief descriptive account of each initiative. 
Women's Safety Taskforce 
The Safety Taskforce was announced in June 2002 and described in the media as follows: 
A national women's safety taskforce will be established today to address sexual assaun, 
domestic violence and Indigenous family violence. The taskforce was announced in Darwin 
yesterday in a communique that followed an Australian and NZ ministerial conference on the 
status of women. The taskforce will be based on the current model, Partnerships Against 
Domestic Violence Taskforce (Sunday Terr~orian, 2002). 
Minister for Women, Kay Patterson (2004), reported this Safety Taskforce first met in 
October 2003 and consisted of officials with responsibility for domestic violence, Indigenous 
family violence and sexual assault across federal, state and territory governments. 
Since the Partnerships Taskforce never officially disbanded, State Public Servant 6 argued 
the Safety Taskforce was a confusing addrtion to the government policy machinery: 
... the PADV machinery was just a nightmare and very dysfunctional but the other added 
problem at the time was that the women's ministers had met and they'd made a comm~ment to 
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the National Women's Safety Taskforce- so something wrthout money but something that had 
clear, had a clear gender perspective and could be viewed as something that was about trying 
to balance out what the conservative Federal Government's agenda might be .... What is this 
thing that has no money but all our minister's have agreed to, ... So it became a complex web 
of how do you, and there was an argument to be said of stream-lining and moving everything 
over to the Taskforce but then the Taskforce, the money certainly wasn't there, because that 
was a significant thing about PADV- there was this bucket of money that while final decisions 
rested with the Commonwealth Minister as to what went forth and what didn't there was public 
servants preparing the advice that were from all jurisdictions as to what should be funded and 
what shouldn't. 
This comment suggests the Safety Taskforce lacked sufficient funding and relevance at 
federal and state levels. Beyond these brief accounts the Safety Taskforce was not 
mentioned in the available official documents. 
Women's National Safetv Agenda 
In 2005 the Howard Government replaced Partnerships and the National Initiative with the 
Safety Agenda which was funded with $75.7 million from the 2005 budget (OFVI/, 2005i). As 
with the National Initiative, the official documents suggest the Safety Agenda was primarily 
a funding program with little associated policy framework or machinery. 
The Safety Agenda aimed to build on the achievements of Partnerships and the National 
Initiative and to "decrease the impacts of domestic violence and sexual assault upon the 
community" (OFVI/, 2005i). OFVI/ (2005i) stated the Safety Agenda was focused on 
prevention, early intervention, and supporting those affected by violence through the health, 
justice and services systems. OFVI/ stated The Safety Agenda's key objectives were to: 
"work towards a society where women's lives are free from violence and the threat of 
violence, and their safety and wellbeing is secured; and position Australia as an 
international leader in reducing violence against women· (OFVI/, 2005e). OFW (2005e) also 
stated the Women's Safety Agenda would: 
... promote policies and practices that address prevention, early intervention and· crisis 
assistance; promote incorporation of demonstrated good practice at national, state, territory 
and local levels; facilitate the development of appropriate and comprehensive community 
responses; raise communrty awareness to reduce tolerance of violent behaviours and to 
reduce the use of violence; implement complementary strategies for men and boys and women 
and girls, to prevent family violence and reduce the use of violence in the community; and 
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promote programmes and policies for women's security and health - addressing the needs of 
women affected by violence, including recovery and wellbeing. 
The similarity of these objectives with Partnerships 2 supports OSW's assertion that the 
Safety Agenda built on the achievements of Partnerships and the National Initiative. 
The Safety Agenda funded seven key projects (OFW, 2005i). These were: rerunning 
Australia Says No; funding the Australian Domestic and Family Violence Clearinghouse and 
the Australian Centre for the Study of Sexual Assault; funding research and pilot projects on 
domestic violence and sexual assault; training for nurses in regional and rural areas; 
training for the criminal justice sector on sexual assault; a dedicated sexual assault 
researcher at the Australian Institute of Criminology; and funding Mensline. A brief 
description of each project is provided in Appendix 6.9. OSW's claim the Safety Agenda 
continued the work of Partnerships and the National Initiative is supported by the number of 
funded projects on this list commenced under these previous initiatives. 
6.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided a comprehensive account of the Howard Government's policy 
and program responses to male violence against women. Specifically, this chapter outlined 
the history, policy machinery and content of Partnerships Against Domestic Violence (1997-
2005), the National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault (2000-2005), the Women's Safety 
Taskforce (2002), and the Women's Safety Agenda (2005-2007). Findings from this chapter 
offer some interesting additional insights into the Australian Government's engagement and 
disengagement with feminism during the Howard years. These insights form a foundation 
for stage two of the study and are explored further in the case study of Partnerships in 
Chapter Nine. The next chapter, however, outlines further findings from stage one with an 
account of the Howard Government's community education campaigns. 
126 
Chapter 7: Male Violence Against Women Commumty Education Campaigns (2001-2007) 
Chapter Seven 
Male Violence Against Women 
Community Education Campaigns 2001-2007 
Australian federalism and the constitutional division of powers mean federal governments 
have traditionally not been involved in service delivery responses to male violence against 
women. Community education campaigns have, however, played a prominent role in the 
Australian Government's approaches to this issue since the Hawke Labor Government's 
National Domestic Violence Education Program in 1987. This chapter provides the second 
part of the comprehensive account of the Howard Government's approaches by exploring 
the government's community education campaigns No Respect, No Relationship (No 
RespecO (2001-2003} and Violence Against Women - Australia Says No (Australia Says 
No) (2004-2007}. No Respect was a campaign developed by the Howard Government and 
reportedly cancelled in December 2003 in a dramatic turn of events ten days before its 
scheduled launch. The Howard Government replaced No Respect with Australia Says No in 
June 2004. Drawing upon the empirical data from stage one of the study, this chapter 
develops an historical narrative outlining the history, development, and key elements of 
each campaign. 
No Respect and Australia Says No were significant for three main reasons. First, the 
campaigns were products of the policies and programs outlined in Chapter Six. No Respect 
was jointly funded by Partnerships and the National Initiative and Australia Says No was 
jointly funded by Partnerships, the National Initiative, and later the Women's Safety Agenda. 
Second, these campaigns were developed internally by OFW, which is the federal 
government agency with primary responsibility for responses to rnale violence against 
women. These campaigns are thus highly representative of the Australian Government's 
approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years. Third, the Howard 
Government's cancellation and replacement of No Respect with Australia Says No offers a 
fascinating story and important insights into the government's engagement with feminism as 
well as into their approaches to male violence against women. 
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No Respect, No Relationship (2001 - 2003) 
7.1 No Respect, No Relationship History and Development 
Between 2001 and 2003 OSW developed two community education campaigns they later 
amalgamated to become No Respect. The first campaign was funded by Partnerships to 
address 'relationship violence'. Community education was an important component of both 
phases of Partnerships and in Partnerships 2 the Howard Government allocated $10 million 
for "national awareness raising (community education)" (OSW, 2001c, 2001d). Partnerships 
funded four national domestic violence community education campaigns. The first three of 
these were: 1) Walking Into Doors, which targeted Aboriginal people; 2) a campaign 
targeted at non-English speaking background (NESS) communities; and 3) Partnerships 
Against Domestic Violence: A Business Approach targeted at the private sector 
(Partnerships Taskforce, 2001, p.38). The final campaign, a mainstream campaign targeted 
at young people, was the largest and reportedly most controversial of the campaigns. 
The Partnerships 1 Taskforce established a working group which included participants with 
expertise in community education, federal and state public servants and a Taskforce 
representative (Taskforce Members 7 & 8 and State Public Servant 10). In approximately 
2000 this working group decided to run community education programs targeted at 
Indigenous and NESS communities which, due to the complexities of cultural 
considerations, relied on the advice of external consultants in their development (Taskforce 
Member 10 and State Public Servant 10). The third campaign, which was targeted at the 
business community and about which there was little available published material, came 
from OSW rather than the working group and only produced a few posters and brochures 
about domestic violence for businesses (Academic 4). The working group decided the 
fourth campaign would be targeted at young people and this campaign reportedly 
generated significant conflict and differing opinions amongst working group members about 
the best approach (State Public Servant 1 0). 
The main reason for this conflict in the working group was reportedly the Howard 
Government's desire to adapt the Western Australian Government's Freedom From fear 
campaign into a national campaign. Freedom from Fear was a community education 
campaign developed in the late 1990s which aimed to show the impact of domestic violence 
on children and encourage men perpetrating violence to change their behaviour. A key 
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informant involved in this campaign (State Public Servant ET) commented that Freedom from 
Fear was well-resourced by the Western Australian Government and included funding for a 
men's helpline, women's counselling services and children's services to meet the demand it 
generated. Freedom from Fear apparently so impressed Minister Newman that OSW 
explored running a similar national campaign (Government MP 2, Evaluator 2, and 
Taskforce Members 8 & 10). 
This interest in Freedom from Fear generated significant controversy amongst state public 
servants because this campaign included a "call to action" which required state 
governments to provide services such as refuges and counselling to meet the demand 
generated (State Public Servants 7, 9 and 10). This meant some state governments would 
need funding to set up new services or realign existing ones to prepare for the proposed 
campaign. Consequently, a number of public servants expressed concern, resistance and 
refusal to participate in the proposed national campaign (State Public Servants 7 & ET). 
According to State Public Servant 9, the states argued they were being "put upon" by the 
federal government's proposal and ''were strongly resistant to it being rolled out to them". 
Similarly, State Public Servant 7 said the federal government's proposal was irresponsible 
and dangerous as the proposed campaign was not going to fund the types of services 
Freedom from Fear had. She continued: 
/ 
.. :there's no way that this is in any way moral, ah ethical, to raise all this expectation amongst 
women that they will be safe and there's some place for the men to be able to get help when 
there isn't. ... So we had a big battle with the campaign and I held out and said no and I went 
back to the Commonwealth saying no we won't go with it ... 1 remember at the time really 
digging in my heels, I was so angry about this campaign and these horrible smooth media 
people coming with no concept of what they were doing and how serious it was (State Public 
Servant 7). 
The Government's own research also reportedly highlighted a range of barriers including 
"the lack of robust national infrastructure to support men who seek help for their violent 
behaviour" (OSW, 2003a, p.15). The Howard Government therefore abandoned this 
proposal. 
Once this proposal was abandoned, the working group began developing a campaign 
based on Partnerships funded research (Federal Public Servant 2, Taskforce Member 8, 
and State Public Servant 10). Federal Public Servants 2 & 5, Taskforce Members 4 & 8, 
Evaluator 2 and State Public Servant 10 argued the two main Partnerships research reports 
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underpinning this new campaign were: the Partnerships 1 meta-evaluation report 
Community Awarene~s and Education to Prevent, Reduce and Respond to Domestic 
Violence (Strategic Partners, 2003b) and Young People and Domestic Violence (National 
Crime Prevention, 2001 ). These reports provide detailed and specific recommendations 
about community education campaigns. Appendices 7.1 and 7.2 provide key messages 
from these reports. In 2001 OSW also commissioned developmental research to inform the 
proposed campaign (OSW, 2003a, p.15). 
The two Partnerships reports and developmental research indicated the best approach for a 
community education campaign would be prevention focused on young people (Federal 
Public Servant 2, Taskforce Member 5 and State Public Servant 10). These key informants 
said the Howard Government therefore started developing a relationship violence 
prevention and early intervention campaign targeted at young people. At the same time, 
however, Taskforce Member 7 and State Public Servant 10 argued that, as with the 
Partnerships Taskforce, the campaign working group effectively disbanded. This meant the 
Howard Government continued developing the campaign without representatives from the 
states or Taskforce. 
The second community education campaign developed during this period was funded by 
the National Initiative and aimed to focus on sexual assault prevention with young people 
(OSW, 2003a). The campaign was reportedly based on the National Initiative's first 
objective: "to promote cultural change in attitudes and behaviours to reduce the incidence of 
sexual assault" (OSW, 2003c). OSW (2003a; 2003c) and Federal Public Servant 5 stated 
that OSW planned this campaign to have three related stages. First, was developmental 
research exploring young people's understanding, knowledge, attitudes and behaviours 
concerning sexual assault to guide the direction, tone and messages. Second, was 
sponsoring a national mainstream media-based arts festival targeting young people. Third, 
was developing an Indigenous-specific project about young people and sexual assault. 
The first stage, the developmental research, was reportedly completed in June 2003 (OSW, 
2003a, p.4 ). At this time OSW concluded there were compelling similarities between the 
sexual assault and relationship violence developmental research (OSW, 2003a, p.4). These 
included similarities in young people's experiences and attitudes and the causes of this 
violence. Appendix 7.3 provides a summary of these similarities. OSW (2003a, pp.16-17) 
also noted findings specific to sexual assault in the developmental research. These 
included community beliefs about sexual assault being the result of miscommunication and 
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the prominence of coercion in 'normal' sexual relationships. Appendix 7.4 provides a 
summary of the findings specific to sexual assault. 
Federal Public Servants 2 and 5 argued that when OSW received the sexual assault 
developmental research they realised it was logical to integrate the campaigns. As Federal 
Public Servant 2 argued: "if we're going prevention and we're going young people, we're 
crazy if we're doing two separate things". Further, Federal Public Servant 5 argued there 
were administrative reasons to amalgamate the campaigns which included preventing 
certain parts of the first campaign's funding being lost to general revenue. In July 2003 
OSW provided the government with a Communication Strategy (OSW, 2003a) to 
amalgamate the two campaigns. OSW (2003a, p.14) argued there was "strong logic" for 
delivering a single campaign because: the two issues are in"extricably linked; sexual assault 
needs to be placed in a relationships context; the target audiences and communication 
channels are the same; the combined approach will meet the needs of the majority of young 
women affected by this violence; and a combined campaign provides greater efficiencies 
and economies of scale given the convergence of timelines and similarities in strategic 
approach. According to Federal Public Servant 2 OSW therefore began developing a 
combined relationship violence and sexual assault campaign, No Respect, from July 2003. 
Once the two campaigns were amalgamated, Federal Public Servant 2 described No 
Respect as a "massive collaborative process" with extensive national consultation. This 
view wasn't shared by others, however. Peak Body Representatives 1 & 3, Academic 3 and 
State Public Servants 6 & 10 described the deterioration of state-federal relationships and 
argued OSW's development of the campaign was secretive and exclusionary. These key 
informants also complained about the absence of consultation with the sector over 
campaign content; particularly with peak bodies WESNET and NASASV14. Nevertheless, 
according to Academic 3 and State Public Servant 6, OSW also seemed "proud" of No 
Respect and ''were talking about it ad nauseum". 
The Ministerial Council on Government Communications (MCGC), which ultimately 
cancelled the campaign, were also reportedly closely involved in developing No Respect. 
The MCGC guided and approved the development of all Howard Government advertising 
not deemed party political. As discussed in Chapter Four, critiques of the Howard 
Government's advertising suggest the vast majority of it was partisan political and aimed 
14 Women's Emergency Services Network and National Association of Services Against Sexual 
Violence. 
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more at electoral advantage than community education. The composition of the MCGC 
supports these criticisms since it included prominent Liberal Party members rather than 
public servants or experts in community education. At the time they cancelled the 
campaign, Bowden (2004a) reported the MCGC included: a "Liberal Party powerbroker" 
and Minister as the Chair; one of "the PM's trusted senior political advisers"; and a Liberal 
MP. This composition suggests the MCGC itself, and advertising approved by the MCGC, 
played an important political role for the Howard Government. 
According to OSW (2003a, p.27) the MCGC was involved in developing No Respect from at 
least July 2003. Federal Public Servant 2 and the MCGC Member recalled the MCGC 
played a prominent decision-making role including contracting research, advertising 
companies and consultants and approving funding. The MCGC Member described their 
involvement as follows: 
The Minister [for Family and Community Services] then presents what's called a research brief 
to the MCGC. We look at that research brief and it goes out to a research company, what are 
the statistics on domestic violence, is it a problem. Can I tell you I don't think anybody on the 
committee needed advice or information that it was a problem etcetera, but that's how it starts. 
Then when it comes back these are the issues then we ask the Department, the Government 
Communications Unit in Prime Minister and Cabinet to give us a Jist of let's say five companies 
that could run such a campaign because of their experience in running social behaviour 
modification campaigns - be it anti-smoking, be it whatever else, road safety campaigns, 
whatever ... They then go away, what they come up with, concepts are tested in focus groups. 
That then comes back to us as a committee. We then usually pick two, get, tell them to go 
away to really flesh out big time how they would communicate the message etcetera. We then 
focus test that again and then the best one, or the one we think is best equipped and the 
research, value for money, all those considerations meshed in, they are then given the contract 
to go away and do the job. 
Similarly, Federal Public Servant 2 described the MCGC as having "had their hand in every 
single step of the way". Media commentators (Bowden, 2004a; Martin, 2004) also reported 
the MCGC oversaw the campaign "every step of the way" and were briefed eleven times 
about the campaign. Bowden (2004a) reported the MCGC "hand-picked the [campaign] 
concept from several tenders and held detailed meetings with international ad agency Grey 
Worldwide as the campaign was refined over several months". These commentaries 
suggest the MCGC thus had extensive involvement, ongoing oversight and decision-making 
power developing No Respect. 
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7.2 No Respect, No Relationship Content 
No Respect's aim was to confront and debunk harmful community misconceptions and build 
young people's understanding, desire and capacity to form and maintain non-violent 
relationships (OSW, 2003a, p.19; 2003b, p.3). OSW (2003b, p. 16) planned the campaign 
would: be multi-faceted; provide information on how to identify negative behaviours and 
attitudes in a relationship; develop, promote and reinforce positive skills for non-violent 
relationships; and provide information about what to do if someone is experiencing abuse. 
OSW's aims and objectives for the campaign were therefore consistent with the 
recommendations of the Partnerships research summarised in Appendices 7.1 and 7.2 and 
the developmental research outlined in the Communication Strategy (OSW, 2003a). This is 
important since Australia Says No was criticised for not being consistenrwith this research 
as discussed in Chapter Eight. 
No Respect was to cover a range of issues concerning "awareness", "attitudes and beliefs", 
and "intentions" (OSW, 2003b, pp.19-23). These issues included: understanding the nature, 
risks and consequence of relationship violence and sexual assault (including debunking 
myths); developing and reinforcing the benefits of, and strategies to form and maintain, 
positive and respectful relationships; and information and strategies to promote supportive 
responses to ·people who have experienced violence. OSW (2003a, p.23) states the 
campaign was developed according to strategic considerations from the developmental 
research. These included: the primary target group of 16 to 24 year olds; a secondary target 
group of parents and 'gatekeepers' such as teachers and sports coaches to model non-
violent relationships and offer support; using a range of strategies aimed at different age 
and target groups; focusing on skills-based programs delivered in schools; approaching 
young people through peer groups; forming partnerships with individuals, groups and media 
organisation that influence popular culture; and telling stories and allowing young people to 
draw their own conclusions rather than telling them how to think or behave. Appendix 7.5 
has a detailed list of these strategic considerations. 
Media commentators reported No Respect cost $12 million and was to be launched by 
Prime Minister Howard in December 2003 to run over Christmas and Summer until May 
2004 (Bowden, 2004a; OSW, 2003a; Roxon, 2004c; Wallace, 2003; Walsh, 2003). No 
. 
Respect had the following five key components: mass media advertising, youth 
communication activities, public relations, NESB and Indigenous specific strategies. 
133 
Chapter 7: Male Violence Against Women Community Education Campaigns (2001-2007) 
The mass media component, which Bowden (2004a) described as the campaign's 
"centrepiece", originated from the sexual assault developmental research. OSW (2003a, 
p.6) claimed the research demonstrated a clear role for the mass media to raise relationship 
violence and sexual assault onto the community's social agenda. The mass media 
component was a series of advertisements for television, magazines, and radio (OSW, 
2003a, pp.23-24). For OSW (2003a, p.24) its primary role was to set the agenda, outline the 
main themes of the campaign, raise awareness about relationship violence and sexual 
assault, and challenge potentially harmful myths and misconceptions. Appendix 7.5 has 
some of the original No Respect advertisements. 
The sexual assault developmental research reportedly found, however, that 'the issue is too 
complex to be remedied by advertising only" and No Respect required additional public 
relations and intervention strategies (OSW, 2003a, p.6). The second part of the campaign 
was a communications and public relations strategy collaborating with media outlets to 
engage directly with young people (OSW, 2003a, pp.24-25). In a Triple J interview 
(Cannane, 2004) Esther Fallon, a public servant who worked on the campaign, described 
this as a diverse multi-media approach "for young people, by young people, about young 
people". The key components of the No Respect communications and public relations 
strategy were identified from a range of sources including: Federal Public Servant 2 and 
Academic 3; OSW (2003a); the ALP (Roxon, 2004a); and the media (Bowden, 2004a; 
Cannane, 2004; Verity, 2004; Walker, 2004; Walsh, 2004; Williams, 2004). These included: 
editorials for television, radio, cinema and print; sponsorship of youth events; online 
resources including a website; publicity events and strategies; engaging directly with young 
people (e.g. text messages); Coaching Boys Into Men sporting program; an lndiger~ous 
specific communication program; and a NESB specific communication program. Appendix 
7.6 has a summary of the key elements of each component. 
7.3 Reactions to No Respect, No Relationship 
Key informants and media commentators provided their reactions to the campaign. Some 
key informants said they had knowledge of the campaign because they had worked on the 
campaign as a public servant or 'critical friend' (giving feedback to OSW) or knew of the 
campaign from information OSW provided to the sector. Media commentators reportedly 
interviewed, and were informed of the campaign by, federal public servants who had 
worked on the campaign as illustrated by Esther Fallon's Triple J radio interview (Cannane, 
2004) and the ABC's 7.30 Report stories on No Respect (Bowden, 2004a, 2004b). 
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Media commentators reported a number of positive comments about No Respect. Tracy 
Bowden from the ABC's 7.30 Report, stated "independent market research provided to the 
Government found these ads were overwhelmingly effective". Bowden (2004a) interviewed 
Dr Jill Murray, an American expert in domestic violence prevention the government invited 
to launch No Respect, who commented: 
I have never seen a campaign that was so strong in terms of scope, its focus, the passion for 
it. ... It would have been ground breaking, absolutely ground breaking around the world. It 
would have been the perfect model for other countries to follow as far as what a domestic 
violence campaign should like look. I was so impressed with it. 
Further, Cat Gander from the NSW Women's Refuge and Resource Centre and Vanessa 
Swan, Chair of NASASV, were both reported as describing No Respect as invaluable in its 
potential to change social values, teach young people about healthy relationships, build 
relationships based on equity, and prevent violence (Bowden, 2004a; Walsh, 2004). These 
comments suggest some workers with expertise in domestic violence and sexual assault 
argued No Respect was a positive and effective response to these issues. 
Key informants wh'o had worked on No Respect argued that the campaign teased out the 
complexities of young people's understandings and experiences of violence and was 
evidence-based. Federal Public Servants 2 and 5 spoke extensively about the influence of 
the developmental research on No Respect. Federal Public Servant 2 argued the research 
revealed that beyond "hard core violence" young people didn't actually understand the 
nuances of relationship and sexual violence or exactly what behaviours this sort of violence 
included. She also argued the developmental research suggested young people were very 
tribal in nature, were not a homogenous group, and needed to be engaged through people 
that they would find plausible including their peers, parents, sports coaches and teachers. 
She continued: 
We wanted to not just have one of those campaigns that talked to women and it was sort of 
like, almost like, it was the woman's responsibility somehow to stop the violence. We didn't 
want to put blokes off by talking about perpetrators and going at that hard end approach. We 
felt that enough had been done on the hard end approach - that that was being done 
particularly in the crisis end of things. So your fellas hittin' you around, all of that, everyone 
actually knows what that kind of hard end domestic violence looks like .... So we were really 
trying to go to the positive end of things to engage, how people talk about respectful 
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relationships and that, the research just showed over and over again that the idea of respect in 
relationships just came back up as a really meaningful sort of message (Federal Public 
Servant 2). 
Similarly, Federal Public Servant 5 argued No Respect was grounded in a firm evidence-
base of what messages would work to prevent sexual assault and domestic violence. 
Federal Public Servant 2 also argued that the campaign integrated a complex 
understanding of violence as a systematic pattern of abuse located in gendered social 
structures and institutions rather than as an isolated behaviour of individuals. She said it 
moved away from prescriptive and parental approaches and simple victim/perpetrator 
dichotomies that young people were unlikely to identify with. She also said it reflected 
complexities of gender, sexuality and language: 
... we tried not to be really heterosexual about it either. We didn't sort of make ·that like, 
obviously most of the examples were around heterosexual couples and stuff but we tried to 
speak in a way that didn"t exclude. We also didn't use gendered language ... We actually tried 
to remove all gendered language from it as much as possible without selling out the idea, we 
certainly didn't shy away from fact and figures around where the violence is and that it is men 
against women predominantly and blah, blah. But, we didn't, we just tried to talk about 'your 
partner' and 'your relationship' so that we didn't immediately give guys the message that, well, 
'we think you're a perve and, you know'. And also, I suppose, it's not assuming that they had 
self-identified as a perve already, like, because the research says they don't know what 
they're, that, that behaviour is perpetrator behaviour well then going out there and basically 
talking about perpetrators was not going to engage them in the campaign in any way, shape or 
form. So, it was about not trying to scare boys off. 
This key informant argued No Respect had a complex relationship with feminism and 
reflected a feminist analysis of male violence by focussing on all young people's 
relationships as involving potentially problematic dynamics, such as inequality and 
disrespect. This was instead of isolating individual men perpetrating violence or their 
relationships as the problem. In this way, No Respect reflected a feminist analysis by 
problematising all relationships between women and men as potentially unequal. No 
Respect thus appeared to locate male violence against women in the context of unequal 
gendered power relations (macro level) and social institutions such as traditional families 
and heterosexuality (mezzo levels) under patriarchy. 
Another aspect of No Respect which reflected its complex relationship with feminism 
according to Federal Public Servant 2 was the way it approached difference and identity. 
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Federal Public Servant 2 argued OSW were cognisant of the gendered nature of the 
violence and thus represented men as perpetrators and women as victims. Simultaneously, 
however, she argues OSW used non-gendered language to engage with young men as 
perpetrators, potential perpetrators, or victims and also to include non-heterosexual young 
people. This approach reflects a post-structural feminist understanding of violence in two 
ways consistent with the discussion in Chapter Two. First, it reflects feminist understandings 
that patriarchy constructs a number of dichotomous hierarchies which privilege certain 
groups over others based on gender, race, sexuality, wealth, education and so on. The 
approach in No Respect acknowledges violence against women is an issue for all young 
people and not, for example, just heterosexual young people. It also acknowledges that this 
violence invokes hierarchical constructions of difference and superiority such as those 
based on gender or sexual preference regardless of the individual identity of the victim or 
perpetrator (Gillespie, 1996; Mason, 2002). Second, its non-gendered, inclusive approach 
acknowledges that young people may have multiple subjectivities (not just victim or 
perpetrator) and engages with young men who may be hostile to feminism or may not 
identify as perpetrators. For Federal Public Servant 2 No Respect thus represented a 
complex relationship with feminism and sophisticated engagement with young people. 
The reported lack of consultation with the specialist sectors in developing No Respect 
meant another key informant expressed great surprise about her positive response to No 
Resl?ect and her perception of the high quality of the final products. Academic 3 argued No 
Respect represented a significant shift in approaches to prevention in comparison to other 
similar community education campaigns. She argued campaigns of this type had 
traditionally focused on a deficit model which concentrated prevention on what women 
should not do if they are to avoid violence (e.g. what women shouldn't wear, that they 
shouldn't drink or flirt). In contrast, Academic 3 argued No Respect "encouraged women's 
agency and power in relationships"; aimed to "develop skills to help men achieve positive 
relationships with women''; and "promoted to men the benefits of healthy relationships with 
women based on respect". Consequently, she argued: 
So I was really excited and just thought if they get this right, this is going to be something that 
we've never, ever seen before ... it was as close to kind of coming to a cultural change that we 
can almost touch that, that was surprising to me they'd gone to that kind of effort and thi~ was 
the Feds, I couldn't believe it that they'd contracted in this way (Academic 3). 
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Academic 3 therefore argued No Respect was positive compared with previous community 
education campaigns on this issue which she said was surprising given the lack of 
consultation. 
Not all key informants expressed such detailed assessments of No Respect and some key 
informants had not even heard of this campaign despite a long history of involvement with 
the specialist service sectors and active involvement in Partnerships. This finding 
highlighted the importance of constructing an account of No Respect and documenting its 
history. Of those key informants who did refer to or comment on No Respect, all except for 
Government MP 1 described the campaign itself in positive terms. A number (e.g. Academic 
3 and Peak Body Representatives 1 & 3) criticised OSW for not adequately consulting with 
the sector in the development of No Respect. These criticisms were, however, juxtaposed 
against these key informants' positive assessments of the campaign's content and their 
surprise at this given the exclusion of the sector from its development. 
7.4 "But then the unexpected happened ... "15: the Howard Government 
cancels No Respect, No Relationship 
No Respect'~>_ launch date was reported as 1 December 2003 (Light, 2004). In late 
November, however, "the unexpected happened ... [and] the Liberal Party pulled the 
campaign" (Roxon, 2004b). Media reports that the campaign had been "shelved", "canned", 
"pulled;', and "cancelled" by the MCGC, were contested on the 7.30 Report by the Minister 
Kay Patter~on. Minister Patterson told the 7.30 Report. "to say it's been cancelled is wrong. 
It has been delayed" (Bowden, 2004a). Whatever the terminology, these reports suggest No 
Respect was not launched as planned in December 2003. 
Federal Public Servants 2 and 5 said No Respect was presented to the MCGC for final 
approval 1 0 days before the scheduled launch and at this point they refused to approve the 
campaign. For State Public Servant 10, this refusal was a "shock" and unexpected given 
the MCGC's close involvement in No Respect's development and the close proximity to the 
proposed launch. Federal Public Servant 2 also described how the MCGC cancelled the 
campaign: 
' Yeah, so they saw the ads when they selected them so it was not like they didn't know what 
the ads looked like or what it was about. And then when we basically everything was ready to 
15 (Roxon, 2004b). 
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go and 10 days before launch they saw the final iterations of the ads and they, that's when 
they pulled it. And it was interesting the way they pulled it. It wasn't like, "nup we've changed 
our mind, we're pulling it" .... They started saying things like "oh, oh, it looks like we're not being 
tough enough on violence" ... that was the line. "Not being tough enough on violence. We're not 
demonstrating that violence is totally unacceptable. We're not, you know, it's our responsibility 
to show-". So it was really subtle and this is how they work .... what that meant was that we just 
missed the whole 'Big Day Out' Tour, we missed the opportunity to get into schools with the 
resource ... We'd missed dates, deadlines. 
These key informants thus suggest the MCGC cancelled No Respect at a surprisingly late 
stage and in an indirect way by simply missing the campaign's deadlines rather than 
formally cancelling the campaign. 
This approach by the MCGC might explain media reports and key informant comments 
which suggested people involved in campaign development were not informed of what was 
happening. Media commentators (Bowden, 2004a; Maguire, 2004) reported that 
Cosmopolitan Magazine and the Domestic Violence and Incest Resource Centre were both 
involved in No Respect and yet were given no explanation or reason for the campaign being 
cancelled. Similarly, State Public Servant 10 and Academic 3 reported they were both 
involved in developing No Respect and yet received no official word that the campaign was 
even cancelled. State Public Servant 10 did say a generic email was sent by OSW that 
broadly stated there would be a change of direction in No Respect. Apart from this email, 
both key informants said there was a "flurry of rumour and activity" with unofficial reports of 
delays but no official communication with any details. 
The reasons the MCGC cancelled the campaign were therefore the subject of much public 
and private speculation. Based on public reports by media commentators, the Opposition, 
and government ministers as well as private comments by key informants, five possible 
reasons were proposed for why the Howard Government cancelled the campaign. 
First, media commentators speculated the MCGC were concerned about what No Respect 
suggested constituted domestic violence (B&T Weekly, 2004; Walsh, 2004). They reported 
key Liberal politicians, including MCGC members, did not believe the verbal intimidation 
and psychological abuse portrayed in the campaign constituted violence (Egan, 2004; 
Gough & Roe, 2004; Harvey, 2003; Light, 2004; Maguire, 2004; The Age, 2004; Wallace, 
2003). These media reports were consistent with the MCGC Member's comments that 
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domestic violence only included forms of violence that were against the law and, as he 
continued: 
My view is if you're to go out into the community and say do you think that's domestic violence 
[verbal abuse and controlling behaviours], I think the vast majority would say no that's 
ridiculous but if you start saying things like that are offensive as people getting broken jaws, 
black eyes, etcetera, etcetera, I think you ... trivialise the serious aspects of domestic violence 
and by lumping it all in together .... we said, 'look, if you want honesty and respect in a 
relationship the man shouldn't have to put up with everything the woman might want to do and 
vice versa'. The man should be able to say to his woman, if I can use that sort of possessive 
term, I don't like that dress you are wearing. She, similarly, can say I think your shorts are a bit 
tight ... With some of the concepts that were being thrown up to us and we also thought that it 
would devalue and give excuses to a lot of people to say, 'oh domestic violence against 
women, you can't even tell them their dress is too short when they are going out the door'. 
These comments suggest this member of the Howard Government understood domestic 
violence narrowly as a criminal act at a micro level alone and that this was one of the 
reasons for the MCGC cancelling the campaign. 
The MCGC Member's comments about equivalence in a relationship (e.g. a man might say 
I don't like the dress you are wearing and the woman might say your shorts are a bit tight) 
are also notable. They suggest an understanding of domestic violence that does not 
consider the mezzo or macro levels of gendered power relations and institutional 
inequalities against women. Nor do they acknowledge the way individual men strategically 
draw upon the mezzo and macro levels (e.g. gendered expectations of women and men's 
roles in families and societies) in perpetrating violence at a micro level. The perceived 
'naturalness' of gendered power relations for this key informant is suggested by his 
comments "The man should be able to say to his woman ... " and that a man was entitled to 
tell his partner 'their dress is too short". Despite acknowledging his use of a "possessive 
term" here, this key informant nevertheless invoked patriarchal discourses of women as 
property and men's entitlement to direct and control women (such as telling her what she 
can and can't wear) as natural. 
Consistent with this first proposed reason, Federal Public Servant. 2 argued the MCGC 
cancelled No Respect because of their inadequate understanding of male violence against 
women and of prevention. She argued the MCGC lacked knowledge about male violence 
against women and did not understand that prevention focuses on warning signs and 
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developing respectful relationships. She argued OSW was careful not to dichotomise men 
as the campaign's targets and encouraged all men to take responsibility for violence against 
women since "even if it's not you, it's probably your mate being a controlling pig". This key 
informant thus suggested No Respect addressed the gendered system of patriarchal power 
relations and dynamics of traditional family and heterosexuality which underpin male 
violence against women (macro and mezzo levels). Federal Public Servant 2 argued the 
MCGC did not comprehend this more complex understanding of violence and only 
understood it as individuals perpetrating violence (micro level). Consequently, she argued 
the MCGC mistakenly perceived No Respect's focus on the disturbing views of young 
people towards violence, power and controlling behaviours as suggesting "violence is in 
every, virtually every relationship". Federal Public Servant 2 also hypothesised the reasons 
for what she called the Howard Government's "deliberate ignorance": 
I think it was an ideological thing that I think they got scared that men's groups were going to 
freak out ... I think it's their lack of understanding that they didn't get that actually what we were 
doing is talking to young men and women in a really non-judgmental way and they took it to 
mean that we were saying that all young men potentially are violent and all relationships are 
potentially violent and they saw that as more insulting [despite what] the evidence said ... It's 
like a combination of their ideological views affects their decisions and then make them think 
they're ~so right that they don't bother to even find out anymore information to inform 
themselves and ~'think that happens all the time .... they choose not to receive good advice, 
they choose not to pay attention to research. They do really think that they know better and 
they convince themselves that what they think is right. 
According to this federal public servant the MCGC's lack of understanding of this issue and 
of prevention as well as their ideological refusal to take into account alternative advice 
therefore played a prominent role in them cancelling No Respect. 
The second proposed reason the MCGC cancelled No Respect was that it targeted men as 
perpetrators. Labor Senator John Faulkner reportedly argued the MCGC thought No 
Respect was "just a bit too rough on men" (Martin, 2004). Other media commentators 
similarly argued: the government were concerned the campaign was "anti-male" (Karvelas, 
2004; Milne, 2004; The Age, 2004; Williams, 2004) and '1oo rough on men" (Contractor, 
2004; Martin, 2004); senior government figures objected to portraying and targeting only 
men as aggressors and emphasising men's violence (B& T Weekly, 2004; Frazer, 2004; 
Harvey, 2003; Ligerakis, 2004; Morris, 2004; Verity, 2004); and at least one member of the 
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MCGC believed men should be shown as victims as well perpetrators of domestic violence 
(Merola, 2003; Wallace, 2003). 
Minister Patterson argued these reports were inaccurate (Milne, 2004) and the MCGC 
Member also disagreed that No Respect was cancelled because of its focus on men. 
Nevertheless, despite these denials, other key informants' comments supported the media 
reports. Federal Public Servant 5 argued: "We'd done two years of formative research and 
tnen evaluation of formative research and then design of the campaign. It was two years of 
hard work and the messages were very clearly targeting men and the MCGC didn't like 
that". Similarly, Academic 3, Taskforce Member 4, and State Public Servant 10 all argued 
the MCGC were concerned about targeting men as perpetrators-and perceived No Respect 
as having an "anti-male sentiment". These key informants thus support media 
commentator's suggestions the MCGC cancelled the campaign because of its focus on 
men. 
The third proposed reason the MCGC cancelled No Respect was because it was 
inappropriate to refer victims of violence to a website. In response to a question from ALP 
politician Nicola Roxon during the House of Representatives Question Time on 19 February 
2004 Prime Minister Howard stated: "It is palpably lacking in common sense to put an 
advertisement that, as its first piece of advice, says to somebody who has been the victim 
of a violent rape to go to a web site" instead of a helpline, priest, parent, police or doctor for 
help and information (Hansard, 2004c). Howard's comments were reported and critiqued in 
the media and by the ALP (Egan, 2004; Light, 2004; Maguire, 2004; Martin, 2004; Roxon, 
2004b). Colleen Egan (2004), for example, argued: "Does our 64-year-old leader not realise 
that today's teens spend more time at computers than in confessionals? And that parents 
and priests rank high among perpetrators in cyclical abuse". This reason was, however, 
later echoed by Minister Patterson (Hansard, 2004i) and reported widely in the media 
(Cannane, 2004; Geelong Advertiser, 2004; Gough & Roe, 2004; Milne, 2004; SBS, 2004; 
Verity, 2004; Walker, 2004; Walsh, 2004). Significantly, Howard's comment is consistent 
with what Mungo MacCallum (2004, p.63) observed as Howard's strategy of preventing 
scrutiny of controversial decisions of his government by describing something as 
"inappropriate". In this context, Howard's approach to No Respect was consistent with his 
strategic deflection of criticism towards the government regarding a range of social issues. 
The fourth proposed reason the MCGC cancelled No Respect was the Howard Government 
wanted to put forward a stronger, more clearly defined message on violence against 
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women. On the 7.30 Report (Bowden, 2004a) Minister Patterson argued: "The campaign 
will go ahead in a way which makes sure that our message that domestic violence and 
violence in relationships is unacceptable and that is the campaign that will go forward". 
Consistent with this, Kerry Flanagan, a senior OSW staff member, reportedly said the 
campaign was cancelled because it needed "a clearer and more narrowly defined message" 
(Martin, 2004). 
Federal Public Servant 2 argued this fourth reason was a Howard Government strategy to 
deflect criticism. She argued it was politically impossible for the Howard. Government to 
cancel the campaign outright and so they instead used rhetoric such as "improving, 
fortifying and strengthening it and making it very clear that violence against women is totally 
unacceptable" (Federal Public Servant 2). She continued: 
This is the message that they kept saying and it's kind of plausible. You can sort of see, 
because I watched the minister get up and sell the fact that they were pulling the campaign 
and she said "we're not, we're not pulling it, we're strengthening it" ... It's a bit of a tricky one to 
explain and it's like no-one got it at the time what was happening. They thought they were 
tweaking the edges and ... we were going "Nup they're not tweaking the edges, this is going, 
it's a radical shift". It sounds so, they're so good at it, they're so convincing 'cause she, the 
Minister just kept saying over and over on the '7.30 Report' you see her "we're just making it 
stronger, we need to send a strong message to Australia that violence is [unacceptable]" ... it 
was a subtle thing but by changing that they actually, it was a fundamental shift and basically 
undermined the whole point of the campaign and why we were doing what we were doing. So 
they wanted just hard core violence placed into everything we did. 
These comments also offer an interesting insight into the Howard Government's 
engagement with feminism by suggesting the government may have strategically used 
feminist rhetoric about responding to violence to achieve their political agenda to cancel No 
Respect. 
The Howard Government's strategic argument that they were strengthening a program 
while dismantling it is evident elsewhere. It parallels Minister Vanstone's comment on the 
eve of the 2001 International Women's Day that the Howard Government was 'the most 
female-friendly government Australia has ever seen" (Maddison, 2004, p.42). Vanstone 
made this comment in the context of the Howard Government's deliberate sirategy to dilute 
women's rights in Australia (Maddison, 2004, p.42) and undermine women's equality as 
outlined in Chapter Three. Further, regarding health policy Amanda Elliot (2006) argues the 
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Howard Government discursively developed a new policy narrative constructing the 
problem- of the health care system as the decline in private health insurance and the lack of 
a public/private 'balance'. While describing themselves as 'the best friend Medicare ever 
had', Elliot argues the Howard Goyernment bolstered private health insurance and 
dismantled Medicare_ Elliot's argument regarding Medicare parallels the Howard 
Government's approach to No Respect This observation forms part of the foundation for 
the argument later in this thesis that the Howard Government's approaches to male 
violence against women may be conceptualised as policies of transformistic hegemonic 
masculinity. 
The fifth proposed reason the MCGC cancelled No Respect was its inconsistency with 
conservative objectives in three ways_ First, was No Respect "was contrary to government 
objectives" (McPhedran, 2004). Second, was it did not conform to conservative values or 
objectives, particularly the idea teenagers could engage in consenting and respectful sexual 
relationships or the proposition that society supports violence against women (Bowden, 
2004a; Merola, 2003; Taskforce Member 4 and State Public Servant 1 0). Third, was "prime 
ministerial strategists [were] wary of identifying Mr Howard with a campaign around teenage 
sex, and worried that male voters could be offended" (Walsh, 2004). These reports thus 
suggest the Howard Government cancelled No Respect because of its inconsistency with 
conservative objectives. 
Whatever the actual reasons, the Howard Government's cancellation of No Respect 
reportedly generated a "storm of protest" from the specialist sectors and ALP (Harvey, 
2003)_ Media commentators reported it "highlighted the Federal Government's "tenuous" 
commitment to the safety of women and children" (Castello, 2004). They also described it 
as a missed opportunity "to change the norms and values among Australia's young people 
which clearly do feed into sexual violence" (Bowden, 2004a)_ Further, given the proximity to 
the launch date, OSW had reportedly already paid for most of the advertising and 
communication strategy with at least $L6 million in booked television and magazine space 
alone forfeited (Contractor, 2004). Consequently, the ALP pursued the Government through 
the Senate Estimates Committee and media to uncover details of 'the scandalous waste of 
money and change of emphasis from a violence prevention campaign to a crisis response 
campaign" (Roxon, 2004a, 2004b; Senate ~ansard, 2004, 2005). The parliamentary 
records at this time show the ALP and Australian Democrats maintained constant pressure 
on the Government to launch No Respect with numerous petitions, speeches and questions 
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in parliament (see for example Hansard, 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2004d; 2004e; 2004f; 
2004g; 2004h; 2004i; 2004j). 
7.5 Making sense of the Howard Government's development and 
cancellation of No Respect, No Relationship 
Given the diversity of reasons listed above, it is valuable to explore why No Respect was 
not cancelled or reworked earlier. Findings from stage one of the study suggest a significant 
factor was the advocacy and activism of femocrats within the federal bureaucracy. This 
issue is therefore explored in greater depth in Chapter Nine. Added to this, one of the 
strengths of this campaign was the femocrats' strategy of grounding of the campaign in 
evidence. An important related component, however, appears to be the location of this 
issue in the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda. 
One argument proposed for how to make sense of this period was that although the 
Howard Government supported responding to domestic violence, they were simultaneously 
not interested in, and did not adequately understand, the issue. Federal Public Servant 2 
argued this meant the government had not carefully considered the consequences of 
developing a _campaign of this type and allowed femocrats to progress the campaign 
without interference: 
I think as long as it wasn't on the radar we were allowed to just get along. do what we want in 
the context of what we want, it was. it definitely had a feminist perspective .... 1 don't think 
anyone really cared. It was just when it became in the public spotlight that that"s when it 
became a problem .... 1 suppose what I am trying to say is that they didn't systematically try 
and control what we were doing in domestic violence from that level and go better not be 
feminist and I don't think they gave a shit basically. I think they just went "okay, whatever". 
Similarly, State Public Servant 11 argued the Howard Government appeared not to 
understand the consequences of responding to domestic violence and what this might 
mean for challenging traditional structures of gender, male power and privilege. 
Despite ongoing approvals from the MCGC, this lack of interest and understanding 
reportedly combined to mean the campaign was beneath the notice of the Howard 
Government. Further, Federal Public Servant 2 argued the MCGC saw the campaign as a 
joke: 
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It was the 'violence against women' campaign and they'd call it the 'sex campaign' so just to 
give you an indication of what we're dealing with here. They'd make jokes about it. They'd 
make jokes "so are you telling me"- cause basically they did not understand violence against 
women, they have just as stereotyped view of what domestic violence is as your average 
person out there in the community that we were developing the campaign to inform. So you've 
got people who actually don't believe that domestic violence is as serious as it is, that it, that it 
exists in the form it exists, and that warnings signs and everything constitute, they were, and 
like I said, we went to them that many times saying it's going to be prevention, these are the 
list of behaviours we are talking about and that and they'd make jokes about it "so are you 
telling me if I turned to [MCGC Member] here and said 'that's a revolting tie' then I'd be being 
violent against him"- just giving you an example. 
The MCGC Member interviewed denied this suggestion. In the absence of another 
explanation, however, these reasons provide some insight into how the campaign might 
have progressed so far with ongoing MCGC approval. Federal Public Servant 2 also 
suggested the MCGC may not have read the strategy despite their ongoing approvals. She 
argued it was not until the two campaigns were amalgamated and the extra money and 
television components added that the MCGC started to take notice as it made the campaign 
more public: 
/ 
... 1 think they didn't pay attention, and because, I mean I think that in itself says something 
about their lack of interest in, in women's issues and violence against women, basically, they're 
not interested. They don't think it's a vote winner, they're not interested. So, they were 
provided with, you could say that they, the kindest you could say is that they were incompetent, 
I suppose, but it's worse than that. It comes from a systematic, systemic attitude against 
women. 
These comments suggest No Respect developed so far because of feminist advocacy and 
activism within the bureaucracy and because it was an issue beneath the Howard 
Government's notice. This last quote also suggests No Respect fits within the broader 
social policy agenda of the Howard Government which marginalised or ignored issues of 
importance to women. 
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Violence Against Women -Australia Says No (2004 - 2007) 
On 6 June 2004 Prime Minister Howard launched the Australia Says No campaign to 
replace No Respect (Contractor, 2004). The Howard Government reportedly developed this 
campaign internally without consulting the sector or state governments. Consequently, few 
key informants provided insight into the development of Australia Says No and it was not 
possible to develop a very detailed account of this campaign. Consequently, the second 
part of this chapter is largely descriptive and focuses on the content of Australia Says No 
and the associated campaign helpline. Australia Says No is, however, explored in detail in 
the key themes from stage one in Chapter Eight and the in-depth case study in Chapter 
Ten. 
7.6 Violence Against Women -Australia Says No Content 
Australia Says No was "a national campaign developed by the Federal Government to 
deliver a strong message that violence against women is totally unacceptable" (OSW, 
2004d). Australia Says No is stylistically similar to No Respect with the same actors, 
images, graphics, and focus on young people. Appendices 7.7-7.14 provide a selection of 
products such as advertisements, brochures, posters and booklets from the campaign's 
media component. Unlike No Respect which aimed to be a comprehensive community 
education campaign, Australia Says No was primarily a media campaign. The key elements 
of Australia Says No were: advertisements on television, radio, magazines and cinema; a 
booklet sent to every Australian household; posters; a booklet targeted at Indigenous 
people; a nation-wide 24 hour confidential helpline; a dedicated website; and a Schools' 
Resource (OSW, 2004d). Australia Says No reportedly cost a total of $27.7 million (OFW, 
2008) and was jointly funded by Partnerships, the National Initiative, and later the Women's 
Safety Agenda (OFW, 2005b; 2005i). 
7.7 Violence Against Women- Australia Says No Telephone Helpline 
Reported as Australia Says No's "centrepiece" was "a 24-hour confidential helpline, 1800 
200 526, which provides assistance by experienced counsellors trained by Lifeli!le" 
(Karvelas, 2004). This helpline was embroiled in controversy and publicly criticised from its 
inception. According to Taskforce Member 10 the Taskforce were concerned about the 
Howard Government establishing a national centralised helpline since: "I just thought that 
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national phone numbers sometimes from our research are resented because people feel 
that they are talking to somebody in Melbourne who has no understanding of what it's like 
to be in Sunbury in WA .. We didn't think it would engage people". Similarly, media 
commentators claimed that on a national Helpline the "counsellors will not know local 
resources or legislation, and will not be able to guide people directly to where they can get 
concrete support" (Macdonald, 2004). Further, they argued that since state governments 
provide crisis services, people who call the helpline will need to be referred on to local 
services where constantly retelling their story is likely to create a barrier to continued help-
seeking (Fynes-Ciinton, 2004; Macdonald, 2004). 
The sector and media commentators also criticised the Howard Government for bypassing 
pre-existing state specialist helplines and select tendering Lifeline to run the helpline. 
Lifeline is a Christian volunteer phone counselling service without specialist expertise 
responding to sexual assault or domestic violence. Media commentators argued the 
helpline duplicated and ignored established services with specialist expertise, the 
confidence of the sectors, local knowledge and referral pathways (Bowden, 2004a; Gough 
& Roe, 2004; Karvelas, 2004; Martin, 2004; Macdonald, 2004; NASASV, 2004). This 
criticism was echoed by the Opposition MP: 
There were some dumb decisions taken because the Government was putting its ideology 
before taking a good hard look at what the best service model would be and so we said at the 
time that the phone line was set up that it made a lot more sense to have, sure one number if 
you wanted to, but had a number that directed to state-based specialist organisations that were 
already providing a phone service in particular in relation to sexual assault. And the decision to 
give the contract to Lifeline to do the phone line - I've got no objection to Lifeline as an 
organisation, I think they provide an excellent service - but I think taking phone calls from 
women who have just been sexually assaulted or are in the middle of an incident of domestic 
violence is a really serious business and the more experienced the people answering the 
phone are the better .... the service that was provided to many of the people who phoned up 
was not as good as it should have been. 
Similarly, the NSW Rape Crisis Centre described the helpline as a "phenomenal waste of 
money"; as it cost $880,000 instead of the $889 NASASV16 quoted for a freecall number to 
divert callers to existing state services (Martin, 2004). In these circumstances, the Howard 
Government's tender of the helpline to Lifeline seems consistent with their strategies of 
silencing dissent and opposition to their social policy agenda as outlined in Chapter Four. 
16 National Association of Services Against Sexual Violence. 
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The quality of the helpline and lack of expertise of Lifeline staff was also a contentious 
issue. According to Peak Body Representative 1: 
... at that time all of sexual assault and DV services were just screaming saying Lifeline has no 
idea how to refer, they never do it appropriately at a state level so this is going to be a 
horrendous dog's breakfast. And, three days before it went live ... [there was a meeting 
between Lifeline, NASASV, WESNET and a women's legal service] and it was at that point that 
their counsellors had no training on how to respond to sexual assault and DV and that's where 
we put into place a whole lot of training and supervision of their workers when th~ campaign 
first went to air. 
Media commentators reported that the NSW Women's Refuge and Resource Centre 
(WRRC) tested the helpline by encouraging workers to ring the helpline with various 
domestic violence scenarios (Howden, 2005). In total, WRRC member services recorded 
about 20 interactions with the helpline of which they reported only one or two were 
appropriate responses to the issues raised (Peak Body Representative 2). The WRCC were 
reported to have concluded the helpline's "inappropriate referrals and responses ... [were] 
indicative of how little understanding many of the Lifeline volunteers have regarding the 
issues and services-related to domestic violence" (Howden, 2005). 
The lack ·of experience; training and expertise of Lifeline staff in responding to sexual 
assault and domestic violence was criticised in the 2005 Senate Estimates Committee. 
Evidence to the Senate Estimates Committee (Senate Hansard, 2005, p.42) records that 
approximately 2-5% of Lifeline's calls included issues of domestic violence and sexual 
assault. Further, helpline staff were not required to be professional counsellors and were 
usually experienced Lifeline volunteers who had moved into paid helpline positions with 
limited additional specialist training (Senate Hansard, 2005, p.42). ALP senators also drew 
attention to this lack of appropriate specialist knowledge, skill, training and experience and 
their concerns about the subsequent poor quality of Lifeline's services (Senate Hansard, 
2005). Senator Crossin, for example, said: 
I am very concerned when women tell me they get a response like, 'It's not him, it's the 
alcohol. Why don't you try talking to him about his drinking problem', or 'My goodness, you've 
got broken ribs, perhaps you ought to wear thicker clothing.' These are responses women are 
recording that counsellors are telling them over the Lifeline Helpline-things like 'Why do you 
think he hits you?', 'You ought to write down the dates and describe what happens each time.' 
They are very concerning comments to us .... 1 have had a number of people who have 
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contacted me to say that counsellors had no idea whereabouts in the state they were calling 
from (Senate Hansard, 2005, pp.48-49). 
The responses Senator Crossin recounts suggest a lack of understanding of male violence 
against women and inappropriate professional practice by helpline staff. These responses 
locate male violence at a micro level, show little understanding of the broader social 
context, and hold women responsible for stopping and preventing the violence perpetrated 
against them. 
In a media release at the time, the ALP (Piibersek, 2005d) summarised their concerns 
about the helpline. These included that: Lifeline staff inappropriately referred clients; there 
was insufficient training for helpline staff; the helpline was not being evaluated; there was 
no assessment of the impact of the helpline on state crisis services; and women were 
asked to call an additional number after calling the helpline. In a later rnedia release, the 
ALP (Piibersek, 2005c) also expressed concern that the Howard Government had refused 
to acknowledge or investigate their complaints against the helpline. The ALP concluded: 
"It's time for the Howard Government to take violence against women seriously, and stop 
putting lives at risk" (Piibersek, 2005c). 
The final reported criticism of the helpline was the extra demand it generated for state crisis 
services without providing additional funding (NASASV, 2004). The Senate Hansard (2005, 
p.53) records senior public servant Kerry Flanagan explaining to Senator Crossin that the 
Howard Government provided $100 to the relevant service each time the helpline referred a 
caller. According to Peak Body Representatives 2 & 3, however, this $100 was inadequate 
to cover service delivery costs. They also argued there was a duplication of services in this 
referral process since the helpline often referred callers to state-based sexual assault and 
domestic violence telephone services who then referred on to women's refuges and 
counselling services. Consequently, the Senate Hansard (2005, pp.42-43) records Senator 
Crossin concluding from Ms Flanagan's comments that, while the state crisis lines received 
the $100 referral payment, the refuges and counselling services providing the bulk of 
service delivery missed out since 'the money is going to the go-between and not to the end 
service". 
Peak Body Representatives 1, 2 and 3 argued the helpline presented a number of 
challenges to crisis agencies. Peak Body Representative 2 stated that although her agency 
was not a service provider, they received thousands of dollars in $100 cheques from the 
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helpline from inappropriate Lifeline referrals. Peak Body Representative 3 explained that 
she ran a domestic violence service which received numerous referrals from their state-
wide women's domestic violence crisis service passed on from helpline referrals. She said 
that as a result of this referral process her service never received a single cheque from the 
helpline. According to Peak Body Representative 1, some services also reported a spike in 
service requests due to people contacting services directly as a result of the campaign. She 
said that these services did not, however, receive any additional funding to meet the 
demand generated from the campaign. 
7.8 Chapter Summary 
Chapter Seven has provided a comprehensive account of the Howard Government's 
community education campaigns No Respect and Australia Says No based on the empirical 
data from stage one of the study. The account has included the history and development of 
No Respect and detailed the five main reasons proposed for why the Howard Government 
cancelled this campaign. Chapter Seven has also noted insights into the Howard 
Government's approaches to male violence against women and the government's 
engagement with feminism including how the government strategically used feminist 
rhetoric to justify cancelling No Respect. The chapter also suggested the development of 
No Respect relied on the activism of femocrats in the federal government combined with the 
Howard Government's lack of interest in this issue. This finding is consistent with the 
government's approach to women's issues generally as outlined in Chapter Four. These 
insights form part of a foundation on which to further explore the Howard Government's 
engagement with feminism in the case studies of Partnerships and Australia Says No in 
Chapter Nine and Ten. It appears that once they paid attention to the campaign, the 
Howard Government intervened, cancelled No Respect and developed Australia Says No. 
The second part of Chapter Seven therefore provides an account of Australia Says No 
including a brief description of the contents of the campaign and critiques of the Australia 
Says No helpline. This account of No Respect and Australia Says No is an important 
background and foundation for the four key themes that emerged from stage one that are 
explored in Chapter Eight. 
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Chapter Eight 
The Howard Government's Approaches to 
Male Violence Against Women: 
Key Findings from Stage One 
The.Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women were complex and 
varied and stage one of ·the study offered significant insights into this period that were 
pertinentfor a feminist analysis. This chapter explores these insights by outlining four key 
themes which emerged from stage one. First is the dissonance between key informants' 
positive assessments of Partnerships and other responses to male violence against women 
and their negative assessments of the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda. 
Second is whether Australia Says No was a feminist campaign which represented a 
progressive political engagement between feminism and the state. Third is the importance 
of considering Australia Says No in context and whether the Howard Government's 
approach to community education campaigns was a wasted opportunity. Fourth is the 
proposition that Australia Says No was a public relations exercise. This chapter concludes 
by using these key themes as a foundation to develop the argument that the Howard 
Government's approaches may be conceptualised from a feminist perspective as both 
policies oi chivalry and policies of cooption. 
8.1 "The only good thing that John Howard had ever done"17? 
The dissonance between key informants' positive assessments of the Howard 
Government's specific responses to male violence against women and negative 
assessments of the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda was a significant 
theme to emerge from stage one. Key informants were predominantly positive about the 
Howard Government's specific responses to male violence against women such as 
Partnerships and Australia Says No. Simultaneously, however, they argued the 
17 Federal Public Servant 4. 
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government's broader social policy agenda had a detrimental impact on women, particularly 
women who had experienced violence. This broader policy agenda, some argued, made 
the Howard Government's specific violence policies irrelevant. 
The professional experiences of key informants and the high level of intergovernmental 
cooperation on the Taskforce meant many key informants had significant knowledge about, 
and experience with, Partnerships. Consequently, key informants provided more extensive 
commentary on Partnerships than the other Howard Government initiatives and offered 
important insights into how they viewed the Howard Government's approaches to male 
violence against women. 
At least seventeen of the thirty key informants described Partnerships as consisting of 
substantial strengths and positives. These positive assessments bridged political and 
federal-state jurisdictional divisions and two examples include: 
PADV I think was a fantastic initiative .... 1 think it was very, incredibly comprehensive, that it 
covered all sorts of areas and it really gave us a big snapshot on things that might work. things 
that were happening, it was a real opportunity to measure and explore domestic violence in a 
way that has never happened before (Taskforce Member4). 
The Partnerships I thought was actually an exciting opportunity to genuinely do some good 
things in domestic violence because there are plenty of people who have good program ideas 
that are soundly based on the available evidence and the idea of being able of get them some 
funding was very exciting (Opposition MP). 
Journalist Michelle Gunn's (1999) description of Partnerships as earning "universal 
applause" was thus consistent with key informants' predominantly positive assessments of 
Partnerships. 
Beyond these overall assessments, three specific areas of Partnerships were praised by 
key informants. The first was its funding. As discussed in Chapter Six, $50 million was 
substantially more investment in this area than allocated by any previou.s federal 
government. A number of key informants (State Public Servant 5, Evaluators 2 & 3, Federal 
Public Servants 2 & 4, and Taskforce Member 5) spoke positively about the amount of this 
funding, its even distribution across the states and that the Howard Government did not try 
to control how the states used this funding. They argued these features of Partnerships 
funding were particularly unusual in Australian federalism. The second significant strength 
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of Partnerships' was its collaboration. Key informants argued it was a true partnership 
between federal and state governments which facilitated the sharing of information and 
innovation (Taskforce Members 2, 4, 5 & 6, Federal Public Servant 4 and Evaluator 2). For 
these key informants, Partnerships was a model of federal-state cooperation and one of the 
best examples to date of partnering between the two levels of government. The third 
significant strength identified was the specific projects, resources and outcomes 
Partnerships generated including the substantial research and evidence base on domestic 
violence (State Public Servant 5, Peak Body Representative 3 and Taskforce Members 1, 
5, 6 & 9). In particular, key informants considered the Partnerships communication strategy 
as valuable in disseminating Partnerships findings and influencing state government 
responses to this violence particularly in Victoria and Tasmania (State Public Servants 3, 7 
& 8 and Evaluator 2). 
Key informants also identified a number of weaknesses of Partnerships, however. These 
weaknesses mainly related to the longevity of Partnerships projects and the ability to 
incorporate Partnerships findings into practice. Academic 3, the Opposition MP, Peak Body 
Representative 3 and Taskforce Member 4 criticised the time-limited nature of Partnerships 
funding and dominance of pilot projects. Federal Public Servant 5 also described 
Partnerships as "chronically underspent". These key informants argued the Partnerships 
funding model set up expectations within communities which were not resourced long-term 
regardless of the success of pilot projects. They suggested this stop/start funding combined 
with program underspending limited the sustainability of Partnerships and the capacity of 
governments and the sector to build upon the Partnerships knowledge and research base. 
Some key informants (e.g. Evaluator 1, Academic 1, Taskforce Members 4, 7 & 9, Peak 
Body Representative 3) and media commentators (Horin, 2005) also argued there was 
insufficient structural and strategic planning or leadership from the Howard Government in 
the development of Partnerships or to embed findings from its research activities. They 
expressed concern that: many good programs were discontinued; people moved on; and, 
despite the meta-evaluation, the knowledge and expertise from Partnerships were not fully 
retained. These key informants thus identified a number of weaknesses particularly related 
to the ability of Partnerships to embed its learning in practice. 
Overall, key informants' predominant views were that Partnerships was a positive and 
effective policy response to male violence against women. Even of the nine key informants 
who identified weaknesses, four also made positive comments about Partnerships. 
Significantly, many key informants who made positive assessments about Partnerships 
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identified themselves as feminists and reported substantial experiences in policy and 
service delivery responses to male violence against women. Further, a number of key 
informants (including the Opposition MP, Peak Body Representatives 2 and 3, Federal 
Public Servants 2 and 5, and Evaluator 2) who were otherwise strongly critical of the 
Howard Government also made positive comments about Partnerships. 
In addition to Partnerships, twelve key informants made positive comments about the 
Howard Government's approach to the issue of male violence against women more 
broadly. Of these twelve, five made positive comments about both Partn(3rships and the 
Howard Government's overall approach. The general positive comments included that the 
Howard Government: had done more than any other federal government on this issue; they 
had made violence against women a priority as a social issue; and they provided a strong 
and sustained commitment to this issue over many years (State Public Servants 5, 10 & 13, 
Government MPs 1 & 2, Federal Public Servants 1, 4 & 6, Taskforce Members 3, 7 & 9, and 
Peak Body Representative 1). Federal Public Servant 4, for example, argued: 
I can't think who it was, but the women's movement, the women's groups said, domestic 
violence policy was the only good thing that John Howard had ever done .... You know on the 
whole pretty good: Yes, yes I've been amazed at some of the strong stands, well I suppose it's 
only the result of so much pressure over years ... but I do notice things that are going on and 
think well really, yeah, they're doing alright. It's been taken on as a serious issue, those sort of 
legal responses, and service responses ... Yeah, well I think the Liberal Government's done 
better [than the previous Labor Government] - wash my mouth out. ... But I think the Liberal 
Government sort of took it on more broadly and tried to get some sort of national, get all the 
states on board in some sort of coordinated way. I mean it didn't really work in that sense, of 
getting really national coordination, but I think a lot was achieved. 
A combined total of twenty-four key informants made positive comments about Partnerships 
and the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women more broadly. 
This shows that a significant majority of key informants assessed these policy responses as 
positive. 
An important finding of stage one was the dissonance between key informants' positive 
assessments of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women 
and their negative assessments of the government's broader social policy agenda. This 
discrepancy is illustrated in Federal Public Servant 4's comment above where she makes a 
clear distinction between the Howard Government's domestic violence policy and the 
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government's broader policy agenda. Fourteen key informants similarly argued that specific 
responses to male violence against women were undermined by the negative impact of the 
Howard Government's broader social policy agenda on women who had experienced 
violence. They argued the Howard Government's nee-liberal, socially conservative policy 
agenda increased women's vulnerability to male violence both during a relationship and 
after separation. Further, they suggested this impact was so substantial it negated any 
positive assessment of the government's specific male violence against women policies 
such as Partnerships. The number of key informants who raised this issue was significant 
because they raised it independently and not in response to specific questions in the 
interview. These key informants identified four main social policy areas and.issues that had 
a specific negative impact on women, particularly those who had experienced violence, 
each of which is addressed below. 
8.1.1 Women's inequality and rights 
Key informants argued that the Howard Government undermined women's equality and 
rights through their support of socially conservative policies and their concerted effort to 
neutralise explicit acknowledgment of gender in government policy. Academics 1 and 3, 
Taskforce Mem!Jers 3 and 4, State Public Servants 5 and 11, and Peak Body 
Representative 3 suggested this social policy agenda promoted and reinforced women's 
inequality with men. The majority of these key informants also explicitly linked their 
arguments about the exacerbation of women's inequality under the Howard Government 
with an increase to women's vulnerability to violence. This was consistent with early feminist 
arguments that violence against women arises from, and reinforces, gendered inequalities 
as outlined in Chapter Two. Academic 1, for example, argued: 
It's their overall policies, they're anti-women, it's not what women need if they're going to get 
out of violence is it? Income, housing, not having to have contact with abusing people, legal 
aid, when they don't think about what you need, they've taken out all that structural stuff, or 
undermined the structural stuff. Maybe if they had a policy that is a human rights policy, if they 
did the optional protocol and they came out with a strong human rights issue, women and 
·. 
human rights issue, but I can't see our current government doing that much. 
Further, some of these key informants suggested the Howard Government simultaneously 
dismantled institutional structures that sought women's equality with men such as OSW and 
the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. These key informants thus argued 
the Howard Government's social policy agenda and dismantling of the women's policy 
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machinery damaged women's equality and their capacity to escape men's violence as well 
as increasing women's vulnerability to this violence. 
8.1.2 Work, welfare and reform 
The Howard Government's industrial relations and welfare reform agendas were raised as 
being particularly harmful and damaging to women who had experienced violence (Federal 
Public Servant 1, Academic 1 and Taskforce Members 1, 3 and 7). These key informants 
argued work and welfare policies offered an important avenue to assist women to leave 
violent partners. As outlined in Chapter Four, the Howard Government's industrial relations 
and welfare policies were particularly harmful to the most disadvantaged and, according to 
these key informants, increased women's vulnerability to violence. Some key informants 
argued these government policies reduced women's actual or potential financial 
independence and what Ramsay (2004) refers to as women's capacity to maintain an 
autonomous household with their children and away from a violent partner. Referring to the 
Howard Government's welfare reform and taxation policies and their broader social policy 
agenda, Academic 1 concluded: "leaving violence is not going to look very attractive for a 
lot of women now . ... 1 think all of that is more important than their specific DV policy. They 
can do more harm to women whether they've got a DV policy or not in all those other ways". 
Further, Federal Public Servant 1also recalled: 
... we were doing a lot of work on economic independence lor women and we'd done a number 
of papers on the fact that we thought the changes to the industrial relations climate would 
disadvantage women. And I ended up having a personal meeting with the Minister about that 
where she told me that that was not the case and she was sick of me telling her that it was and 
she didn't want me to tell her again. 
The Howard Government's industrial relations and welfare agenda thus reactivated feminist 
politics around the significance of financial independence which had been a key theme in 
feminist domestic violence activism. 
8.1.3 The family law system 
Key informants highlighted the Howard Government's approaches and changes to family 
law as having a particularly negative impact on women who had experienced violence. 
Some argued these family law changes, including the presumption of shared care of 
children, "unfriendly parent" provisions and penalties for disclosing "unproven" domestic 
157 
' 
Chapter 8: The Howard Government's Approaches to Male Violence Against Women 
violence, reflected the dominance and influence of men's rights groups on the government 
(Academic 1, Opposition MP, Peak Body Representative 3, and Taskforce Members 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 7 and 9). Key informants remarked these changes contradicted violence prevention 
principles and the Howard Government's statements against violence. Harsher critics 
argued these changes were "ideologically backwards", reflected "backlash politics", and 
"shored up violent men's perceptions of their ownership of women and children". As the 
Opposition MP argued: 
... some of the changes that they've made in family law really counteract anything they've tried 
to do in domestic violence ... they haven't had the sort of strength of will to say to some of the 
more extreme elements in the family law debate that what you are doing is damaging children. 
They've in fact swallowed a whole lot of the rhetoric of the angry, disgruntled end of that 
argument and in some ways probably increased the risk of exposing people to ongoing 
domestic violence and they've done the easy thing but they haven't done the hard thing, they 
haven't done anything to genuinely help people in that situation. 
For these key informants, the Howard Government's family law changes thus undermined 
women and children's safety and increased their vulnerability to violence by undermining 
the capacity of women to leave a partner from whom they had experienced violence. 
8.1.4 Supported Accommodation Assistance Program (SAAP) funding 
Key informants also criticised the Howard Government's funding for the Supported 
Accommodation Assistance Program (SAAP) which they argued was inadequate. SAAP is 
a joint federal-state funding program for emergency and crisis accommodation which 
includes women and children's domestic violence refuges. Taskforce Member 4 and Peak 
Body Representative 3 criticised what they argued was the Howard Government's 
inadequate funding of services, particularly refuges, through SAAP. Taskforce Member 4 
argued the Australia Says No campaign was particularly inappropriate given that SAAP 
funding did not meei current service delivery levels let alone unrnet needs: 
I think it's been meaningless rhetoric and I think in some ways it's absolutely disgusting that 
they have set up an expectation that they are a Government that actually cares about domestic 
violence and, which would mean in many situations that women do believe that and that they 
will leave, they are being given a level of confidence, that it's a climate to be confident in. That 
you can leave and there's going to be a number of points along the way that are going to help 
you. Well, it's absolute total crap, there is not and if you look at just the refuges, which is 
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probably still the backbone of service delivery in this country in terms of domestic violence 
services, turn away one out of two women a day, two out of three children a day. 
These key informants continued by arguing that almost 80% of women who use refuges do 
not have an independent income and have few accommodation alternatives. She 
suggested that in this context the Howard Government was abusive in raising expectations 
and encouraging this vulnerable group of women to leave partners who were violent 
towards them. Both key informants also criticised the Howard Government's inadequate 
funding of other services such as domestic violence and sexual assault counselling services 
particularly in the context of demand generated by Australia Says No. 
Supplementing these key informants' arguments, similar criticisms of SMP were apparent 
in six newspaper articles (MP, 2005; Horin, 2005; Hudson, 2005; Silmalis, 2005; 
Summers, 2003a; Walsh, 2005) and five ALP media releases (ALP, 2004; Plibersek, 2005a, 
2005b, 2005c, 2005d). Although it is the nature of the Opposition to oppose, the criticism of 
SAAP in these media releases was significant given the Opposition MP's positive 
assessment of Partnerships as outlined earlier in this chapter and the Opposition's support 
of No Respect outlined in Chapter Seven. These key informants and media commentators 
thus argued the_ Howard Government's responses to male violence against women were 
meaningless "window dressing" unsupported by adequate service funding. 
8.2 A Feminist Campaign? 
The question of whether Australia Says No was a feminist campaign which represented a 
progressive political engagement between feminism and the state was another important 
theme to emerge from stage one. As Winter (2007, p.33) argues Australia Says No appears 
'to send a positive message, putting government money where feminist mouths have been 
for many decades, [they] called for concerted action at a national level". Through Australia 
Says No the Howard Government provided a significant and sustained mass media 
campaign on the issue of violence against women at a reported cost of $27.7 million (OFW, 
2008). As well as being the largest financial commitment of any federal government to this 
sort of campaign, key informants suggested Australia Says No responded to feminist 
demands by using gendered language and providing a clear message against sexual 
assault and domestic violence. 
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In replacing No Respect with Australia Says No, the Howard Government argued they were 
making it clear domestic violence and sexual assault are totally unacceptable. This 
argument was consistent with feminist rhetoric and activism and, according to Federal 
Public Servant 2 was a plausible position, "something that everyone would agree with and 
is actually fundamentally correct". Australia Says No highlights feminist language and terms 
such as "domestic violence", "sexual assault" and "violence against women". Australia Says 
No also positions men as the perpetrators and women as the victims of this violence. 
Further, some of value positions and assumptions articulated in the campaign reflect a 
feminist influence. These include that: violence against women is a negative behaviour not 
to be condoned or tolerated by the community; sexual assault and domestic violence 
(physical assault) are crimes; these behaviours have a negative impact on victims; and the 
Government has a responsibility to respond to this issue. Federal Public Servant 2 argued 
No Respect reflected a more complex and sophisticated feminist analysis of male violence 
against women than Australia Says No as outlined in Chapter Seven. For these key 
informants, however, explicit gendered language and understandings of violence were 
important in these types of campaigns. In replacing No Respect with Australia Says No the 
Howard Government thus appeared to respond to feminist demands by taking a gendered 
approach to male violence against women and articulating the message that violence 
against women is totally unacceptable. 
/ 
Ten key informants, the majority of whom identified themselves as feminists, spoke 
positively about Australia Says No. Their comments included that Australia Says No: was 
"an important initiative with a positive message"; was "comprehensive"; was "a significant 
investment"; was "better than nothing"; "appeared to take violence against women 
seriously"; and got this type of violence "public attention at a national level" (State Public 
Servants 12, 13 & 14, Federal Public Servant 1 and Taskforce Members 3 & 2). A number 
of key informants who identified themselves as feminists thus expressed positive 
assessments of the campaign which suggests it may have been a progressive political 
engagement between feminism and the state. 
Other key informants spoke positively about the content of Australia Says No and argued it 
reflected appropriate, feminist-influenced theoretical explanations of violence. State Public 
Servants 10 & 13 and Taskforce Member 7, all of whom identified themselves as feminists, 
spoke positively of the campaign's gendered representation of violence and its message 
that this violence was inappropriate. All three spoke of their surprise over these positive 
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features of Australia Says No given their negative perceptions of Howard Government 
social conservatism. Taskforce Member 7, for example, argued: 
I think the Australia Says No campaign is a gendered, it does, which I find amazing .... no-one 
could come away from those ads and say they are not recognising that women are the primary 
victims and men are the primary offenders ... 1 don't necessarily think the message that 
Australia Says No to violence against women is bad because ... while I can be critical of 
elements it still says 'Violence Against Women· Australia Says No'. It still takes a position. 
Similarly, Peak Body Representative 1 expressed "relief and pleasant surprise" that the 
campaign "did not hold women responsible for violence" or engage in too many "women-
blaming messages" such as 'telling women to avoid rape by not wearing short skirts". She 
argued the campaign "holds men responsible for violence" and suggested the Howard 
Government may have adopted some of the politics of feminism even though it might have 
been overtly hostile to feminists. 
This argument that the Howard Government may have adopted feminist politics and 
understandings of male violence against women was supported by the interview with 
Government MP 1. Despite his narrow, criminal definition of violence against women, a 
number of Government MP 1 's comments were consistent with feminist perspectives of 
male violence against women. These included: acknowledging the criminal nature of this 
violence; the negative impact of sexual assault on women who experience it; and the 
importance of government interventions in this issue. This suggests Peak Body 
Representative 1 may have been accurate in her suggestion the Howard Government had 
taken on board some of the politics of feminism. Taken together, these comments suggest 
that Australia Says No may have been influenced by feminism and reflect a progressive 
engagement between feminism and the state. 
8.3 Wasted Opportunities? 
The positive assessments of Australia Says No were not universal, however. Understanding 
Australia Says No in context suggests this campaign may have been a lost or wasted 
opportunity. Australia Says No fits within a broader genre of violence prevention campaigns 
classified by VicHealth as "general or specific awareness campaigns" (Donovan & Vlais, 
2005, p.32). This campaign was not radically different from many other campaigns 
preceding it run by Australian government and non-government organisations. It is therefore 
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important to explore why it was that key informants suggested the campaign may have 
been a wasted opportunity. 
Key informants and media commentators mainly suggested Australia Says No was a 
wasted opportunity for the government to appropriately respond to, and prevent, male 
violence against women. Federal Public Servant 2 argued: 
At the end of the day they probably didn't even produce a violence campaign that was that 
different to a lot of other violence campaigns that have been out there. It"s not like what they 
did was that, I suppose the end product was not something that hadn't been done before and 
therefore was a terrible thing. It was in the context it was terrible - that they are Federal 
Government, that they actually, it"s not like they're the NSW Government and can raise crisis 
responses and then have their crisis responses there, they just, they don't know where those 
people were going so it was irresponsible, it was also, given that their research told them that 
they needed to do it like this, they chose to do it another way and they chose to be in the dark 
and go backwards and that was unforgivable basically. 
These sentiments were echoed by specialists in the sector, such as NASASV Chair 
Vanessa Swan, who reportedly labelled Australia Says No "misguided", a "missed 
opportunity" or a ·"lost opportunity" (Bowden, 2004a, 2004b; Macdonald, 2004; Walsh, 
2004). From this perspective, a number of contextual issues undermined the value of 
Australia Says No as a community education campaign according to key informants and 
specialists in the sector. These included: the Government's cancellation of No Respect; the 
argument that Australia Says No did not reflect, and in some cases was contradictory to, 
the research and evidence on good practice in campaigns of this type; and the division of 
federal and state responsibilities and lack of collaboration in developing Australia Says No. 
Each of these issues is outlined below. 
One of the main reasons Australia Says No was criticised as a missed opportunity was 
because it was a tertiary intervention campaign, unlike the primary and secondary 
prevention campaign that No Respect was planned to be. Despite stylistic similarities with 
No Respect, the messages and content in Australia Says No were significantly altered18. 
Taskforce Member 2 argued Australia Says No was a very conventional, tertiary 
intervention campaign which replicated many previous state government campaigns and 
was thus a missed the opportunity to focus on primary prevention. Similarly, State Public 
18 The table in Appendix 9.1 compares the main features of No Respect, No Relationship against 
those of Violence Against Women- Australia Says No. 
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Servant 10, who had expertise in running violence against women prevention campaigns, 
argued Australia Says No was "disappointing from a prevention perspective", "focused on 
violence after the fact", and was thus a missed opportunity. 
State Public Servant 11 argued the approach in Australia Says No might have been harmful 
to violence prevention efforts. State Public Servant 11 had expertise running men's 
domestic violence groups and a state-based tertiary intervention campaign targeting violent 
men. He explained that there is ambivalence for perpetrators who often "simultaneously see 
themselves as both a victim and a perpetrator". For this key informant, dealing with men's 
perceptions and experiences of powerlessness and victimisation is an important part of 
tertiary intervention with perpetrators. Rather than responding to and dealing with this 
perception of victimisation, he argued that Australia Says No was likely to further entrench 
and reinforce it since: 
... the campaign is more traditional in the sense of being a kind of a public sort of statement 
about the acceptability of violence against women and I think a lot of men or perpetrators 
switch off to that. ... my experience tells me that the men involved, the perpetrators of the 
violence would look at that as just another version of us being kind of picked on, of not being 
understood, the feminists in government reeling out these campaigns. I can imagine if you did 
focus groups ·of men who had been violent in the home they'd be saying, "not fair, it's not just 
us, we were wronged too", all of the usual stuff. They, I think, in some ways become even 
more entrenched in their views as a result of seeing that style of campaign .... a lot of 
perpetrators will look at Australia Says No and say 'that's not me' but along with that though 
they will also say that's those bloody femes again having a go at us .... So I don't think those 
campaigns motivate men at all really to do anything. Telling perpetrators of violence that 
there's a public, there's a shameful element and that the public should be encouraged to view 
them negatively for their behaviour really I suspect only entrenches the view that no-one 
understands me, I'm a victim. 
State Public Servant 11 also argued Australia Says No reflected an ideological rather than a 
practical and workable approach to engaging violent men. He thus suggested the campaign 
rnay have reinforced perpetrators' sense of victimisation and undermined its capacity to 
engage with perpetrators and successfully challenge their violence. 
Media commentators similarly criticised the Howard Government for replacing the 
preventative focus on respectful relationships in No Respect with the crisis end approach in 
Australia Says No focussing on how to deal with the aftermath of sexual assault and 
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domestic violence. Opposition MP Nicola Roxon, for example, argued the prevention 
approach in No Respect was far superior to the crisis management approach in Australia 
Says No (Gough & Roe, 2004; Robb, 2004; Roxon, 2004a, 2004b; Walsh, 2004). Other 
commentators argued Australia Says No: reinforced stereotypes about violence (B& T 
Weekly, 2004; Egan, 2004; SBS, 2004); was not aimed at men's behavioural change 
(Egan, 2004); paid "little more than lip service to violence against women (AAP, 2005)"; 
treated '1he symptoms of domestic violence, rather than preventing its causes" (Milne, 
2004); "window-dressed images of middle Australia" (Fynes-Ciinton, 2004); was not 
designed to offer real help (Egan, 2004; Fynes-Ciinton, 2004; SBS, 2Q04); "missed the 
mark" (Fynes-Ciinton, 2004); and was a ''waste of government money" (Egan, 2004; 
Macdonald, 2004; NASASV, 2004; Walsh, 2004). 
Another major criticism of Australia Says No was its lack of connection to a research and 
evidence base. The Opposition MP argued: 
... the Government spent a lair amount of money on the campaign and it"s disappointing to me 
and I know to many other people that it was, the money was spent in a way that didn't reflect 
the research and planning that went into the original campaign and was therefore probably less 
effective than it would have been, or should have been, or could have been. That"s a real 
' tragedy when you think about what"s at stake. To have the potential to do something really well 
and choose not to do it really well because, for example, men might be insulted about the idea 
that men are being blamed for violence against women seems to me. I don't know, really quite 
culpable. 
State Public Servant 2, Federal Public Servants 2 & 5, Taskforce Members 7, Academic 3, 
and Peak Body Representative 3 also made similar comments about Australia Says No. 
They all argued the final campaign did not reflect, and was even contradictory to, the 
original developmental research underpinning No Respect. These key informants also 
suggested that, rather than being an accident or oversight, the Howard Government chose 
to ignore this research and evidence base by cancelling No Respect and replacing it with 
Australia Says No. 
Media commentators made statements about the research and evidence base consistent 
with the key informants' comments above. Roxon (2004b) argued the Howard Government 
missed the point of their own research and contravened the advice and recommendations 
of experts in the field about the need for "preventing and not just reacting to violence 
against women". ACT Domestic Violence Crisis Services Manager, Denise Simpson, 
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reportedly said: "when you consider what could have been in the campaign - which really 
listened to what young people said in two years of consultation by the Government - then it 
is a missed opportunity and crying shame" (Macdonald, 2004). Similar statements and 
criticism of Australia Says No were also made in Domestic Violence and Incest Resource 
Centre (DVIRC) and No To Violence (NTV) media releases as well as by violence 
prevention specialist Michael Flood on the SBS news (DVIRC & NTV 2004; SBS, 2004). All 
three argued the campaign ignored two years of government-funded research and missed 
the opportunity to help the next generation build better relationships and learn about respect 
and equality in relationships. The media commentators thus also criticised Australia Says 
No as a missed opportunity in the context of not following the recommendations of the 
government's own developmental research. 
Supporting these criticisms, Australia Says No adheres to none of the list of 
recommendations for community education campaigns from Howard Government-funded 
research. Partnerships 1 publications (National Crime Prevention, 2001; Strategic Partners, 
2003b) make a number of recommendations that are summarised in Appendices 7.1 and 
7.2. Other than its focus on young people as a target audience, Australia Says No does not 
reflect any recommendations for practice for community education campaigns in these 
publications. When assessed against this research, the criticisms that Australia Says No 
/ 
was inconsistent with the government's own research on community education campaign 
appear accurate. 
One key informant argued Australia Says No was also inconsistent with good practice 
principles for violence against women community education campaigns more broadly. 
Academic 3, a key informant with particular expertise in sexual assault prevention, argued 
Australia Bays No: "just misread all of the literature, all of the program development work 
and evaluation work that had occurred both internationally and locally". Academic 3 was 
particularly critical of Australia Says No's focus on the criminal justice system and reporting 
the crime of domestic violence or sexual assault given feminist discussions of the continued 
inadequacy of criminal justice responses. She argued she was "disappointed" by Australia 
Says No and '1here was nothing about the evidence-base that was informing this campaign" 
(Academic 3). Consistent with these comments, Australia Says No appears to have 
observed few of the key recommendations for effective and appropriate violence against 
women community education campaigns. Indeed, it actually directly contradicts many of the 
recommendations for good practice from the literature. 
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The final way in which Australia Says No was argued to be a missed opportunity related to 
differing responsibilities between Australian state and federal governments. State Public 
Servant 6 argued that, as a tertiary intervention campaign, Australia Says No was 
inappropriate for a federal government because it duplicated state responsibilities and 
placed significant strain on "already over-stretched" state services. Similarly, Federal Public 
Servant 2 argued: 
Prevention, prevention, prevention is where we should be going and not raising need at the 
crisis end. That's dealt with by the states, that's not our responsibility. Oh,.no, no, they wanted 
national lines and they want to set it up now ... we knew what they were doing was actually 
dangerous. We're saying to them, you can actually, by raising this - and some of the things 
they wanted to do were actually like irresponsible and dangerous like sending information to 
people in the mail, like they then a big mail out and we're saying to them to send that to a 
woman in violence, she's not going to get that out and read it in her house, that's really, that 
could put her in a lack of safety. 
This federal public servant thus suggested the Howard Government developed Australia 
Says No despite contradictory advice from federal public servants. For both of these key 
informants Australia Says No was problematic and a missed opportunity in the context of 
the division of state and federal responsibilities. They argued a campaign such as Australia 
Says No, which may be perfectly reasonable from a state government, may simultaneously 
be irresponsible and inappropriate when developed by the federal government. 
The Howard Government was also criticised by media commentators for its failure to 
consult and collaborate with the states or sector in developing Australia Says No. As one 
newspaper reported: 'the refocusing of the campaign away from education of young people 
has bitterly disappointed peak sexual and domestic violence bodies, which were not 
consulted in its reworking" (Walsh, 2004). Similarly, Heather Nancarrow, Director of the 
Queensland Centre for Domestic and Family Violence Research reportedly said stake-
holders had not been consulted and "already overstretched local [state] infrastructure has 
not received adequate additional funding to cope with what should be a landslide of calls for 
help" (Fynes-Ciinton, 2004). This argument was repeated elsewhere in the media (e.g. 
Gough & Roe, 2004). Thus, Australia Says No was considered inappropriate in the context 
of federal/state responsibilities and for the Howard Government's failure to adequately 
consult with the states. 
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8.4 A Public Relations Exercise? 
The final key theme to emerge from stage one concerned the Howard Government's 
political pragmatism and the value of Australia Says No as a public relations exercise to 
advance the government's social and political agenda. Consistent with the critique of the 
Howard Government's political opportunism and their advertising outlined in Chapter Three, 
media commentators were critical of Australia Says No and described it as partisan political 
advertising. Colleen Egan (2004), for example, argued: 
They waste our money in the pursuit of power and pretend the advertising is,, in fact, .aimed at 
valuable public education. Truth is, the priority is promoting themselves .... The Howard 
Government's new $20 million anti-domestic violence campaign ... may not be the most blatant 
pre-election money waster (that award might go to the Anti-Terror Fridge Magnet of 2002) but 
it ranks among the more bizarre. Saddled with the not very hip and creative title of "Violence 
against women: Australia says no", the campaign is supposed to appeal to young people. 
That's why most of the actors are not teenagers and they look like potential Liberal voters . 
... Coincidentally, the accompanying brochure means we've all paid for John Howard to put his 
photo over the word "values" in our letterboxes just months from a federal election. At least 
somebody will _get value for the $20 million. 
Similarly, Gail Williams (2004) linked Australia Says No to the Howard Government's 
election campaigns and argued: "Governments are adept at alerting the community to 
fearsome aspects of society and then letting them know they are doing something about it". 
These media commentators thus argued Australia Says No was an example of Howard 
Government political opportunism and not a genuine attempt to reduce male violence 
against women. 
A similar criticism of the Howard Government was raised by key informants. Taskforce 
Members 1 & 8 and Peak Body Representative 3 connected Australia Says No to 
government elections and political pragmatism. They argued that through Australia Says No 
the Howard Government wanted to be seen to be doing the right thing around election 
times and this campaign was important to help the government court the women's vote. 
Extending this argument, State Public Servant 10, suggested Australia Says No "feels a bit 
like platitudes ... it seems like the target audience is Australia per se as opposed to women 
who are affected by domestic violence". Similarly, State Public Servant 14 described 
Australia Says No as "tasteful little sound bites" and "easily consumed messages" where 
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"they seem to be doing something when in reality you're doing nothing". The Opposition MP 
also argued: 
... their response has generally been about being seen to be doing something rather than 
actually doing something. So I think that they have been eager to be seen to be tackling the 
problem but they haven't put much effort into doing the things that we know work ... it seems to 
me in some cases they've deliberately ignored doing the right thing to do the more high profile 
or popular thing .... 1 think it's immoral to play politics with that sort of stuff. 
These key informants thus argued Australia Says No was electoral populism rather than a 
genuine effort to appropriately respond to, and reduce, male violence against women. 
It is not surprising that the six key informants quoted above were critical of Australia Says 
No in this way since all were outside of the Howard Government. Key informants from within 
the federal public service, however, also suggest Australia Says No was partisan political 
advertising. Federal Public Servant 4 argued: "It was such a problem because the 
Government didn't want a ... sort of a prevention attitude change, they wanted their nice ads 
on TV". Similarly, Federal Public Servant 2 argued the Howard Government were only 
interested in: "big campaigns that are going to get them votes ... just a big, showy 
advertisement, which is what the Howard Government really loved to do because it looks 
like they're really doing something and it's, they're not that effective". This key informant 
continued: 
... they send that book around to every household so every household out there that doesn't 
have violence in it, every voter out there's going, "good old John Howard, he's doing stuff, it is 
totally unacceptable this violence against women, look at them doing something". Now every 
Australian doesn't know that that's. a crock and it's bad policy and it actually could have not 
only, it could actually have negative consequences for people, so all they give a shit about is 
that they look, appear to be doing something, and this is the most convenient way of appearing 
to be doing something ... so, you're going to impress people who don't know anything about 
domestic violence, sexual assault (Federal Public Servant 2). 
These federal public servants thus argued the Howard Government was more concerned 
with politics than the risks the approach may have posed for women experiencing violence 
or the potential to change the behaviour of male perpetrators. This supports the proposition 
that Australia Says No was partisan political advertising focused on electoral. advantage. 
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Extending this argument, the Opposition MP suggested Australia Says No was not just 
about political opportunism. She argued the campaign fit with the Howard Government's 
broader social policy agenda and reflected a strategic political use of this issue with few 
political risks: 
I mean there's no one in the community arguing any longer that men should be able to hit their 
wives, or emotionally abuse them or whatever else. So running a campaign that says it's wrong 
to hit your wife or girlfriend, that's not a difficult decision to make. To take another step and say 
a lot of this is about power and control issues, a lot of this is about the relationship between 
men and women in society more generally, that is a more difficult decision. So I think that 
they've taken the first step in articulating what everyone believes, what almost everyone 
believes anyway that it's not a good thing to hit someone and they've sort of sort to take credit 
for tackling the problem but they haven't gone the next step that would genuinely begin to 
tackle the problem .... There's no political cost to it and every government has to have some 
sort of social policy things that they run on. Even the most conservative governments have, it's 
bad to hurt children and small furry animals. Like there's always some sort of, people always 
look for a human face on any government and it's not, what they've done has not cost them at 
all politically, it hasn't cost them much financially either, but it certainly hasn't cost them 
anything politically and they've not really gone the next step to tackling the more difficult issues 
which may have cost them politically. 
Another key informant also believed the purpose of Australia Says No was to generate 
support for the Howard Government by obscuring their conservative social policy agenda 
which damaged women's inequality as discussed in Chapter Four. Taskforce Member 4 
argued: 
General public response to it gave a lot of confidence in the Government and I think if you 
were really to kind of unpack it a bit further you could say, well, there's this Government that 
kind of espouses these '50s families views that frighten a lot of people but then if there's this 
ability of the Government to put forward things about saying well we hold those values but we 
don't support inequality. There's all sorts of messages that come across in that that says yes 
we do think that the, we believe in the kind of sacredness of marriage etcetera but we don't 
believe in inequality. So I think it was the timing of it, all of those things, I'd say it was quite, I 
don't think it was an accident. 
For these key informants, Australia Says No thus provided the Howard Government the 
opportunity to put "a human face" on their government, "obscure their conservative agenda" 
and "show they were doing something about a serious social issue" without significant 
political risks. 
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Other key informants argued the Howard Government's greater concern with being seen to 
be doing something rather than the substance of the campaign was illustrated by their 
treatment of Indigenous Australians. Despite its separate Indigenous component, Taskforce 
Member 7, Academic 3, and State Public Servants 12 & 13 critiqued Australia Says No as 
culturally inappropriate and superficial. Consequently, State Public Servants 12 & 13 who 
were both from the Northern Territory, recounted how they attempted to negotiate with the 
Howard Government to develop a complementary, culturally appropriate, Indigenous 
campaign. This campaign was funded by the Northern Territory Government and developed 
for Indigenous Australians to tie in with Australia Says No. These key informants recalled 
they contacted the Howard Government as a courtesy because they were trying to link the 
two campaigns and they encountered significant opposition. According to State Public 
Servant 13, the Howard Government: 
... got legal advice and that we couldn't ... It actually went further than saying us, it was nobody, 
anywhere, could use any component of their campaign- couldn't adapt it, couldn't use it. And I 
just couldn't believe it because we were again trying from the start to do something co-
operative, that in no way contradicted what their message was. It was trying to localise it, it 
was trying to get broader coverage, it was trying to do all this stuff and we had thought that we 
had support aU along the way . 
. -
These key-informants recounted in detail how the Howard Government actively blocked the 
Northern Territory Government's attempt to make Australia Says No more culturally 
appropriate. They argued that their experiences suggested the Howard Government had a 
greater concern with the Australia Says No branding and being seen to be doing something 
rather than actually eliminating male violence against women in Indigenous communities. 
Key informants also suggested that the Howard Government utilised Australia Says No to 
counter criticisms by the UN of the Howard Government's previous CEDAW reports. As 
outlined in Chapter Four, the Howard Government had distanced themselves from UN 
structures and refused to observe international obligations in response to UN criticism of 
Australians poor performance regarding CEDAW, Indigenous Australians and asylum 
seekers. At the same time, however, Howard Government policies such as the invasion of 
Iraq nevertheless relied on an appearance of cooperation with the UN (Baldino, 2005, 
p.194). It was therefore important for the Howard Government to balance their- non-
cooperation with UN and other international agencies with the appearance of being a 
cooperative global citizen. 
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For some key informants this history with the United Nations and the Howard Government's 
obligations under, and criticism by, CEDAW played a role in Australia Says No. Taskforce 
Member 2 argued Australia Says No was directly related: 'to the criticism from the UN about 
Australia's performance on CEDAW ... a reaction to the criticism from the reports, the 
Australian reports to the UN, about its response to domestic and family violence and being, 
needed to be seen to be doing something". Similarly, Federal Public Servant 6 and 
Taskforce Member 7 argued Australia's obligations under CEDAW played a role in Australia 
Says No. Taskforce Member 7 also argued: "it's something they can trot out in the UN, the 
reports to the UN around the Commission on the Status of Women, they always trot that 
campaign out. So from a PR, marketing, international obligation perspective it gives them 
something they can hang their head on". Consistent with these comments, one media 
commentator stated Australia Says No was "just window-dressing designed to help the 
Government comply with the United Nations Declaration of Elimination of Violence Against 
Women" (Fynes-Ciinton, 2004). From these perspectives, Australia Says No was thus part 
of the Howard Government's political opportunism in international as well as domestic 
political contexts. 
The arguments outlined above indicate that the Howard Government may have an 
additional purpose)or Australia Says No beyond their professed commitment to preventing 
and responding to violence against women. They suggest the Howard Government's 
approach to the campaign was grounded in political pragmatism and was about showing 
the government were doing something about a serious social issue without exposing 
themselves to any significant political risks. 
8.5 Discussion 
This chapter has explored key themes which emerged from stage one of the study. First, 
was the dissonance between key informants' positive and negative assessments of the 
Howard Government's male violence against women policies and broader social policy 
agenda. Second, was the proposition Australia Says No may have represented a 
progressive engagement between feminism and the Howard Government since it was 
' consistent with feminist rhetoric and practice responding to male violence against women. 
Third, was the concept of wasted opportunities and that Australia Says No may be 
considered a missed opportunity and an inappropriate campaign in the broader social, 
political and historical context. Fourth, was the proposition Australia Says No was partisan 
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political advertising focused on electoral populism and being seen to do something rather 
than being an appropriate response to male violence against women. When considered 
together, these themes provide an important foundation to make sense of this period and 
theorise how the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women may 
be conceptualised from a feminist perspective. 
As outlined in Chapter Three, some feminists (e.g. Genovese, 2000; Ramsay, 2004) have 
interpreted government responses to male violence against women in terms of a politics of 
chivalry. From this perspective it is argued governments may offer highly visible responses 
to male violence against women which focus on rescuing or protecting the victim while 
doing little to challenge inequality between women and men. Feminists usually argue male 
violence against women is underpinned by individual (micro), institutional (mezzo) and 
structural (macro) factors. Consequently, feminists who interpret certain government 
policies as policies of chivalry suggest the neglect of institutional and structural factors in 
these responses undermines their capacity to reduce or adequately respond to male 
violence against women. 
Analysis of the dissonance in key informants' assessments of the Howard Government's 
approaches suggests this understanding of policy as chivalry offers one possible way the 
government's approaches may be conceptualised from a feminist perspective. The Howard 
Government's initiatives, such as Partnerships, were highly visible responses to male 
violence against women. The extent of publicity and the number of publications released by 
the Howard Government as part of the Partnerships program as discussed in Chapter Six 
also suggests a deliberate strategy to make these programs highly visible. Further, the 
exploration of whether Australia Says No was a public relations exercise more so than a 
community education campaign highlights the highly visible nature of the Howard 
Government's approaches. These approaches therefore reflect the first key element of 
policies of chivalry understandings by being highly visible responses to male violence 
against women. 
The Howard Government's initiatives such as Partnerships also focussed on protecting and 
rescuing women and children as victims of male violence at a micro level. Partnerships 
does not explicitly consider connections between the micro level of individual behaviour and 
the broader social context, either mezzo or macro levels, which feminists argue play an 
' important role in male violence against women. This point is illustrated in the Statement of 
Principles guiding Partnerships (see Appendix 6.1) and the six Partnerships priority themes 
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outlined in Chapter Six. Partnerships principles and themes such as "protecting people at 
risk" not only explicitly focus on 'protection', but also reflect micro or at best mezzo level 
understandings of violence. These principles and themes suggest domestic violence is 
about individuals and relationships and they do not situate domestic violence in the broader 
institutional or structural context. Thus, the Howard Government's approaches reflect the 
second key element of policies of chivalry understandings by focusing on rescuing or 
protecting victims of violence. 
Key informants also argued the Government's broader social policy agenda had a 
detrimental impact on women, and particularly on women who had experienced violence, by 
undermining women's equality and increasing their vulnerability to violence. As discussed 
above, the specific examples key informants used to argue this point included: the Howard 
Government's dismantling of the women's policy machinery; industrial relations and welfare 
reform agendas, changes to family law; and inadequate funding of SAAP. This suggests the 
third and final element of policies of chivalry, that the government does little to challenge the 
inequality between men and women, is also apparent in the Howard Government's 
approaches. 
Conceptualising the-Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women as 
/ 
policies of chivalry thus offers one possible way the dissonance in key informants' 
assessments of the Howard Government can be explained from a feminist perspective. The 
Howard Government's approaches offered highly visible responses to male violence 
against women. Although not including macro or mezzo level understandings, these 
responses had the third component of feminist understandings by addressing micro factors. 
In this context, key informants' positive assessments of the Howard Government's specific 
initiatives such as Partnerships make sense. Simultaneously, key informants' assessments 
of the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda were negative because they 
argued the Howard Government undermined women's equality with men and increased 
their vulnerability to violence. Consistent with feminists who use policy of chivalry 
understandings, some key informants argued the Howard Government's positive and highly 
visible responses to male violence against women were meaningless in this broader social 
policy context. Conceptualising the Howard Government's approaches as policies of 
chivalry thus offers one way of explaining the dissonance in key informants' assessments of 
the government's specific male violence against women policies and broader social policy 
agenda. 
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This conceptualisation as policies of chivalry is not, however, entirely consistent with key 
informants' negative assessments of the Howard Government's broader social policy 
agenda. Feminists (e.g. Ramsay, 2004) who use policy as chivalry understandings argue 
the government has little or no achievement toward women's equality at structural (macro) 
and institutional (mezzo) levels. For the Howard Government, however, key informants 
argued the government's broader social policy agenda was actually. regressive and harmful 
to women's progress towards equality rather than static. Further, the other themes explored 
in this chapter of wasted opportunities and whether Australia Says No was a feminist 
campaign or a public relations exercise do not make sense if the Howard Government's 
approaches are only conceptualised as policies of chivalry. It is therefore useful to explore 
another way the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women may 
be conceptualised from a feminist perspective. 
As outlined in Chapter Three, some feminists (e.g. Chappell, 2002b; Laing, 2008; 
McFerren, 1990; Morris, 2008; Murray, 2005; Radford & Stanko, 1996) argue that certain 
government responses to male violence against women may be understood as policies of 
cooption. From this perspective, responses exist on a continuum from the absence of 
remedy to doing harm to women. At the far end of this continuum, feminists argue 
governments only respond to this violence to protect and maintain women's consent to 
patriarchal institutions such as heterosexuality and traditional family. In doing so, these 
governments oppress more radical aspects of feminism and the feminist critiques of 
patriarchy accompanying feminist responses to male violence against women. Further, 
some feminists (e.g. Bacchi, 1999b; Laing, 2008; Radford & Stanko, 1996) argue responses 
to male violence against women may be coopted by conservative governments to win 
support for their own agendas. They argue that these responses, contrary to feminist 
intentions, individualise the crime and these governments embark on a range of 
interventions harmful to victims and perpetrators. 
The theoretical lens of policies of cooption offers another way of understanding key 
informants' positive assessments of the content of Australia Says No and their negative 
assessments of the campaign in context. The Howard Government adopted feminist 
rhetoric and responses to male violence against women as illustrated by the government's 
use of feminist language and concepts in Australia Says No. In their approaches to male 
violence against women, however, the Howard Government also simultaneously oppressed 
more radical challenges to patriarchy (macro level) and traditional heterosexuality (mezzo 
level) that were available to them. This argument is supported by the Howard Government's 
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replacement of No Respect, a primary and secondary prevention strategy which addressed 
problematic gender dynamics in all relationships (macro, mezzo and micro understandings), 
with Australia Says No, a tertiary intervention campaign addressing individual violent 
behaviour (micro understanding). 
The proposition that Australia Says No was a public relations exercise as explored in this 
chapter also suggests the Howard Government used this campaign to maximise their 
political advantages while limiting their political risks. Through Australia Says No the 
government appeared to be doing something about this serious social. issue while 
simultaneously representing male violence against women in a limited, individualised 
(micro) way that most Australians would not challenge. In this respect it appears that 
Howard Government political pragmatism eclipsed a genuine attempt to tackle and respond 
to this issue of male violence against women in all its complexity. Understanding the 
Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women as policies of cooption 
thus offers a useful alternative way of making sense of this period. 
By conceptualising the Howard Government's approaches as policies of cooption, it is 
possible to make sense of the strategic value of Australia Says No in advancing the Howard 
Government's social and political agenda nationally and internationally. As discussed in 
Chapter Four, there was extensive criticism of the Howard Government's 1950's 'white 
picket fence' social conservatism and its negative impact on women and women's equality. 
The Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women and their use of 
feminist rhetoric and understandings enabled the government to show they were doing 
something about a serious social issue of particular concern to women. This strategy had 
two possible positive outcomes for the Howard Government. First, was to "put a human 
face" on the government and balance possible concerns women might feel due to the 
negative impact of the Howard Government's social conservatism on women's equality. 
Second, Australia Says No offered the government the opportunity to counter criticism of 
their previous reports to CEDAW and appear to be a good global citizen. These arguments 
suggest Australia Says No may be an example of what feminists critique as responses to 
male violence against women that are coopted by conservative governments to win 'support 
for the government's social and political agenda. 
The ·analysis of the Howard Government's approaches as both policies of chivalry and 
policies of cooption suggests this government's policies and ideologies were complex and 
varied rather than monolithic and make sense of the apparently contradictory findings in the 
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key themes explored above. The analysis also suggests a change in the nature of the 
Howard Government's approaches over time and the likely significant impact of the 
government's intentional and increasing exclusion of feminist activists from the policy 
process. This may explain why conceptualisations of the Howard Government's approaches 
as policies of chivalry emerged mainly from discussions of Partnerships (the earlier 
initiative), and those as policies of cooption emerged mainly from discussions of Australia 
Says No (the later initiative). 
Analysis of these findings from stage one responds to the research question for this thesis. 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight provided a detailed account of the male violence against 
women policy field during the Howard years, and identified key moments, issues and 
debates. This account raised a number of issues relating to feminist engagement with the 
state. From a feminist perspective, the Australian Government's approaches to male 
violence against women during the Howard years can be understood as policies of chivalry 
and policies of cooption. Further, although it appears the Howard Government explicitly 
rejected feminism, there was strategic political value in the government responding to a 
feminist issue such as male violence against women using feminist rhetoric and 
understandings of this issue. This understanding offers a possible explanation for how and 
why the coalition of conservative political parties in the Howard Government provided such 
/ 
a sustained and comparatively well-funded public policy response to male violence against 
women between 1996 and 2007. 
From stage one of the study three additional issues emerged related to the research 
question which would be best to explore further in the case studies in stage two. First was 
the significance of the broader social and political context to understanding Howard 
Government approaches to male violence against women. Second was the dramatic impact 
of policy process and the role of individuals in shaping the content and nature of the 
Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women. In particular, was the 
unexpected finding that feminists inside and outside of government developed a productive 
engagement with the Howard Government; a government they argued was hostile to 
women's interests. Third was the dissonance between key informants' positive 
assessments of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women 
and negative assessments of the impact of the Howard Government's broader policy 
agenda on women who had experienced violence. Although this dissonance could be 
explained by conceptualising the Howard Government's approaches as policies of chivalry 
and cooption, it was unusual that key informants were not more critical of this Government's 
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approaches given their personal and professional experiences. That is, the majority of key 
informants identified themselves as feminists with rich experiences with the feminist 
movement and various Australian governments. Stage two of the study, which consists of 
in-depth case studies of Partnerships and Australia Says No explores these issues in more 
depth. The findings from stage two are examined in the following two chapters. 
' 
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Chapter 9: Case Study 1 - Partnerships 
Partnerships Against Domestic Violence 
Feminist approaches and the femocrat strategy have conventionally dominated national 
male violence against women policy. This chapter examines the ongoing salience of the 
femocrat strategy during the Howard years by exploring Partnerships as a case study of 
policy process. The literature outlined in Chapters Three and Four suggests the Howard 
Government's nee-liberalism, social conservatism, and political opportunism undermined 
the femocrat strategy and women's equality. It also suggests the Australian Government's 
interaction with feminism during the Howard years was a history of animosity and decline. 
This period is therefore usually represented as a constraint, rather than a political 
opportunity structure, for feminists working within or with the federal public service. The 
following chapter develops insights into process and context as well as the capacity, 
strategies, and political opportunity structures (POS) exploited by feminists to advance their 
agendas despite the conservatism of the Howard Government. It tells an important story of 
continuities and discontinuities in the femocrat strategy during the Howard years. 
9.1 Continuities 
The case study of Partnerships in this chapter suggests there were continuities in the 
femocrat strategy and feminists had an ongoing salience and influence on the Australian 
Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years in two 
main ways. First, was the ongoing nature of policy activism and the impact of key actors in 
the policy process. This included the continued influence of feminism and its impact on 
understandings of male violence against women even amongst conservative politicians. 
Second, was the significant intergovernmental cooperation evident in the Partnerships 
Taskforce and how femocrats used this policy machinery as a political opportunity structure. 
This contradicts the suggestion that conservative governments and the policy machinery 
they develop are a constraint to feminists. It also draws attention to the potential of 
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federalism to facilitate progressive social policy in this area despite the Howard 
Government's open hostility to feminism. 
9.1.1 Understandings of violence, policy activism, and individual roles 
The Howard Government's championing of paternalism and erosion of participatory 
conceptions of democracy as outlined in Chapter Four suggest policy activism was unlikely 
to be successful during this period. In this context, Ramsay's (2004) findings about the 
important role of policy activism and feminism in earlier federal responses to male violence 
against women were unlikely to be relevant in the Howard years. Key informant comments 
about policy process indicate, however, the continued importance of policy activism and 
feminism to this period. This was particularly apparent in the roles and identities of key 
informants, their expressed commitment to feminism and their policy activism. 
The positioning of many key informants as policy activists in the Partnerships policy process 
was apparent in their roles, identities and acknowledged feminist politics. Although no key 
informants used the terms 'femocrat' or 'policy activist' to describe themselves, two 
recurring features of key informants' responses in the interviews reflected the continued 
applicability of these terms to this period. The first was the self-identification of many key 
informants as feminists and their use of feminist definitions and understandings of violence. 
The second was the policy activism evident in the roles and actions of a number of the key 
informants in the policy process. 
The self-identification of many key informants as feminists demonstrated the continued 
importance of feminism to the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against 
women since the majority played an active role in the government's policy processes. 
Fifteen of the thirty key informants directly identified themselves as '1eminists" without 
prompting. Based on their responses to questions, it is likely a further ten key informants 
would describe themselves as feminists if asked. Of the two men interviewed, one 
described himself in pro-feminist terms. A number of key informants also made reference to 
the ongoing importance of feminism to their work responding to male violence against 
women as illustrated by Federal Public Servant 4: 
... we were strong feminists then and it's interesting I think even though it might be sort of, it 
has become a bit passe, but the principles I think are still entrenched, aren't they, in the work 
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that's being done even at a policy level. If you go back and analyse it all, it's sort of feminist 
principles isn't it- even though people don't want to call it that ... But it still was there. 
Those key informants identifying as feminists represented a diversity of feminist views 
including radical, liberal, and post-modern feminism. Some women also said that although 
they identified as feminists they recognised limitations of feminism and utilised other 
complementary perspectives such as understandings of race, class and other aspects of 
diversity. 
Many key informants' definitions of male violence against women reflected feminist 
understandings. Nineteen of the thirty key informants provided a definition or articulated 
their understandings of male violence against women. Of these nineteen, sixteen provided 
definitions which reflect elements of feminist understandings of male violence against 
women. These definitions drew on feminist concepts such as: power and control; violence 
as an enactment women's inequality with men; the gendered nature of violence; references 
to patriarchy; and violence as an expression of male authority or oppression reinforcing 
women's subordination. Some examples included: 
... so it would be a kind of feminist analysis, so I'd see violence against women as sort of, 
another form of gender, it's an enactment of gender inequality in a sense. So it's a form of 
oppression against women, primarily it's a tool used by men in the sort of, the privacy of homes 
and the privacy of their spaces, and includes a range of behaviour from the kind of physical 
through to emotional, psychological, financial, stalking, that kind of thing (Evaluator 1). 
Obviously physical violence, sexual violence, I don't think there's much to gain by sort of trying 
to list it. It's just anything that is designed to control women, to be cruel to women (Government 
MP2). 
Violence against women from my philosophical point of view is around expressions of 
patriarchy in a patriarchal society ... Women are an oppressed gender in our society in our view 
and individual males are expressing social male power which is entrenched through all 
institutions and structures and legislation and ideology throughout our societies (Peak Body 
Representative 3). 
Even key informants who did not identify as feminists and who provided more conservative 
definitions (e.g. Government MP 1) also reflected a feminist influence such as recognising 
the gendered nature of the violence. Given the prominent role of many key informants in the 
Partnerships policy process this active feminist positioning is significant. It suggests that 
180 
Chapter 9: Case Study 1 - Partnerships 
feminist understandings that have conventionally dominated national policy responses to 
male violence against women continued to play a prominent role amongst key players in the 
policy process during the Howard years. 
Key informants' biographies and their varied roles and identities suggest participants in the 
Partnerships policy process engaged in extensive policy activism working across 
insider/outsider boundaries. This was apparent in the diversity of reported roles and 
responsibilities where almost half occupied at least two relevant roles in the Howard years. 
A significant majority of key informants had diverse and shilling personal biographies 
reflecting their commitment to feminism and policy activism working against male violence 
against women. Taskforce Member 1, for example, clearly articulated this activist 
commitment in her comment: "we were very passionate about our jobs and about where our 
loyalties and, the, our sisterhood". It is not possible to provide specific examples of career 
transitions without potentially revealing key informant identities. Generally, these included 
careers moving between: the policy machinery of state and federal governments as 
femocrats; the women's community or state government service delivery sector (refuges, 
sexual assault services, feminist training organisations); or as feminist activists in academic 
positions. The fluidity of boundaries and consistency of ideological commitment to male 
violence against women in these career transitions as well as the maintenance of 
relationships across these boundaries illustrate how many of the key informants were policy 
activists. Moreover, some key informants explicitly described how their involvement in 
Partnerships was an expression of their feminist commitment and policy activism. 
All three politicians interviewed also referred to a personal history of domestic violence 
policy activism even though two were in a government openly hostile to feminism. Two 
referred to their association with women's domestic violence refuges, one to an association 
with a national feminist organisation, and one to a previous femocrat job. One referred to 
this history and association with domestic violence as one of the reasons they entered 
politics. The fact that all three politicians openly acknowledged policy activist histories and 
associations with the women's movement is significant. It suggests that far from being on 
the periphery of policy making, policy activism and feminism has been mainstreamed as a 
legitimising feature and activity for policy and political actors responding to male violence 
against women. These comments suggest the femocrat strategy, feminism and policy 
activism had an ongoing impact on the Australian Government's male violence against 
women policy processes during the Howard years. 
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The important role of policy actors in progressing Partnerships illustrated its dependence on 
the values, commitment, policy activism; and feminism of these policy actors. These 
comments were in direct contrast to a disembodied, traditional, rational or structuralist 
understanding of policy process moving through specified cycles or stages. The following 
comment by Academic 3 about her impressions of the Howard Government's approaches 
to male violence against women overall illustrate the importance of feminist policy activism 
to this period: 
I think piecemeal, I think ill-informed, ill-thought through and visionless. I mean I just don't think 
there has really been a long term strategic vision for what could have been done for women 
and for kids and families and beyond but for women principally in dealing with what is on 
anyone's view and absolute epidemic of violence given the numbers that we have. That's as a 
whole. If I looked at the policy kind of umbrella I reckon that for me defines it. Underneath that 
it's always more complex and I think there were moments when there were people in positions 
who genuinely wanted to do much better than that and they would have moments where they 
would use power for good and not evil and they would do whatever they could within those 
confines I think to do good work .... I worked with and met people and saw the ways in which 
they tried to subvert or push the parameters as much as they could but all without kind of 
tipping the boat or tipping the scales or being noticed. 
Similarly, Federal Public Servant 4 commented about Partnerships: "I've learnt how 
important individuals are and it shouldn't be that way in a way, should it? That it should, 
whatever's happening should rely on much, something much solider than an individual's 
charisma, or intelligence, or ability to persuade. That's how it happens". One example given 
by a number of key informants about the importance of the policy activism of individuals 
was comparisons between Howard Government Ministers Jocelyn Newman and Amanda 
Vanstone. Ministers Newman and Vanstone were Minister Assisting the Prime Minister on 
the Status of Women between 1997-2000 and 2001-2004 respectively. 
Minister Newman was reportedly integral to the early successes of Partnerships (Taskforce 
Members 1, 5, 8 & 10 and Federal Public Servant 4). According to key informants, Minister 
Newman was a liberal feminist who had a history with feminist organisations and was 
enthusiastic about responding to domestic violence. Taskforce Members 5 and 10 argued 
her focus on getting as much traction for Partnerships as possible and her determination to 
"put her mark" on that initiative meant she was a strong advocate for Partnerships. Federal 
Public Servant 4 recalled how Minister Newman was really behind Partnerships and "valued 
the states coming together". This commitment to federal-state partnerships and participatory 
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conceptions of democracy reflects a fundamental feature of policy activism identified by 
Yeatman (1998, p.34). Minister Newman's feminist politics and commitment to combating 
male violence against women in partnership with the states is therefore an important 
example of the importance of individuals and policy activism in the Partnerships policy 
process. 
In contrast to Minister Newman, key informants reported Minister Vanstone was not 
interested in male violence against women or participatory and functional federal-state 
relationships. Three key informants argued Minister Vanstone's lack of enthusiasm and 
disinterest, her conflict with OSW First Assistant Secretary Rosemary Calder, and refusal to 
sign briefs impacted significantly on the progress of Partnerships (Federal Public Servant 5 
and Taskforce Members 2 & ta). Federal Public Servants 4 and 5 argued Minister 
Vanstone negatively impacted on Partnerships and it deteriorated and lost its flexibility and 
momentum despite its significant support from the Prime Minister's office. This contrast 
between Ministers Newman and Vanstone suggests the significance of the support, 
feminism and policy activism of key individuals in the success of Partnerships. 
Minister Newman was, however, only one example of the policy activism of individuals 
mentioned by key informants as playing a significant role in Partnerships. Two of the other 
/ 
examples provided, Pru Goward and Rosemary Calder (successive First Assistant 
Secretaries of OSW), suggest the value of policy activism in describing the Partnerships 
policy process outside of traditional understandings of feminism. Key informants described 
Goward and Calder as anti-feminist or non-feminist respectively despite them being in 
femocrat positions and engaging in policy activism. The strength of the contradictory 
comments from key informants about Goward and Calder's roles in the Partnerships policy 
process was notable. There was a split between some participants who saw them as 
harmful or ineffective and others who saw them as playing a fundamental positive role. 
Policy activism provides a useful analytical frame to help make sense of these apparent 
contradictions. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, although policy activism is commonly associated with 
progressive social movements this is not universal (Brennan, 1998. p.1 03). Goward and 
Calder need not be feminists to be policy activists; they only needed to attain an 'insider' 
status and either transform assumptions and practices of the dominant agenda or resist 
change through policy activism. Despite their reported anti-feminism or non-feminism 
respectively, Goward and Calder acted in ways which suggested they were policy activists, 
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perhaps even feminist policy activists, and it was apparently. their relationship with feminism 
rather than their policy activism that prompted criticism. Brennan's argument that policy 
activists need not be from progressive social movements and may be advocating resistance 
to change or the status quo seems an appropriate description of Goward. Goward 
reportedly said: "it is important to question how representative some women's groups are 
and that governments must listen to the 'silent majority'" (Gunn, 1999). Her claim to be 
listening to the 'silent majority' and her tenacious pursuit of Partnerships funding as 
described by Federal public servants 4 & 5 and Government MP 2 suggest Goward was, 
despite her anti-feminist statements, pursing liberal feminist goals using policy activism. 
Alternatively, unlike many of her predecessors who were policy activists attracted to the 
bureaucracy, key informants' comments suggest Calder was an example of a bureaucrat 
whose policy activism and feminism were nurtured in the bureaucracy (Dugdale, 1998, 
p.1 05). Calder was a career bureaucrat who reportedly did not originally have a feminist or 
gendered analysis of male violence against women (Taskforce Member 1 and Evaluator 2). 
Nevertheless, key informants described Calder as open to the findings of Partnerships 
research and, over time, convinced of the importance of understanding male violence 
against women as a gendered issue. Comments by Taskforce member 8, Evaluator 2 and 
Federal public seryarit 5 suggest Calder increasingly employed what Dugdale (1998, p.119) 
terms "deep insider" policy activism including a pragmatic ethics and ability to straddle the 
divide between the bureaucracy and the women's movement to progress both Partnerships 
and the National Initiative. Calder's policy activism is particularly notable given Minister 
Vanstone's lack of support. Taskforce Members 8 & 10 and Evaluator 2 argued that 
Calder's policy activism played a role in her conflict and animosity with Minister Vanstone 
and eventuated in her leaving OSW. This suggest Calder was an example of a policy 
activist who sacrificed bureaucratic advancement to their commitment to the issues 
(Dugdale, 1998, p.1 07). The nature of the policy activism of Goward and Calder thus 
suggests the value of policy activism and the continued relevance of the femocrat strategy 
to federal male violence against women policy during the Howard years. 
9.1.2 The femocrat strategy continues?: The Partnerships Taskforce, political 
opportunity structures and intergovernmental cooperation 
The feminism and policy activism of Taskforce members, individually and in relationship to 
each other, had a significant impact on the nature and development of Partnerships 
according to key informants as illustrated by the first Taskforce meeting. Key informants 
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described this meeting as involving significant tension and conflict amongst Taskforce 
members mainly because of the non-proportional allocation of funding. Taskforce members 
were reportedly able to put aside their differences, however, and tried '1o get the best we 
possibly can out of this money" (Taskforce Member 8). This decision to prioritise domestic 
violence over state-based loyalties reflected Taskforce members' policy activism and 
commitment to feminism. Taskforce Member 1 described how Taskforce members bonded 
closely as a team and were loyal to feminism, domestic violence and each other over state-
based loyalties: Similarly, Evaluator 2 commented: 
... there was a total commitment to changing things for women and I think_ that level of 
commitment does not come across in most government state/commonwealth because I've 
done things like [other] agreements and funding and all of that sort of thing and that's not the 
way it works. And there was a genuine respect and caring and support for the women, each 
other on the Taskforce. 
Further, Federal Public Servant 4 explained any animosity and conflict amongst Taskforce 
members was negated by the significant respect for each other and their commitment to the 
issue of domestic violence. This loyalty, respect and commitment reflects Taskforce 
members' policy activism and suggests the ongoing salience of the femocrat strategy in the 
Howard years. / 
Many members of the Taskforce were also reportedly committed to maintaining a feminist 
approach to domestic violence in Partnerships. and convinced non-feminist Taskforce 
members of the importance of this. As. Taskforce Member 8 argued: 
We did actually manage to get the 'f' word in, in the end, as you would believe .... We did 
manage to talk about feminism, and be happy to talk about feminism towards the end, but it 
was certainly at the beginning we weren't all feminists. Not everyone who was sitting around 
the table was and was comfortable with that concept. 
Further, for Federal Public Servant 4. the Partnerships policy machinery was important in 
maintaining feminist responses to domestic violence during the Howard years. She argued 
state representatives would not let the Australian Government "get away with anything that 
was shonky or that was really not representing the issue fully" and strongly advocated for 
feminist responses to domestic violence. Not all key informants perceived this strategy as 
' 
entirely successful, however. Academic 1, lor example, argued Partnerships was a 
confused policy with a "mismatch of bits of feminism thrown in with bits of family 
dysfunction". She attributed this to tensions within the Taskforce including "women's reps 
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around the country tussling with the Government over what it [domestic violence] was". 
Nevertheless, overall, policy activism reportedly helped to maintain feminist perspectives in 
Australian Government domestic violence policy despite the conservative, anti-feminist 
political context. 
The loyalty and policy activism of femocrats reportedly underpinned the ongoing role of 
feminism in domestic violence policy development and the success of Partnerships as an 
example of intergovernmental cooperation. Taskforce Member 2 described Partnerships as 
unique with its strengths of collaboration across federal and state jurisdictions, sharing 
information, and enabling innovation. Similarly, key informants argued the Partnerships 1 
policy machinery was: "a model of Commonwealth-State cooperation", "a unique 
commitment to working in partnership with state governments", "a proper partnership" and 
"one of the best examples of partnering that there has ever been" (Federal Public Servant 4 
& 5, Evaluator 2 and Taskforce Members 5, 7 & 8). Evaluator 2 and Taskforce Member 8 
attributed this success directly to the feminist commitments of Taskforce members. 
Evaluator 2 also argued: 
.. .it wasn't argy .bargy about who gets the money and who jumps over somebody else. It was 
totally focusse.d·on the clients, these are the women we're concerned about and it was never 
said this way, as feminists we have a chance to really make a difference with this pool of 
money'. 
Similarly, Taskforce Member 8 described Partnerships as "the best Commonwealth/state 
experience that I have ever had and I have had a few of them in various roles in 
government". She argued this was because of the collaboration amongst Taskforce 
members and willingness to distribute funding disproportionately based on project needs 
rather than the traditional per capita funding demanded in Australian federalism. These 
experiences and perspectives suggest Partnerships 1 reflected the continued salience of 
the femocrat strategy in making use of formal structures of federalism and 
intergovernmental cooperation to develop progressive social policy. They also suggest the 
feminism and policy activism of Taskforce members and their commitment to domestic 
' 
violence were fundamental to the successes of Partnerships 1. 
The reported willingness to cooperate to ensure funding for domestic violence policy 
development suggests Taskforce members adopted the political pragmatism which was an 
important characteristic of the femocrat strategy as discussed in Chapter Three. Three key 
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informants, all of whom identified as feminists, demonstrated this political pragmatism in 
speaking of their experiences interacting with governments: 
It's about using opportunities ... generally that consensus is an okay thing to build in public 
policy sense .... these are the challenges for people working in any, for feminists working in any 
public policy area - if you see a policy opening not withstanding that it might be used in a 
different way and in a different context - that issue about the conservative orientation towards 
the family, well as policy people we use it because it's an opportunity. So, conservative interest 
in the protection of the family you say, yeah, okay, let's go for it. It's about people having safe, 
nurturing, strong families that are capable of raising strong, nurturing, safe environments for 
children. No conservative is going to argue against that so it fits (State f"ublic Servant 5) . 
... conservative governments can do reasonable things even when you think, even when their 
process is lucked, to know that this issue is a broader issue than traditionally aligned ... I learnt 
how to stay involved with bureaucratic systems and political figures .... how not to give 
particular bureaucrats a hard time personally 'cause they work in systems. But also how to not 
embarrass ministers ... because as soon as you've done that you're off their list. ... So, if you 
want to be in it you have to find pragmatic ways to do things (Peak Body Representative 1). 
I guess it's that perspective that is something better than nothing? If it encourages a couple of 
people to take action who wouldn't normally have taken action that might be a good thing. It's 
such a big' problem and because we haven't worked out the answers to it I guess my 
perspective is something is better than nothing and if there's going to be investment then we 
should take that. ... 1 learnt pretty quickly with [service] when I was director there about how 
important it was to engage in that political process and how powerful the advocate voices were 
(Taskforce Member 3). 
All three key informants also described practical and pragmatic ways they engaged in the 
policy process to achieve their goals. This political and ideological pragmatism suggests the 
ongoing relevance and value of the femocrat strategy and policy activism to domestic 
violence policy development during the Howard years. It suggests feminist successes 
during the Howard years relied on feminists' pragmatism as well as their strategic use of the 
intergovernmental policy machinery as a political opportunity structure. 
A final example of the ongoing importance of the femocrat strategy to the development of 
Partnerships was the policy activism· of individual members of the Taskforce. Taskfdrce 
Member 6 argued there was a tendency to underestimate how the energy of individuals 
pushed forward policy and much of Partnerships' strength was due to the relationships 
formed. Similarly, Federal Public Servant 4 and Taskforce Member 10 argued the strength 
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and successes of Partnerships related directly to the quality and nature of the individual 
representatives and strong personalities involved. Key informants identified a number of 
influential participants on the Taskforce including: head evaluator Tricia Szirom; federal 
bureaucrats Dianne Herriott and Robyn Waddington; and state representatives Pam 
Griffiths (NT), Robyn Henderson (NSW), Carol Kagi (WA), Penny Armytage (VIC), Debbie 
King (VIC) and Heather Nancarrow (OLD). Unlike Minister Newman, Rosemary Calder and 
Pru Goward, these influential participants were described by key informants as reflecting a 
more typical femocrat experience and strong commitment to feminist policy activism. Key 
informants' observations about the role of these individuals and the nature-of their feminist 
policy activism suggest the femocrat strategy continued to play an important role in 
domestic violence policy development during the Howard years. 
9.2 Discontinuities 
Key informants' experiences also reveal a number of discontinuities in the policy process 
which suggest the Howard years were a period of decline for the femocrat strategy in this 
policy area. First was how the Howard Government undermined all nine key features of the 
femocrat strategy identified by Sawer (1999, p.40) 19• Second was the negative impact on 
Partnerships of Howard Government strategies for silencing dissent, actively opposing 
policy activism, and undermining the political neutrality expected of public servants in 
Westminster systems of government. Third was the transformation of the Partnerships 
Taskforce which undermined its progressive feminist goals. 
9.2.1 From Office of the Status of Women (OSW) to Office for Women (OFW): More 
than just a change of name 
Key informants argued the Howard Government's approach to OSW strategically 
undermined the women's policy machinery. This included detailed observations about the 
negative implications of this approach for the femocrat strategy and the specific role of 
Partnerships in this process. According to Federal Public Servant 5: 
In the tough world of Prime Minister and Cabinet when you're dealing with Matters of State, 
capital 'M', capital 'S', to have something soft on women's issues or childcare or multi-cultural 
affairs is seen as pandering to a minority, it's not hard policy and it doesn't make a difference 
to the well-being of the country and the well-being of economics. It's about communities so it's 
19 As summarised in Chapter Two. 
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soft and it has to struggle to get oxygen. It's been a thankless job for every head of that Office 
and ... very few of them have gone on to stay in the public service. They are worn out by the 
time they've gone. 
These observations suggest the Howard Government was biased against what it labelled 
'special interest groups' (particularly women and feminists) and highlight the impact of the 
government's approaches on OSW staff. Academic 1, Federal Public Servant 4, 
Government MP 2 and Taskforce Member 7 also commented on the rapid turnover of stafi 
at OSW which escalated over time. They argued frequent changes in OSW personnel made 
progressing Partnerships difficult; with the subsequent loss of corporate knowledge and 
absence of strong and informed leadership negatively impacting on its character and 
effectiveness. 
The apparent diminished influence of feminism in OSW was also a significant indicator of 
the threat the Howard Government posed to the femocrat strategy. Under the Hawke and 
Keating Governments OSW had maintained an explicit feminist stance. This changed when 
the Howard Government was elected in 1996. The Howard Government's intolerance for 
feminism was illustrated by Government MP 2: 
The Labor Party had a whole lot of people in there who were, well they were very left leaning 
and that meant that they had a super-feminist view of men that I think was a disadvantage to 
get men to take notice of what needed to be done. I think if you want to deal with somebody 
whose not behaving how you want them to you don't go about it that way. And I think we had a 
better ability to convince men -whether it's at the Cabinet table or whether it was in business .. 
Federal Public Servant 4, who worked in OSW for the Keating and Howard Governments, 
argued this strained relationship with feminism impacted on OSW's work and she recalled 
that after March 1996 OSW staff had to stop using the word 'feminist' in briefings: 
We used to really have very strong sort of feminist analysis and absolutely explicitly in our 
briefings to ministers but the moment the Liberal Government came in that was -we couldn't 
use the word anymore .... I think we had some probably explicit instructions and we weren't 
allowed to use the word 'Ms'. 
Further, State Public Servant 6 said she noticed a gradual trend away from feminist 
language and feminist analyses of male violence against women during the Howard years. 
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The impact of this shift from feminism was. reportedly apparent in the Howard Government's 
male violence against women policy. Taskforce Member 3 and Academic 3 argued the 
Howard Government increasingly pressured OSW to move away from feminist perspectives 
on domestic violence in their policy development. Taskforce Member 3 described the 
conflict generated and the pressure she observed from the Howard Government who 
"wanted to see it [domestic violence] as a communal issue or violence against everybody or 
family violence which included child abuse"'. Academic 3 also argued the men's rights 
groups and backlash politics were very influential on the Howard Government. She argued 
OSW ''were politically getting pressure from other ministers as I understood it and perhaps 
from the highest position that we were not to be talking about gender anymore in that 
Office". State Public Servant 6 argued, however, that this was a gradual process and their 
policy advocacy meant OSW maintained some influence early in the Howard years which 
may help to explain the feminist influences apparent in· Partnerships. These comments 
suggest, nevertheless, a discontinuity in the policy process where the Howard Government 
oversaw a gradual decline of the influence of feminism, OSW, and the femocrat strategy 
until OSW was "a mere shadow of its former self" (Gunn, 1999). 
Fundamental changes at OSW reportedly undermined key features of the femocrat strategy 
including the w~eel and spokes model according to key informants. Academic 1 , Peak Body 
Representative 1, Opposition MP, and Taskforce Members 9 & 10 commented on the shift 
in OSW from being a policy advisory agency to essentially a funds administration agency 
and the unwinding of its women's advisory capacity across the bureaucracy. Federal Public 
Servant 5 described OSW under the Howard Government as "very much a poor cousin in 
policy terms" and "secretaries of departments were not inclined to take direction from the 
Office on matters they saw as their policy priorities". Peak Body Representative 3 and 
Academic 1 similarly argued a raft of bureaucratic changes at this time had a profound 
negative influence on how functional OSW were and their primary objective came to be "just 
keeping things off the front page, keeping things out of trouble really". Taskforce Member 9 
argued the implications of this shift in OSW were significant. She suggested administering 
significant grants-based programs such as Partnerships meant OSW's "eye came off things 
like watching what was going on in the Federal Family Court" and the growing power of 
anti-feminist men's groups. 
Taskforce Members 3 and 9 argued, however, that OSW's shift to a grants administration 
agency helped to strategically arrest the downsizing of OSW in the conservative political 
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climate. Taskforce Member 9 suggested Partnerships offered an embattled OSW the 
opportunity to generate a strategically safer role by transforming itself: 
I think the movement into PADV under the new Liberal Government for the commonwealth 
Office was a survival issue - it gave them a reason to continue to exist in what was a new, 
potentially hostile government. Don't forget that when the Howard Government came in and 
.. .it was hello, we're not interested in gendered analyses and they publicly stood up and the 
Women's Office at that stage was how do we survive and PADV was a creation of it and the 
reality of it at my level is you take what you given and you use it. 
The value of this perspective in understanding the changes to OSW is indicated by how 
often the Howard Government and OSW drew attention to the successes of Partnerships 
particularly in response to criticism (see for example: Goward, 2004; Newman, 1999b). 
Although therefore ensuring OSW's survival as an agency, this shift also fundamentally 
changed the nature of OSW's role and responsibilities from what they had been previously. 
In this context of their comments about changes to OSW, Taskforce Member 19 argued it 
was a logical and unsurprising final "kiss of death" to the femocrat strategy when the 
Howard Government transferred OSW out of DPMC and into the Department of Family and 
Community Services in 2004. Defending this move, Goward (2004) argued: "the concept of 
/ 
a women's office doing a mixture of policy and program administration in a central agency 
[is] out of step with modern public administration" and she challenged the mainstream 
public sector to apply a gender analysis to their work. She continued: "Frankly, the task of 
OSW was always an ambitious one; a few dozen policy officers challenging the carefully 
honed and negotiated Cabinet submissions of line departments with their hundreds of policy 
officers is doomed to end almost always in being ignored" (Goward, 2004), Goward's 
argument here is, however, illogical _and more an argument for abolishing OSW altogether 
than moving it to a more junior portfolio. 
That the Howard Government did not abolish OSW, but renamed it Office for Women 
(OFW), is symbolic. The removal of "status" from OSW's title is consistent with conservative 
ideology and with an apparent successful political strategy of gradually diminishing the 
power of the office. It also suggests the Howard Government were confident that in moving 
OSW, and renaming it OFW, they would successfully sever OSW's last ties to the femocrat 
strategy. OSW's survival, albeit in a down-graded form, may reflect their success in 
strategically transforming themselves into a grants administration agency that was not seen 
as too much of a threat to the Howard Government's conservative values. 
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9.2.2 "Silencing Dissent"20 
The second significant discontinuity in the femocrat strategy during this period was the 
Howard Government's "silencing dissent" in the public sector and NGOs. Taskforce 
Members 3, 7 & 8, Federal Public Servants 2, 4 & 5, Opposition MP, Academics 1 & 3, 
Evaluator 2 and Peak Body Representative 1 made specific reference to a "culture of fear" 
and the substantial level of control the Howard Government exercised over the public 
sector. Opposition MP, Taskforce Member 7, Academic 1, and Federal Public Servant 2 
also linked this culture of fear and gagging of public servants to OSW's high turnover of 
stall and challenges in the Partnerships policy processes. These key informants argued the 
actions of the Howard Government and their tight control of the public service generated 
high levels of fear and anxiety amongst public servants and undermined their provision of 
'frank and fearless' advice. Their comments suggest the culture of fear in the public sector 
during the Howard years as outlined in Chapter Four existed in women's policy generally 
and domestic violence policy specifically. They also suggest this culture of fear impacted on 
Australian Government responses to male violence against women. 
Two key informants argued that the Howard Government created a comparatively high 
degree of politicisation of the public sector. Peak Body Representative 1 argued the 
politicisation of the public sector in the Howard years was exaggerated and generated more 
fear and higher levels of anxiety amongst federal public servants than their state 
colleagues. She argued "people were more frightened in Canberra" and the Howard 
Government's crack down on leaks in particular generated high levels of anxiety and 
disempowerment amongst the public service. Federal Public Servant 2 delineated her first 
hand experience of this culture of fear and harassment of dissenters which she argued was 
exacerbated in women's policy because "Howard got in there and he systematically just 
started defunding and disempowering and disenfranchising that whole area". These 
personal experiences suggest discontinuities with the femocrat strategy which relied on 
feminist policy activists being able to provide governments honest and open advice. 
According to key informants, the Howard Government also undermined public sector 
neutrality and nurtured a culture of loyalty to the Government. Federal Public Servant 5 
argued their minister "wasn't necessarily welcoming of frank and fearless advice". Fo( 
others (Federal Public Servant 2, Opposition MP and Academic 3), the government's 
20 (Hamilton & Maddison, 2007) 
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politicisation of the public sector was systematic and insidious. These key informants 
argued the public service became highly politicised during the Howard years and Federal 
Public Servant 2 argued: 
I think that we spend a lot of our time doing things that we, writing, everything that we'd do to 
protect the Government and make sure we were never doing anything that would put it in an 
uncomfortable position even if it meant so that it wasn't ever put in a position . to make a 
decision that might come back to haunt it. We would absorb all of that all of the time because 
otherwise we would just be considered belligerent or incompetent or juvenile or not 
professionals and just like this culture of like to be terribly tricky, and protective of the 
Government you're being terribly professional ... Oh, frank and fearless, frank's dead baby ... 1 
just felt that my whole time was spent protecting the Government and doing political work. 
This federal public servant also described a culture of loyalty and a variety of ways public 
servants operated to protect the Howard Government. She argued senior public servants 
"will just totally obfuscate they will do everything to protect ministers" and she used Senate 
Estimates Committee hearings as an example of this (Federal Public Servant 2). 
These comments abouUhe culture of loyalty were echoed by key informants outside the 
federal public service. Academic 3, for example, commented on the culture of fear and what 
she described as "misplaced" loyalty. The Opposition MP argued this culture of fear got 
worse over time and "every department has suffered the same fate and the sort of 
unwinding of the women's advisory capacity within the bureaucracy". She continued: 
... in a culture where loyalty to the Government is rewarded above almost anything and you 
think about the stellar careers of the bureaucrats who were involved in.the children's overboard 
lie, people know that if they want to get ahead that's what they have to do .... 1 think that a 
culture develops in an organisation. If an organisation is headed by someone whose only goal 
is to support the Government politically then that goal inevitably permeates the culture of an 
organisation. I think that a lot of people who wanted to be apolitical public servants just doing 
their best have probably left the public service in recent years and the people who remain 
understand that frank and fearless advice isn't valued and why would they stick their necks out 
in that circumstance (Opposition MP). 
The Opposition MP argued the Howard Government's politicisation of the public sector also 
undermined the important function the public service traditionally played in the Australian 
system of government. She suggested this undermined the principle of '1rank and fearless" 
advice and encouraged public servants to provide advice on what was easy and popular 
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rather than the right thing to do in any given situation. Thus in addition to politicisation and 
culture of fear, some key informants suggest the Howard Government also nurtured a 
culture of loyalty which undermined the role of the public service and the femocrat strategy. 
Stage two of the study suggested specialist sexual assault and domestic violence services 
from government and non-government organisations were subjected to similar treatment by 
the Howard Government as the NGOs outlined in Chapter Four. The Howard Government's 
relationship with WESNET through Partnerships was one example cited by key informants 
of how they attempted to silence dissent from the women's sector. Soon after forming 
government the Howard Government rationalised the peak bodies and as part of this 
process WESNET reluctantly federated with the Australian Federation of Homeless 
Organisations (AFHO) (Peak Body Representative 3 and Evaluator 2). Peak Body 
Representative 3 argued this reflected the Howard Government's attempt to silence dissent: 
... they started to introduce their threat of defunding any organisation which criticised them -
which they've successfully managed to do over the last few years .... we saw some peak 
bodies who were quite radical get defunded so then there was the assumption that while you 
can't speak out against this government or you'll lose your funding so there was all those 
tensions within apeak about how, whether you're better off being critical and getting defunded 
or pulling back a bit and keeping your funding going- so there's all those tensions. We argued 
to them that a healthy democratic state needed to have peak bodies and criticism from the 
non-government sector- particularly a welfare state and that they couldn't just silence dissent 
like that but they weren't very keen on listening. 
Although WESNET federated with AFHO, they remained an unfunded peak and were 
contracted by OSW to provide consultancy advice as part of Partnerships. Peak Body 
Representative 3, Evaluator 2, and Taskforce Member 8 argued this relationship was 
characterised by distrust and animosity. Peak Agency Representative 3 argued WESNET 
were increasingly pressured to produce deliverable outputs under Partnerships 1 and 
subsequently produced a number of Partnerships research projects. She argued this was a 
strategic move by the Howard Government which intended to keep WESNET busy with 
research and silence public criticisms of WESNET's loss of peak body funding. This key 
informant suggested WESNET's relationship with the Howard Government was an example 
of how the government's strategies against NGOs were applied to the specialist male 
violence against women service sector. 
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The role of WESNET within Partnerships offered an important insight into this period 
consistent with Chappell and Sawer's description of the tension between feminists inside 
and outside the bureaucracy as outlined in Chapter Four. Taskforce Member 8 and 
Evaluator 2 described the strained relationship between WESNET, OSW staff and the 
Partnerships Taskforce. Their description of this relationship was one of a widening gulf 
between femocrats inside the bureaucracy and feminists in services outside it where 
WESNET took an "opposition stance" against OSW (Evaluator 2). These key informants 
detailed a history of significant animosity and tension between WESNET and OSW. They 
argued WESNET engaged with the Minister's Office and Opposition in a way that 
undermined relationships with OSW. Taskforce Members 8 & 2 and Evaluator 2 also 
argued, however, that .it was a strategic error excluding sector representatives such as 
WESNET from the Partnerships Taskforce. They argued this exclusion was a significant 
weakness undermining the Taskforce's credibility and success. This history is consistent 
with McFerren's (1990) comments about the tendency under conservative governments for 
the refuge movement to concentrate their attacks on femocrats in the bureaucracy rather 
than the Government itself. It supports the proposition that the gulf between 'insider' and 
'outsider' feminists widens under conservative governments. 
9.2.3 The Partnerships Taskforce 
The Howard Government's strategic repositioning and down-grading of OSW as the 
centrepiece of the femocrat strategy is consistent with Chappell's (2002b, p.30) argument 
that the femocrat strategy was left in "tatters" during this period. Although the 
intergovernmental cooperation amongst Taskforce members as described above reflected 
continuities in the policy process, some key informants argued the Partnerships Taskforce 
also reflected a decline of the femocrat strategy during the Howard years. They argued this 
was particularly evident in the deterioration in relationships across the jurisdictions between 
Partnerships 1 and Partnerships 2. 
Key informants' positive comments about intergovernmental cooperation in Partnerships 
were not universal and some key informants spoke of the limitations of the Partnerships 
Taskforce even early in Partnerships 1. Federal Public Servant 4 argued the Partnerships 
Taskforce never achieved national coordination or a truly national approach. Similarly, State 
Public Servant 4, from NSW which had a Labor Government, said they were suspicions of 
the Liberal Government. She said NSW distrusted the Howard Government's '1alk about 
family values and family support", their conservative agenda within Partnerships, and their 
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narrowing of violence against women to domestic violence. She argued her brief for 
Partnerships was to survey the situation but not be too cooperative since the Howard 
Government were trying to get credit "for something they weren't doing a lot about". For 
Government MP 2 Partnerships was also hampered by the lack of cooperation from the 
states. She argued the states had "an in-built enthusiasm to discourage the Commonwealth 
from doing anything with them". Although positive perceptions of Partnerships as a model of 
intergovernmental cooperation early in Partnerships 1 were dominant, these key informants 
suggested these views were not universal. 
Despite these negative comments, many key informants argued the deterioration in 
relationships in the Partnerships Taskforce occurred between Partnerships 1 and 
Partnerships 2. Many spoke of Partnerships 1 as a true partnership across jurisdictions. 
They argued Partnerships 2, however, involved: increasing Commonwealth centralisation; 
national rather than state-based project funding; and a breakdown in intergovernmental 
relationships until the Taskforce effectively became dysfunctional and ceased meeting. A 
number of key informants offered their perspectives on why the Commonwealth centralised 
the projects in Partnerships 2 and why relationships deteriorated between the federal and 
states governments during this time. In grouping these reasons there was a notable 
difference in the comments of public servants in the state and federal governments. 
/ 
The first reason key informants proposed for the changes between Partnerships 1 and 2 
was that it was an agreed progression of Partnerships to national projects and the 
Taskforce evolved to reflect these changes. Federal Public Servants 4, 5 & 6 and State 
Public Servant 9 also attributed this deterioration to key individuals leaving OSW and did 
not believe there was a deliberate strategy to sabotage intergovernmental relationships. All 
four believed the change from Minister Newman to Minister Vanstone was significant. 
Federal Public Servant 5 and State Public Servant 9 argued Minister Vanstone did not have 
the same passion or commitment to domestic violence as Minister Newman and 
consequently disengaged from Partnerships 2. Further, unlike Minister Newman, Federal 
Public Servant 4 argued Minister Vanstone was focussed only on what the Commonwealth 
would do and was not interested in bringing the states together in Partnerships 2. She also 
believed changes and turnover in OSW staff significantly contributed to deteriorating 
relationships and made it difficult to keep Partnerships going (Federal Public Servant 4). 
Alternatively, some key informants argued the inherent nature and tensions of 'cooperative 
federalism' were responsible for relationships deteriorating within the Partnerships 
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Taskforce. State Public Servants 4, 5 and 9 argued Minister Vanstone's withdrawal from the 
states was part of the Howard Government's wider centralising trend away from cooperative 
federalism and reflected existing animosity between state and federal jurisdictions. They 
argued this trend was not isolated to the women's policy area and the Howard Government 
were "natural centralisers" who wanted more credit for the work of Partnerships. 
Government MP 2 described becoming "fed up with the states" and argued that although 
she originally believed ''whole-heartedly in federation, in federalism", she now believes 
federalism is a "waste of time" and "dead". These key informants suggested the inherent 
tensions in Australian federalism and the Howard Government's centralising tendencies 
over time eroded the capacity of the jurisdictions to work together in Partnerships 2. This 
may, however, also be an indication of a Howard Government who, having sought the 
cooperation of state jurisdictions early on, now had the confidence from five years in power 
to progress their agenda alone. 
Another reason proposed for the shifts between Partnerships 1 and 2 was the political 
identities of the parties in power at state and federal levels. Chappell (2002b, p.30) argues 
that most feminists were unable to engage in the 'federalism foxtrot' during the Howard 
Government's first term because Liberal or Coalition parties governed in all states except 
NSW. Two key informants suggested this political difference undermined NSW's 
cooperation in 'Partnerships. One commented "New South Wales was always hard to get on 
with" (Federal Public Servant 4). The other, State Public. Servant 4, explained that her brief 
from the NSW Government was to be fairly uncooperative since, as the only Labor 
government, ''we had nothing to gain much from sitting around that table". 
By 1998, however, the pendulum had started to swing back to the ALP at the state level 
(Chappell, 2002b, p.30) and when South Australia elected an ALP state government in 
2002 all states had ALP governments. Academic 1 and State Public Servants 3, 6 & 11 
suggested it was the common political identity as Liberal or Coalition governments that 
encouraged the early intergovernmental cooperation of Partnerships 1. State Public Servant 
3, for example, argued that her state had a state Liberal government when Partnerships 
started which made it much easier to collaborate and yet this collaborative relationship 
deteriorated when their state voted in a Labor government. Similarly, two other key 
informants argued: 
Phase one was a partnership with the states because they were all, apart from NSW, Liberal 
states. So a lot of money went through the state government departments and federal 
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ministers ran out and launched things because it made them look good. Except for NSW, like I 
said, we didn't know what PADV was in NSW because we never got any funding because we 
were a Labor state. It was really obvious and then gradually all the states went Labor and so 
phase 2 they didn't put all that money out through the states anymore. They did it through 
consultancies. So I think they weren't very happy to run about working in collaboration with 
Labor states and making them look good (Academic 1) . 
... the fact that every single state and territory government became Labor and we had a 
conservative federal government parallels with when it became absolutely ridiculous .... the 
clearest indication was South Australia was the last jurisdiction other thaQ the Australian 
Government to be conservative and then when [it] flipped in 2002 that became, it became 
unpalatable .... they would have formed the opinion that they were providing the money, why 
are they sharing the decision-making around that money with jurisdictions which aren't, where 
they've been elected out. ... They wanted the wins. They wanted to be able to use it as a policy 
platform for a whole range of other issues and they didn't want states being party to that win 
(State Public Servant 6). 
This change in the ALP holding power at the state level thus offered one explanation for the 
deterioration in intergovernmental relationships between Partnerships 1 and 2. This is also 
consistent with Brett's {2005) argument, as discussed in Chapter Four, that there was a 
clear shift in the.way the Howard Government related to the states due the division between 
the Liberal and Labor parties being the primary opposition that structured Howard's 
thinking. It suggests that changes in the states to being Labor governments were a 
constraint rather than a political opportunity structure for femocrats in Partnerships. 
In contrast to Chappell and Sawer's arguments that the ALP tends to be a political 
opportunity structure for the femocrat strategy, these comments suggest the ALP being in 
power in the state governments stifled rather than facilitated progressive social policy at the 
federal level. Nevertheless, although femocrats were unable to engage ·in the 'feminism 
foxtrot' early in Partnerships 1, the comments also extend Chappell's point about the 
potential of Australian federalism in developing progressive social policy. Chappell (2001, 
p.67) argues Partnerships maintained progressive ideas competing with the conservative 
position on domestic violence due to femocrats working in conjunction with more socially 
progressive state governments. These findings suggest this situation was, however, only 
facilitated by the Howard Government's willingness early on to work with Liberai/Coalition 
state governments. This suggests femocrat political pragmatism enabled them to exploit a 
political opportunity structure through federalism when they had governments of the same 
political persuasion at federal and state levels. 
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This argument about the prominent role of the political identity of the state governments in 
Partnerships 2 was, however, explicitly rejected by two key informants. Evaluator 1 argued 
that although this may have been relevant she didn't think that the Howard Government 
were "that well organised to run such a good conspiracy". She suggested this deterioration 
was more due to a leadership vacuum in Partnerships. Similarly, Federal Public Servant 5 
argued: 
... all states became Labor which is a recipe for something like that grinding to a halt. It didn't. 
The Prime Minister wasn't interested in it grinding to a halt. He was just interested in it being 
managed in a way that didn't cause any heat or steam and preferably delivered something 
good .... 1 think the people who say it didn't reach its potential have never sat inside trying to 
run a program like that and have never dealt with all of the complexities of state and territory 
governments and the Commonwealth government ... The fact that it achieved what it achieved 
was pretty terrific. 
These comments thus illustrate a diversity of views amongst key informants to explain the 
deterioration of intergovernmental relations on the Taskforce between Partnerships 1 and 2. 
Whatever the reason for the changes, key informants argued they had a significant negative 
impact on Partnerships. Evaluator 1 and Taskforce Member 10 argued the states' 
commitment and interest in Partnerships 2 waned due to the withdrawal of financial 
incentives to be involved and the Howard Government's increasing control. Similarly, 
Taskforce Member 2 argued the Taskforce lost its way due a backlash against the Howard 
Government's changes to OSW and their controlling behaviours. Taskforce Member 10 also 
noted the "downgrading" of representation on the Partnerships 2 Taskforce. She suggests it 
is possible the state governments, which by 2002 were all ALP governments, followed 
NSW's lead and minimised their collaboration with the federal Coalition Government. 
Further, since state femocrats may have been more easily able pursue opportunities and 
feminist goals within their ALP governments, they may have been less committed to 
Partnerships 2 than to Partnerships 1. 
The Commonwealth's apparent disengagement from federal-state collaboration in 
Partnerships 2 was a significant strategic error according to key informants. State Public 
Servant 5 argued the states provided an important buffer in relationships between the 
Howard Government and the sector. She argued Partnerships consequently became ad 
hoc and disconnected to what was happening locally which undermined its ability to 
influence the directions of the state governments who were responsible for the bulk of 
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domestic violence service provision. State Public Servant 6 argued that by by-passing the 
states Partnerships 2 was not able to effectively impact on the service delivery system or 
connect with individual jurisdiction's policy initiatives. As a result she argued "there's a 
whole range of findings about how things should work and how things could be better that 
just don't go anywhere and are just going to sit there until, well forever". State Public 
Servant 7 argued the Howard Government's approach to Partnerships 2 was a strategic 
error which "let the states off the hook". She suggested the states needed to be involved in 
Partnerships 2 to maintain ongoing programming and implementation of the learning from 
Partnerships projects especially since Partnerships was not recurrent funding. Evaluator 1 
also argued Partnerships 2 subsequently became "isolated projects being run off on their 
own with very little policy development" which mirrored OSW's shift from a policy advocacy 
to a grants administration agency. These key informants thus suggest the disengagement 
between federal and state governments was a strategic flaw undermining the successes of 
Partnerships. 
9.3 Discussion 
This case study of the Partnerships' policy process suggests there were continuities and 
discontinuities in the femocrat strategy during the Howard years. This chapter has proposed 
that policy actors, policy machinery and structures were all significant in the Partnerships 
policy process and the final policy outcome. It has also indicated the utility of employing 
Yeatman's (1998) understanding of 'policy activism' and Chappell's (2002a; 2002b) 'political 
opportunity structures' to make sense of this period. 
This case study suggests there was an ongoing relevance and salience of feminist 
influences and the femocrat strategy during the Howard years. As explored early in the 
chapter, many of the key informants who played key roles in the Partnerships policy 
process, identified themselves as feminists with policy activist histories, expressed feminist 
definitions and understandings of male violence against women, and identified Partnerships 
as one expression of their feminist policy activism. According to these key informants 
Pattnerships was very influenced by feminism and reflected the ongoing salience of the 
femocrat strategy despite the Howard Government's open hostility to feminism. Although 
the problem of male violence against women has been constructed in a range of different 
ways, feminist approaches to this issue have conventionally dominated national policy 
approaches and these findings suggest they continued to do so even under the Howard 
Government. 
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Although feminists and femocrats have historically been important players in national male 
violence against women policy, they have tended to do better under more progressive 
Labor governments (Chappell, 2002b). During the early Howard years, feminists were 
unable to do the 'federalism foxtrot' (Chappell, 2002b) to exploit differences between state 
and federal governments because all governments except NSW were Liberal/Coalition. The 
Howard Government also put new policy machinery and processes in place in this period 
that changed the policy capacity and influence of feminists and femocrats. The literature 
outlined in Chapters Three and Four suggests features of this period, including the political 
identities of governments and the conservatism of the Howard Government, were a 
constraint for feminists. Consistent with, and extending, Chappell's (2001) argument about 
the potential of federalism to nurture progressive social policy, however, this chapter 
suggest feminists were able to exploit the new policy machinery such as the Partnerships 
Taskforce as a political opportunity structure to pursue feminist objectives and progressive 
social policy. This suggests the ongoing influence of feminism and importance of the 
femocrat strategy in this period despite the Howard Government's conservatism and open 
hostility to feminism. 
The findings presented in this chapter about continuities with the femocrat strategy provide 
a possible explanation for the relative lack of feminist criticism of the Howard Government's 
approaches to male violence against women. Through this case study of Partnerships I 
have argued that the policy activism of feminists and femocrats impacted on the nature of 
Howard Government approaches to male violence against women, particularly in the early 
years (1997-2002). This was a different finding to the dominant feminist view reported in the 
literature about their interactions with the Howard Government. This feminist involvement 
and the government's inclusion of some feminist content in Partnerships can thus help 
explain the relative absence of feminist critique towards the Howard Government's 
approaches as discussed in Chapter Seven. 
Although Partnerships thus seemed to be an exception to the Howard Government's 
assault on the femocrat strategy early on, the findings presented in the second half of this 
chapter suggest it did not continue to be. The centralisation in Partnerships 2 and 
subsequent withdrawal and disengagement from the partnership heralded the deterioration 
of formal and informal intergovernmental relationships. Intergovernmental cooperation was 
an important component of the femocrat strategy. Particularly after 2002, however, this 
chapter argues the Howard Government increasingly eroded intergovernmental cooperation 
in responses to male violence against women and challenged and reduced the discursive 
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power of the femocrats in the policy process. This case study of Partnerships therefore also 
suggests the Howard years were a period of gradual decline of the influence of femocrats 
and feminist policy activists on policy process and content. It would thus seem that 
Chappell's observation that the Howard Government left the "femocrat strategy in tatters" 
(Chappell, 2002b, p.30) was an accurate one that applied to the Howard Government's 
approaches to male violence against women as well as their broader women's policy 
agenda. 
The role of policy process, feminist policy activism, and the femocrats' exploitation of the 
political opportunity structures available to them is therefore important to understanding 
Partnerships. By Australia Says No, however, the Howard Government seems to have 
largely excluded feminists inside and outside government from involvement in the 
development of the government's approaches to male violence against women. Despite the 
Howard Government's deliberate exclusion of feminists, key informants generally praised 
both Partnerships and Australia Says No as positive while simultaneously critiquing the 
Howard Government's broader social policy agenda. To explore why feminists might have 
assessed Australia Says No so positively despite their exclusion from the policy process 
during this period, the next chapter focuses on Australia Says No as a case study of 
content. 
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Chapter Ten 
Case Study 2: 
Violence Against Women - Australia Says No 
Terms like 'family', 'violence' and 'family violence' have no abstract meaning and can only 
be understood by what they accomplish in a specific problem representation in a particular 
context and so any term can be made to do any kind of political work (Bacchi, 1999b, 
p.178). 'Male violence against women', for example, may be employed either for or against 
feminist goals. This chapter is a case study of the content of Australia Says No using a 
modified 'What's the Problem?' approach (Bacchi, 1999b) analysis from stage two of the 
study. Consistent with Bacchi (1999b, p.165), the focus of analysis in this chapter is on how 
descriptors are deployed in Australia Says No to produce particular problem 
representations in a· particular social and political context. The analysis for this case study 
found multiple representations of the problem in Australia Says No. These representations 
were complex and both operated alone and interacted with each other in a way that 
paralleled the feminist micro, mezzo and macro level understandings of male violence 
against women outlined in Chapter Two. Consequently, the discussion below is divided to 
reflect each level of understanding. Interspersed through this discussion, the chapter also 
explores the possible effects of these problem representations. The chapter then concludes 
by proposing that one way the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against 
women may be understood from a feminist perspective is as policies of transformistic 
hegemonic masculinity. 
10.1 Individualised Representations of Violence (micro) 
Micro level understandings of male violence against women in this thesis attribute this 
violence to the behaviour of individuals as discussed in Chapter Two. These individualised 
understandings of male violence were apparent in representations of the problem in 
Australia Says No as explored below. 
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1 0.1.1 Individual pathology: male perpetrators of violence 
When men were identified as perpetrators of violence in Australia Says No, the dominant 
representation of the problem was of the individual pathology of angry, criminal, and/or 
distressed men. In the Education Resource, for example, one representation of the problem 
was individual men's inappropriate anger management or conflict resolution skills. This was 
illustrated in the campaign's objective to assist young people: "identify non-violent ways of 
responding to conflict and stress" (Education Resource part 1, p.1 ). Further, the Education 
Resource advised young people: "holding these negative feelings [anger] in is difficult, tiring 
and unhealthy. Unfortunately many people release these .feelings in an inappropriate way, 
making the situation even worse" (Education Resource part 1, p.1 0). 
The representation of the problem as individual angry men was also apparent in 
Advertisement 121 where a man stated: "I got really angry and I just gave her a slap, you 
know, stuff happens. But she knows, I mean, she deserved it". The advertisement 
challenged the statement "she deserved it" with the statement "no she didn't". It did not, 
however, challenge the underlining premise of representing the man's violence as a 
problem of 'anger'. These examples suggest that one way Australia Says No represented 
men's violence was as a response to conflict and stress or as an individual man's anger 
management problem. This problem representation is in contrast to the feminist analyses 
outlined in Chapter Two which usually represent the problem as a man's calculated 
behaviour to control and intimidate a woman (micro) that is supported and facilitated by the 
institutional and structural (mezzo and macro) context. 
Another way the analysis suggested Australia Says No represented the problem was as 
about criminal or bad men. The campaign texts clearly focused on the types of the violence 
defined as criminal by law, specifically sexual and physical assault. This representation was 
most apparent in how the campaign dealt with sexual assault. On page 12 of the Australia 
Says No Booklet (the Booklet) under the heading "It's a crime" was the text: "Forcing 
someone to have sex when they don't want to, or forcing them into having sex by making 
them think they will be harmed if they don't is a serious criminal offence". The Booklet then 
defined various types of criminal offences of sexual assault. In Advertisement 3 this 
representation was less explicit but still apparent with the statement: "I was raped and I told 
the police. It was hard but I know I've done the right thing". 
21 References to advertisements in this chapter are to television advertisements numbers 1 to 4 - the 
full transcripts of which are provided in Appendix 7.9. 
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The campaign's use of the narrow definition of sexual assault and domestic violence as 
criminal acts illustrates the prominence of crime control discourses in Australia Says No and 
the representation of the problem as the behaviour of individual criminal men. Supporting 
this argument, advertisement 1 delineated a number of scenarios of criminal forms of 
sexual assault and domestic violence. The advertisement concluded with the statement: 
"This behaviour is not just unacceptable, it's criminal". Similarly, in Advertisement 2, the 
statement "My boy1riend hits me, then he says.he loves me and reckons it's all okay" was 
followed by "No, it's a crime". Further, page 4 of the Booklet lists problematic behaviours 
such as possessiveness, jealousy, threats and put downs which it identifies. as precursors 
to, or warning signs of, criminal physical violence. This representation of the problem does 
not indicate that some behaviours, such as threats, may be criminal acts in their own right 
and it is also contradicts feminist analyses which usually define these behaviours as part of, 
and not just precursors to, domestic violence. 
A third representation of the problem in Australia Says No was as the individual pathology 
of distressed men in need of help and support for whom counselling or other health 
interventions would be appropriate. This representation was most apparent in the solutions 
offered in Australia Says No. In Advertisements 1 and 4, the problem was represented as 
an issue of the man's anger and criminal acts as discussed above and included the 
statement ''This behaviour is not just unacceptable, it's criminal". Yet, the subsequent 
solutions offered were not criminal solutions such as encouraging perpetrators to turn 
themselves into the police, cease their criminal behaviour or call 'Crime Stoppers'. The 
advertisement instead advised "You can get help and support by talking with an 
experienced counsellor on this confidential helpline". Similarly, near the end of 
Advertisement 4 is the statement "If you have a problem because you've experienced or 
been responsible for assault or violence you can call this helpline for help and support". 
Despite the campaign representing the problem as a criminal act, its solutions contradict 
this representation by suggesting it is a problem of distressed men in need of help and 
support. This juxtaposition of crime control and mental health discourses is confusing and 
contradictory since 'it conflates criminal acts with men's distress. 
This analysis of the campaign's representation of the problem as the individual pathology of 
men with anger, crime or health problems parallels FitzRoy's (1999) analysis of 
Partnerships outlined in Chapter One. FitzRoy argues Partnerships represents the problem 
as the individual pathology of 'angry', 'bad' and/or 'sad' men. 'There were thus similar 
representations of the problem as the individual pathology of male perpetrators in both 
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Partnerships and Australia Says No. Apart from distancing these men from the institutional 
and structural factors which feminists argue underpins male violence against women, this 
way of representing the problem, particularly as anger or distress, may also obscure 
individual men's responsibility by offering an excuse for their violence. Further, the links 
between these representations in the campaign and FitzRoy's analysis of Partnerships 
suggests the broader relevance of this analysis to the Howard Government's approaches to 
male violence against women beyond the campaign alone. 
1 0.1.2 "Violent relationships" 
The way Australia Says No represents the problem as dysfunctional families and 
miscommunication is discussed in the next section as a mezzo level representation of the 
problem. Nevertheless, the way the campaign represents the problem as "violent 
relationships" is relevant to both micro and mezzo level understandings because of the way 
male perpetrators are represented as subjects in this approach. This is one example of the 
complexity of representations in the campaign which interacted with each other across the 
different levels of feminist understandings of male violence. against women. 
In Australia Says No the dominant representation of perpetrators as subjects was passive 
and consequently men were distanced from 'the' rather than 'their' violence. The campaign 
represents the primary problem as "violent relationships". The campaign's stated aim in the 
Booklet (p.3) is: 'to raise young people's awareness about the harm caused when personal 
relationships become violent". It also describes the problem throughout the campaign with 
terms such as "abusive situation", "a problem with a relationship", "violent relationships", 
and "abusive relationships". Further, these "violent relationships" are represented as acting 
on their own accord thereby obscuring the agency and actions of the man committing the 
violence as the following examples from the Booklet illustrate: 
When there is violence or intimidation the relationship can become very destructive and 
physically and emotionally dangerous (p.4). 
A violent relationship may not be violent all the time .... There is a strong chance that the 
violence will get worse over time and the relationship more abusive" (p.S). 
This representation of the problem as the "violent relationship" rather than the behaviour of 
the perpetrator was poignantly illustrated in the Education Resource documentary about 
Angela Baker's experiences of her partner's violence. The documentary described these 
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experiences as: "a recent real relationship that went horribly wrong", "a teenager who fell 
victim to relationship violence" and "Angela's story raises awareness of the indicators of 
destructive relationships". These examples suggest Australia Says No represented the 
"violent relationship" actively as the subject and thus the problem. 
By representing the problem as the ''violent relationship" and thus personifying the 
relationship, Australia Says No employs the type of passive language to refer to the 
perpetrator that is critiqued in Chapter Two. By doing this, the campaign "nominaliz[ed] the 
act of violence" (Lamb, 1991, pp.251-253) and diffused the perpetrator's responsibility by 
making the violent relationship the active subject and the perpetrator the passive object of 
this representation. By representing "violent relationships" as subjects using active voice, 
Australia Says No therefore constructed men's violent acts as "acts without agents" (Lamb, 
1991) and obscured the responsibility of the perpetrator. Feminists usually argue that 
responsibility for male violence against women rests with the choices of individual 
perpetrators that are facilitated and condoned by certain institutional and structural 
contexts. In contrast to this understanding, the campaign's use of language and 
personification of the "violent relationship" as the problem shifts responsibility for the 
violence from the male perpetrator and the social institutions and structures feminists argue 
facilitate and condone his violence and onto the relationship. 
10.1.3 Blurring the boundaries between male perpetrators and female victims 
The representation of the problem in Australia Says No also blurs the boundaries between 
victims and perpetrators in a way that echoes how individual perpetrators themselves 
create "zones of uncertainty" (Towns, 2005) as discussed in Chapter Two. Australia Says 
No usually directed advice, comments, and messages to victims and perpetrators 
simultaneously instead of addressing them as two separate groups. This blurring of 
boundaries was illustrated in the Prime Minister's statement in the Booklet (p.1 ): "This 
Booklet is a resource for young people, parents, friends and the community at large. It 
provides information on how to identify and avoid violent and abusive situations, how to 
build and maintain healthy relationships and who to contact if you need protection or 
advice". Another example in the Booklet (p.4) was: "Building and maintaining a healthy 
relationship needs a commitment from both partners to work at it"'. Similarly, one of the 
advertisements stated "If you have a problem because you've experienced or been 
responsible for assault or violence you can call this helpline for help and support". 
Representing responses to victims and perpetrators simultaneously and offering the same 
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solutions (getting help and support, building healthy relationships) in this way can obscure 
who is responsible for the violence. It creates a zone of uncertainty which may shift 
responsibility evenly between female victims and male perpetrators of violence. 
The campaign's use. of passive language and representation of the "violent relationship" as 
the problem may have also seamtessty shifted the focus from the man's violence and 
represented the woman as the problem. In the Booklet (p.18), for example, is the statement: 
'What works here depends on how witting she is to see there is a problem and how abusive 
the relationship has become". This statement suggests the problem is the "abusive 
relationship" and the absence of the man as a subject of the sentence creates a "zone of 
uncertainty" (Towns, 2005). This absence of the man may infer it is the "abusive 
relationship" and the woman has (or is) 'the problem". As the one with "the problem" this 
representation implies the victim is responsible for the violence or at least for stopping the 
violence. By making the man invisible in this way, the campaign shifts the focus of 
intervention and responsibility to the woman who needs "help and support" to address "her 
problem". This is contrary to feminist understandings of violence which usually require that 
men be held responsible for their violence. 
Extending this analysis of the problem as the woman, another representation in Australia 
Says No was the failure of victims 'to identify and avoid violent and abusive situations" 
(Australia Says No BooKlet pp.t-3) and "letting yourself be abused" (Education Resource, 
part 1, p.17). This is illustrated in statements in the Booklet such as: 
They might be scared that their partner will hurt them if they try to leave (p.8) 
When you are frightened and your self-esteem is low, it can be hard to find the strength to 
leave .... But the first step in changing things is to understand what's been happening is wrong. 
Even if your boyfriend or partner says they care about you and you care about them, it's not 
OK to be treated like this (p.9). 
This problem representation suggests the psychopathology of the victim and her tack of 
understanding caused her to remain in the relationship. It also infers that the woman's fears 
are unfounded or irrational. This is in contrast to feminist analyses of men's violence which 
argue that women stay for a range of reasons at the micro, mezzo and macro levels. As 
outlined in Chapter Two, these reasons may include: the behaviour and threats of their 
partner to hurt them if they leave; their inability to achieve economic independence to 
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support themselves and their children; and social expectations about women's roles and the 
gendered division of labour. 
The way the campaign targets solutions mainly towards victims of violence rather than 
perpetrators supports this argument that women/victims are represented as the problem i[l 
Australia Says No. Of the twenty-eight suggested solutions in the Booklet: twelve were 
directed at victims; nine at families and friends of victims; three at both victims and 
perpetrators together; two at perpetrators; and two at families and friends of perpetrators. 
For the young people, these solutions included: they need to build healthy relationships; 
and both sexes need to develop skills in assertiveness, communication, conflict resolution 
and anger management. For young women, these solutions include that they need to: 
understand the nature of violent relationships; leave violent relationships; talk to a 
counsellor; and do things to make themselves safe from violence such as going out in a 
group, planning ahead, don't be alone with someone they don't know well, and be careful 
with alcohol. For parents, these solutions are that theyneed to: talk to their children about 
healthy relationships and "the negative consequences of thoughtless sexual behaviour"; 
and identify if their child has experienced violence and respond in certain ways (e.g. 
encourage her to talk, give her support). 
These solutions thus focus predominantly on young women and families and not on 
perpetrators, communities, or structural issues. They suggest the main problem is that 
women are not keeping themselves safe and are engaging in 'unsafe behaviours' and 
families are not responding appropriately. Such solutions police the behaviour of women 
and families and suggest they, rather than men or society, are responsible for preventing 
violence. From a feminist perspective, this. approach .blurs the boundaries between 
women's vulnerability to men's violence and men's responsibility for this violence. 
In representing the problem as the psychopathology of the victim, the campaign is also 
silent about the relational and social context in which feminists argue the man perpetrates 
violence. In the vignettes on pages 6, 7 and 9 of the Booklet, the ideal solution to domestic 
violence was represented as the woman leaving the relationship. These vignettes and the 
Booklet generally did not take into account research findings that a man's violence is likely 
to escalate and he is more likely to use lethal violence against his ex-partner and/or children 
following separation. It also assumes women have the social and economic resources to 
leave the relationship and there were no children from the relationship since current family 
law arrangements are likely to order the man's ongoing contact with the children as outlined 
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in Chapter Four. Further, the Howard Government's social and economic policies could be 
seen to have operated as a constraint on women's capacity to leave when their partner was 
violent. Nevertheless, in representing the main solution to the problem as the women 
leaving and by not acknowledging these broader micro, mezzo and macro constraints 
identified by feminists, the campaign suggests the problem is the woman's psychopathology 
and her failure to leave. 
The tone, style, nature and content of the solutions in Australia Says No provide further 
insight into how women were constructed as subjects and thus what the problem was 
represented to be. There was a clear difference in the language and. solutions directed 
towards perpetrators compared to victims. The solutions outlined above suggest victims 
were represented as women who do not understand violence, need someone to explain to 
them it is not okay, and be told what to do about it. Moreover, the solutions targeted to 
women involved a series of directive statements as illustrated by statements from 
Advertisements 2 and 3 including: "you should report it", "do seek help and support", and 
"yes, she should [tell somebody]". Similarly, the Booklet included statements such as: "don't 
feel ashamed or embarrassed" {p.1 0), "get safe and stay safe" (p.1 0), '1alk to someone" 
(p.1 0) and "go with people you feel safe with and who you know have your best interests at 
heart" (p.14). 
In contrast to women, men were constructed as active agents for whom, with the single 
exception of the line "you must have consent", the non-directive language of ctioice is used. 
Examples of this from Advertisement 1 included statements such as "you can get help and 
support" and non-directive labelling of behaviour such as "that's sexual assault" or "yes you 
are" . One of the few solutions targeted at men in the Booklet is the statement "Being 
someone's boy1riend doesn't give you the right to decide what they should do. And nothing 
gives you the right to use force" (p.13). Although this is a strong statement on the 
unacceptability of men's violence, it did not demand action from men in the same way as 
the statements towards women in the campaign demands action. 
This differential use of language suggests that in the campaign women were both held 
responsible for the violence against them and constructed as victims who needed 
protection. Simultaneously, while men's responsibility for their violence was obscured by the 
use of passive language, they were .also represented as agents who are encouraged and 
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not directed to "seek help". Using directive language for women victims and the language of 
choice for male perpetrators inverts the relationship between victim and perpetrator. That is, 
it is logical that the person responsible for the violence should be directed to change their 
behaviour while the person victimised should be empowered to make choices about what is 
right for them. This language also draws upon hegemonic notions of masculinity. It 
suggests women are weak, passive, vulnerable, and in need of protection. As a corollary to 
this, it suggests men are strong, active agents who can choose their behaviour. This 
dichotomy echoes the aspects of hegemonic masculinity which suggest men are 
responsible for both protecting women and using violence as a mechanism of social control 
for women who do not conform to patriarchy as discussed in Chapter Two. 
The Howard Government also reinforced hegemonic masculinity in Australia Says No in 
other ways. Defending the government's replacement of No Respect with Australia Says 
No, Howard, for example, said on the 7.30 Report "Real men don't hit women and I think 
it's as good a way as I can find in my vocabulary to describe the feelings that I have on the 
subject" (Bowden, 2004a). He also stated elsewhere: "personal relationships are private but 
violence against women is unacceptable, wherever and whenever it occurs" (SBS, 2004). 
Further, the Prime Minister's Statement in the Booklet includes: "It is not the role of 
government to telL pimple how to live their lives - relationships are personal and private" 
/ 
(p.1 ). Comments like these draw upon discourses of male strength and an idealizing of the 
family as private but also suggest male violence against women is a crisis of masculinity. 
Simultaneously, they also distance hegemonic masculinity from responsibility for facilitating 
and condoning this violence. Instead they suggest this violence comes from the breakdown 
of features of hegemonic masculinity such as chivalry, men's responsibility for their family, 
and the privacy of the family. These are the very institutional and structural features that 
feminists argue underpin male violence against women. 
10.2 Families and Heteronormativity (mezzo) 
1 0.2.1 Dysfunctional families and communication problems 
At the mezzo level, a significant representation of the problem in Australia Says No is as a 
problem of dysfunctional families/relationships and miscommunication. The first illustration 
of this is the role of intergenerational transmission or "cycle of violence" theories which 
argue child victims of domestic violence are likely to become victims or perpetrators 
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themselves as adults22. In the context of domestic violence and, to a lesser extent, sexual 
assault, representations of the problem which use intergenerational transmission theories 
suggest a problem of dysfunctional families who transmit violence through generations. 
Related to this, male violence against women may also be represented as being the 
consequence of conflict and miscommunication in a relationship; that is a dysfunctional 
relationship. Representations of male violence against women as being a problem of 
dysfunctional families and dysfunctional relationships respectively were apparent in 
Australia Says No. 
lntergenerational transmission theories were one of the representations of the problem in 
Australia Says No. The Prime Minister stated at the front of the Booklet: "Violence can 
become a learnt behaviour, destroying people's capacity to form healthy relationships, now 
and in the next generation". Similarly, in her media release accompanying the Education 
Resource Minister Patterson stated: "Research shows young people are most at risk, and 
that harm experienced early in life has the potential to influence future relationships". 
Although this representation of the problem as the intergenerational transmission of 
violence was thus apparent in Australia Says No, the most prominent representation was 
one of dysfunctional relationships and/or communication problems. While domestic violence 
was usually represented as a problem of dysfunctional relationships, sexual assault was 
usually represented as problem of miscommunication. 
One example of the representation of the problem as being one of dysfunctional 
relationships and communication problems was in the vignette of the counsellor's story in 
the Booklet {p.11 ). This included the statement: 
... 1 work with people who are experiencing domestic and sexual abuse, or have experienced 
abuse in the past. They are just normal people, experiencing bad relationships .... 1 help people 
build skills to maintain healthy relationships, where both parties can communicate well. 
In addition to the Booklet, the Education Resource also represents the problem as one of 
dysfunctional relationships as illustrated by the solutions it promotes for young people. In 
this resource the vast majority of activities focus on conflict resolution, communication, 
healthy relationships, assertiveness, problem-solving skills, how to deal with strong 
emotions, negotiating consent, mutuality, and identifying types of violence. Violence 
prevention specialist Michael Flood (2004b) argues that these sorts of activities and skills 
=>-rhis is distinct from the 'cycle of violence' used as a metaphor by human service professionals in 
describing a specific violent relationship as discussed and critiqued by Jones (2004, pp.138-155). 
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training are valuable and important in a primary prevention approach but are inappropriate 
in secondary prevention or tertiary intervention such as Australia Says No. Flood's analysis 
suggests that, from a feminist or pro-feminist perspective, this representation of the problem 
in Australia Says No was inappropriate for a campaign of this type since it suggests the 
problem is dysfunctional relationships and miscommunication rather than violence. 
The Education Resource also represented the problem as being about dysfunctional 
relationships in a way that was confusing and contradictory. It did this by oscillating 
between 'abusive' and 'unhealthy' relationships as if they were one and the same thing. The 
Education Resource contained messages about developing healthy relationships and 
discussions about skill development in communicating and relating to others. The 
simultaneous and unclear interspersing of messages about healthy relationships with 
messages about violent behaviour in this Resource is, however, confusing. There was no 
distinction in the Booklet between an unhealthy relationship where there may be conflict or 
miscommunication without violence and a relationship where one partner is using violence 
against the other (i.e. they can exist independently of each other). Further, the 'solutions' 
offered were all solutions to deal with 'unhealthy' relationships rather than sexual assault 
and domestic violence. These solutions suggest the campaign represents the problem as 
being about 'unhealthy or dysfunctional relationships' in a way that is confusing and 
contradictory. 
From a feminist perspective, these representations of the problem as the individual 
pathology of individual men at a micro level and as "dysfunctional relationships" at a mezzo 
level minimize the nature and extent of this violence and distance it from gendered power 
relations. They do this by setting up a dichotomy between unhealthy relationships which 
many people may experience and violent relationships caused by individual angry, criminal 
or distressed men. This suggests that male violence against women is the problem of a 
small minority of men and ignores what feminists argue are the widespread institutional and 
structural factors underpinning this violence. Such a problem representation absolves men 
from examining any controlling or abusive behaviour beyond physical violence and 
absolves society from responsibility for this violence. This argument is supported by the 
vignettes on page 9 of the Booklet which, alter describing a woman's experience of 
domestic violence from her partner, conclude: "most men are not like that". This statement 
suggests that Radford and Stanko's (1996, p.78) argument that state responses to violence 
against women are an "attempt at policing the family and heterosexuality in order to clean 
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up its public face and to restore its legitimacy as a safe institution for women" may apply. to 
Australia Says No. 
In contrast to the "dysfunctional relationships" of domestic violence, the dominant 
representation of sexual assault in Australia Says No was as a problem of 
miscommunication. In the Booklet {p.14), for example, were the statements: 
Communication is key for all relationships. Surveys report that boys in particular are anxious 
about communication. Many feel that they need to have a "few drinks" before they are able to 
talk to girls. Sometimes they might need help to find more positive ways to handle shyness and 
the fear of rejection. Without communication there can be no real ·relationship. If 
communication is poor or not valued, negotiating the boundaries of the relationship will be 
difficult, if not impossible. Poor communication can lead to conflicting expectations, especially 
about sex. Sex without consent is sexual assault- there is no room for confusion. 
Remember if you are so drunk that you don't know if the other person is consenting - stop. It 
could be rape. When you know that the other person is so drunk they may not be capable of 
giving consent- don't do it- because this would be rape. 
These comments represent sexual assault as a miscommunication problem and an 
accidental or spontaneous event. They obscure what feminists argue are the deliberate and 
planned actions.-of perpetrators who commit sexual assault and the institutional and 
structural context that facilitates and condones this behaviour. 
This representation of sexual assault as miscommunication was exemplified in the "mind-
reading" activity in the Education Resource (part 1, p.15). This activity was a scenario of 
sexual assault from the perspective of the victim (Monica) and perpetrator (Michael) which 
compared each of their thoughts before, during and after the sexual assault. This activity 
represented the rape as an accident of miscommunication as illustrated in explicit questions 
such as: 'how could they have communicated more clearly?' (part 1, p. 13). It also ignores 
the premeditation evident in Michael's comment "I think she's telling me tonight's the night! 
Finally!" and his deliberate disregard of Monica's wishes evident in the comment "She 
keeps pushing my hands away- she probably wants to make it seem like it's all my idea so 
she doesn't feel too slutty". Further, another question, 'what could Monica and Michael have 
done differently'? {part!, p.13), represents Michael raping Monica as being the 
responsibility of them both. This kind of representation of the problem invalidates the 
Booklet's statement there is "no room for confusion" and, from a feminist perspective, blurs 
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the boundaries by suggesting Michael and Monica are both responsible for the 
'miscommunication' that it suggests led to Michael raping Monica. 
In this scenario Michael also draws upon hegemonic notions of masculinity to negate 
Monica's non-consent and justify his own actions. An excellent example of this was the 
comparative comments by Monica and Michael respectively: "I told him to stop but he got 
on top of me and started kissing me really hard whenever I tried to say something, I tried to 
push him off, but he kept holding me down" compared with "She keeps pretending to 
struggle- it makes me feel really powerful. I'm so excited!". Michael's connection between 
over-riding Monica's indications of non-consent and feeling powerful are illustrative of how 
sexual assault is linked to performing hegemonic masculinity but this is not challenged in 
any way in this scenario in the Education Resource. 
The Education Resource also validates Michael's interpretations of the situation by framing 
the problem in the questions it asks students as a problem of mutual miscommunication, 
seeking to develop communication skills and focusing more on the actions of Monica than 
Michael. Michael Flood (2004b, p.9) argues that representing sexual assault as a problem 
of miscommunication in ways such as this: 
... obscures ·the gendered power relations and deliberate, planned choices that typically 
organise sexual violence. Men do not sexually assault because they lack skills, but because 
they feel they can, doing so offers certain benefits, and their behaviour is socially sanctioned. 
Skills training can underestimate the power men invest in existing gender relations, the ways in 
which dominant forms of masculinity may 'feel right' or 'make imaginative sense' to the men 
who inhabit them . 
Yet, in addition to the two questions noted above which suggest this is a problem of mutual 
miscommunication, the students are also asked to consider 'what signs did Monica give that 
she didn't want to have sex?' and 'why .didn't Michael get the m(Jssage?'. These questions 
both focus on Monica and draw upon hegemonic masculinity by implying that it is Monica's 
responsibility to communicate appropriately to Michael that she is not consenting rather 
than Michael's responsibility to check she is consenting and appropriately interpret her 
signs of non-consent: As a result, the sexual assault may easily be interpreted by the 
students as Monica's fault. An alternative question which might shift responsibility to 
Michael and promote ethical sexuality could be something like: 'what steps did Michael take 
to find out if Monica wanted to have sex?'. By framing the questions in the way it did, 
however, the Education Resource implicitly supports Michael's interpretation of events and 
215 
Chapter 1 0: Case Study 2 -Australia Says No 
negates what feminists would argue is his responsibility for the rape. It suggests that mutual 
miscommunication and Monica's failure to demonstrate non-consent in an acceptable way 
to Michael are responsible for the rape. In this way, this scenario strategically draws upon, 
and in turn reinforces, features of hegemonic masculinity which privilege men's 
interpretations and experiences of events over women's. 
1 0.2.2 Male perpetrators of violence represented as victims 
Another possible effect of the representation of the problem as dysfunctional. families and 
miscommunication is that the perpetrator may be constructed as a victim rather than a 
perpetrator of their violence. In the Booklet, "Brett's Story" {p.13) about a man facing 
possible sexual assault charges supports ·this interpretation. Brett's final statement "My 
mum is taking me to see a counsellor for guys. But I am really scared about what is going to 
happen" first of all conflates the line between the victim and perpetrator (e.g. both need 
counsellors to deal with 'the' sexual assault). Further, the last message the reader is left 
with is Brett's fear about what will happen to him. This may encourage the reader to identify 
and empathise with Brett as a subject of pity and possibly even a 'victim' of the sexual 
assault himself. Such an interpretation is particularly likely given the way the campaign 
represents sexual assault as a problem of miscommunication. This problem representation 
/ 
does not challenge what feminists would argue is Brett's agency and choice to sexually 
assault his girlfriend and his premeditation suggested in the line "She said she didn't want 
to go too far. It really bugged me that she got to make all the decisions". This statement, 
which is unchallenged in the Booklet, suggests the complexity of the role of gendered 
power relations in sexual assault as it draws on hegemonic notions of masculinity and 
men's perceived rights to be dominant and decision-makers over the bodies and actions of 
women. By not challenging Brett's statements and representing his fear in a way that might 
cause the reader to pity him, it is thus possible the reader might conclude that both Brett 
and his girlfriend were victims of the "abusive situation" and miscommunication. 
In Advertisement 1, the representation of the problem of sexual assault as one of 
miscommunication also constructed the man as a victim of the "violent relationship". In this 
advertisement was the statement: "She came back to my place and she knew what we 
were there for and then like half way through she says no but I kept going". Although 
followed by 'that's sexual assault", there was no clear statement about who was 
responsible for the sexual assault. This scenario may generate audience sympathy for the 
man who was implicitly portrayed as a victim of miscommunication and a victim of a 
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situation where each person had different expectations and did not communicate these 
effectively. Further, if the audience was influenced by biological determinist beliefs or myths 
about sexual assault, such as the "male sex drive discourse" (Ehrlich, 2001 }, this man could 
also easily be constructed as the victim of a woman who acted irresponsibly by stopping 
half way through a sexual encounter; thereby inverting the roles of victim and perpetrator. 
Similarly, in the same advertisement was the statement: "I kept going you know and the 
next minute she says that I forced her. But it was too late, what was I supposed to do?". 
Given the continued strength of myths about sexual assault, these representations of the 
problem as miscommunication and uncontrollable male sex drive may cause the audience 
to empathise with, or perhaps minimise the responsibility of, the perpetrator. They may also 
reinforce sexual assault myths identified by feminists and may construct the perpetrators as 
the 'victim' of the sexual assault in the context of miscommunication or a woman who 
shouldn't have agreE)d only to go 'half way'. 
1 0.2.3 Idealised families 
The representation of the problem as family dysfunction and family breakdown and the 
solution of restoring and strengthening 'good' families were also apparent in the campaign. 
In particular, Australia Says No idealised certain types of families. Within the Booklet and 
/ 
Education Resource, parents were constituted positively as supportive and caring role 
models for their children. The Booklet (p.16), for example, .contained the statement: 
"parents too play an important role. Family behaviour and expectations provide and 
important model for young people experiencing their first relationships". Similarly, the Prime 
Minister stated (Booklet p.1): 
The Australian Government believes that families are the backbone of a strong and health 
community, and loving and supportive relationships are at the heart of happy, well functioning 
families. Families are the best places for children to learn about love and respect, and how to 
build and maintain health and caring relationships. 
These statements suggest the campaign assumes parents and families are positive 
influences on children's lives. Further, idealised representations of families in the campaign 
were also apparent on pages 16 to 18 of the Booklet. These pages were specifically 
directed at parents under the headings "Parents Can Help" and "What Parents Can Do". 
They went through positive suggestions and strategies for parents to use to help their 
children deal with violence. This focus on parents for solutions suggests the campaign did 
not acknowledge what feminists argue is the .endemic extent of domestic violence and 
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sexual assault perpetrated by men within families. It is also at odds with the Howard 
Government's representations of the problem in Australia Says No as dysfunctional 
families/relationships and intergenerational transmission of violence as discussed above. 
The idealised representation of the family was combined in Australia Says No with a focus 
on particular types of families. In restoring and "strengthening families" the 1-!oward 
Government singled out particular types of families for attention for violence prevention; 
those families who were not ''well-functioning" (Booklet, p.1 ). Expressed in the language of 
the culture wars discussed in Chapter Four, male violence against women in this context 
may be considered as a problem of the minority 'them' rather than the mainstream 'us'. 
Although the focus of the campaign is on those families the Howard.Government judged not 
''well-functioning", Australia Says No could also be considered to serve a strategic political 
purpose within the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda. The solutions to the 
problem promoted in Australia Says No, which focussed heavily on victims as well as their 
families and friends, suggest the campaign was as much about policing all families as it is 
about policing women victimised or at risk of violence and those families constructed as 
'Them'. This is because these solutions are framed in the context of idealised concepts of 
family and contain very specific .scripts and directions about how families should behave 
and function - i~ particular in responding to men's violence but also more generally. 
This argument is supported by Howard's (2004) comment: 'We need families to talk about 
the values that underpin healthy relationships - relationships that support and nurture. We 
need communities to have clear expectations about what is considered responsible, 
acceptable behaviour". Indeed, a whole page of the Booklet (p.18) was titled "What parents 
can do" and prescriptively tells parents what to do if their daughter has experienced 
violence. Similarly, pages 16-17, titled "Parents can help" contained a number of explicit 
and implicit assumptions, representations, and value statements of how 'good' families act. 
Examples of this included the vignette "Joh's Story" on page 17 which scripts how a 'good' 
parent should relate to their child and the statement on page 16: 'We all need to understand 
and encourage the importance of those fundamental values that are the foundation of 
healthy, strong relationships: respect, communication, sharing, independence, trust, 
companionship, honesty". In the Booklet (p.1) Howard states: "relationships are personal 
and private"; a statement consistent with the liberal ideology of privacy and individualism. 
The content of the Booklet as discussed above, however, contradicts this statement and 
suggests that in practice Australia Says No offers a neo-libera\ reversal of this idealised 
social relationship between the family and the .state. Thus, consistent with neo-liberal and 
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socially conservative rather than liberal ideology, Australia Says No may be seen as a 
"practice or technique of governmentality" (Johnson, 2000, p.152) seeking to train families 
to behave in a certain ways and promoting conservative, idealised values about families. 
This analysis locating Australia Says No in the broader social policy agenda of the Howard 
government, rather than being tangential to it, parallels Rundle's (2001, p.42) analysis of 
Howard Government anti-drugs campaigns as discussed in Chapter Four. Rundle argues 
that in the anti-drugs campaigns "the family was reconstructed as an arm of the state, to 
whom was subcontracted the role of shaping the behaviour of the young, in a manner 
scripted by professionals". The analysis in this chapter suggests ·that Australian 
Government responses to male violence against women during the Howard years also can 
not be divorced from the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda. In promoting 
an idealised, conservative, patriarchal and traditional model of family and government 
Australia Says No fit comfortably within, and contributed to, the Howard Government's 
broader social policy agenda. 
1 0.2.4 Heteronormativity and conservative values 
The Howard Government's representation of the problem in Australia Says No was also 
heteronormative arid reinforced hegemonic heterosexuality. In particular, the campaign 
/ 
focussed on, and idealised, families and relationships which were implicitly and explicitly 
heterosexual. In Australia Says No all representations of violence were of violence 
perpetrated within heterosexual relationships and all vignettes and images are of people 
who are either implicitly or explicitly heterosexual. This heteronormative representation of 
the problem in Australia Says No concealed and silenced the experiences of those who did 
not fit with constructions of hegemonic masculinity or hegemonic heterosexuality. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Mason (1997; 2002) argues that a sophisticated analysis and 
representation of male violence against women requires gender to be considered outside of 
individual embodiment alone. This includes a diversity of experiences in which gender 
relations of all types are constructed and hegemonic masculinity and hierarchies of 
difference created and reinforced. These include gay and lesbian experiences of domestic 
violence and sexual assault and men's experiences of being sexually assaulted. The 
individualising of the problem in the Howard Government's representations as discussed 
earlier in this chapter along ·with the exclusion of gay and lesbian experiences of men's 
violence is therefore significant. These representations in Australia Says No may have 
silenced and concealed the experiences of lesbian women and gay men who are subjected 
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to men's violence, such as sexual assault, as a punishment or hate crime for not playing by 
the 'rules' of hegemonic masculinity, subordinate femininities and hegemonic 
heterosexuality. 
In representing the problem in Australia Says No within a framework of hegemonic 
heterosexuality the Howard Government also reinforced heteronormativity in a way that was 
·consistent with their approach to gay and lesbian rights generally as explored in Chapter 
Four. This was done by constructing heterosexuality as a public subject of social policy, in 
this case a violence prevention campaign, and excluding homosexuality as presumably only 
to be tolerated in private sexual relationships. This suggests Australia Says No constructed 
a hierarchy which rendered lesbians and gay men invisible. In this way, Australia Says No 
appears illustrative of Mason's (1997, p.31) concept of the homophobic mind. From 
Mason's perspective it is significant thatthe homophobic mind does not care about whether 
lesbians and gay men exist but does seek to limit their social and legal rights as well as 
their visibility in public policy._ It is thus the invisibility of lesbians and gay men in Australia 
Says No that suggests it represented the problem in a way that was heteronormative. 
The representation of the problem of sexual assault in Australia Says No also reflected a 
socially conservative understanding. of sexuality. The representation of sexual assault 
mixed the boundaries between consenting sexual relationships and sexual assault. The 
Booklet (p.16), for example, stated: 
Young people can be unaware of some of the negative consequences that might result from 
thoughtless sexual behaviour. Even when someone is legally old enough and gives consent, 
indiscriminate sexual activity can have serious consequences - the possibility of sexually 
transmitted diseases, pregnancy, loss of reputation, being talked about, embarrassment and 
anxiety. 
From a feminist perspective, this statement blurs the boundaries between what could be 
quite healthy, respectful and non-violent sexual encounters between young people and 
sexual assault. It represents the problem as an issue of immoral sexual relationships and 
moralises about the nature of these relationships and the problems of certain types of 
consenting sexual behaviour (i.e. "indiscriminate sexual activity"). This representation 
constructs sexual assault as a problem of relationships that do not fit with the conservative 
ideal; presumably those which are not monogamous or are "indiscriminate". It also reje.cts 
the possibility that young people can. engage in enjoyable, consenting, mutual and 
respectful sexual encounters outside of a hegemonic heterosexuality model of sex as only 
between a committed, mutually exclusive heterosexual couple. These messages therefore 
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negate what feminists might argue are the rights of both men and women to be sexual 
beings and engage in consenting sexual activity without being raped as well as obscuring 
the way perpetrators strategically draw upon the mezzo and macro levels in their use of 
violence. In this way Australia Says No reinforced heteronormativity. 
10.3 Non-gendered and Racialised Representations of Male Violence (macro) 
1 0.3.1 Non-gendered Representations 
The representation of male violence against women in Australia Says No as an issue of 
individual men's pathology as discussed in the micro level understandings above constructs 
the problem as non-gendered. It does this by pathologising and distancing individual men 
perpetrating violence against women from the social and structural gendered power 
relations facilitating this violence and the patriarchal dividend it creates for all men (to 
varying degrees) as discussed in Chapter Two. By suggesting it is not only individual men 
but 'angry', 'criminal' or 'distressed' men who use violence the campaign also suggests it is 
only pathological or damaged men who are violent towards women. This is instead of the 
feminist argument that this violence is something "normal, ordinary men do routinely on a 
very substantial scale because. they want to, because they think they have the right to, and 
' 
because nothing effective is done to stop them" (ltzin, 2000, p.378). Further, the campaign's 
use of language and failure to contextualise Australia Says No in its broader social, political 
and historical context also suggests the representation of the problem was a non.gendered 
one. 
There was a confusing juxtaposition of the name of the campaign, Violence Against Women 
-Australia Says No, which was gendered, with the language used throughout the campaign 
which is non-gendered. In the campaign's images and vignettes all perpetrators are 
represented as men and all victims as women. This gendering of the problem is only 
evident at the embodied level of individuals, however, and in the Booklet the language was 
usually gender-neutral. On page 8, for example, were the phrases: "Some of the time, 
violent people treat their partners very well"; "it's common for both the abusive partner and 
the victim to try and make it OK"; "Sometimes the violent person will blame the victim"; and 
"people subject to violence and abuse can begin to think the violence is their fault". This mix 
of gendered and non-gendered language and imagery is not explained in the campaign and 
is thus confusing and contradictory. It suggests the campaign recognises violence as 
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gendered at the micro level of individuals but does not recognise this violence as gendered 
at the mezzo and macro levels as feminist would argue is important. 
The absence of the broader social, political and historical context in Australia Says No also 
illustrates its non-gendered approach. Even in the more detailed Education Resource there 
was no explanation or framing of the problem within gendered power relations. The 
Education Resource had no lessons, for example, that acknowledge feminism, the women's 
movement or how violence against women became an issue of public policy concern. Nor 
was there any discussion or acknowledgement of the historical, social and political context 
which continues to make women vulnerable to male violence including: ongoing systemic 
inequalities between women and men; social expectations about women's primary care of 
children and men; and the history of discriminatory laws, social acceptability of violence, 
control of wives/women, and of women and children being regarded as the property of men. 
There was also no attempt to explain or represent the links between different forms of 
violence such as sexual assault and domestic violence within a broader theoretical 
framework outside of the name of the campaign. These absences suggest the 
representations of the problem in Australia Says No individualised violence and isolated it 
from the gendered poJNer relations which feminists argued underpin male violence against 
women. 
10.3.2 Race, culture and nationalism 
The Howard Government's representation of the problem of male violence against women 
also reveals the role of race, culture and nationalism in Australia Says No when 
conceptualised within the broader social and political context. As outlined in Chapter Two, 
feminist understandings suggest patriarchy creates a range of hierarchies such as gender, 
race and age. By contextualising the campaign within its broader context, the 
representation of the problem of male violence against women in Australia Says No 
appears consistent with the Howard Government's culture wars and assimilationist 
nationalism identified by commentators as discussed in Chapter Four. 
As discussed above, Australia Says No targets those families the Howard Government 
considered were not "well-functioning", which presumably includes the racially and culturally 
other or 'them' in the language of the culture wars. One of the strategies of the culture wars 
was to leave the concept of 'us' and 'them' intentionally vague so 'them' became a strangely 
shifting category, as explained in Chapter Four. This is particularly relevant in the context of 
222 
Chapter 10: Case Study 2- Australia Says No 
the Howard Government's campaign slogan "Australia Says No". This slogan invoked the 
notion that violence against women was a problem for those the government deemed 'un-
Australian' including Indigenous people and those from non-English speaking backgrounds. 
The campaign also created a subject category of 'Australia' as an imagined authority which 
included 'us'. This distancing of the majority Australian 'us' from the non-Australian 'them' 
committing male violence against women was illustrated in Howard's comment: ''The 
Government, like the overwhelming majority of Australians, is appalled by violence against 
women and deeply concerned that it remains a significant problem in our community" 
(2004, emphasis added). In this context, the phrase "Australia Says No" promoted a 
particular racialised meaning which focussed attention on those the government deemed 
"un-Australian" as Webster (2006a; 2006b) also argues as outlined in Chapter One. 
10.4 Discussion 
This case study of Australia Says No offers an alternative way of understanding the Howard 
Government's approaches from a feminist perspective, in addition to the policies of chivalry 
and cooption understandings explored in Chapter Eight. Chapter Nine argued the role of 
policy process, individual feminist policy activism, and the femocrats' exploitation of the 
political opportunity structures available to them is important in understanding Partnerships. 
It suggested· feminists were able to incorporate feminist understandings of male violence 
against women into Partnerships. This provided one explanation for why feminists, including 
key informants, may not have been as critical of the Howard Government's approaches to 
male violence against women as they were of the government's broader policy agenda. By 
the time of Australia Says No, however, the Howard Government had reportedly largely 
excluded feminists inside and outside government from involvement in the government's 
approaches to male violence against women. Despite this, key informants, generally 
praised Partnerships and Australia Says No as positive while simultaneously criticising the 
Howard Government's broader social policy agenda. This case study of Australia Says No, 
however, extends this discussion by providing a foundation to develop the argument that 
the .Howard Government's approaches may be conceptualised as policies of transformistic 
hegemonic masculinity. 
As outlined in Chapter Two, Demetriou's (2005) 'new sociology of hegemonic masculinity' 
reworks the concept of hegemonic masculinity. He does this by focussing on the way 
dominant men use the process of group formation and the formation of historic blocs in 
hegemonic masculinity to win the consent of those they oppress. Hegemonic masculinity 
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theorists and feminist understandings of policies of cooption suggest that dominant men 
oppose, annihilate or marginalise oppositional (e.g. feminist) interests. In contrast, 
Demetriou argues dominant men redeploy the oppressed group's practices in a 
transformistic way. That is, dominant groups appropriate and redeploy oppressed groups' 
practices in a way that creates something new while simultaneously reasserting and hiding 
operations of power. Thus, they transform what appears counter-hegemonic into an 
instrument of hegemonic domination. 
This discussion proposes that a new way of understanding policy based on Demetriou's 
work is to conceptualise the Howard Government's approaches as policies of transformistic 
hegemonic masculinity. This conceptualisation does not replace policy of chivalry or policy 
of cooption understandings explored in Chapter Eight. Rather, it proposes a third level of 
theoretical analysis grounded upon this foundation of policies of chivalry and policies of 
cooption understandings. This conceptualisation helps explain how the Howard 
Government provided such a sustained and comparatively well-funded public policy 
response to male violence against women which largely escaped the feminist critique 
directed at the government's broader social policy agenda. 
The case study of Australia Says No in this chapter suggests the Howard Government's 
/ 
approaches to male violence against women may be conceptualised as policies of 
transf<xmistic hegemonic masculinity in two related ways. The first concerns feminist 
understandings of male violence against women. The second incorporates Mason's (2002) 
concepts of mutual constitution, vehicles of articulation, territory .and the cultural body. 
Chapter Eight suggests the Howard Government utilised some feminist understandings, 
language and concepts concerning male violence against women in Australia Says No. 
Extending this analysis, this chapter explored the multiple representations of the problem in 
Australia Says No which correspond generally with the individual (micro), institutional 
(mezzo) and structural (macro) levels of feminist understandings of male violence against 
women. Chapter Ten also suggests, however, that the way the Howard Government utilised 
these feminist understandings of male violence against women subverted and redeployed 
feminist practices to reassert and reinforce hegemonic masculinity at the micro, mezzo and 
macro levels. 
At the micro level, feminist analyses suggest individual men are responsible for their choice 
to perpetrate male violence against women. Consistent with this, one representation of the 
problem in Australia Says No identified individual men as responsible for male violence 
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against women. It did this, however, in a way that shifted responsibility for this violence 
away from the male perpetrators and the social context which feminists argue facilitate and 
condone this violence. It also suggested that it was only 'angry', 'criminal', or 'distressed' 
men who committed this violence rather than it being normal, everyday men enacting 
normal gendered power relations and inequality between men and women as feminists 
would argue. By representing the problem in this way, Australia Says No thus isolated these 
men from the broader social context feminists argue facilitate and condone their violence. It 
also obscured the feminist argument that male perpetrators are normal, not pathological, 
men who strategically draw upon structural and institutional factors such as women's 
inequality and patriarchal family structures in their use of violence. From a feminist 
perspective this problem representation, however, also simultaneously diminished the 
responsibility of these individual men for this violence by labelling them, in FitzRoy's (1999) 
words, as "mad", "bad" or ''sad" and thus excusing their violence. 
Further, the analysis in this chapter suggests a number of additional rhetorical devices 
operated at this micro level in Australia Says No to shift responsibility for male violence 
against women from male perpetrators to either the relationship or the women victimised. 
First, the campaign represented perpetrators as passive subjects and distanced men from 
their violence by making the ''violent relationship" the active subject. Second, the campaign 
represented the problem in a way which blurred the boundaries between victims and 
perpetrators by addressing the messages to both groups simultaneously while also 
directing most interventions and solutions solely to the victims of violence and their families 
and friends. This approach created "zones of uncertainty" (Towns, 2005) which suggest the 
people targeted for the solutions/interventions (i.e. the female victims and their families and 
friends) are the ones with 'the problem' and thus responsible for the violence. This chapter 
thus suggests a number of rhetorical devices as well as individual pathology 
representations operated at a micro level in Australia Says No to obscure and shift 
responsibility from the male perpetrators to the female victims of male violence against 
women. 
At the mezzo level, feminist analyses suggest institutional factors such as the nature of 
relationships between men and women, hegemonic heterosexuality and heteronormativity 
play a significant role in male violence against women. Consistent with this, another 
representation of the problem in Australia Says No was of the relationship between men 
and women. In contrast to feminist analyses which suggest all relationships between men 
and women are potentially problematic within patriarchy, Australia Says No represented the 
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problem as "dysfunctional relationships" or "communication problems". That is, at the mezzo 
level the problem is not institutional and reflective of problematic dynamics in all 
relationships under patriarchy but rather is represented as the result of individual bad 
families, bad relationships, or miscommunication. There was also a confusing and 
contradictory representation of the problem at this level which conflated unhealthy 
relationships in which there may be poor communication or conflict with relationships where 
men perpetrate violence against women. Similarly to the micro level discussed above, from 
a feminist perspective this representation shifts responsibility from male perpetrators and 
the institutional and structural context which facilitates and condones their violence. This 
representation may also result in the male perpetrators being considered as the "victim" of 
the "violent relationship" in a way likely to elicit the sympathy of the audience. 
Exploring how the sexual assault of Monica by Michael was represented as 
miscommunication in the Education Resource strongly supports the argument that the 
Howard Government's approaches were policies of transformistic hegemonic masculinity. 
This scenario was an excellent example of the way the campaign strategically drew upon 
and validated hegemonic notions of masculinity reinforcing men's and male perpetrator's 
framings of the problem of male violence against women. These framings include 
arguments and myths identified by feminists such as male violence against women is a 
problem of dysfunctional relationships, miscommunication, or the actions of the female 
victims. Combined with women's dominant roles and responsibility for relationships and the 
private sphere and gendered divisions of labour under patriarchy, these problem 
representations reinforce the way hegemonic masculinity holds women responsible for the 
violence perpetrated against them. Instead of challenging men's perpetration of violence, 
this suggests that from a feminist perspective the problem representations in Australia Says 
No validated and reinforced hegemonic masculinity and thus could actually increase 
women's vulnerability to men's violence. 
The argument that the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women 
may be conceptualised as policies of transformistic hegemonic masculinity at the mezzo 
and macro levels is further supported by taking into account Mason's understandings of 
violence. As outlined in Chapter Two, Mason (2002) proposes a number of concepts to 
understand violence including mutual constitution, vehicles of articulation, territory and the 
cultural body. Mason argues that in any single incident of violence different aspects of 
identity, such as race, class, or sexuality, are mutually constituted and articulated through 
each other in highly interactive ways. This mutual constitution occurs regardless of the 
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individual embodiment (e.g. race, gender or sexuality) of the victim or perpetrator. In 
Mason's approach violence is underpinned by a hierarchical construction of difference 
grounded in bodily specificities where the perpetrator draws upon "a sense of superiority 
and concomitant devaluation of the personal integrity of the racial or gendered other" 
(Mason, 2002, pp.63-64). Mason also uses the concept of territory as an important 
conceptual category for understanding people's sense of belonging in the context of 
violence. She argues that those who are dominant use the concept of territory to derive 
their sense of entitlement to 'manage' those they deem inferior in their hierarchical 
construction of difference. Although Mason applies her concepts to individual incidents of 
violence (micro) and their connection to social structures (macro), these concepts are, 
nevertheless, useful to make sense of the analysis of Australia Says No in this.chapter. 
At the mezzo level, the Howard Government's approaches to traditional families and 
hegemonic heterosexuality in Australia Says No promoted idealised conservative, 
patriarchal types of families and heterosexuality. One representation of the problem in 
Australia Says No suggests male violence against women is a problem for families the 
government has deemed not "well-functioning" including 'un-Australian' families. In this way 
the Howard Government could be seen to have validated and reinforced a hierarchical 
construction of difference and sense of superiority for 'good', traditional, heterosexual 
families. Moreover, this chapter argues the Howard Government promoted traditional 
families as a normative standard by which all individual families can be judged regardless of 
their experiences of male violence. That is, in Mason's language, the Howard Government 
invoked the notion of territory to manage those they deemed inferior as well as the 
population at large. This approach parallels the way Mason argues individual perpetrators 
draw upon hierarchical constructions of difference to justify their violence and use this 
violence to manage those they deem inferior. It is particularly ironic that, according to this 
argument, the Howard Government used male violence against women policy in Australia 
Says No to validate and reinforce the institutional conditions which Mason's argues 
underpins the perpetration of violence in the first place. 
The Howard Government's broader social policy agenda was a conservative one and their 
social policies promoted traditional heterosexual families and supported a gendered division 
of labour as discussed in Chapter Four. From a feminist perspective, however, male 
violence against women exposes .institutions such as traditional families and heterosexuality 
as potentially harmful to women's interests and may therefore erode women's support and 
confidence in them. It could therefore be argued that to maintain women's particip<J,tion in 
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these institutions and advance the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda·, it 
was important for the government be seen to respond to male violence against women. 
Chapter Eight argued that Australia Says No was a public relations exercise for the Howard 
Government and the government were more interested in being seen to respond than being 
genuinely interested in reducing the incidence and impact of male violence against women. 
The analysis of Australia Says No at the mezzo level in the discussion above, however, 
sugg·ests the representation of the problem may have operated in two additional ways to 
advance the Howard Government's conservative social policy agenda. Fi[st, was to 
maintain women's consent to patriarchal institutions such as heterosexuality and traditional 
family structures by showing the Howard Government was doing something about this 
violence. Second, was to actually promote and reinforce the superiority of traditional, 
heterosexual family structures by suggesting families deemed not "well-functioning" or 'un-
Australian' were at most risk of male violence against women. In this way, the Howard 
Government could be seen to have strategically inverted feminist understandings by 
representing male violence against women not as a result of hegemonic masculinity and 
heteronormativity but rather as a crisis of these institutions. That is, through Australia Says 
No the Howard Government transformed feminist counter-hegemonic practices into 
instruments of hegemonic domination. 
At the macro level, feminist analyses of male violence against women suggest structural 
factors such as patriarchy and social and economic inequalities between men and women 
play a significant role in male violence against women. Consistent with this, in Australia Say 
No the title of the campaign and particularly the term "violence against women" suggests 
the problem is a gendered one. As illustrated in this chapter, however, this gendering of the 
problem is only evident at the embodied level of individuals (micro level). Thus, the 
language throughout the campaign is primarily non-gendered and nothing in the campaign 
frames the problem within the broader social or historical context of unequal gendered 
power relations as feminist analyses suggest is important. 
Beyond the invisibility of gender, at the macro level the chapter argues the Howard 
Government also invoked notions of race, culture and nationalism in Australia Says No. 
These are important because, as outlined in Chapter Two, some feminists argue patriarchy 
creates a number of hierarchical binaries such as male/female, black/white and so on. This 
chapter argues the Howard Government's representations of the problem in Australia Says 
No reinforced and constructed male violence against women as an issue for the racially and 
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culturally othered. In the broader social and political context of the Howard Government's 
"culture wars" this is particularly important. This representation at the macro level suggests 
male violence against women is a problem for 'them' rather than the mainstream 'us'. 
Similarly to the discussion of traditional families and heterosexuality above, in this way the 
Howard Government again reinforced through Australia Says No the hierarchical 
constructions of difference which underpin violence. That is, this representation of the 
problem attributed to the racially and culturally othered an inferiority grounded in the 
suggestion that male violence against women is a problem for 'them' rather than 'us'. It also 
distanced male violence against women as a problem of little relevance to. the Australian 
community at large. 
The Howard Government's representation of the problem in the context of race, culture and 
nationalism at the macro level also invoked Mason's concept of territory even more so than 
at the mezzo level. This is illustrated by the slogan "Australia Says No" and its potential to 
be interpreted as directed at those deemed 'un-Australian'. This slogan draws upon and 
reinforces the assimilationist nationalism promoted by the Howard Government in the 
culture wars. It therefore offered a further justification for the government to manage those 
deemed inferior, which· in this case were the culturally and linguistically othered. The 
representation of tlie problem in Australia Says No at a macro level can thus be seen to 
have strategically contributed to the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda in 
the context of their culture wars. This is in direct contrast to feminist approaches which seek 
to challenge the sense of superiority and hierarchical constructions of difference 
underpinning male violence. Thus, the representation of the problem at the macro level in 
Australia Says No suggests the Howard Government transformed feminist counter-
hegemonic practices into instruments of hegemonic domination. 
Prominent hegemonic masculinity theorists, R.W. Connell and James Messerschmidt 
(2005), reject Demetriou's 'new sociology of hegemonic masculinity' as only applying to the 
local and not the regional (nation-state) or global levels. The discussion above, however, 
argues that based on the case study of Australia Says No it is possible to develop a new 
way of understanding the Howard Government's approaches which applies Demetriou's 
analysis to the regional (federal government) level. Further, understanding the Howard 
Government's approaches to male violence against women as policies of transformistic 
hegemonic masculinity in this way offers a useful explanation for the dissonance in feminist 
and key informants' assessments of this government. It also provides a significant insight 
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into the importance of context in understanding Australian Government responses to male 
violence against women during the Howard> years. 
In this thesis I have argued that the Howard Government did not annihilate or marginalise 
oppositional feminist interests or practices such as feminist framings, discourses, concepts 
or approaches to male violence against women in Australia Says No. Rather I propose the 
Howard Government redeployed these feminist practices in a transformistic way consistent 
with Demetriou's 'new sociology of hegemonic masculinity'. By doing this the Howard 
Government created something new in Australia Says No which simultaneously supported 
the Government's broader conservative social policy agenda while hiding operations of 
power and their hegemonic effects. That is, the Howard Government coopted feminist 
counter-hegemonic practices and redeployed or transformed these into instruments of 
hegemonic domination. This chapter thus suggests that these approaches did not sit 
outside of the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda but rather were 
consistent with, and strategically contributed to, this agenda. 
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Chapter 11 
Australia Says No?: 
The Howard Government's Approaches 
to Male Violence Against Women 
A key problematic for feminists has been the capacity of the state to respond appropriately 
to social issues, such as male violence against women, which have a significant impact on 
women's lives. Many feminists have argued the modern western state is a gendered and 
patriarchal one that entrenches the power and privilege of dominant men and question the 
capacity of such a state to respond to their interests. Simultaneously, however, Australian 
feminists have historically centred their activism on the state, and particularly the 
bureaucracy, as illustrated by the femocrat strategy straddling the divide between the 
bureaucracy and women's movement. The activities of femocrats have therefore sparked 
strenuous debate in the Australian feminist movement about whether feminists working 
inside the state would be coopted or compromise feminist demands (Goodwin, 1999, p.52; 
Nyland, 1998, p.216). Further, although feminist approaches and the femocrat strategy 
conventionally dominated national male violence against women policy in Australia, the 
Howard years are usually represented as a constraint for feminists and the femocrat 
strategy. 
This thesis examined the ongoing salience of the femocrat strategy during the Howard 
years and the complex relationship between feminism and the state that developed in this 
period. It sought to answer the question: What was the nature of the Australian 
Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years? This 
question arose from my interest in how and why the conservative Howard Government who 
explicitly rejected feminism provided a sustained and comparatively well-funded public 
policy response to male violence against women between 1996 and 2007. In answering this 
question, this thesis has responded to a significant gap in the literature on the Howard 
Government's approaches to male violence against women as well as contributing to 
broader studies of policy content and policy process in Australia. 
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This thesis contributes to general understandings of political and policy process by 
suggesting researchers take into consideration the significance of policy actors or 
participants, the significance of structures or policy machinery, and the significance of 
discourse. The thesis suggests that in investigations into public policy it is valuable to take 
into account and explore both the policy process and the outcome or content of these 
policies. Based on this study of national male violence against women policy, this thesis 
recommends the utility of employing Anna Yeatman's (1998) understanding of 'policy 
activism', Louise Chappell's (2002a; 2002b) 'political opportunity structures', and Carol 
Bacchi's (1999b) 'What's the problem approach' to make sense of this period .. Beyond male 
violence against women in this period, these concepts are also relevant and useful to 
studies of the broader women's policy enterprise and feminist engagements with the state 
during different periods and with different governments. 
A second important contribution of this thesis is filling the gap in the small, emerging body 
of literature on the Howard Government's responses to male violence against women. 
Although this literature (Chappell, 2001; Donovan & Vlais, 2005; FitzRoy, 1999; Jones, 
2004; McKenzie, 2005; Morley & Macfarlane, 2008; Murray, 2005; Murray & Powell, 2009; 
Phillips, 2004, 2006,, 2008b; Summers, 2003b; Webster, 2006a, 2006b; Winter, 2007) 
provided ail important foundation for this thesis, on the whole the analyses tend to be rather 
limited in scope and the Howard years have been a period of male violence against women 
policy development which has not hitherto been documented in much detail. This thesis has 
filled this gap by developing a comprehensive account or narrative of this period which has 
recorded the history, policy machinery, policy process and content of key Howard 
Government initiatives. This account has included the Howard Government's policy and 
program responses Partnerships Against Domestic Violence (Partnerships) (1997-2005), 
the National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault (National Initiative) (2000-2005), the 
Women's Safety Taskforce (2002), and the Women's Safety Agenda (2005-2007). It has 
also documented the community education campaigns No Respect, No Relationship (No 
Respect) (2001-2003) and Violence Against Women - Australia Says No (Australia Says 
No) (2004-2007). The importance of documenting these initiatives while the experiences of 
key informants were still relatively recent and the documentary evidence was still available 
was illustrated by the number of key informants who had not even heard of No Respect 
despite strong associations with other Howard Government initiatives. It also provides an 
opportunity for feminists and policy-makers to learn from this period. 
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The division of powers in the Australian federal system of governance means Australian 
state and territory governments have traditionally played the most significant role in 
responding to this social issue. "Federalism has not been an issue central to Australian 
feminist discourse" (Chappell, 2002b, p.151 ). Australian research, including feminist 
research, on government policy responses to male violence against women has therefore 
tended to focus on state rather than federal governments. The signifiqance of constitutional 
expansionism and the sustained response by a federal government to male violence 
against women during the Howard years, as documented in this thesis, suggests this 
should change. This thesis has demonstrated the importance of feminist researchers and 
activists interested in male violence against women increasing their attention towards the 
federal governments and the relationships between state and federal governments in the 
future. In addition to constitutional expansionism, this is important because this thesis 
supports Bacchi's (1999b, p.178) proposition that any term or concept including 'male 
violence against women' has no abstract meaning and can be employed for or against 
feminist goals. In this context, ongoing feminist concerns with cooption, although perhaps 
warranted, are also quite complex. 
The problem of male violence against women has been constructed in a range of different 
ways, butfeminist·approaches to this issue have conventionally dominated national policy 
approaches and this thesis suggests they continued to do so even under the Howard 
Government. The Howard Government's engagement with feminism was, however, a 
complex one. This is evident in the key themes which emerged from stage one of the study. 
First, was the dissonance between key informants' positive and negative assessments of 
the Howard Government's male violence against women policies and broader social policy 
agenda. Second, was the proposition Australia Says No may have represented a 
progressive engagement between feminism and the Howard Government since it was 
consistent with feminist rhetoric and practice responding to male violence against women. 
Third, was the concept of wasted opportunities and that Australia Says No may be 
considered a missed opportunity and an inappropriate campaign in the broader social, 
political and historical context. Fourth, was the proposition Australia Says No was partisan 
political advertising and a public relations exercise focused on electoral populism and being 
seen to do something rather than being an appropriate response to male violence against 
women. 
Based on these findings from stage one of the study, I argued that two ways the Howard 
Government's approaches to male violence against women may be conceptualised from a 
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feminist perspective is as policies of chivalry and policies of cooption. Ramsay's (2004) 
research concluded that policies of chivalry were a useful way of describing federal 
government responses to domestic violence between 1970 and 1985. The dissonance in 
key informants' assessments of the Howard Government's approaches suggests the 
ongoing relevance of Ramsay's findings to this later period (1996- 2007) since the first way 
these approaches could be conceptualised were as policies of chivalry. In the discussion in 
Chapter Eight I concluded the Howard Government's approaches were consistent with the 
three key elements of policies of chivalry since they were: highly visible responses to male 
violence against women; focused .on protecting or rescuing victims of violence; and the 
government simultaneously did little to challenge women's inequality. Nevertheless, key 
informants also argued the Government's broader social policy agenda had a particularly 
detrimental impact on women who had experienced violence by undermining women's 
equality and increasing their vulnerability. This suggested a policy as chivalry 
conceptualisation alone was an inadequate way of understanding the Howard 
Government's approaches from a feminist perspective. 
Consequently, the second way I argued the Howard Government's approaches could be 
conceptualised from a feminist perspective was as policies of cooption. The findings from 
stage one suggest the Howard Government adopted feminist rhetoric and responses to 
' male violence against women at a micro level. Nevertheless, I argued they simultaneously 
oppressed more radical challenges to patriarchy (macro level) and traditional 
heterosexuality (mezzo level) that were available to them. This was particularly apparent in 
the government's cancellation of No Respect. Further, I proposed that Australia Says No 
was a public relations exercise the Howard Government used to maximise their political 
advantages while limiting their political risks. These findings suggested that understanding 
the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women as policies of 
cooption thus offered a useful additional way of making sense of this period. In particular, 
they made it possible to make sense of the strategic value of Australia Says No in 
advancing the Howard Government's social and political agenda nationally and 
internationally and why a government who had explicitly rejected feminism might adopt 
some feminist responses to this issue. 
This analysis of the Howard Government's apprqaches as both policies of chivalry and 
policies of cooption suggests the government's policies and ideologies were complex and 
varied rather than monolithic. It also suggests a change in the nature of the Howard 
Government's approaches over time and the significant impact of the government's 
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intentional, increasing exclusion of feminist activists from the policy process. This may 
explain why conceptualisations of the Howard Government's approaches as policies of 
chivalry emerged mainly from discussions of Partnerships (the earlier initiative), and those 
as policies of cooption emerged mainly from discussions of Australia Says No (the later 
initiative). 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight therefore provided a detailed account of the male violence 
against women policy field during the Howard years, and identified key moments, issues 
and debates. This account is an important historical record of these initiatives. It also raised 
a number of issues relating to feminist engagement with the state on the basis of which I 
concluded that the Howard Government's approaches may be conceptualised as both 
policies of chivalry and policies of cooption from a feminist perspective. From stage one of 
the study there also emerged three further issues that were explored further in the case 
studies in stage two. First was the significance of the broader social and political context to 
understanding Howard Government approaches to male violence against women. Second 
was the dramatic impact of policy process and the role of individuals in shaping the content 
and nature of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women. In 
particular, was the unexpected finding that feminists inside and outside of government 
developed a productive engagement with the Howard Government; a government they 
argued was hostile to women's interests. Third was the dissonance between key 
informants' positive assessments of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence 
against women and negative assessments of the impact of the Howard Government's 
broader policy agenda on women who had experienced violence. In particular, it was 
unusual that the key informants were not more critical of the Howard Government's 
approaches given their personal and professional experiences as feminists, activists and 
policy-makers. 
The third important contribution of this thesis which emerged from the case study of 
Partnerships in stage two of the study was the role of feminists and feminism in Australian 
policy production. Feminists and femocrats have historically been important players in 
national male violence against women policy arenas. Feminists have, however, tended to 
do better under the more progressive Labor governments (Chappell, 2002b). Feminists 
have therefore usually represented conservative governments generally and the Howard 
Government specifically as a constraint rather than a political opportunity structure for 
progressing feminist goals. During the early Howard years, feminists were unable to do the 
'federalism foxtrot' (Chappell, 2002b) to exploit differences between state and federal 
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governments because all governments except NSW were Liberal/Coalition governments. 
This thesis suggests that the Howard Government also put new policy machinery and 
processes in place in this period that changed the policy capacity and influence of feminists 
and femocrats. This change was not straightforward, however, and reflected continuities 
and discontinuities with the past since feminists and femocrats continued to be key players 
in the policy process but the Howard Government also challenged and reduced their 
discursive power. 
Consistent with, and extending, Chappell's (2001) argument about the potential of 
federalism to nurture progressive social policy, this thesis argued feminists were able to 
exploit the new policy machinery such as the Partnerships Taskforce as a political 
opportunity structure to pursue feminist objectives and progressive social policy. Indeed, 
femocrats appeared to have significantly impacted on the nature of Howard Government 
approaches to male violence against women, particularly in the early years (1997-2002). 
This was evident in the feminist influence on Partnerships and No Respect. Although this 
thesis also concurred with Chappell's (2002b, p.30) proposition that the Howard 
Government left the '1emocrat strategy in tatters", these findings have significant 
implications for femocrats and feminist policy activists. In particular, the ongoing relevance 
and salience of, feminist influences and the femocrat strategy during the Howard years 
despite the Howard Government's conservatism and open hostility to feminism is important. 
This thesis suggests that the femocrats' pragmatism and grounding of their arguments in 
evidence are valuable strategies which enabled them to exploit the political opportunity 
structures available to them even when there was -a conservative or hostile government in 
power. The strategic transformation of OSW into a less-threatening grants administration, 
rather than a policy advisory agency, as explored in this thesis was also an important 
survival strategy which may be of use with future conservative governments. This strategy 
was not, however, without its risks and might only be considered a last resort since limiting 
the policy advisory capacity of OSW may have left women's policy more vulnerable to the 
Howard Government's cooption and transformistic redeployment as discussed further 
below. 
Conservative governments such as the Howard Government are usually represented as a 
threat to the femocrat strategy and a constraint to feminist policy activists. The successes of 
feminist activism during this time, albeit moderated and somewhat constrained by the 
conservative political context, are nevertheless important. These successes suggest it may 
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be valuable for femocrats to pay more attention to the opportunities provided by cooperative 
federalism under conservative governments in addition to their traditional approach 
exploiting the differences between state and federal governments in the 'federalism foxtrot'. 
The experiences of feminists during the Howard years as outlined in this thesis also provide 
some important lessons for feminist policy activists outside of government. Historically, 
when conservative governments have been in power in Australia the gulf between 'inside' 
and 'outside' feminist activists widened with "much recrimination on both sides over funding 
cutbacks and negative policy decisions" and feminist activists outside the government have 
focused their attacks on the bureaucracy (Chappell, 2002b, p.29; McFerren, 1990, p.204). 
Consistent with this, the thesis suggests a similar dynamic operated between feminists 
inside and outside the Australian Government during the Howard years. The complex 
relationship between feminism and the state and the strategic way feminists adapted to the 
constraints the Howard Government presented them with and exploited the available 
political opportunity strategies suggests feminists outside of government might want to 
rethink this approach. Rather than concentrating their attacks on the bureaucracy, this 
thesis suggests that during periods of conservative government the strategic alliances 
between feminists inside and outside government become even more important for 
achieving feminist goals. 
This thesis also suggests; however, that context is important and feminist engagements 
with conservative governments must be undertaken with great care and awareness of the 
capacity for 'male violence against women' to be employed both for and against feminist 
goals. This thesis highlights that the following warning from Glyn. Davis' (1998, p.37) is an 
important one for feminist policy activists engaging with the state: 
There are risks in policy activism. What if others take up our critique but not our policy 
recommendations? What if in proposing policy from the margins we unintentionally advance 
hostile agendas? Authorial intent, long suspect in literature, proves an equally doubtful 
concept in policy-making. 
The fourth significant contribution of this thesis is to propose that the Howard Government's 
approaches to male violence against women were consistent with, not anomalous to, the 
government's broader social policy agenda. This thesis provides an excellent example of 
policy-making during the Howard years illustrating how nee-liberalism, social conservatism, 
political opportunism, and hegemonic masculinity intersected and were reproduced. One of 
the ways it did this was by examining content through the case study of Australia Says No 
and exploring why feminists were not more critical of this campaign despite being largely 
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excluded from the Howard Government's policy machinery by this time. Based on this case 
study, this thesis proposed that the Howard Government used male violence against 
women policy to progress their conservative political and social policy agenda in a way that 
concealed operations of power and their hegemonic effects. To explain this, the thesis 
introduced and developed the concept of policies of transformistic hegemonic masculinity 
based on Demetriou's (2005) 'new sociology of hegemonic masculinity'. 
This thesis proposed that the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against 
women may be conceptualised as policies of transformistic hegemonic masculinity in two 
related ways. The first concerns feminist understandings of male violence against women. 
The second incorporates Mason's (2002) concepts of mutual constitution, vehicles of 
articulation, territory and the cultural body. Chapter Ten argued using these concepts that, 
despite using feminist framings, discourses, concepts and approaches, the Howard 
Government represented the problem of male violence against women in a way that was 
contrary to feminist understandings and goals at the micro, mezzo and macro levels. This 
included: representations of the problem as the individual pathology of 'angry', 'criminal' or 
'distressed' men; personifying "violent" or "dysfunctional" relationships and 
miscommunication as the problem; shifting responsibility for violence from men and the 
institutions and structures feminists argue facilitate and condone their violence; promoting 
/ 
heteronormativity and idealised conservative, patriarchal types of families; promoting non-
gendered understandings; invoking race, culture and nationalism to construct violence as 
an issue for the racially and culturally othered; and reinforcing concepts of territory and the 
hierarchical constructions of difference which underpin male violence. 
I have argued that the Howard Government coopted and redeployed feminist counter-
hegemonic practices and transformed these into instruments of hegemonic domination. I 
have also suggested these approaches did not sit outside of the Howard Government's 
broader social policy agenda but rather were consistent with, and strategically contributed 
to, this agenda. This analysis highlights the importance of care in feminist engagements 
with the state and ongoing attention to the potential that feminist concepts and approaches 
can do any kind of political work. It suggests feminist activists need to carefully consider the 
impact of social and political context and constantly analyse what the problem is 
represented to be in their interactions with governments. 
The title of this thesis uses the tagline of the Howard Government's community education 
campaign, "Australia Says No", as a question. By doing this I endeavoured to explore 
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whether Australia really did "say no" to male violence against women in the Howard years. I 
also examined the complex relationships between feminism and the state including political 
opportunity structures exploited by feminists and risks evident in conceptualisations of the 
government's approaches as policies of chivalry, cooption and transformistic hegemonic 
masculinity. From a feminist perspective and perhaps ironically,. this thesis concludes the 
Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women transformed policies 
and practices which seem counter-hegemonic into an instrument of hegemonic domination. 
Importantly, from a feminist perspective, the Howard Government's approaches thus 
undermined attempts to eliminate male violence against women and increased the 
vulnerability of women to this violence. On this basis, the Howard Government can be 
considered as being far from "saying no" to male violence against women. 
/ 
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1.1. Timeline of federal government responses to violence against women (detailed between 1996- 2007). 
Time Key laws, policies, and/or events (with dates) Comments 
period 
1972- 1973 App't of Elizabeth Reid - first women's adviser to the Prime Minister. Source for events in this section (Weeks, 
1975 1994, pp.12-26). 
1974 Establishment of section in Dept of PM&C which became the OSW 
1974 Elsie {first women's refuge) and Sydney {first) Rape Crisis Centre opened. 
1975 National Women's Refuge Program (11 refuges) funded. 
1975-
1983 
1983- 1983 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women adopted in Source for events in this section (Weeks, 
1992 Australia (27 August) 1994, pp.12-26). 
1985 National Consultation and Assistance Program for Women -grants increased to women's organizations. ' 
I 
1985 WESP- Women's Emergency Services Program entered the Federal Supported Accommodation 
Assistance Programme. 
1987 National Domestic Violence Education Programme (three year initiative of federal government). Part of I 
this was the "Break the Silence" Campaign conducted by OSW in 1989. I 
I 1991 National committee on Violence Against Women established. 
1992- 1992 VAW policy (need details - confirm that this was under Keating and not Hawke). 
1996 
1996 September 1996 National Domestic Violence Forum convened. The Forum was convened by the 
I Commonwealth • ... and attended by over 
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130 specialists in the area of domestic 
violence". (PADV Taskforce, 1999, p.4) 
1997 July 1997 OSW represented Australia in the 17111 session of the CEDAW Committee when it considered H.O.G meeting includes premiers and chief 
Australia's third period report. minister from all Australian states and 
territories. 
15 October 1997 Launch of the National Rural Domestic Violence Information Kit -which was one of the 
recommendations of the 1996 DV Forum. "The Partnerships initiative is resourced by 
$25.3 million from the Commonwealth (June 
November 1997 PADV launched by Heads of Government at the National Domestic Violence Summit 1997-June 2001 ). Part of the package-
convened by the Prime Minister. worth $12 million- is for cooperative work 
I 
between the Commonwealth and the State 
12 November 1997 Launch of "Business Against Domestic Violence" by the Prime Minister. Development and and Territories. The other part of the 
ongoing administrative support for this provided by OSW. package- $13.3 million- is for new 
Commonwealth portfolio projects to be 
developed in consultation with the states." 
"Partnerships is coordinated by a 
Commonwealth, States and Territories 
Taskforce, the Terms of Reference of which 
were agreed by the Heads of Government at 
the Summit (Appendix B) .... As a 
commitment to the Partnerships initiative, 
State and Territory governments resource 
their representatives to participate in the 
taskforce as well as devoting considerable 
in kind resources to project management." 
(PADV Taskforce, 1999, pp.1&3). 
1998 February 1998 First PADV Taskforce Meeting Task force includes representatives from all 
Australian states and territories. "In 
November 1998 the Taskforce contracted out the meta-evaluation for PADV. November 1998 the Taskforce contracted 
Strategic Partners, in collaboration with the 
Centre for Gender Studies at the University 
of South Australia, to undertake a "meta-
evaluation• which over the life of the 
initiative will synthesize and analyse the 
outcomes and relationships between and 
across projects." (PADV Taskforce, 1999, 
p.14). 
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1999 1999-2000 Budget. Federal Government committed extra $25 million for PADV. (Newman in foreword, PADV 
Taskforce, 1999, p.i). 
May 1999 National Forum on Programs for Perpetrators of Domestic Violence. 
October 1999 Men and Family Relationships program launched by Larry Anthony, Minister for Community 
Services using PADV funding. 
From November 1999 PADV hosted eleven one-day show-casing workshops in metropolitan and regional 
centres around Australia. 
2000 April 2000 PADV conference: "Children, Young People and Domestic Violence: The Way Forward" held in The Men's Access Line: "It is a preventative 
Melbourne. measure with a focus on assisting men to 
choose solutions that reduce the likelihood 
May 2000 tender process completed for the Men's Access line which was allocated $1 million in seed funding of self-harm or harm to others. The primary 
through the Men and Family Relationships initiative. target groups are men facing separation and 
men experiencing difficulties managing their 
November 2000 "Men and Family Relationships" Conference. relationships with ex-partners and children". 
(PADV Taskforce, 2000, p.35). 
Unsure of year: Refusal of the Federal Government to sign the second optional protocol of CEDAW. [personal note - these two groups seem 
groups that are highly likely to already be 
"Beijing Platform for Action" and "Beijing Plus Five Outcomes Document" arise out of a Special Session of the using violence. I do not think that this is 
United Nations General Assembly on Women held rn New York in 2000. necessarily really a 'preventative' measure 
but rather more likely to be early 
2000 Australian Domestic and Family Violence Clearinghouse established. intervention. ! 
I 
OSW is responsible for coordinating and 
implementing both "Beijing" UN initiatives. 
These include provisions related to violence 
against women. 
2001 March 2001 Release of "Australia's Beijing Plus Five Action Plan 2001-2005" developed by OSW. 
April2001 "Rekindling Family Relationships" PADV Conference. 
April 2001 Launch of "Walking Into Doors" campaign targeting Indigenous family violence. 
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2002 
2003 
June 2001 Phase One of PADV draws to a close and Phase Two commences which is planned to last until 
June 2003. Phase Two is based on a meta-evaluation of Phase One and the "Framework for Developing 
Approaches to Domestic Violence 2001-2003". 
June 2001 OSW convenes a round table of officials from federal, state and territory government agencies to 
discuss ways of responding to the problem of sexual assault against women and to commence work on a 
national approach to combat sexual assault. 
2001 Launch of the National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault with a budget of $16.5 million. 
December 2001: "Across the Lifespan: Violence in the Lives of Women and Girls" PADV Conference. Perth. 
2002 Commencement of 3 major PADV projects benefiting children (listed in DPMC Annual Report 2001-
2001). 
2001-2002 OSW commissioned the Australian Bureau of Statistics to identify how existing sexual assault data 
could be better used, and to Identify future data needs. They also commissioned the Australian Institute of 
Criminology to undertake the Australian component of the "International Violence Against Women Survey" and 
to work on data related to sexual assault. 
February 2003 PADV Corporate Conference: 'Work and Family Conflicf, Melbourne. 
2003 Reallocation of $1 0 million of PADV and NICSA funds for the anti-terrorism kit. 
December 2003 Withdrawal of the planned community education campaign "No Respect, No Relationship". 
September 2003 Establishment of the Australian Centre for the Study of Sexual Assault financed from the 
NICSA. 
2003 or 2004? Establishment of the ''National Women's Safety Taskforce". This taskforce brings together 
Australian women's ministers' collaborative work on domestic violence, sexual assault, and family violence in 
Indigenous communities. 
22 December 2003 Australia (through OSW) presents the fourth and fifth reports on CEDAW to the UN. 
2003-2004 Meta-evaluations of the two funding phases of PADV were completed. 
In the DPMC Annual Report 2001-2002 
funding for PADV Phase 1 is described as 
lasting until June 2004 - previous 
documents and reports including the 2000-
2001 Annual Report list this as being until 
June 2003. 
In 2003 the Howard Government 
reallocated $7.5 million from PADVand 
$2.5 million from N/CSA to help pay for 
"the controversial and, many argued, 
superfluous anti-terrorism kit, which 
included the notorious fridge magnet, 
which was mailed to every Australian 
household in February 2003" (Roxon, 
2003a, 2003b; Summers, 2003a; 
2003b, p.93). 
The "No Respect, No Relationship" 
campaign was 'shelved' two weeks 
before being launched in December 
2003 because "several male members 
of the Prime Minister's panel that 
approves all government 
advertisements said that it was too 
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rough on men" (Bowden, 2004a; 
Contractor, 2004). 
2004 January 2004 Establishment of the "Support for Victims of People Trafficking Programme" managed by OSW. PADV and NICSA were provided with an 
additional $6.7 million to run the VAW-ASN 
June 2004 End of contracted funding for the Australian Domestic and Family Violence Clearinghouse and the campaign between 2003-2005. As part of 
Australian Centre for the Study of Sexual Assault. Future funding for both services put out to tender this campaign the government contracted 
supposedly in accordance with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). out a 24 hour helpline to Lifeline. 
6 June 2004 Launch of the "Violence Against Women - Australia Says No" Campaign jointly funded under 
PADV and NICSA. 
October 2004 Launch of Access Economics report on the costs of domestic violence to the Australian 
economy. 
2005 30 June 2005 Completion of both PADV and NICSA and replacement with the "Women's National 
Safety Agenda". 
2005 PADV Showcasing events commence. 
25 July 2005 Rerun of VAW-ASN ads for two weeks. 
2005 Questions raised about the appropriateness of responses to women calling the Helpline in 
Senate Committee on Community Affairs considering Budget Estimates. 
2006 Early 2006 VAW-ASN ads rerun. 
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1.2 Summary of the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women (1987- 2007) 
Polley machinery and Polley Responses I Products. Evaluation and Critique. 
Intergovernmental/ 
lntersectoral Nature. 
National Commonwealth State Taskforce $2.2 million program including: Positives: 
Domestic on Domestic Violence. - research into community attitudes; - Raised the profile and community awareness of 
VIolence - National Domestic Violence domestic violence. 
Education Representatives from Awareness month; - Good engagement of the community with NVDEP 
Program commonwealth , state and territory -network of local committees to activities. 
governments. coordinate local activities and the - Put domestic violence on the political agenda. 
appropriate distribution of resources; 
Some representation from the -Break the Silence media campaign: Negatives: 
women's crisis sector. television advertisements, posters, - Reinforce stereotypes of violence as physical. 
radio advertisements, a national phone- -Ambiguous definitions of domestic violence. 
in, pamphlets and information kits; - Detrimental impact of other government policies on 
- specific projects addressing Aboriginal women experiencing violence (eg income security and 
and Torres Strait Islander communities, immigration). 
women from non-English speaking - Problem of anti-violence programs from the state when 
backgrounds, young people, and rural it is inherently violent. 
and isolated communities; 
- 51 grants to community organizations 
under the National Agenda for Women ; 
- Break the Cycle National Forum on 
Domestic Violence Training for service 
providers. 
National National Committee on Violence - NSVAWpolicy document. Positives: 
Strategy on Against Women. - Training in the Area of Violence - Influenced the broader funding agenda including 
VIolence Against Women resource. grants under the National Agenda for Women and 
Against Implementation & accountability - Stop Violence Against Women SAAP. 
Women framework across federal campaign 1993. - Comprehensive and coordinated strategy. 
government. - Influenced and strengthened grants - Incorporated a monitoring and evaluation framework. I 
-
programs related to violence including -Provision of "valuable resources". 
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Representatives of state National Agenda for Women and SAAP. 
governments and NGOs on the - Influenced development of Women's 
Committee. Reported in the Safety Survey 1996. Negatives: 
literature as being more - Insufficient funding for the Strategy itself and no direct 
representative than the previous funding for projects. 
Taskforce. - Relied on the individual goodwill of state governments 
and the community sector. 
Taskforce reported to have - Lacked the federal leadership required. 
ceased to function despite not 
being officially disbanded. 
Partnerships Taskforce - focus on state PADV1 comprised a diversity of state Positives 
Against projects. and national projects, research, - Provision of significant funding. 
Domestic resources and reports usually - Federal framework and useful policy machinery allow 
VIolence Intergovernmental Taskforce with addressing the key priority areas states control over the projects. 
Phase 1 Federal, State and Territory announced at the Summit and these - Meta-evaluation and learnings very useful to the sector 
Representation. NGOs were projects are detailed in the three and government. I I 
specifically excluded from the PADV1 annual reports (1999; 2000; I 
Taskforce. All representatives 2001). Negatives 
were also departmental and so no - Degendering, backlash against feminist analyses, 
sectoral (service delivery) individualising and pathologising approach to violence, 
representation either. Significant denying men's agency and responsibility for violence 
tensions existed amongst and discounting social context. 
Taskforce members. - Focus on Indigenous and other vulnerable 
communities racialising violence and ignoring structure. 
! - Misuse and reallocation of funding. 
I 
Partnerships Taskforce- focus on national PADV2 comprised of a range of As for PADV1 above. 
Against projects. primarily national projects. 
Domestic 
VIolence Taskforce as for PADV1 however 
Phase 2 this seemed to have ceased to 
function and the federal 
government took an increasingly 
centralised role. 
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National Internal federal inter-departmental - Sexual Assault Information I was unable to locate any literature evaluating or 
Initiative to working group however some Development Framework (IDF). critiquing NICSA other than reference to the reallocation 
Combat inter-governmental consultation - International Violence Against Women of $2.5 million of unspent funds to the National Security 
Sexual with the National Sexual Assault Survey. Public Information Campaign. 
Assault Roundtable. Some individual - Funding a full-time data analyst at the 
NICSA projects had their own Australian Institute of Criminology to 
governance structures such as work solely on sexual assault research 
working or advisory groups. (produced 3 research reports). 
- National Framework for Sexual 
Assault Prevention. 
- Australian Centre for the Study of 
Sexual Assault (ACSSA). 
No Respect, Working group under PADV1 According to Kls and documents the Positives 
No consisting of inter-government products were developed using a - Evidence-based on research. 
I 
Relationship and NGO representatives with substantial evidence base from PADV, - Engaged with a diversity of young people through a 
expertise in community education N/CSA, and specifically commissioned range of multi-media strategies. 
around violence. research and included the 5 key - Reflected a complex and comprehensive 
components: understanding and definition of violence. 
Participation in the development - Sought to prevent violence before it occurred and 
of content from some in the sector - mass media advertising (television, focussed on the nature and benefit of healthy and 
such as DVIRC however radio, respectful relationships. 
comments about the peak bodies, magazine, cinema), I I 
WESNET and NASASV being - youth communication activities, Negatives 
excluded. However - public relations, - Despite some consultation OSW did not consult widely 
communication about the -NESS specific strategies, and enough with the sector on the content. 
campaign was reported as - Indigenous specific strategies - Intergovernmental structures had broken down by the 
comprehensive. The Ministerial time this campaign was being developed. 
Council on Government -Was never released. 
Communications oversaw all 
aspects of the development of the 
campaign. 
~ --- I 
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VIolence No available information. The - Advertisements targeted at male Positives 
Against campaign was likely to have been perpetrators and women victims in - Represented a commitment to violence against 
Women- developed by, or at least in various media including television, women, good that something is being done. 
Australia collaboration with, OSW. The radio, magazines and cinema; - The campaign booklet appeared to be based on 'real-
Says No author listed on the back of the - Booklet sent to every Australian life' experiences of violence and reflected specialist 
campaign booklet is Senator the household; knowledge and expertise in the suggestions offered. 
Hon Eric Abetz, Special Minister - Posters; 
of State. - Booklet targeting Indigenous people; Negatives 
- Nation-wide 24 hour confidential - Created an "us and them" dichotomy racialising 
helpline; violence as "un-Australian" and relevant only for ethnic 
- Dedicated website; and and cultural minorities. 
-Schools resource. - Narrow focus on family-oriented, therapeutic 
interventions rather than a complex socio-cultural 
understanding of violence. 
- Crisis end approach rather than prevention. 
- Criticisms of the Helpline tendering process too Lifeline 
as being ideological and the services as inappropriate 
and inadequate. 
- Generated additional demand on services without 
adequate resources to meet this demand. 
- Broader context of Howard Government policies 
harming women. 
Women's Women's Safety Taskforce. -Australia Says No campaign. I was unable to locate any literature on either the WST 
National Reported to be based on the - Australian Domestic and Family or WNSA. 
Safety PAOVTaskforce. Very little Violence. Clearinghouse and the 
Agenda mention of it except for its Australian Centre for the Study of 
establishment. Sexual Assault. 
- Research projects on domestic 
Seemed to be no engagement violence and sexual assault. 
with the state governments or the -Training for nurses in regional and 
sector except for through the rural areas and for the criminal justice 
sectors capacity to apply for the sector on sexual assault. 
grants in this program. - Dedicated resource at the Australian 
Institute of Criminology. 
- Mensline. 
--
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1.3 Timeline of Office of the Status of Women I Office for Women 
Time Govt and Responsible Minister Name of Structural Name of head Comments 
period PM and title office location of and title 
office 
1972-1975 Labor N/A N/A Dept of PM&C. 1973 Appointment • ... Reid's position became a very public one. While 
Gough of Elizabeth Reid - the Prime Minister retained responsibility for 
Whitlam first women's women's affairs, matters relating to women were 
adviser to the routinely referred to his adviser. Reid became the 
Prime Minister. only member of staff with formal authority to make 
statements and public appearances in her own 
right. In addition to her quasi-ministerial role, Reid 
was also pioneering the policy coordination and 
policy monitoring functions which were to become 
central to the work of OSW". (Sawer & Groves, 
1994, p.21) 
N/A 1974 Dept of PM&C. Sara Dowse ( 197 4- This section operated in support of Elizabeth Reid 
Women's 1977), Head of and was set up particularly to deal with the large 
Affairs Women's Affairs volume of correspondence that she received but 
Section Section. also prepared speeches and conducted research for 
established. the women's policy adviser (Sawer & Groves, 1994, 
p.22). 
N/A 1975 Dept of PM&C Sara Dowse (1974- The establishment of this branch was intended 
Women's 1977), Assistant integrate the functions of the women's adviser into 
Affairs Secretary of the the public service. When the Women's Affairs 
Branch Women's Affairs Branch was set up "Elizabeth Reid was offered the 
established Branch position as head of the new branch but she 
to replace resigned instead. She argued that the move from 
the the Prime Minister's Office ... to a public service 
Women's position was designed to silence her. Reporting 
Affairs through the hierarchy of PM & C meant she would 
Section. no longer have either direct access to the Prime 
Minister or a public voice" (Sawer & Groves, 1994, 
. p.23) . 
- ------ ---
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1975-1983 Coalition 1976 Creation of new Women's Dept of PM&C. Sara Dowse (1974- In appointing the Minister in June 1976, the PM 
Malcolm portfolio and Affairs 1977), Assistant increased the recognition given to the Branch. 
Fraser appointment of Tony Branch. Secretary of the (Sawer & Groves, 1994, p.24). 
Street, Minister Assisting Women's Affairs 
the Prime Minister on Branch. During this time the wheel and spokes model of 
Women's Affairs. women's policy was developed. 
1976-1977 lan Macphee, 
Minister Assisting the 
Prime Minister on 
Women's Affairs. 
1977-1981 Bob Ellicott, 1977 Dept of Home Kath Tapperell "The Women's Affairs Branch was renamed the 
Minister for Home Affairs renamed Affairs (1977-1983), Head Office of Women's Affairs in 1977, an upgrading I 
and then Minister for Office of of the Office of which was to presage the hiving off of what had 
Home Affairs and Women's Women's Affairs. increasingly become an irritant. After the election of 
Environment (from Affairs. December 1977 it was announced that the Office 
1980). was the be moved to the newly created Department 1 
of Home Affairs, then ranked 261h our of the 27 
1981-19821an Wilson ministries". (Sawer & Groves, 1994, p.26) 
1982-1983 Tom 
McVeigh, both Minister "Sara Dowse at last went public, resigning her 
for Home Affairs and position and making the transfer of the Office into a 
I 
Environment political issue .... Relocation from a central 
coordinating department to a peripheral one meant 
problems in performing the policy monitoring and 
policy co-ordination roles. From the depths of Home 
Affairs it became increasingly difficult to gain 
automatic access to Cabinet submissions. Nor was 
the Office to play such an effective role as the hub 
of the women's affairs wheel". (Sawer & Groves, 
1994, p.27). 
Sawer and Groves call this period the Office's 
"years of exile". p.28. 
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1983-1992 Labor 1983-1988 Susan Ryan, 1983 Dept of PM & C. Anne Summers "In 1983 the Hawke Government was elected with 
Bob Hawke Minister Assisting the renamed (1983-1986), Head the most comprehensive women's policy of any 
Prime Minister for the Office of the of the Office of the government to date, thanks to the work of Senator 
Status of Women. Status of Status of Women. Susan Ryan, assisted at the drafting level by 
Women. experienced bureaucratic feminists such as Sara 
Dowse . .. . Commitments relating to the machinery 
of government included the return of the Office to 
PM & C, the restoration of women's units with 
'relevant government authorities' and the setting up 
Suzanne Brooks of a new high-level co-coordinating body, the 
(1986-1988), Head Permanent Heads' Taskforce on the Status of 
of the Office of the Women ... The return of the Office had great 
Status of Women. symbolic importance as a statement of the 
government's commitment to women. It greatly 
strengthened the role of the Office in monitoring 
Cabinet proposals and advising on Budgetary 
proposals. It also enabled the Office to function 
once more as the hub of a network of women's units 
and to introduce new co-coordinating mechanisms 
such as the Women's Budget Program ... " (Sawer & 
Groves, 1994, pp.28-29). 
"Another commitment which was swiftly 
implemented was a large expansion in women's 
refuge funding under the new Women's Emergency 
Services Program.'' (Sawer & Groves, 1994, p.30) 
1988-1990 Margaret Office of the Dept of PM & C. Helen L'Orange 
Reynolds, Minister Status of (1988-1993), Head 
Assisting the Prime Women. of the Office of the 
Minister for the Status of Status of Women. 
Women. 
1990-1993 Wendy Falin, Office of the Dept of PM & C. Helen L'Orange 
Minister Assisting the Status of (1988-1993), Head 
Prime Minister for the Women. of the Office of the 
Status of Women. Status of Women. 
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1992-1996 Labor 1993 Rosemary Office of the Dept of PM & C. Anne Sherry (1993-
Paul Keating Crowley, Minister Status of 1994}, Head of the 
Assisting the Prime Women. Office of the Status 
Minister for the Status of of Women. 
Women. 
1993-1994 Roz Kelly, Office of the Dept of PM & C. Anne Sherry (1993-
Minister Assisting the Status of 1994}, Head of the 
Prime Minister for the Women. Office of the Status 
Status of Women. of Women. 
1994-1996 Carmen Office of the Dept of PM & C. Anne Sherry (1993-
Lawrence, Minister Status of 1994}, Head of the 
Assisting the Prime Women. Office of the Status 
Minister for the Status of of Women. 
Women. 
1994-1996 Carmen Office of the Dept of PM & C. Kathleen Townsend 
Lawrence, Minister Status of ( 1994-1997) 
Assisting the Prime Women. First Assistant 
Minister for the Status of Secretary of the 
Women. Office of the Status 
of Women. 
1996-2006 Coalition 1996-1997 Judi Moylan, Office of the Dept of PM & C. Kathleen Townsend 
John Howard Minister Assisting the Status of ( 1994-1997) 
Prime Minister for the Women. First Assistant 
Status of Women Secretary of the 
Office of the Status 
of Women. 
1996-1997 Judi Moylan, Office of the Dept of PM & C. 1997-1999 Pru OSW staff numbers 30 June 1998: 40. 
Minister Assisting the Status of Goward, First 
Prime Minister for the Women. Assistant Secretary 
Status of Women. ___ -~ _ 
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1997-2000 Jocelyn Office of the Dept of PM & C. 2000 Joanne OSW staff numbers 30 June 1998: 33. 
Newman, Minister Status of Caldwell, Acting OSW staff numbers 30 June 1999: 33. 
Assisting the Prime Women. First Assistant OSW staff numbers 30 June 2000: 33. 
Minister for the Status of Secretary 
Women 
2000-2003 
Rosemary Calder, 
First Assistant 
Secretary 
2001-2004 Amanda Office of the Dept of PM & C. 2000-2003 OSW staff numbers 30 June 2001: 40. 
Vanstone, Minister Status of Rosemary Calder, OSW staff numbers 30 June 2002: 51. 
Assisting the Prime Women. First Assistant 
Minister for the Status of Secretary 
Women 
2003-2004 Kerry 
Flanagan, First 
Assistant Secretary 
2004 Kay Patterson, Office of the Dept of PM & C. 2003-2004 Kerry OSW staff numbers 30 June 2004: 45. 
Minister Assisting the Status of Flanagan, First 
Prime Minister for the Women. Assistant Secretary In the 2004-2005 DPMC Annual Report the Office of 
Status of Women the Status of Women is no longer mentioned or 
delineates separately. It does note that a "Women's 
Policy Unit" was established in November 2004 In 
the Social Policy Division of the DPMC. It does not 
specify the number of staff for the unit but the entire 
division's staff is listed as being 43 as at 30 June 
2005. 
October 2003 Kay Office for Dept of Family 2004-2006 Kerry 2004 OSW was downgraded to FaGS. The 2004-
Patterson appointed as Women and Community Flanagan, Group 2005 FAGS Annual Report states: "Following the 
the Minister for Family Services. Manager Women last election [October 2004) we also welcomed the 
and Community and Youth. Office for Women which moved to FaGS from the 
Services. Department of Prime Minister and Cab1net." (p.4). 
--------
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2004-2006 Kay Kerry Flanagan reports to Deputy Secretary, Wayne 
Patterson, Minister Jackson. Under Kerry Flanagan there are also 2 
Assisting the Prime branch managers: Lee Emerson, Office for Women, ' 
Minister for Women's Policy Research and International; and Jenny 
Issues (as well as Bourne, Safety, Leadership and Consultation. 
Minister for Family and 
Community Services). In the FaGS 2004-2005 Annual Report, the Office 
for Women are included under Outcome 1 "Families 
are Strong". There are some interesting summaries 
about the nature and evaluation of PADV, NICSA 
and VAW-ASN in part two of the Annual Report 
under Outcome 1. 
There does not appear to be a breakdown of staff 
on the basis of branches in the FaGS Annual 
Report. 
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5.1 Participant Information Statement 
. The University of Sydney 
Social Work & Policy Studies 
Faculty of Education & Social Work, A35 
NSW 2006 Australia 
Federal Government policy responses to violence against women 1996-2006. 
Participant Information Statement 
This research on Federal Government policy responses to violence against women is an 
analysis of Australian federal government public policy responses to domestic violence, 
sexual assault and violence against women between 1996 and 2006. The specific focus 
of this study is the policy initiatives Partnerships Against Domestic Violence (PADV) and 
the National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault (NICSA) and the associated community 
education campaign Violence Against Women- Australia Says No (the campaign). 
The study is being conducted by Ms Mayet Costello and will form the basis for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy at The University of Sydney under the supervision of Dr 
Lesley Laing, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Education and Social Work. 
The research has two key aspects: 1) A textual analysis of key documents and texts 
associated with PADV, NICSA and the campaign; and 2) Interviews with people who 
have a working knowledge, or experience in the development or implementation, of 
PADV, NICSA or the campaign. 
I would like to interview you for about an hour to discuss your knowledge and 
experiences of the development of PADV, NICSA and/or the campaign. During the 
interview, I would like to take notes and also ask you to agree to let me tape-record the 
interviews. You can also participate in the interview without it being tape-recorded. What 
you tell me will be completely confidential, except as required by law. A report of the 
study may be submitted for publication, but individual participants will not be identifiable 
in such a report or publication. Data from this study will be stored in a locked cabinet on 
file/tape for 7 years and then disposed of by shredding and erasure. 
Being in this study is completely voluntary - you are not under any obligation to consent. 
Participants may withdraw from the research at any time without prejudice. Any person 
with concerns or complaints about the conduct of a research study can contact the 
Senior Ethics Officer. Ethics Administration. University of Sydney on (02) 9351 4811 . 
You are also welcome to provide this information sheet and/or my contact details to any 
colleagues who you believe may be interested in participating in this research. Please 
feel free to contact me on 0407 252 861 or m.costello@edfac.usyd.edu.au if you have 
any questions or comments at any time during the project. 
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5.2 Participant Consent Form 
• The University of Sydney 
School of Social Work & Policy Studies 
Faculty of Education & Social Work, A35 
NSW 2006 Australia 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
I, ....... ......... ................ ......... .... ....... ................. , give consent to my participation in the 
Name (please print) 
Federal Government policy responses to violence against women 1996-2006 
research. 
In giving my consent I acknowledge that: 
1. The procedures required for the project and the time involved have been 
explained to me, and any questions I have about the project have been answered 
to my satisfaction. 
2. I have read the Participant Information Statement and have been given the 
opportunity to discuss the information and my involvement in the project with the 
researcher/s. 
3. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without 
affecting my relationship with the researcher(s) now or in the future. 
4. I understand that my involvement is strictly confidential and no information about 
me will be used in any way that reveals my identity. 
Signed: 
Name: 
Date: 
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5.3 Interview Questions 
Federal Government policy responses to violence against women 1996-2006. 
Interview questions I topics for semi-structured key informant interviews 
1 . What is the nature of the work you do I agency you work for? What is your role in 
this (if agency)? 
2. Very briefly, what is your understanding of the definition, causes and consequences 
of male violence against women? Do you identify as having a feminist perspective 
on this issue? [This is meant for me to get an understanding of the participant's 
perspective]. 
3. Request participant look at OSW and V AW tables - add any1hing importanVmake 
any corrections. 
4. What experience with, or knowledge about, PADV, NICSA, or the campaign do you 
have? When did these experiences occur (approximate years/months)? Is your 
experience with these policies or the campaign because of your current position? If 
from a previous position, what was the nature of the work and your role in the 
agency that caused you to have experience with these policies and/or the 
campaign? 
Unstructured interview comment 
Through my research I am trying to construct an historical narrative and account of 
PADV, NICSA and the campaign. I am hoping to explore why these policies and 
campaign were developed, how they developed and operated throughout their lifespans 
(such as the nature of the policy process), get an understanding of the main participants 
and their relationships with each other, and have a good understanding of the actual 
nature of the policies/campaign. 
Possible unstructured questions 
5. What is your perspective on responses to male violence against women under the 
Coalition Federal Government (under Prime Minister Howard) over the last decade? 
6. How do you think violence against women as an issue got on the policy agenda 
particularly under the current Federal Government? 
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7. What is your understanding of how and why PADV, NICSA and/or VAW-ASN were 
developed? 
8. How were the issues of sexual assault, domestic violence and/or violence against 
women represented and constructed in the policies/campaign? Do you think this 
representation or construction of the issues is consistent with the Federal 
Government's espoused values, beliefs and agenda in regard to social issues and 
public policy more generally? Do you think these issues should be represented or 
constructed in a different way? If so, how u think and what do you think would be the 
consequences of this alternative representation? 
If relevant for those working on the campaign: when writing about ''victims" and 
"perpetrators" what or who were you thinking of? Were they male or female, 
old/young, black/white etc? 
9. What was your impression of the policy process through which the policies and/or 
campaign were developed? 
10. Who do you believe were the main participants in developing these 
policies/campaign? What were the power relationships between these participants? 
What conflicts were there and how were these dealt with? Did this change over 
time? What was your involvement with these participants and how did they interact 
with you? 
11. If relevant for the research reports or campaign: Did you ever experience, or are you 
aware of, any interference or intervention in the process or outcomes of research, 
research/project reports or the campaign from Federal Government Public Servants 
or politicians? What was the nature of this intervention? Do you think it was 
appropriate? Did it have any affect on the nature or outcomes of the 
project/research/campaign? If so, was this affect negative or positive? 
Alternatively if a Federal Government Public Servant/politician: Did you ever 
yourself, or are you aware of from any other Federal Government Public Servant or 
politician, any intervention in the process or outcomes of research, research/project 
reports or the campaign? What was the reason for, and nature of, this intervention? 
What was the outcome of your/their intervention? 
282 
12. What did you learn in your experience with PADV, NICSA and/or the campaign? 
How do you think these policies I campaign or the process in which they were 
developed can be improved? Are there any alternative policies I approaches that you 
would suggest? If so, what impact would these alternatives make - how would it be 
different? 
Final Question 
13. On completion of my PhD would you like a summary of my final PhD thesis and/or 
would you like to be informed about any associated publications resulting from this 
research (note this will be well into the future)? 
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5.4 Textual Analysis Tool 
Background and Textual Location 
What is the name of the text? 
What type of text is it (eg website, report, magazine ad, audio-visual)? 
What policy is the text part of (PADV, NICSA or VAW-ASN)? Is the text part of a chain 
or network of texts within that policy/campaign? 
Brief summary of the text: 
When was the text written I published? 
Who is the author of the text? Where are they from (eg specify gov't dept, service, 
consultancy)? 
Does the text have any other associations I affiliations (eg publisher, funding body-
specify what there are)? 
Where was the text located (eg website, publication references)? If I have a copy of the 
text also specify personal files location (eg PhD Folder, computer file name): 
Are there any links in the text with other relevant policies or texts? How are these 
presented (eg close relationship, as information only, linked)? 
Historv and Context 
Is there any acknowledgement in the text of the social, historical, or political context in 
which it is located? 
What elements of relevant represented social, historical, or political events are included 
in the text? 
Are any relevant social, historical or political events or contexts obviously excluded from 
the text? 
Problem Representation 
What is the problem represented to be? 
What type of male violence against women is identified as the problem (eg domestic 
violence, sexual assault, violence against women)? Are there any links between the 
different types? 
What is the definition of the type of violence identified as the problem? 
What are the theoretical explanations or causes represented to be for the type of 
violence identified? 
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Assumptions 
What presumptions or assumptions underlie the representation? 
Where is the level of analysis regarding male violence against women? 
How is gender constituted? What is the role of gender? 
What values are evident and what values does the author explicitly commit themselves 
to? How are these values expressed and realized (eg as statements of fact, predictions 
and hypothetical statements, evaluative statements, or assumed values)? 
What existential, propositional or value assumptions are made? 
Can any of the assumptions or values made be seen as ideological. If so: what 
ideological positions are evident? 
Language and Discourse 
What is the nature and tone of the language used (including gendered/non-gendered, 
passive/active, how the message is delivered etc)? 
What influences on the language are evident (eg feminist, bureaucratic)? 
What discourses are drawn upon in the text? What are the main features of these 
discourses evident in the text? 
Is there a significant mixing of discourses? If so, how do these discourses interact I how 
are they~ textured or mixed together? 
Subjects 
What is the explicit or implicit role and nature of government in the text represented to 
be (egis the issue considered a govt responsibility or a private one)? 
Who is the intended audience of the text? Is the content and/or presentation of the text 
consistent I appropriate for the intended audience? If so, how? If not, how not? 
Which subjects are present in the problem representation? Which are obviously absent? 
How are subjects constituted within this problem representation? 
Are subjects represented in an active or passive way? 
Who is held responsible (or accountable I to blame) for the 'problem'? 
Effects 
What effects are produced by the representation of the 'problem'? 
What is likely to change with this representation of the problem? What is likely to stay 
the same? 
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What are the aims, goals and/or objectives of the policy? Which of these are 
privileged/dominant? 
What 'solutions' are offered to the 'problem'? 
What strategies and interventions are proposed or follow on from the 'solutions' offered? 
Where/to whom are these strategies and interventions directed? 
Who is likely to benefit from this representation? How will they benefit? Who is likely to 
suffer from this representation? How will they suffer? 
Absences 
What is left unproblematic in the 'problem' representation? 
How may this text be evaluated in terms of my minimum policy practice responding to 
male violence against women (eg what is present, what is absent)? 
How may this text be evaluated in terms of my good policy practice responding to male 
violence against women (eg what is present, what is absent)? 
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6.1 National Domestic Violence Summit Statement (Partnerships Taskforce, 2000, 
p.21) 
, NATIONAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SUMMIT 
;,~STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AGREED BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT 
'This statement of principles comes from the combined policy and ptacrice experience of governments, 
·services, police, judiciary, researchers and community in dealing with domestic violence over the last two 
'decades. It is an expression of consensus by the Heads of Government of Australia. 
CONTEXT 
':Domestic violence is widespread and complex. ft is a major issue affecting the social, emotional, physical 
·and financial wellbeing of individuals and families and resulting in significant social and economic costs to 
~ the community. 
Children often witness domestic violence and are profoundly affected by this experience. 
· Domestic violence is an abuse of power perpetrated mainly (but not only) by ruen against women bod~ in 
·a relationship or after separation. 
; Domestic violence takes a number of form5, both physical and psychological. The commonly 
; acknowledged forms of domestic violence are physical and sexual violence, emotional and social abuse and 
j e<:onOmic deprivation. 
( bo~estic violence occurs across all groups, cultures and creeds. 
:· Domestic violence often occurs and recurs in a pattern which affects the lives of women, men and 
'children. Violem:e can continue from one geneTation to the next. · 
PRINCIPLES 
• AU individuals have the right to be free from violence. 
• AU forms of domestic violence are unacceptable in any group, culrure and creed. 
• Many forms of domestic violence are against the law. Acts of domestic violence that constitute a 
criminal offence must be dealt with as such. 
·· • The safety and wellbeing of those subjected to domestic violence must be the 6.tst priority of any response. 
:-, Those who commit domestic violence must be held accountable for their behaviour. 
·, The commUnity has a responsibility to work toward the prevention of domestic violence and to 
demonstrate the unacceprability of all forms of domestic violence. 
INTERVENTION AND PREVENTION 
Reducing the incidence of domestic violence requires a shared commicment and a coordinated response by 
governments and the community; 
_Children need education and experience which enables them to build equal. respectful and non-violent 
relationships in adulthood. 
Stmtegies need to include programmes aimed at early interverition and prevention of further violence, 
abuse or deprivation. 
Strategies are needed to improve the response the criminal justice and other systems to domestic violence. 
Services need to take into account the fact that women and children, as the main victims of domestic 
'violence, have their own particular legal, health, welf8re, social and economic issues. 
Strategies developed to address domertic violence need to take account of the needs of all Australian 
communities, including the needs of indigenous people and people from culturally and Unguistically 
diverse backgrounds. 
,Domestic violence strategies need to address the different needs and experiences arising from gender, age, 
,sexuality, disability and geographic isolation. 
Ongoing strategies are needed to increase community awareness that domestic violence is unacceptable. 
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6.2 Partnerships Taskforce Terms of Reference (Partnerships Taskforce, 2000, p.22) 
PARTNERSHIPS AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
TASKFORCE TERMS OF REFERENCE 
COMMITMENT BY GOVIRNMENTS 
Head. of Government are committed to working in partnership to prevent domestic violence. 
ROLE OF THE TASKFORCE 
Membership of the Taskforce represents commitment on the part of government> to work togcrher in 
preventing and responding to domestic violence across Australia. 
The Taskforce will identify opportunities for strategic collahoration between the Commonwealth and the 
States and Territories to enhance knowledge and develop good pracrice. 
The Taskforce will recommend priorities for national initiatives under the themes of Parrnrnhips Against 
Domestic ViD/ence. Specific projects under the themes proposed by a State or Territory wiU also contribute 
to the development of national knowledge. 
The Taskforce will promoto sharing of kna~Niedge and the clmeminarion of information on preventing ana' 
responding to domestic violence. 
The Taskforce will detormine a framework for evaluation of Parrnrnhips Against Damtslic V"wlenc<. 
The Taskforce will report annually through the Commonwealth/State Mini>ters' Cooference on the Statui 
of Women to Heads of Go\-emment. State and Tetritoryrepresentatives wtll report within their 
jurisdiction• ~appropriate. 
The annual report of the Taskforce will be publish«!. 
The Taskforce will continue for the life of Partnmllipr Agairut Dowslic V"JOltnce, which is funded until 
june WOl. 
MEMBERSHIP 
The membenhip cl the Taskforce will consist of: 
• one representative from the Department of the Prime Mini>ter and Cabincr, who will chair the 
Taskforce; and 
• up to two government representatives from each of the States and Tettitories. 
Representatives of key Commonwealth department> workin0 on related issues will be co-opted as required. 
RESOURCING 
State and Territory governments will fund their representative(!) to attend meetings cl the Taskforce, 
which will be held up to three times a year. 
The Commonwealth, through the Office of the Status of Women, will provide admini>trative support for 
the Taskforce, 
The Office cl the Status of Women will provide resource. within a spocif'!td yearly budget for the 
Taskforce to seek expert advice, 
' 
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6.3 Partnerships 1 Structural Framework (Partnerships Taskforce, 2001, p.4) 
Ministerial counCil of Women's I Council of Australian Ministers Governments 
- authority fur 
-~ Policy direction{ responsibility Framewort/approaches ' 
t,,. 
' 
. ' ..• , ........... "''"" - \ ... -- -
National Taskforce on Domestic VIolence 
- C'th, State and Territory officials 
! Policy frami!WOrt, establishes outcomes, directions and policies, good practice etc 
, __ . -- . ·--~--.. ·r· T -------.-
., _______ 
' 
Collaboration/Consultative Council of Partners and Target Market DeYI!Iops 
Implementation strategies for framework established by Taskforce. 
• Cammonwealth •locilil Ga.remment (Peaks) • Service Provider (Peaks) • Business 
• States and Territories • ATSJC • Community leaders (peaks) 
t, 
""!"!"' -- ., -~!-'' ~ -
~ Relevant strategies of each of these areas influence OV Framework and are Influenced hy OV framework. 
-
,., ~--··" ---~-- -.-~ .... ~,._·~ 
' 
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!fUNDm_~R~~~!~_OJ~Q'L~Itf!£'~~~$t,~~lh~"ir~ tf~~-io~itlt~ 1 l Working .with Adol=rnt Bo)-s: a. '1lle Rage Project~- R~nsive Adol~t Group Education; Berry. St~, Vie.. FaCS 
h. :Boys Rave; -Resisting Abuse and Violence. for Equality, Youth (lnd family 
Seivice (L.Og:iii Cicy), Qld. · · . . . · . ; 
FaCS Indigenous Family Relationships Piloi Projects: ·· '" ·.· ... ·· -~ 
. I 
a. Anglic.arc WA (Kil\ov.IY F~mily Counsdl.ing Scrvke Kununurra/WytlC!ham) & ? 
011l'"OOUrng Yawwoode'ni Aboriginal COr\)ondon (Kununurn Cr~is 
A~commodadori Cenire). Talking Women's Buslncss. 
FaCS 
FaCS 
.FaCS 
b .. ·Family "Life l1ovcmeni of Austlalia (lntcrrdatc) & Southern Cr05$ University 
c;negc: ~f Indigenous Aialralian PC(,ples · · 
c. CA!ntieafC Tov.mvillc &. Townsville Aboriginal & Isbrider Health Services. 
d., Ncwastlc F..mily Support Sctvkc & War!ia Ngurn Ahorigin:tl Wom<:n5 Re. 
e. Ad~laide Cent~! M.ission, Centre of Personal EdLlCation & N~~in Yunti 
Abririginal CommuriiryHc.alth Centre- 'Indigenous F~lli~ Pr~iec~; 
f. Anglican: NT, Da..Win & ~·vaal indigenous organbation.S In Dar..vin. 
Young Women's RclatiONhips Pilot Projects: 
a. "&rry Street, Vic. 'V10lcnce Pn:vcnrion Project for Young Women:. 
b .. -Family Rcla~iONhlps Institute, Vic. 'Youn: Women's Rciationship lnitiati\-e.' 
c_, R~.~tiol_lshi~ Au.Stralia, NSw. 'Does he treat you righd- Se.mlrim'. . 
d; Rdatiomhips AUsrralia, SA. •\Yh.ar Smart Girls Knmi. 
c., C'..entitcare, B~i.sb:Jnc:. 
(; Centac.arc: Geraldron. 
Relationship SUJlil0!1 ~rviw fofMen:. 
a, Bl.ifnsidc Centi:hl a'rid Mid North Co:ut; NSW -·~en tn ~miltcs', 
b. Relationships AUstralia, NSW. 
c. Unifam, NSW. 'Men's Matters'.; 
d. Bumslde Gbmmatta, NSW Mulri-culrural men and family ~lationships serviCes 
c, Newcastle Family Support ServiCe, NSW. 
r. OlUdreti's Protcctii>n &x:icty;Vic: 
£· Bethany Family Su~~: ·\.hc. Mm ~nd Family Reladonshi!l Program. 
h. M~ee Family Care, Vic.· 
i. Australian GR:c:k Wclf.ile Society, V"~e.. Ccumelling fQi Greclt-Spealclng men and 
their fi mi lies. · 
j .. Li&:llne; Bun'dabCrg. MCll arid Families, 
.k. Rel;.tion.shipsAm.t~lia and GaJ\ang Place, Qld. 
l. Man:'ja J~du Women's Refuge, WA. 'M.cn's bum::ach ~mice 
m• Ngala, WA; 
n, Ccnrac~ Cath.olic .. F~ily Services Wh)-a.II.a, SA 
o. Port Adelaide Centnl Mission, SA. 
p."' "Anglicarc:, Tasmania. 'Tool~ fo/Mcn'. 
q. · M~cd Otild & Family Centre, ACT. The M~leali' 5epar.itcd f-a·lheri Progiam. 
f. Rcla~ionships Australia, NT. 'Fathers after sc:paratioil Course'. 
National Men's Accc:sS Line 
Commonwcalih Domestic Viol~nce.Woruhops with YoungPcople 
Deparonent of · · 
Eclucado~. Training 
and Yo<ith Afblrs (DmA) 
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ru11om 9 · . oitiYA&.tEd~J~!tf :. · ~-. ,- -<.'.:., . - .-: _ : . ;-. · 
NCP &. DffiA Young Peoples Attirudcs to and Expcnc:ncc of domC$tic violence-R=h project 
[)qiemnent of Transport Dom~ttc Violence in Rural and Remote Communities Research 
anJ Regiona I Services 
(OTRS) 
Abonginal anJ Torn:5 Family Violence Advoca.cy Project- Cairns 
Saan Islander Commission 
(ATSIC) 
ATSIC Frumly Violence Advocacy Projects: 
I. Apumpima Care York Hcallh Counctl 
2 Kalgoorlic 
3. The Far North Queensland Indigenous Consortium for Social anJ EmotiOnal 
Health and Wdl Being 'Traimng for Workers with Indigenous Women and 
Children who have Expcnenccd Family Violence' 
ATSIC Traming for AJ!cncic~ Workinl: wtlh lndiGcnou.~ Women 
Department uf 
lmmtllfartOn anJ 
Multiculturdl Atl'am 
(DIMAl 
- --
STATE AND TERRITORY 
Domestic and Criminal Violence Hutory of Mtgrat ion Sponsors 
~ Run.l Cri$1S lntcrvcntiun l'arcncrships l'rojc.:lS __ 
NSW Cn~inal Jusnce System lntcrnJ!COCY Gutdclinc.~ for Responding to DomestiC Violence 
NSW _ Dubbo Integrated Rcspon.-c Project 
~SW Rouunc Scrccnmg of Patients Clf Specified I ko:Jlth Service. .. 
NSW BIOhART Domestic Violence Prevention Film ProJeCt 
NSW Tdmworth Domesnc Vtolcnce Projcc.t 
NSW Promoting Healthy Rdarioruhtps 
VIC Enhanccmem of Family Vtolcnce Protocols and Inter-Agency lmkagcs 
VIC Identifying Family Violence R~_;,rc..;..e..;..K...:it_-__;th_;,e_G:....P_K_;,i..;..r ____ _ _ __ _ 
VIC Konn Family Strcngrhcnmg 
VIC Supporting Children and Young People who have experienced famt.ly violence 
VIC Evaluaoon of Co-ordinated Community Intervention Project (Moe Family Violence 
Project) - Gippsland 
VIC 
VIC 
Recovery from Grief&. Trauma of the Experience of Family Violence 
Feasibility Study on the Implementation of an Enlunced Perpetrator PrQGrom 
Infrastructure 
VIC Joint Ch11d Pnxecuon and Famiii Vtolcnce Services Strategy 
VIC Measuring Family Violence in Victoria 
QLD Bc.t Practice Intervention for chilckcn and )001\g people who wicnos domestic violence 
QLD Domestic Violence and Pregnancy project 
QLD Torres Strattlslandcr Domestic Violence Communny Education{Trainmg St:ratcgy 
QLD Domestic Violence and Child Protection 
QLD Trammg for School Commumtics tn Relation to Otild Wuncsscs of Domestic V10lcnce 
QLD Young Pregnant and P3renting Support 
QL[) Ktd. and Domestic Violence Training Initiative 
QLO lndt~enous Eunily Viol_en_c_e_P_re_v_e_nn_·o_n ______________ _ 
WA Crisis Intervention tn Aboriginal Family Violence- Strntcgtes and modcb for WA 
WA Tratning for Service Delivery 
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FUN~D ORGAJUSATION. . PROjECT/GRANTS TITLE. , . _ . · .. '. ': · 
WA 
WA 
SA 
S.'\ 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
SA 
TAS 
TAS 
TAS 
TAS 
TAS 
TAS 
TAS 
TAS 
NT 
NT 
NT 
ti.'T 
NT 
ACT 
ACT 
ACT 
ACT 
ACT 
Regional Multi-culrural AccCSli Pro)ecD 
Pilot Counselling Program for Aborigmal Men Responsible for F:lmily VIOlence 
Peer tducation for young people at rislt 
Competency-based Training MoJules Project 
Consultation Project 
Resources for Aboriginal Communities - Young People's ruource 
Rcsourc~ for Multi-cultural Communities Project 
Community Action/Education Project 
Out of Sight- Not out of Mind 
Safe Livmg in Abonginal Communttics 
Domcsnc Violence lmegr.ucd lnfonnarion ProJect 
Website Project 
Domestic Violence Training Delivery Model for Rural Health Professionals 
Indigenous Family Violence Scoping and Capocit)• Building 
Domestic Violence and the Needs of Women with Mental Health Problems 
Feasibiury Srudy for a Regional Domcsuc Violence Coun Suppon Scrvtcc 
Pathways and Tummg Points: how wumen survtve vtolem pGrtncrs 
Seeping study for a Tasmanian statewide perpetrator program 
Domestic Violence Education Package for young people: Be Cool .. Not Cruel 
Phase 1: incr~-asc awareness 
Domestic Violence: Education Package for young people: Be Cool . . Not Crud. 
Phase 2 consisD of extended mtdi.l advertising 
Pilot Coun·Mandarcd and Court-Referred Program for Offenders ofDomesric and 
Aborigmal Famuy Violence 
Effccth•eness of a Mandated Program for Indigenous Family Violence Offenders 
Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault mrcrvcmion project for young people 
No Violence ln Schools (NOVIS)· Building Healthy Relationshi~ for Young People 
Understanding the Domestic Violence Law in Australia - A Community Education 
Campaign for Ethnic Communines 
Pwtners for Prevention- a community consultation approach 
EvaluatiOn of the ACT Corrective Services Family Violence Perpetrator Program 
Interagency Family Violence Intervention Program 
Phase I 
Phase 2 
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6.5 Partnerships 1 Publications (Partnerships Taskforce, 2001 , pp. 79-83) 
NEWSLETTERS, BULLETINS AND fLYERS 
Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Newsletters No:. 2, 3, 4,5,6 & 7 
Partnerships Against Domestrc Violence Flyer 
Mew Etoaluo.tion Bulletm No 1 
Meta E1·aluation Bulletin No 2 - Worlang with Young People 
Meta E~-aluation Bulletin No 3 - Working u.~th Men 
Meta Evaluation Bulletin No 4- A Guide w Evaluarion 
Mew Et'(lhUltion Bulletin No 6 - Indigenous {n'Ojects 
J<e:j Findings - Working \vith Chilclren and Young People 
Key Findings- Working uith Indigenous People 
Key Findings- Working with Men 
Ca:.e stuJtcs of Domestic Vmlence Programs in Australia: 
Workmg u.oith Children and Young People: cnse srud1 I 
Pm>ention & perpetrator programmes· case study 2 
Peer education programmes: case study 3 
Supporting rural & remote communiries: case study 4 
Competency Standards Flyer 
PARTNERSHIPS REPORTS AND PRODUCTS FROM NATIONAL PROJECTS 
Current Perspectives on Domestic Violence: A Review of National and lntemauonal Literature 
Against the Odds - H01.1.o Women Survive Domestic Violence- Executive Summary 
Against the Odds - Hou.• Women Survive Domesuc Violence- Full Report 
Competency Swndard.s: Research Report Stage I - Project co develop compclency standards for 
people who come into professional contact with those affected by domesuc violence 
Domesric Violence Pret•ention: Srrateg~es and Resources for Working wtth Young People 
Women, Men and Dcnnescic Violence: an analysis of data and research on incidence of 
domestic violence 
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Attitudes w Domestic Violence and Family Violence in the Diverse Australian Commamiry 
Indigenous Solutions: t~.-'OTking with Indigenous commuruties expenencing domestic viok'Tlce: 
The National Indagcnoll5 Family Violence Grants Programme 
The Way Forward: Children, young people and dmnesuc ~:iolence. Proceedings of the National Forum 
held m Melbourne, April 2000 
Two Lim, Two Worlds: Older People and Domestic Violence, Volume I 
Two Lit•es, Two Worlds: Older People and Domestic Violence, Volume 2 
ll's Not OK- It's Vaolence: lnfonnation aheM domestic violence for «.'Omen wilh disabiliues, 
includmg poster, hrochure, card, information booklet for servace provtders, and cassette for 
visually impam:d persons 
Research into Good Practice Models to Facil!rate Access to the Cavil and Criminal Justice System 
by People Experiencing Domestic and Family Violence 
Walking Jnco Doors campaign lrrochures: family (Archae Roach and Ruby Hunter), women 
(Ruby Hunter) and men (Archie Roach) 
Partnerships Against Domesoc Violence Poster 
Partnerships Against Domestic Violence First Report of the Taskforce 1997-1999 
Partnerships Against Domesnc Violence Second Report of rhe Taskforce 1999-2000 
REPORTS AND PRODUCTS- COMMONWEALTH fUNDED PROJECTS 
Young People Say "DV-No Way": Et,afuation of the National Darnesric Violence Prel!elltion Workshops 
for Young People (Produced by DETYA) 
Domestic Violence in Reg-ronal Australia -A Literature Review (produced by Department of 
Transporr & Regional Services) 
Healing our Families: Family Violence Adt'OCOC) Pmjecr (produced by Apunipima Family Violence 
Advocacy Project, Queensland) 
Getting \Vhar You Want: A Peer Guide mro Healthy Relationships(produced by the Young Morhers for 
Young Women, Queensland) 
Gcuing \Vhar You Want: Presenters' Workbook (produced by the Young Mothers for Young Women, 
Queensland) 
Gold[aelds Regum: Famil:y Violence Adwcacy Project (proJuccd by Bega-Garnbiningu Health 
Services, Western AU5rralia) 
Lit:ing wath Love.! Booklcr (produced by Geraldton Cenracare and Sexual AliSault Resource Cenrre, 
Wesrem Auscralia) 
Uving u•irh Love! Resource Kit (produced by Geraldmn Centacare and Sexual Assaull Resource 
Centre, Western Ausrraha) 
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What Smart Girls Know (produced hy RelaCioll.)htps Ausrralia, South Australia) 
,,l.ot.>es Me Not (produced by Berry Street Inc, Victoria) 
REPORTS AND PRODUCTS- STATE AND TERRITORY PROJECTS 
Be cool .. . not rn1d: Booklets Numbers 22-27 
Bt cool . .. not cruel: Community Educcuion for Young People (Northern Territory) 
Kids and DV 
Practice Standards 
Kids and DV- EL'Cilu.aring Service Delicery 
Kids and DV- Models of Service (Queensland ) 
\"u(>f Kits: Fun UJtth Feebngs- A resource for u'Orkers/teaclum of pre and primary aged children 
exploring c1notions and feelings (Sourh Australia) 
Relationship Violence: No Way' -Young Men and Relationships Violence Prevention Project Report 
(South Australia) 
Violence m the Home has Many Forms: Multicultural Domestic Violence Radio Announcements CD 
(South Australia) 
Silent Witnesses Kit· Domestic Violence Hurts Kids 1iJO (South Australia) 
Reshaping Responses to Domestic Violence: Eucmive Summary (South Australia) 
Rtshaptng Responses to Domestic Violence: FulL Report (South Australm ) 
Reshaping Responses co Domtstic Violence- Appendices (South Australia) 
Home Safe Home: The bnk between domestic and family violence and uromen's homelessness 
(South Australia) 
Idemifying Family Violence: Report on the Resource Kat for General Practicioners in the Westtm Suburbs 
ofMelboume (Vtctoria) 
Identifying Family Violence: A Resource Kic for General Pracricioners in the Westtm Suburbs of 
Melbourne (Victoria) 
Mapping Pathways of Sen·ice Provision: Enhancement of Family Violence Prococols and Interagency 
Unkages (Victoria) 
MOt Family Violence Project- A Raiew of tht Project with Implications for Local Priority Policing 
(Victoria) 
Evaluation of che Australian Capiral Territory Interagrncy Family Violence Intervention Program: Final 
Report (Austrahan Capital Territory) 
Crisis lnten'f'!ltion in Aboriginal Family Violence: Summary report (Western Australia) 
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Cnsis fncm'e!Uion in Almiginal Family Violence: Strategies and ModeLs far Western Australia 
(Western Australia) 
ldenci{,ing Family Violence: A Resource Kit for General Pracntioners in NSW (New South Wales) 
Relationship Violence: l\o Way! - Young Men & Relationships Violence Prevention Project 
Posters & Posrcards 
GENERAL PUBLICATIONS & SPECIAL PROJECTS 
Budget Highlights - Budget 1999-2000 
2000-2001 Budget Highlight For Womct (Swtement) 
2001-2002 Budget Highlight For Women (A Message From The Mtmster) 
Women 2000 
Australum Women Working Together 1999- an overview of the activities of Ausrraltan women'~ 
non-government orgamsauons 
Maintaining Our Commitment to Women- Statemenr by the Hon. Judt Moylan MP, 12 May 1998 
Our Commitment w Women -statement by Senator the Hon jocelyn Newman. Minister for 
Social Sccuriry and Minister assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women, 13 May 1997 
Working for Women: Office of the Status of Women- Strategic Directions 2001-2003 
More Choice for Women - statement by Senator the Hon Jocelyn Newman, Minister for Social 
Securiry and Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Srarus of Women, 20 August 1996 
\Vomen and Parliaments in Australia & Neu• Zealand- discussion paper prepared for the 
Commonwealth/State Ministers' Conference on the Status of Women, September 1994 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
Training m rhe Arw of Violence Agamst Women, August 1993 
The Effectit>eness of Protection Orders 
National Rural Domestic Violence Kit 
NCVAW Position Paper on Mediatton 
Community Actittu:les w Violence Against Women - Executive Summary 
Community Attitudes co Violence Against Women - Full Report 
NCVAW Women and Mediation- Information Booklet 1992 
Violence in rht Home: Tht Big Secret 
National Stop Violence Against Women Day poster 
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Domc.;ric Vi,,lcnc~ and Sexual A~ault Leaflets in Community Lan1.ruag~ (Arabtc, &lSntan, 
Chincseftvlandann, Croatian, Englt~. Farsi/Pcrsian, Greek, Italian, Japanese, Khmer, Kurdish 
(Kurmanji), Kurdtsh (Smam), Man·Jonian, Ponuf.,'\JCsc, Ru~tan, Serbian, Spantsh, Tagalog/ 
Filipmu, ThJt, liJ:ngna/Erurcan, Vtctnamcsc 
Read My Ups - r\)S(Cr with text 
Anocha Tue~day Nighr - Video 
INTERNATIONAL AND LEGAL 
SeXIWI ksault Law Reform: A Narional Pe-rspeccite 
Fottrch UN \*'orld Confi!Tence on Wcnnen: Placjonn for Acuun. Australta's Implementation Rep<lrc, 
Aprill9Q7 
IX'omen m Australia: Au.uralw's Thmi Report on lmplem.."'Tltirtg the United nations Contt.'TUion on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Dtscriminauon Against Women 
UN Founh World Conference on Women, Bet)tng Information Ktt, l995 
lJmred Nauons Fnurrh WoriJ Conference on Women 1995 lnfclShcet: ~o 10 
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6.6 Partnerships Phase Two Structural Framework and Projects (OSW, 2001e) 
!Activities 
Outputs/ Products and Future 
Directions 
Education and training 
Service models design and operation 
Perfurmance indicators and best practice 
models 
Funding principles 
I edJcale assooa!ed I 
go:/! egenoes 
I peek bodies ra~su~g l 
-eness 
scope saMces and 
develop best pracuce 
saNtee techni~s 
llfWISe success ot 
integrated 
approaches 
~IT'&n 
·s 
¥00111811'5 safety IR 
home 
develOp econornc 
economc~on 
atJdl! ot lraJ11fl9 
SBMce standarcs 
and comoetendes 
lnagenous urban 
~ 
COIIllTUlty 
responsjblit'{ 
NESBprOjea 
A Business 
A.QQ!.oach 
malong no1se 
ma,or campSJ~ 
~eoote 
1 wauang irco Doors 1 
i'ESB Carnp81~ 
lraroel Gf~s 
PoUcy (0\' & SIT) 
Funders(C¥1 & SIT) 
Services (SIT) 
~ 
Community & 
Individuals 
round 1- graniS 
round 2 - major 
.e!21ea5 
round 2 .capaoty 
bulldi~ 
romd 3 • Capaaty 
btllclulg 
urplementllllOII-
:s 
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6.7 Partnerships Phase Two Framework (OFW, 2005d) 
Partnen.hips Agaimt DomeMic Violence I About the Initiative I A new National Dome... Page I of6 
MINISTER ASSISTING THE PRIME MINISTER FOR WOMEN'S ISSUES I WINDOW ON WOMEN I 
PARTNERSHIPS AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE I APPOINTWOMEN I NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR 
THE ELIMINATION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
Office for 
Women 
PartnershipS 
Against 
Domestic 
Violence 
SITE MAP 
Yoo are ~ere: Home About 1tle Partnerships Against Domestic V10lerce ln»iative 1 A nfNI National 
Domestic Violence Framework 1 Framework 
About the Partnerships Against Domestic Violence 
Initiative 
~ ''o•·. ~ipsAg:un;t { r..1;i ' uomCSIK ¥io!tme 
ABOUT THE 
PARTNERSHIPS AGAINST 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
INITIATIVE 
Whalll Pllttn"""'Ps• 
HaN d d Plrlne<Pips &tart? 
Parlneflhpol Pho .. 1 ""d 
Phaoa2 
'Mlo is rnpon._ (a 
l'amenllpo? 
Nallonal Ewlull·on ol 
Pa""erattpo l'hooes1 and 2 
A new 1\II>Cn• Dcnestc 
Vaenca FrenewaK 
POLICY. PLANNING AND 
SERVICE DELIVERY 
Partnfl1111ps mswrces ond 
putj•calorw 
Ceonnghousa 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
HELP 
Wl•t help IS OV!IIablo? 
Exr1p• d dOf'l'ootc "'olence 
lnlormabon abaiA domesbc 
v.alencetn Au"tnha 
A BUSINESS APPROACH 
~~ Portnt11h~ A9ll'mt Ooml\lic Violtro 
Framework for Developmg Approaches to Domestic 
Violence 2001-2003 
Preamble 
PartnersiHps Against Domestic ViOlence was if,i:ia:ed by Heads o< 
Gov!!IT'ments in 1997 to worl< toge:her towarcs :lle common goal or 
preventing domestic violence ccross Aus:rafia and amehora:ing hs effects 
T~e iritiative grew out of a neec for a coordina:eo approach to the 
problem. More than two decades of ciligent e~ort by woolen's 
representatives, go•emmen:s and ser.ice pro,icers had resut.ed in a 
multi:uo'e orvanfl(l and some!imes corl'loc:ing re:>!l'>I'SPS ard approact-as 
The emphasis of Partmtrsllips was. therefore. on ceveloping knowleOge 
about wl'at ac!~ally worl<s best- tes:irg ard researching new ways o' 
addressing domestic vlolerce. enhancing ard sharirg knowledge, 
developing ard dOaJmen:ing good pradce ard educating the ComtTI(.ni:y 
Partnerships begar as a coali:ior. o' individuals anc projects loosely 
focussed di'OUrd a set of ~area principle~ 81'10 priority il'emes Over :lle 
ensuing three and a half years. it developed into a cohesive partrers~ip 
between Commonweett/'. S:a:e and Tenitory represen:a:ives who st-are 1. 
commOf' ~nders:andi11g of domestic violence, the treore!ical explara:iOf'S 
about i:s na:ure ard t~e mos: appropriate means o' addres.sirg it in 
di"'enng contex1S 
Understandings about domestic violence 
~mesjc violence occurs !Mlen ore partrer in a relationship attempts by 
physical or psycholosical means to comi1101:e and control t~e otrer. It is 
generally ~noers:ood as gendered violence. anc is an abuse of power 
within a relationship or alter separatiOf'. In tl"e large majort.y of cases :he 
offender is male and tre victim female Ch1ldran and young people are 
profoundly arected by domestic vtolence. both as wilr'esses and as 
victims . 
http:!/ ofw. facl. .gov .a ulylad v/0 t /framework_2.htm I 31/0512005 
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Partne!'!.hip~ Agail'l!.t Domestic Violence I About the Initiative I A new National Dome... Page 2 of6 
I CONTACT us Many Abonginal and Torres Strait Islander commuri:ies pre'er the tem• 
~amtly Vlolerce'. 'Fam1ly' covers a ciVerse range of ties o:mut\J&I 
obligaoon ana s~ppor1. anc perpe:ratcn ard vichms of family violl'f1Ce cat 
lrclude. for example, aur.ts, Lndes. cousirs arc ch~dren of pnevJoos 
rela!ioosrips. 
Jomestic or family violence may involve a Wide ranse of behaviours. 
lrcluding: physical abiJSe, sext.al abuse. spirit~a l ab\Jse: verbal abuse: 
emo:ioral abuse. social abLse: ano economic atx.se 
Polley ard serviCe rasporses :o domestic violence are sraped accorcirg 
to bel1e's. assumptiors ard ll"eorias aboot ~ow and wt-y 1:. occurs . A 
number or paraaiQms have been ioenan&d. basec or di!fenrg vcllues ano 
perspee1ives .. Not ell ere compatible, and some are contradic:ory 
Eariy :heories rocussec on idertifying and treating irdividual or irdlvldLal 
family 'ceflc•encies' whicl: were Lnderstooa to precispose :hemlo usirg o 
bl>ing s~.bjeei ::o v10lence Approaches based solely or. SI.:Ch models 
lgnora sigrftcarn causal 'adors. one are rON considered lrappropria:e. 
Later theones toca:ed violence as a reac:JOn :o sociological struct\Jras arc 
irstitiJtions. or as a reflection or patnarchal s:ructuras In society. More 
recent ll"eories take a mora comprerensive view of the individ~al witNn 
:h cor:ex: or ll"e broader soc•ety. Domes:lc VIOlence is seen as anstrJl 
~ a complex in:erac:ior beMeen. on t~e ore hero. pervasive poli:ical 
arc social stn.c!\Jras ir1 whic~. wom~n J;ererally have less power thm 
men. anc or :he o:her irdtvioiJal responses :o trose structures 
Understandings about partnerships 
To improve tre experiences of women ana children needing help, era to 
l'l>d~ce t~elavel of oomestic violence wi:hin Austratian sodl!ty. 
coordiration. 1r :egrauon ard corsis:ency of domes lie violence services 
arc interven:iors are critical. Par'Jlerships provide a means of achieving 
~.he necessary coopera:ior. 
Etfec:ive partnPr>hps are required betwelll'1 levels of government. 
bl>tween service delivery agencies and between tre range of 
pro'essionals irvolved ir domestic violence. At ·;t,e highes: policy level, 
:11ere is nAPd for Rn orgoirg commitmerl ro acNevrg cnmmon standarcs 
ere protocols. Quatity comparable data ard coord•ratior trroughoot tre 
l>Brvice sys:em from prevention and primary researcr :rrough to :er.iary 
level in:erventions. Wrthin such a framework. comm~nr.y level 
partnerships will be lacil ita~ed to pursue consistent evidence-basec 
epproeches as well as coordinating local 5ervices according to local 
needs 
Sustaining the learning - a strategic approach 
In 2001. a secorc pl'dSe of Partnarsri~ was initiated to corsohcate the 
4ndings to dale . both about domestic violence ard about partnersrips. 
and ;o E!X!ena them. The chaUerge is to translate the practical end 
;heoretical underst&rcings into a corerent end sustair1able rational 
strategy for the fulllre. Based or :11e foundation laid in Per.rerships One. 
the following s7ategic framework has been developec :o ~rderpir 
Partrershl()s Two ard beyono. 
http://of w. fae!>.go" .au/pad v/0 1/fr.unework_ 2 htm I 3110512005 
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VIsion 
Ar1 Australiar ciJM1! tht wJ11 no: tolera:e violence anc a community tra: 
will work tose:h<lr to eijnW!ate violerce. 
Principles 
1 Allr~dividuels t-a\'6 tl'e ng~lto lrve free from violence. Violence an( 
:he !llr~at of violence egains: women is e ft.ndamen12l violation o' 
·.~>Pir ruman rigrts 
2. Domestic violence is an eoose o' power perpetrated mainly by nlt'r 
against won1en and is rein'orced and condoned through complex 
interactions between individuals and tt'etr environments 
3. All forms of domestic violence artl ~nacceptable in any group. 
re~a rdlass or cul:ure or creed 
4. DnnlPStic lliolPrce is an ksue thai a 'feels the whole communi:y an• 
demal1ds a whole of commurt:y response 
5. The rea~on5 aon~esic viol~rce Pxisls and is condored are complf! 
erd fl!GLire a r~nge o' responses 
6. Tre sa'e:y erd weft-beirg cl :hose subJected to don1estic violer.ce 
rnu51 b8 :te fir.;: prionty for ary response 
7. Those wro use violpnca mLSt take resporsibility for th91f bahalliou 
8. Ads or dOITll'stic violence tra: cons~:~:te a criminal o~erce ~st bf 
daat. wi:h as suer 
9. The prevention end reouc:ion of domas:ic violence requtres strorg 
govemmert ana coovnurity lt!adership to: 
- Cl1!1t.e 111:egratea. coorcina:ed ard coUaborative responses 
-build community reso~n:es ard capacity. 
Objectives 
1. Adcress the tmmadia:e and long-:erm tmpac:s ol domes:ic vtolei1Cf 
ard Indigenous family violence or. women and children, and the 
social and ~tnancial costs to the con1muney 
2. Er>~.na an relevdntpohcies end !.ervices are responsive to ci>'erstt) 
and ci~erence ircltJdtng: racial. cui Mal. and fir~istic diversity. anc 
geraer. age. s~>~uabty . dtSabilt:y and seog-apt>y 
3. Establish sL-st&inable panrersrips be:v.een alle~els of 
govemmar1 anc the Wider c~ri:y to prevert ard reduce 
domestic violence 
4, Adlie\'IJ a whole r:J goverrmanl respoose :hrot.gh rele~ent policy 
ard programma c~c.r.QRS in the areas o' heal:/' ,lasal. justice. soct;; 
ard economic policy 
5. ES1abltsh a conSis:ent and cooratnatad approadl :a vtolence 
rre~en:ior and in:erventions in aU relevan: service systems 
ind~ding c:ornrr.Jnity, income sopport, health, legal. JUStice, 
housing. ard aduca:ion 
6. Erable complementary and collaborative policy. programme. and 
http://ofw.fao:s.go".au/padv/OI/framework_2.html 3110512005 
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serv1ce delivery grounded in agreed concepts anc approaches 
7 Promote sustainable services and interventions underpinned by 
evidence-basea practice 
8. Buad wstainable safe commurny environments 
9. Develop mec~anisms for the cooperative development. transfer 
and use of research amongst on teres led parties 
Goal 
To establish a whola·O'-s;overrvnert epproa~ that mduces ena preveriS 
domestic violence in Australia 
GOAl 
v.tlOit-01·--to•O>a<~l'llt~­
Dff"'''tf''tr·oorntU( ..ottntt n AtJe-a.ll 
2ill2M.U ~ 
c.~ .... ~oc~.~ ... c.mr.-t!O 
((JII.JbOflt"./t~ 
- ..... bl<ld 
ana 'ff'Ac:'f Otht'Y lop toe~ 
Outcomes, Strategies and Performance Indicators 
OUTCOME 1: Safe Communllles 
Au;.rallan commuri:ies. both of s~ared interest and o' place, rejec: 
violence end: 
• build anc sustain safe commurity envirorments 
• ~ave e'fective and appropriate commurity and service slrategies 
• value, acknoMedg& and support diveffilty and difference 
Strategies 
t . Identify and spread 
~nderstaJ'lding of the human. 
social and financial cost of 
oomesjc violence to 
communities 
2. Promote. support and engage 
wi:h strong commurity 
leadership that rejec'.s 
violence 
3 Buid oommunity capacities to 
reject and mspond 10 violence 
and develop community 
http://ofw. facs. gov .au/pad v/0 1/fra me work_2. htm I 
Performance Indicators 
• Reduction in oncidence. 
severi:y and impact of 
domes:ic violence as measun 
by social irdicators 
• Reriuction in women's levels 
of fear of violence 
• Level of availability o' 
appropriate domestic violenCE 
services to all commurlties of 
place ard Interest 
• lncmased awareress and 
responsiveness of commuri1y 
31/0512005 
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resilience 
4. ~eso~rce communi1y 
organise :ions to provide 
appropria:e anc e'feclive 
resporses 
level service providers to 
domestic violence issues for 
their client groLp 
• lncreasec panicipajor in arc 
leadersrip of community 
activi:ies to COLnter domestic 
violence 
OUTCOME 2: Coordinated and Collabor;atlve Polley and Service 
O.Uvery 
Sustainable par.ner..hips between all levels or government and ll'e wicer 
commuri:y to provioe seamless and holistic resporses that· 
• Preven: and reduce domestic violence by aedressing :he: 
- immeci<r.e and lorg-term impacts of dome; tic violerce and 
lncigenous family violence or. women and chidren, and 
- social and r111ercial cos:s ~o the commurity 
• empcwver ard meet the neacs ere diversity of service 1.1sers ard 
their commLni~es 
• mal<imlse e'!ective use of avail~ble reso~.~rces ll1rough ~exible 
fording ammgemerts respoosive to communi:y need. and 
• are evtdEnc~basec best1ll'l!c:ice 
Strategies 
1. qeview and develop models 
ana approaches to implement 
f111dirgs from research and 
eviderce-based practice 
2. Ma1~tain exis:ing par.rershir;s 
to s~s:ai~ s:rong. sEfe 
comn1Lnl1ies. and develop 
new ones 
3. EstabliSh irtagrated. 
complementary arc 
colaborabve policy, 
programmas ard service 
delivery iri:iatives t~at 
adcness immeo1aie ard long· 
term social and ftranciel costs 
and: 
- give priority to :he safety and 
wel~eing or :l-ose subjected 
to comestic violence 
- develop urderstandirg of :t>e 
interac:ive aspects. anc 
• reduce risk ard increase 
resilience o' ir.di•iouals anc 
~nities 
http://ofw.fncs.gov.aufpadv/OI/framework_2.html 
Performanca indicators 
• lmplemertatior of agreed 
pnnciples ard s:ra:egies of 
the framework throughout the 
service system 
• Increase in ano e':'ectflleress 
or collaborif.ion llf>:ween 
differer t levels of goverrmert 
bLsirless and communi1y 
sec:ors (eg. Bus~ness 
partnersrips, agreemen:S) 
• level of targe:ed fl.ndirg 
coml1lments 'rx celivery o' 
dorne:>bc violence service arc 
responses by relevant areas 
or an governments 
• l evel of accessibility. visibility 
ard in:eQra·ior. o~ tre :>ervica 
system 
31/0512005 
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Top of Pa;Je 
Key web Slles from Of>lV 
OUTCOME 3 Commitment to Evldenc•basad Approaches 
Policies. fLI'(llrg arra~liemerr5 servic~ delive<y ard prac:ice are based 
on i!!ir&ad concepts &rd principles throuQ~ commitmen; to and 'uncir.g o' 
• researcto. mor>noring ~rd evalua:ion, ed\.catior ar.d :ramir.g 
• as:;l>ssmert Gnd appliCation of new or emerg;rg tec~r.olo!;ies and 
approaches 
• documen:atlon ar.c dissemination o• emerg1rg f~ndmgs anc 
knowlec:ge. and 
• orgoing community oebate and engagemer: 
Strategies 
1 Establi">h mechanisms ror the 
conaborative develapmert. 
trllnsfer erd use or research 
by all s:&keholders 
2. Ma~allr a commi:mert to 
or going ilrO rew I'll search 
arc ce~alopmart iniJaaves 
that addl'llss and prograss the 
~~les 
3. lmplementevaiLatior and 
research fl'cings ir. policy and 
service deliVery 
4 AUdit :he e!f&CJV!II'f!SS Of 
govemmen: polides. 
1nbalives and service 
OL:comes against :re 
fram&YIOrl< pnnC1ple5 
5. Orgarg eouca:ion and 
training :hat Is continuously 
tnfomll!d by research arc 
development ini:latllies 
P.'aintair commi:mer tto aU 
relavr: service sec:ors and 
ec~catioral ins:i!IJ'ions 
Performance Indicators 
• Level o! research and 
development 
• Level o' access to. 
accep;ance cf, end uptake of 
research findings ard policy 
principles :1-I'OI.Q~OLtthe 
service sys:em 
• Level o' capacity of local 
communr.i!!S :o apply choice. 
unders:andifl!; ana skils to 
develop loc;;l sol~'tions :o locc 
problems 
• All domes:ic violerce service' 
demorstra!e l!'liderce-basec 
prec:lce. best practice 
principles ard coo:inua.s 
Improvement infom1ed by 
ongoing research and 
evaluation 
FEEDBACK COPYRIGHT AND DISCLAIMER PRIVACY 
OW Partnerstlps Aganst Domesll: Violence! ~potnl~ ' \VIOdaw on Women women gJv au 
Austnllian Gov9IIY'l!!tll O"ice ra Wonen 
D9p811meft o' FaMily and CoMnJn.ly Services- Box 7788 Canb.ra Mai Cenie ACT 2610 
-elephone 1800 Bal863- racsimole •61 6212 2497 • Cnail wcmen@!acs gov.au 
L81St motifed. 02-May-2005 
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6.8 Partnerships Explanations of Domestic Violence 
(Strategic Partners, 2003a, pp.1 0-12) 
F ratneYIOI1t BIOiogicaf l ndMdual SoCial Stressors and 
0etermi1ISITI Pathology IndiVidual Risks 
leyfh._s • S:::cic • Medico rrcdel SV3tems theory bclogy • Psycnoono·yt c . Excho~g• '"•OOV 
• SJ"'ivo! of • "e-soncl s!ress 11eso;..-ce•~•OtY 
to-e spec<M 
• lnttJt· • S;,.b<J rvre of 
• town O'& g&I'IIII'Otioncl vio1e.,ce 
MOde Ita theories 
way. 
• Socrollec.-rmg 
• Dystunchof'ol 
;o"nn;oet 
fmplccrlions • Foc~o~s~or • Develocmeot of . Foc.r.es on d~dyrng 
!Of ···•-h hOw ml tccton I~ gro<..ps 1n the dom81t c . ~eseo'C" locus populotron 
violence IS a on seotct>."g 'or consderec most 
not~ rot fcctooslhot morg•no rsed a~o 
iruhctof o'~Jd,spose and moslltl ely to come to 
men who or co!)se 1"8 ellen bono' 
an> ac.,.,es'Jc outhooles and/or 
nt!ponOt"g VIOlence usmg humor serv1ees 
to h-."'80b ,l": os o "8S\.o to~ v'oJe,.ee 
f1-er 
envi<OnMenl 
lmpicalions • Ant..l"'\4?'iC • Funchng of • Po-q focus on ~.-pet-otors csyc~otog co· morg•NJ nee groves !Of ,olicy 
ofvicience 1wvicesa,.d • Prog!'OMS 101 Men [-, 
018/Wibe rreofol"eo' th Ong&' 'TIOnoge'T"ent 
,.., o-.d al m~e,._,e,.honJ end si'11SS rebe' 
vicllr>svJil • "ocus on • Hogh •.si< grO<.ps beviQrre., dV3Ivnchono req..,re rrle<venltons Ol~is: 
'a-ni_ e1 .r.. the e.g. dec' wth l.,e 
bc:ogi<:aly COMm!.n.ly. "causes" - alcohOl. detenmn~. drvgs. 
uneMployment. 
hoMeleunaSJ 
Power and Interactive Systems 
Oppression and lndivldu.lls 
• Polr.otchy- 'Tla'e . ntegooted 
str..,ctvrol power ""eort~lcol 
• Pu~ond e•pcnohons 
~nvo·e dorro ".S • Mul"rple pe"Spect v~ 
• Ge'"'<l&r O"'Oiysis, "' c:>existence 
• VIQlence OJC 
"choice .n confe..t" 
• Focus on worre~ • lleeo to research the 
os v~hms o"<l de•ocfive aspects 
0"6!1'1 OS • Approaches to 
~erperroton reduce ns< end 
• F:xus on now enl'.once '8S lienee 
roc.a and • Con .nves~gote hew 
cul!vrol proc"Ces r.~:tol cvi"Vr• . 
succetl v•olence heter:lS8X.JO, 
OQ01n1t \'\IOrT'&!": oc'Tlir.cnce and 
hcmophobo o~d 
'OC~sm pui ... p 
porhcl/or bame-. IOf 
\YOrne~ 0'"'0 ther 
chilo'8n 
• ~undrngfcrc~s • A 'oows fe< brood 
trterve~to"'' oelin fion of ·to only' 
• •erpe"I'Ofor • Educot.>n or.d 
>:rogroms com 'TIUnrly 
prov•ded oeveopmenl a., 
cde-cclo..g 
companents o~ a 
'85pon>e 
• Corsstent v.•th 
gov.,.-ment poicre• 
o-: commun.ty 
caoacry ouilo.-g 
end susie r.at>:rly 
• Con .ntegrote culfl;ro. 
OVe"'.iyand 
.r.d geno"s fom•ly 
violence , .. ~o "'he 
Mode 
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Framework Btological IndiVidual Social Stressors and Power and lnteractJve Systems 
Oetemlinism Pathology IndiVidual Risks Oppressoo and Individuals 
lmpUcations • Provide.s on • l!'\0- VIOIJO I ~aed • ~e pro !)fa"" 1S In !r~e • Menorethe • Co'TV"'.dy needs to 
&xc.,.,se for t-eotme~t to forr.Jy ondlor problem to~e responSJbi5ty ~or 
lor behov.ov!. chonge or.o su::cutlure. • Women o·•·e seen o violohon of 
Own.,shlp ore !nerefore OS community cohwS:On 
oe"!000~1 v clmsfs.;'Vivor; crod weltbe;ng 
responstble. 
Implications • Cn,tno- • Cnminoge•c • CnM1r.ot justiCe end • Domes!<: v.o.ence • oomesiJc VIOierce 
Q&r\C 010flir.g 1n~ervent.on isocnmnol con be "explotneo" lor JusHce proli.ng 
• Cnminol jushce respo•ses tho! o•e ofence b w!rl IS,,. o crime 
• CnMinol resooMse torgeted m o•eos end not occeptot>e. 
11-sfice whe·e !here .s <I'OWn 
response to be high levels of 
dOMes~c v10 ence 
lmpHcalions • Menneeo!o • Sosed 01" r!T • Focus on o-ogro-ns • <ccus on Men • Everyone 1 hurl b1 
be frtuned 'acto,a'>d oro...nd -nproved tckng o.v. lot l'revenHon how~o oresurred soool rteo;:~cton. responsobi . ty. • l"c~tive OOj)f'OOC'"&S 
.. ber.ove" causes 'dent fy • Qemove I"& •cot..ses• • &ut<::i •g poshve w">eh norre 
end ccriro.' those most ol such 05 mol ng re ohorshtps ll<perences 
lr&ir ru~ tn 'o rnit&S access to alcohol. 
• WoMen's t-g"'t !'O • Deahng w !h r.s( end 
violence. a·d work on 
o so'e camMunoty •esilience 
• Wo,..en tndiVtdual 
• P"even~o· o•o eart1 
need to choroctenst.cs 
1e<w. !"OW to l o prevent inlervennon. 
pro!ec~ ~.lure voeler.ce 
l~e-rse'ves. 
lmpftcations • or'fic.::tto • Mcncgement • Tcrgete:l ocp'OOcn • Pemove women • Wame• or.o chtd'&~ 
l'lonoge would be to domes I c VIC'eoce and chkfren to s~ppor'ed end rna• 
for ··~si> t~e around t~ai tc~es account of sofelsec .. re ·erroveo 
Management way l~:r.gs destgm•g o~d Ire social enwor.ment • C ear messages from 
ore". supporltng e~wo•menl's tmpoc! policy a"<< couo1s 
• Fccus on ~erv•ces for on dorres'lc obowl '9spo•sibli'y. 
protec~on tndividuols fo v·o·e~ce. 
of wo'l\9• chonge 
and chldren cehovoour 
from rrce 
i vl()l&nce 
lmpUcalions for lnt.rvention 
Aduft • Provide sofa • f•divd.o' • Target a·lower socio- • Awareness '0 s rg . Na'l'ltnQ lh~l" 
Survlvon 
occorrMOd change economic ore<J5 . Err power women e~perences and 
ohon end • 8te0<1ng CO· • tno-eose women's to make chooces leeli•gs 
end Victims protection dependency undersfcnd1r.g of 
• Oomestc . !de•ltfVlng d scourses from the howrrucll.rc v ole•ce .:so "hot cho le•ge 
moe slreucl\con C"ne 'loenc:e end obu<e 
violence prec spose men to 
• tnforrroilon or.o o'fer prefe-:-ed v·Oet~ce 
• Po •I col oc1Tv1y 
ways of beong 
. Prov~oon of '9Sources 
to WOMan who WISh 
to eave voo!ence 
-e:oi!O~sh os 
. Decrease 5\ruct~ro 
s!resson 
. trrpeme"'ll • Gelling tid o! • To-get a• lower socio- • Cnmtnol sonc:l•o•s . tntervenhons foe JS c• 
'•rpelrators 
lege o•gerond economtc areas 
• G'O~ps lor Mentohr.g 
reMed.es to 'n.stroton • S~oppor' to oblotn perpnol011 •esoons.o lily IO' lhe., 
stco rre ... ·s • Anger e'Tlployr'l9nf . Erm.r.ng men use of vio ence. I 
use of rronogetr~en t lore "esoors oTty . 11uo'orce c::mir-<:1 
I 
VIOI9n>Ce 
• Streng roelure of !he oct. 
cehovourol 
'oc..,s 
Children l . tdenf.'y . Boseoo~ • Tc.r;et o! lower soc1o-- Awareness ros rg • See a!!emotives. 
t"cse atnsk tndividua!s 01' econoMic: areas !nrcugll tdentfya•o 
Young based or. groups berg • s .. ppo,.. young CO'Tlmur fy c~a.lenge t•e 
'•opt. por&n!s' tder.h'ied os 'ol peoole •o rerro111 at eouca,or. OO'Tltncnt 
e><pe·enc~ ns~· school • Gercer re.o•rcrJ vnde<sto~c •gs 
end piece • l~diY(:fuol . f>oovide educa~on • Enco~roge • Pe<:os;nse IMpoct on t~arT"\.i"'"Cet I&C'Tli'Q end r&lO.?Ces ec:vroc-e c'lildren as wei 05 
survelar.ce reo"JC•ih!pS yc~or.; a.ople. 
• Porent.ng • Frov<:le eo•y SI.Cocri 
programs fer for chtod'&n. 
women 
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6.9 Women's Safety Agenda (OFW, 2005i) 
OfW- Women's Safety~-Ehmuwion of Violence file :II/C:/Doc:umen~o20and-..20Semo@S/Admlnistnuortol0Access ... 
I of l 
MINISTER ASSISTING THE PRIME MINISTER FOR WOMEN' S ISSUES I WINDOW ON WOMEN I 
AUSTRALIA SAYS NO I WOMEN.GOV.AU 
WOMEN AND THE LAW 
FAMILIES AND CHILDREN 
EQUALITY FOR WOMEN 
WOMEN' S SAFETY 
AGENDA-EL IMINATION 
OF VIOLENCE 
Ellmlnotlon of VIolence In the 
Uvea of Women 
Domoatlc Viole nco Holp 
Vlo,.nco Agai nst 
Womon-Austrolla Says No 
Oomostk: Violence 
C .. aringHouao 
Australian Centre for tho 
Study of sexual Assault 
Australian lnslltute of 
Criminology 
Provloua lnltlatlviS 
e:m~~ffll Oomesbc 
PADV Put*catlOIIS and 
PresenlabonS 
PADV Resources lor Bu<JneSs 
Sexual Assau~ 
WORK AND EDUCATION 
LEADERSHIP AND 
CONSUL TA TlON 
APPOINTWOMEN 
-WOMEN ON BOARDS 
INTERNA TlONAL 
INTER·GOVERNMENT 
LIAISON 
NETWORKS 
WOMEN IN AU STRALIA 
STATISTICS 
PUBLICATIONS 
Office for 
Women 
ABOUT US I CONTACT US I SITE MAP I HELP 
Locatoon Home 1 Women's Safety Agenda - Ehmmatlon o# VIOlence 
Women's Safety Agenda - Elimination of 
Violence 
In lila 2005 Budget the Australian Government announced its $75 7 miOton 
commitment to continue to taka a IMd role in elim1nebng domestic violence 
and aexuelessault in the Australian Community. 
The Women's Safety Agenda addresses four broad themes - prevention, 
health, justice and services. Together they 111m to decrease the Impacts of 
domestic violence and sexual assault upon lila community by build1ng on the 
achie1111ments of the Partner3h/p& Against Domashc V10lence Initiative and the 
Nationellnitieliva to Combat Sexual A$$ault , increasing et1ention on 
preventing violence and early intervention and support for those affact8d by 
violeme. 
The measure includes: 
Re-running the successful national Violence Against 
Women. Australia Says No campaign 
This national multlmad111 campa~gn will build on lila success of lila 2004 
C4mpaign and INIII Intnsasa community 11111111raness of the issues of domestic 
violence and sexual assaull Through 11 24-hour help line, the campaign will 
proVIde precticalessista.nce to those experiencing violence, to friends end 
t.nity who want to know whet they can do to help end assJStance to those 
wanting to change their VIolent behaVIour. 
Continued funding for the Australian Domestic and 
Family Violence Clearinghouse and the Australian 
Centre for the Study of Sexual Assault 
These nabonal resource centres Will continue to provide central points for the 
collection and dissemination of Australian domestic end family violence and 
sexual assault policy, practlte and research. 
Research projects on domestic violence and sexual 
assault 
This element will fund research and pilot projects concerning domestic violence 
end saxualessault in the Australian community It will enhance previously 
developed research and good practice 
Training for nurses in regional and rural areas 
510312009 9:09 AM 
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O!W- Women's Safely Agalda- Eliminalion of Violence file:II/C~2oand'o20Sttti.ogs/Admmistratm.20ActeU. .. 
2of2 
Top of Page 
~e· -eb sites from OfW 
P111Cbce nurses in reg1onal and rural areas win receive training to ass1st them to 
identify and respond to domestic violence and doctors will receive assistance 
to release the nurses for this training. This wdl give people in regional areas 
access to e personal and confidential referral service 
Training for the criminal justice sector on sexual assault 
This eltment will develop tra1mng for the legal sector to ensure that ~ is 
ettuned to the sensitivities thet eccompany women's experiences of sexual 
asseull Research has highlighted the important rote of the crim1nel justice 
sector in determining whether a victim of sexual assauH proceeds through the 
legal system. 
Dedicated resource at the Australian Institute of 
Criminology 
This will continue the valuable research programme on various aspects of 
sexuel essaull 
Mensline 
This funding recognises the demend on Mensline's services that will be 
generated through the riH'Unning of the Violence Against Women. Austrelie 
Seys No cempaign end will provide counsellors et Mansline with training end 
metenels on domestic VIOlence 
FEEDBACK I COPYRIGHT I DISCLAIMER I PRIVACY 
OfW 1 Wind(IN on Women 1 women.gov.aul Australia Says No 
Australian Govwnment 0111ca for Women 
Department of Family end COmmunHy Services- Box 7788. Canberra MaD centre ACT 2610 
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Chapter 7 Appendices - Male Violence Against Women 
Community Education Campaigns 2001-2007 
7.1 Quotes summarising relevant key findings from the Partnerships 1 Community 
Awareness and Education Meta-evaluation Report 
7.2 Summary of findings from the research report on young people and domestic 
violence 
7.3 Summary of similarities between relationship violence and sexual assault in 
campaign developmental research commissioned by OSW 
7.4 Summary of findings specific to sexual assault in campaign developmental research 
commissioned by OSW 
7.5 Strategic considerations for No Respect, No Relationship from the developmental 
research 
7.6 No Respect, No Relationship original advertisements from the mass media 
component of the campaign 
7. 7 Key components of the No Respect, No Relationship communications and public 
relations strategy 
7.8 Violence Against Women- Australia Says No Magazine Advertisement 
7.9 Violence Against Women- Australia Says No Transcripts of Television 
Advertisements 
7.10 Violence Against Women- Australia Says No Brochure 
7.11 Violence Against Women- Australia Says No Poster 
7.12 Violence Against Women- Australia Says No Campaign Booklet 
7.13 Violence Against Women- Australia Says No Indigenous Campaign Booklet 
7.14 Violence Against Women- Australia Says No Campaign Website 
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7.1 Quotes summarising relevant key findings from the Partnerships 1 Community 
Awareness and Education Meta-evaluation Report (Strategic Partners, 2003b). 
" ... education based in the community is a more effective approach than national media 
campaigns, although it was recognized that they could be complementary. Most participants 
stressed the need for community education to be specific to a target community, and 
developed in conjunction with that community. . .. Sustainability, legacy and a focus on 
changing behaviours - not just attitudes - should be key considerations for future initiatives 
of this type" (p.15). 
"Health promotion activities in relation to domestic violence are therefore not particu larly 
suited to a solely mass-media advertising approach -simple messages or slogans requiring 
simple behavioural change [due to their potentially serious unintended consequences]. 
Mass-media approaches would be more effective if their aim was to simply increase 
awareness of an issue, and if these were supported by other approaches for information 
provision and behaviour change, such as media-based editorials or drama works, or 
community based education activities and support services" (p.30). 
"All strategies begin with the client. Rather than attempting to make an audience accept and 
carry out the marketer's values and beliefs, practitioners of social marketing recognise 
clients will only change their behaviour when they recognise it is in their interests. It is 
therefore essential to start with an understanding of the target audience's needs and wants, 
its values and perceptions ... Competition is always recognised; every choice by the cl ient 
involves giving up some other action. What the client sees as major alternatives must 
always be kept in mind so the deficiencies of these alternatives can be highlighted and the 
benefits of the new behaviour promoted" (p.31 ). 
" ... raising community awareness may even be detrimental to the community as a whole, 
and to affected individuals in particular, when awareness is raised with no additional 
investment in service provision and skills development. Given the prevalence of domestic 
violence and the relatively low level of service usage in Australia (ASS 1996), raising 
community awareness has the potential to awaken latent demand for domestic violence 
services. This is particularly the case if awareness raising is combined with a call for 
community or individual action. This factor should be taken into account when establishing 
a comprehensive multi-faceted package to response to, address and prevent domestic 
violence" (p.40). 
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"The critical long-term aim of domestic violence prevention community education is a 
reduction in the prevalence of domestic violence both currently and in future generations. 
This fundamental outcome is sometimes neglected in the development of campaigns that 
my focus on the more achievable and measurable objectives such as changing attitudes 
and brand recognition" {p.41 ). 
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7.2 Summary of findings from the report on young people and domestic violence 
(National Crime Prevention, 2001, pp.23-24) 
Summary of Findings with Preventative Significance 
Given the interactive nature of macr<>- and mtcr<>-level influences, and the role of 
soctoeconomtc marginalisatlon In the use of and support for vtolence, educative programs 
that include positive parenting have prevention value. Chtldren who recerve educational and 
supportive asststance wtll also be helped in their long term adJustment. 
Early intervention for at risk children and adolescents (before the onset of violent 
behaviours). has more potential for prcventton than addressing prevention in a rearguard 
action. 
In adolescence, peers are influential in reinforctng beliefs about violence. Prevention 
programs, whether in schools or in the community. need to make posittve use of peer 
tnvolvement. 
Preventative programs should be underpinned by theory and be multifaceted. to reflect 
the roles and intersectiOns of macr<>- and mlcr<>-level factors: class, gender, community 
culture, family/indiVidual circumswnces. They should also reflect an understanding of 
both the role and limttattons of attttudes and their influence on behaviour. 
The understandings, beliefs and attitudes of young men and young women, and tndeed, 
of both partners in a vtolent relationshtp, need to be addressed; and, ultimately, more 
open and dtrect forms of communication taught and encouraged. 
Prevention strategtes need to be spectfically targeted to the client group. This applies 
as much across age and gender groups as it does across cultural groups. For particular 
cultural groups, the issue needs to be problematised by the broader membership of the 
communtty wtth, ideally, their intenstve tnvolvement tn planmng and delivering programs. 
Relattonship v1olence prevention programs should not be subsumed by a focus on confliCt 
resolution sKills, an outcome lent support by many CTS-based findings of ·gender symmetry' 
which tend not to measure or explain serious Violence and how and why it is used. 
Programs tn the mass media which convincingly show the negattve outcomes of violence 
(eg reject.on) and positive ways of communtcatlng could be useful in guiding young people' s 
beliefs about violence. 
Institutions and sporting organisattons need to d•scourage violence. 
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7.3 Summary of similarities between relationship violence and sexual assault in 
campaign developmental research commissioned by OSW (OSW, 2003a, p.16} 
• There is strong support from young people, their parents and other stakeholders for a 
government led awareness campaign to place the issue on the public agenda; 
• there is a need to inform young people about the extent and prevalence of violence, 
particularly sexual assault, in intimate relationships and dating; 
• young people's relationships are varied and complex and age and experience 
significantly influence attitudes and behaviours about sexual relationships; 
• young people are confused about how to behave towards each other, often 
misunderstand each other and require relationship skills development to improve their 
capacity to form non-violent relationships; 
• young people believe that their peers and the media has an influence on their 
attitudes and behaviours around relationship violence and sexual assault; 
• gender roles and expectations (about 'commitment' and sex) play a role in relationship 
violence/sexual assault; 
• young people hold a number of misconceptions including that a woman's behaviour 
can contribute to relationships violence/sexual assault (eg 'provocation' and 
flirting/teasing) and that consensual sex as a result of pressure is normal; and 
• relationship violence and sexual assault are often associated with young people's 
lifestyles (eg. excessive alcohol consumption and drug use) 
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7.4 Summary of findings specific to sexual assault in campaign developmental 
research commissioned by OSW (OSW, 2003a, pp.16-17) 
• Participants had difficulty in clearly defining when inappropriate sexual behaviour in 
relationships is sexual assault; 
• the community is not comfortable in analysing terminology and issues surrounding 
sexual assault; 
• consent and perceived consent emerged as a particularly difficult issue. Males and 
females in the study strongly believed that misinterpreting and misunderstanding 
communication or the signals given between two people in regard to sexual intentions 
represents a critical issue; 
• the use of pressure to have sex is normalised behaviour. For some men pressure 
was euphemistically seen as 'seduction' or 'persuasion' and regarded as acceptable 
within a relationship. Women are less prepared to place blame solely on the male if 
they consent to sex under pressure; and 
• irrespective of knowledge that a high proportion of perpetrators are known to the 
victim, many still preferred to think of sexual assault perpetrators as strangers. 
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7.5 Strategic considerations for No Respect, No Relationship from the developmental 
research (OSW, 2003a, p.23). 
• While mass media will generate high awareness of the campaign messages the issue 
is too complex to be remedied by the use of a mass media campaign alone. Evidence 
from the comments made throughout the study suggests that the use of a range of 
strategies for different target groups, at different ages, would be more meaningful and 
likely to be more effective in the long term; 
• peer groups are an important influence and source for advice and information; 
• there is a need for skills based programs for youth. Such skills based programs have 
the potential to not only minimise the chance of violent or abusive behaviours 
occurring but also can facilitate the development of appropriate behaviours and 
healthy relationships. These skills are a particular need of young males; 
• partnerships with influential individuals, groups and media organisations can be a cost 
effective and powerful way to influence the portrayal of relationships, relationship 
violence and gender in popular culture; 
• telling stories and allowing young people to draw their own conclusions can be more 
credible, more relevant and therefore more effective than 'telling' them what to think 
and how to behave; and 
• when discussing the issues of communication, anger and conflict there was a 
frequently made suggestion that such programs be taught in schools 
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7.6 No Respect, No Relationship original advertisements from the mass media 
component of the campaign 
.1~~ .. 
...... ~""f..f.-. 
-
.. 
There's never an 8Kcuse for any kind of physical 
violence oc- assault. lt'a always completely unacceptable 
and in some cases It's criminal. 
Relationships can be dillicull, but they must always 
be built on ntspect. And respect includes how you 
treat and talk to each other and giving each other 
space when you need it. 
The firs1 place to atart exploring the issue 11 
on the website below. It hn information for young 
people, parents and educators. Plene go to It now • 
NO RESPECT NO RELATIONSHIP 
WWWJespect.gov.au 
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" J;~I..... IL---.. 7! 
...... ~., ~;t: J 
....... ~~ 
-
THINK ABOUT YOUR BEHAVIOUR. 
Relationships can be diffiCult, but they must a~ays 
be built on ,.spect. And respect includes how you 
tre8t and talk to each other and giving each other 
space when you need it. 
And there's never an excuse for any kind of 
physical violence or assault. It's always completely 
unacceptable and in some cases it's cnminal. 
The fnt plac4t to start exploring relationship issues 
is on the website below. It has infonnation for young 
people, parents and educators. Please go to it now. 
NO RELATIONSHIP 
WWWJespect.gov.au 
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,.~L : I!/L~.,,:?!a:l• 
·--t$~·; 
l'fiA.~~~ 
-
Moat sexual uaault and violence doesn't take 
place in dark alleys or deserted parks. In happens in 
normal flats and hOUHS in average streets, JUst like 
the one you five in. 
The problems range from physical violence and 
M&ault tiO controllng behaviour and constant put-downs 
and cnhcism. No one should have to put up it - rfa 
always unacceptable and in some cases it's criminal. 
Both sides need to understand that relationships 
need to be bllsed on respect The firwt place to start 
exploring the rssue is on the webSite below. It has 
information for young people, parents and educator'$. 
PlUM 00 tiO it noN. 
NO RESPECT NO RELATIONSHIP 
WWWJespect.,gov.au 
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tJJi:.~ ..... ... .~~ ._,, w,~~"f~'J' 
... 
--
Moat sexual asaault and violence doesn't ta.ke 
place in dark alleys or deserted parks. In happens in 
nonnal flats and houses in average streets, just like 
the one you Gve in. 
The problems range from physical violence and 
assault to controlling behaviour and constant put-downs 
and criticism. No one should have to put up it- it'a 
always unacceptable and in some cases it's criminal. 
Both sidea need to understand that relationshipe 
need to be based on r&spect. The first place to start 
exploring the issue is on the website below. It has 
information for young people, parents end educators. 
Please go to rt nON. 
NO RELATIONSHIP 
WWWJespect.gov.au 
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7.7 Key components of the No Respect, No Relationship communications and public 
relations strategy Compiled from: Federal Public Servant 2 and Academic 3; OSW 
(2003a); the ALP (Roxon, 2004a); and the media (Bowden, 2004a; Cannane, 2004; Verity, 
2004; Walker, 2004; Walsh, 2004; Williams, 2004). 
• Editorials for television, radio, cinema and print encouraging young people to discuss 
the issues through interviews, stories and documentaries with young people about their 
experiences and perspectives on violence. These included: a 5 part series on Triple J's 
morning show; 16 one hour broadcasts on Triple J's Super Request program; a 10 part 
animated series for broadcast on Channel V and Greater Union Birch Carroll & Coyle 
Cinema outlets; and editorial features in magazines such as Sain, Cosmopolitan, and 
Dolly and an e-zine (internet based magazine). 
• Sponsorship of youth events including Big Day Out, Supercross, and Australian Mixed 
Touch as well as developing specific youth events for the campaign such as basketball , 
community concerts and hip hop competitions. 
• Online resources on No Respect's website developed by DVIRC which included on-line 
forums, e-cards, user-polls, quizzes, practical relationship tips, audio and video stories, 
resources and referral information. 
• Publicity strategies including the campaign launch and a speaking tour with a panel of 
experts on relationship violence and sexual assault who were also to be contacts for the 
media to provide specialist information and to moderate on-line and radio discussions 
with young people about the issues. 
• Resources to engage directly with young people including text messages, developing 
and distributing a school curriculum resource, and distributing merchandising such as 
mobile phone accessories and lanyards. 
• Coaching Boys Into Men program teaching sports coaches (particularly football) to 
promote positive attitudes about, and behaviours towards, women by young men. 
• Indigenous specific communication program including: community liaison program; 
ambassadors program including well-known Indigenous people; Indigenous specific 
campaign materials (such as posters, brochures, messages from the ambassadors); 
322 
national song-writing competition; and sponsorship of Indigenous cultural and 
community events such as "The Deadly's". 
• NESS specific communication strategy including: multi-cultural short film festival; youth 
champions program; media partnerships with selected NESS media; and NESS specific 
campaign materials for young people and their influencers. 
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7.8 Violence Against Women- Australia Says No Advertisement 
(New Weekly, 1 August 2005) 
~~~ 
,. 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
-
Violence and o~ult ag<linst women Is always unacceptable 
and, ot course, rnoGt men understand th:ll Sometimes this 
behaviour is criminal and should be reported Immediately. 
Women who have suffered It should 08118( feel It's thew laull 
Instead they should seek help and advice. It could be from 
h1ends o.- paren111, o.- It cook! be by talking to on expertencod 
counsc!tor on the new Confidential Helphne. You can also visit 
our website, www.oustraliasaysno.gov.au 
Violence against women Is a serious social problem. It win 
only stop if evetybody In Austrafoa says No. 
Confidential Helpline 
1800200526 
_., ..... ____ H .. ~ 
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7.9 Violence Against Women- Australia Says No Transcripts of Television 
Advertisements 
Violence Against Women- Australia Says No Advertisement 1 (men's) 
Image of young white man with dark short hair in blue t'shirt shown in a few different poses I 
stills. 
151 male voice: "I got really angry and I just gave her a slap, you know, stuff happens. But 
she knows, I mean, she deserved it". 
White writing comes up with "No she didn't" then screen blacks out to leave just the writing. 
Image of young white man with blond longish hair in grey t'shirt shown in a few different 
poses I stills. 
2"d male voice: "I kept going you know and the next minute she says that I forced her. But it 
was too late, what was I supposed to do?". 
White writing comes up with "You must have consent" then screen blacks out and leaves 
just the writing. 
Image of young European looking man with short dark hair, light blue t'shirt and light jacket 
in a few different poses I stills. 
3 rd male voice: "Yeah I know this bloke and we all know he hits his girlfriend, never in front 
of people but she won't do anything, you know, I can't say anything can 1?". 
White writing comes up with "Yes you can" then screen blacks out and leaves just the 
writing. 
Image of man (a bit older) , slightly darker than white European (could be Greek?) with dark 
hair in light blue shirt and dark jacket in a few different poses I stills. 
41h male voice: "Oh you just lose control sometimes, it's only shoving and stuff. It's not like 
I'm one of those blokes who beats up on a woman." 
White writing comes up with "Yes you are" then screen blacks out and leaves just the 
writing. 
Image of white man with dark hair in checkered shirt in a few different poses I stills. 
51h male voice: "She came back to my place and she knew what we were there for and then 
like half way through she says no but I kept going". 
White writing comes up with "That's sexual assault" then screen blacks out and leaves just 
the writing. 
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Images of all first, second and fifth man - one at a time while 6 th male voice: "This 
behaviour is not just unacceptable, it's criminal. You can get help and support by talking 
with an experienced counsellor on this confidential helpline". 
Image of "1800 200 526" in white with "Confidential Helpline" in green in a smaller font 
under it. 
Sixth male voice: "1-800, 200, 5-2-6". 
Image of campaign logo: "Violence Against Women" in white box with black writing and 
under it "Australia Says No in green box with black writing which split apart slightly. 
Underneath this is a white image of the Australian Government coat of arms. 
6 th male voice: ''To violence against women, Australia says no". 
Image of black screen with white writing: top line (bold) - "Authorised by the Australia 
Government, Canberra". Second line: "Spoken by [bold]: N. Brady, F. Humphreys, C. Lee, 
P, Stenn, G, Pro." 
6th male voice: "Authorised by the Australia Government, Canberra. Spoken by N. Brady, F. 
Humphreys, C. Lee, P, Stenn, G, Pro." 
Violence Against Women - Australia Says No Advertisement 2 (women's long) 
Image of white woman, with short dark hair wearing a pink long-sleeved sh irt a in a few 
different poses I stills. 
1st female voice: "My boyfriend hits me, then he says he loves me and reckons it's all okay". 
White writing comes up with "No, it's a crime" then screen blacks out and leaves just the 
writing. 
Image of Asian woman, with long dark hair wearing a red shirt and dark jacket in a few 
different poses I stills. 
2"d female voice: "I couldn't believe it happen. I only had a drink and he thought he could 
have me. I said no but he wouldn't stop" 
White writing comes up with ''That's sexual assault" then screen blacks out and leaves just 
the writing. 
Image of dark European looking woman with long dark hair in green top in a few different 
poses I stills. 
3'd female voice: "I know my sister gets hit by her boyfriend. She won't talk to me, our 
parents, nobody, but she should tell somebody". 
White writing comes up with "Yes, she should" then screen blacks out and leaves just the 
writing. 
Image of white woman with long blond hair, glasses and white shirt with dark jumper over it 
in a few different poses I stills. 
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41h female voice: "He goes berserk sometimes and hits me and then he says it's my fault 
that he lashed out at me." 
White writing comes up with "It's never your fault" then screen blacks out and leaves just the 
writing. 
Image of white woman with short dark hair and dark long-sleeved top in a few different 
poses I stills. 
5th female voice: 'When you've been raped, you feel so alone, you don't know who to talk to 
and if there's any help". 
White writing comes up with "Yes, there is" then screen blacks out and leaves just the 
writing. 
Images of all first, second, fourth and fifth woman - one at a time while 6th female voice: "If 
assault and violence has happened to you, do seek help and support. You can start by 
talking to an experienced counsellor on this confidential helpline". 
Image of "1800 200 526" in white with "Confidential Helpline" in green in a smaller font 
under it. 
6th female voice: "1-800, 200, 5-2-6". 
Image of campaign logo: "Violence Against Women" in white box with black writing and 
under it "Australia Says No in green box with black writing which split apart slightly. 
Underneath this is a white image of the Australian Government coat of arms. 
6th female voice: "because to violence against women, Australia says no". 
Image of black screen with white writing: top line (bold) - "Authorised by the Australia 
Government, Canberra". Second line: "Spoken by [bold] : J. Baird, B. Wilson, A Schober, S. 
Yardley, K. Scott, A. Hegh." 
6th female voice: "Authorised by the Australia Government, Canberra". 
Violence Against Women - Australia Says No Advertisement 3 {women's short) 
Image of white woman, with long dark hair wearing a yellow long-sleeved shirt a in a few 
different poses I stills. 
1st female voice: "He hit me and at fi rst I kept quiet but finally I spoke to someone and they 
really helped me". 
White writing comes up with "You did the right thing" then screen blacks out and leaves just 
the writing. 
Image of white woman, with short dark hair wearing a grey t'shirt a in a few different poses I 
stills. 
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2nd female voice: "I was raped and I told the police. It was hard but I know I've done the right 
thing". 
White writing comes up with "You should report it." then screen blacks out and leaves just 
the writing. 
Image of woman possibly or European or light middle eastern descent, with shoulder length 
dark hair wearing a bright pink long-sleeved shirt a in a few different poses I stills. 
3rd female voice: "In the end I was scared for my safety and I knew I had to leave him" 
White writing comes up with "There is help available" then screen blacks out and leaves just 
the writing. 
Image of "1800 200 526" in white with "Confidential Helpline" in green in a smaller font 
under it. 
4th female voice: "If assault or violence happens to you, do seek help and support. You can 
start by talking to an experienced counsellor on this confidential helpline. Call 1-800, 200, 5-
2-6". 
Image of campaign logo: "Violence Against Women" in white box with black writing and 
under it "Australia Says No in green box with black writing which split apart slightly. 
Underneath this is a white image of the Australian Government coat of arms. 
4th female voice: "because to violence against women, Australia says no". 
Image of black screen with white writing: top line (bold) - "Authorised by the Australia 
Government, Canberra". Second line: "Spoken by [bold]: M. Wonnacott, A Schober, L. 
Crawford, A. Hegh." 
4th female voice: "Authorised by the Australia Government, Canberra." 
Violence Against Women - Australia Says No Advertisement 4 (combined) 
Image of Asian woman [2"d female from ad 2]. with long dark hair wearing a red shirt and 
dark jacket in a few different poses I stills. 
1st female voice: "I said no but he wouldn't stop". 
White writing comes up with "That's sexual assault" then screen blacks out and leaves just 
the writing. 
Image of man [4th male from men's ad] (a bit older), slightly darker than white European 
(could be Greek?) with dark hair in light blue shirt and dark jacket in a few different poses I 
stills. 
1st male voice: "Oh you just lose control sometimes, it's only shoving and stuff. It's not like 
I'm one of those blokes who beats up on a woman." 
White writing comes up with "Yes you are" then screen blacks out and leaves just the 
writing. 
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Image of "1800 200 526" in white with "Confidential Helpline" in green in a smaller font 
under it. 
2nd female voice: "If you have a problem because you've experienced or been responsible 
for assault or violence you can call this helpline for help and support". 
Image of "1800 200 526" in white with "24 hours, 7 days" in green in a smaller font under it. 
2nd female voice: "Call 1-800, 200, 5-2-6 for a confidential discussion with an experienced 
counsellor." 
Image of campaign logo: "Violence Against Women" in white box with black writing and 
under it "Australia Says No in green box with black writing which split apart slightly. 
Underneath this is a white image of the Australian Government coat of arms. 
2nd female voice: "to violence against women, Australia says no". 
Image of black screen with white writing: top line (bold) - "Authorised by the Australia 
Government, Canberra". Second line: "Spoken by [bold]: B. Wilson, P. Stefanou, A. Hegh." 
2"d female voice: "Authorised by the Australian Government, Canberra" 
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7.10 Violence Against Women- Australia Says No Brochure (OSW, 2004d) 
Call the confidential 24 hour helpline 
1800 200 526 
to talk with experienced counsellors. 
Emergency 
000 
Kids Help Line 
1800 551 800 
If you wish to talk to a counsellor 
and do not speak English well, call 
Translating and Interpreting Services 
13 14 50 and ask them to contact the 
Helpline for you. 
Callers who are deaf or have a 
hearing impairment may call through 
the National Relay Service on 
13 36 77 and quote 1800 200 526. 
To order an nlormatlon booklet cal1300 76 46 56 or 
visit the website: www.australlasaysno.gov.au 
The lrlormatlon booklet Is available In Engllsh, 
Ca'ltonese. Manda'ln, Italian, Greek. Arable. 
Vletna-nese. Spatish. Macedorian, llxklsh. Pols/1, 
Croatian. SertJjan. Russian, Korean and Fa-sl. 
(Front and back) 
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f""\ .. cycle 
of violence 
A vblent 191atlonsh~ may not be vloleR al the tfme. 
Some of tilt ttne. VIOie!t people treat thK partners very 
w1!1. They can be very kMf11 and sony tor their vlolert 
behavlout l can make than:! to see w<llat'S really 
happening. Thef&ls a strong charca tNt the v!Oienc& wit 
get worse (Nar time and the relationship mCfe abusiVe. 
Attar a violent lncldoot. H's oommon fa- both the abusive 
partner and the vtctfm to try and make I OK - make 
u:;uses, apologtse. promise to change. Bit thEf8 Is no 
excuse fa- IIU betiavtol6 and )lsi saytng sony IS not 
gocd &noll,lh. Sometrnes the Violent person wtl b4ame 
the vtcttn- "I woUdn't happen I you dd what I said'. 
People Slbject to vlolert abuse can 
begin to tf1l1( ti\S tilt violence is 
their falil They mlglt stmt to try b 
II In wlh whalevw tNW partner 
warts. even If It makes them 
unoombtabl&. 'They mlljlt feel 
~ M tllet partner wll h\.11 
them If they try to Ieaiie. 
But the fist step In chanofno things is to understand 
what's been happening Is wrong. Ellen If your boyfriend 
a- partner says they care about you and you care about 
them. ~ ·s not OK to be trealed Ilk& this. 
T~IIL t . someone 
Usten to your feelngs and trust them -If somettino 
doesn't feel right. 11 Pfobabll' isn'L 
If you need ad'llce or nformatlon 
there Is a range of set\'lcas and 
s~ avalallle. And this can 
apply to both men and women. 
If you'Ve elthar experienced a-
been 1'9S1)00Sllle tor assault a-
violence you $hoUid talk to someonev.'ho cares about 
you. It could be your Mum a- Dad. a l!lmly member a-
friend, a-cal the H~lne fa- coolldentlal ~. 
\ t •. call the 
Helpline 
• '!bur calwil be answoll'l!d b'f a 
per.;on, no answering mactines. 
no reoordeCI messages 
• The person who answers your 
~ v.• be en experienced 
counselor, not the police, 
not a gowmment depa'tment 
• 'lbu wl not have to~ your name 
• Anyonew'ho IS concerned can cal this Helplne 
• 'lbu can request a male or lemlle counsellor 
• Altar taldf11 wtth you about your conoerns. the 
counselor may olftll' to put you In touch v.•lh another 
organisation that can provide~ ~or suppat 
(Inside) 
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7.11 Violence Against Women- Australia Says No Poster (OSW, 2004d) 
FC ENTW.. t'T"' · 'L, . .._ 
Anybody who h:~s expllrion~d or I:>Qen 
rQ.SPOn sible for assault or violencll should 
call ttis Confl<lential Hlllplne. 
1800 200526 
""'\.1" 
Gilt 1his free boold9t with inform:~tion for 
yomg p;opl9, pru-ents and the commlllity 
to help ldontify 3'lCI avoid vlol9nt and 
00llsiv9 ~latloostlps. Call 1300 76 46 56 
or "'l.~lt www.australlasaysno.gov.au 
VIOl E'NCE AGAINST WOMEN 
~~~ -~rlfTlC~ItC\~CMir~\o&L,.,....,_. 
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• 
" \.: .. 
Good relationships 
The Austrolan Government beflews that famflell are the backbone of a strong 
ond healthy community, and loving aupportlw relatlonstips are at the heart of happy, 
well functioning families. Famllle8 ere the best placee for children to leam about love 
and respect, and how to buDd and maintain 1-ealthy and canng relationships. 
Aelallonshlps founded on fear and violence caonot sustain or ruture either 
partner or the famly they might hope to raise. TraQically. \\'hen a young peraon'a ew1y 
relatlonshlp experiencee Include VIolence and 69XUal assault. the consequencee can 
1'9901181e beyond the immediate feelings of rort and confusion. 
These 9)1periences can destroy an Individual'& sense of self-worth. Some come to 
accept vlolence as the norm, thlnklng they desenle no better. VIolence can become e 
learnt behaviour, de8troylng people'& capadty to form healthy relatiOnships, row and In 
the next generation. 
When parents talk to their children about what makes a good relationship II helps 
young people develop and clarify their own values. It can provfde an oppor1unity for 
chldren to talk about things which might be worrying or confusing them. 
This booklet Is a re90UI'ce Ia young people, parents, friends and the community at 
krge. It prcNidae Information on hew to ldenufy and awld violent and abusive silualione, 
how to build and maintain healthy relationships and who to contact If you need 
protection or advice. 
H Is not the role of government to tell people how lo live their lives - relationships 
are personal and private. But VIolence against women Is unacceptable. It dlrnntshes 
the liVes of an thoae It affects and h tarntshes err; COITYTUllty that tOlerates 11. 
"'- fl--.-<-
JOhn Howard 
Pr1me Mlnlst.-
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About this 
This booklet Is part of a nallonal 
campaign to Ellmlnate VIolence Agolnst 
Women. It oJnw to raise you-og people's 
BWafWlBSS about the harm Caused 
when pen~CJnal relationships become 
violent. The booklet also pt'OIIides 
Information abo\.t who to contact for help 
and odvloe If you, or someone you know. 
Is being abused. 
The personal stories In this booklet are 
based on people's real lie experiences. 
Events Oke tin are happening In 
our community -In the home. In the 
worl<place, In those places we relax ond 
have fun. Places where we &houtd feet 
sale. The people In the photO(J'aphs 
used In this booklet are models. 
The booklet cornplemen1s the campaign 
appearing on television, radio and In 
magazines. It aeek8 to encourage families 
and friends to talk about relaUonahlpe 
and provtde8 Information to help Identify 
when people, eapecially young people. 
might be lnvoNed In violent. a potentially 
abusive. situations. 
3 
To flf'ISU'e support Is available for 
those expel1encing violence, e 24-hour 
Conftdenllal Helpline has been 
establlshed. When you cal the 
Helpline on 1800 200 526 you con 
have a confldentlol discussion with an 
experienced counsellor. Contact detwls 
can be found at the end at tNs booklet. 
Funding tor the campaign Is provided 
under Partnerships Against Domestic 
VIolence and the National Initiative to 
Comba1 Sexual Assault. It Is part of the 
Australian Government's $73.2 miUion 
commitment to adcnss domestic 
and famly violence and sexual assault 
In Australia. 
The Minister Assisting the Prme Minister 
for the Status a Women, Senator the 
Hon Kay Patterson. Is responsible 
for Implementing th- two key 
progmmmea, which are administered by 
the Australan Government's Office 
a the Stat~.e of 'Nomen. 
The Australien Government thanks 
thoee organ~satione who kildly provided 
material Ia lnctualon In this booklet. 
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No relationship 
Wa look for relaUorlShipe so that we relatlonshlp ~ a commitment from 
both par1llEn to work at ll can shale pm of 01.r lives. In a good 
relatlonshlp the par1nefs support each 
other, ehar1ng the good Unes and helping 
each other tiYouQh the tough ones. 
But Ills worth h, because In a good 
relationship people feel good about their 
pmner and good aboUt thernaelvee. 
When someone matters deeply to us, 
and lhoee lnt8098 feelings of loYe and 
reepect are recumed, It enables us 
Not all relatlonllhlps work that way, 
no matter hoN much we might want 
them to. When there Is violence or 
lntlmldatlon the relationship can become 
very destruc:Uve and physically and 
emotionally dangerous. 
to lace the world with confidence. 
Things 1'1111 not always go smoothly. 
Building and maintaining a healthy 
While evert per110n's experience of an abusille relat ionship will be diff81'81ll, 
there ate eome corrrnon patterns of controlling behaviour and abuse. which 
ano often evident before the relationship becomes physically violent: 
POS&OSSiv.-
Jealousy 
Put Downs 
cllecklng on their partner all the time to - where 
they are, what they're doing and who they'ralo\1th 
ttylng to rastrtct where they can go and who they can aae 
aca..lng their pol1ner of baing lrlallhfuf or ftlrtlng 
without good reason 
18ois1Wlg thel' partner from family and friends, 
often by nJda and objectionable bahavlou' 
humiliating their partner, either publicly or privately by 
attaclmg their lntellgence. their looks or capebillllee 
constantly comparing their partner unfa\IOU'8bly with othenl 
blaming the pertner for all the probl&fT'a In the relationship 
Monaca & Throats yelling. sulking and deliberately damaging thinga that 
are of~ to their partner 
threatening to use violence against their partner, 
the partner's family, friends or evan a pet 
4 5 
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OK 
It's not OK to be physically threatened or scared Into things whk:h malte you 
uncomfortable or unhappy, just becaU!Ia you are In a relationship. 
1-with my oorrr-Matt for • 'I'JIIT 
end a half. AI ttst, I /hoUgllt he was 
T,. one·- we UOid to llav• suella great 
1/lne Whe<IWI _, -log«/Wand 
hi WIIS _,_ Wtlg me,_ $IHC/IJI 
lwaa. 8ut tllen,. dlllllflld. He'd get 
fWIIy pantnOid end /flfiiOUS - tlllhll 
1..-s c~ oo /lim He waslllw.IIJIS 
yellrlg at me. Aner • wtllle n r.n Ike/ 
c-1 do ""YfY*l9 rlgll~,. was IW1g)' 
with me all t,. ,,._ One ttna aner -·a 
OMn to. parry-had. hUQe llglll. 
He raid ra-c~ oo to oo• of Ills 
motes, llld/!1 s/llppod me hard across 
the noc.. Mertllat,lf got-
- Wilt really worr/fldllt>Out me. 
IIM<I to mllll• MCII$ .. Itx Malt but st. 
said II was Matt who had ,. Pf'Oblam. 
Mf 1Hs1111ltld told""' tha .. ,. tl*lg. 
I tlllrfld to • oounwt/or and st. 
.:tp/1/ned that It twas.., special ro 111m 
,,., ,. _,ldn, /!<If me. If,. reBiy 
Cllnld lbout ,., ,. _,/Ill""'· 
1,_ a.-~now He AWIIY 
respecl!l,., Sin .. argue som•t.mes. 
But -hive a~ "*tlotlsllt> -· 
.... .,.. both Ulc llt>Ouf lhlllgs ~
If loe/s good end /IHI good. 
6 
n all startod a couple ot montM aner 
our dllllflhter EmnNI M<J surtod ~ 
Mlcht/JMI. we dldnlllce him~-..,.. 
t~JW9ht that he was too poooan/W. She 
rtopJMd ~ /WirlendS.., She could 
1» wff/J lin~ I>IA ,. WOU<J sill get JeeloiJs. 
llld yel at /WI! She did sometlllng he 
dkln 1 II< e. w. lo<Jnd/1 dffllaJif to talc to 
her llliOUIII - wnen .... IUlld somelhlllg. 
lhe would say ,. only got Jpalouo ~>«:aus• 
n• loved htlt: We aldn1 Wlllll ro lflterl.,•, 
~- we atdnY .,.., her to snuJr 
rcund and uelim ..trhocJI us lcmlwfng. 
bul ,,. 10'/lt* ,.,.Uomlllp /l1sl dldn1 -
right Jofs bellallfour was hlnltlg onlrrpact 
oo t,. whOle tonlll): His IW1g)' moodS got 
worse, Mid one dq sn. eamo l>lfCI< th)m 
• -end _,'1 wtl1t cuts and~ 
Mer tnat - Clll/fld • nJiatlomhlp 
COU'>SIIhg IIIII, end filly really helpld. 
r,.,. ll8t>od ..trh W.IIJIS to appi'OIICII Emma 
llld talc to I'MIIt>Out Mi<:IUWII'S llbUs/lle 
-vloU; llld flllp her ~and thst 
sne wasn't to blamllor Ills ec:tlons. -
Emma brolr• I! otr, ""' hi/pod Of tl~Atlg lis 
piiOM calli lor-. NOW tlltngs •• l>lfCI< to 
normal- Emma feels good aboullllltWif 
and Is doing tNify well at unJ. 
It's not OK to be put down and pushed 8f'OI.RI- shoved, hit, slapped, kicked. punched. 
No one desetves to be lnlated thl5 v..oay. No one ahould use violence- or the thleet of 
violence- to make you do 1'.1lat you don, want to do . 
It 'a not OK for someone to use the excuse that they ere !Fed, atressed, over worked or 
under f11l811CiaJ ~ as a l1ll*ln for thEW violent behallkllr. 
7 
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Breaking the cycle 
A violent retatlooshlp may not be violent 
all the tlme. Some of the time, violent 
people treat their partn«s V«Y well. 
They cen be V«Y loving and sorry for 
thetr violent bellavlot.r. It can make it 
hard to-What's really happening. 
There is a strong chance that the 
violence wiU get worse over tlme and 
the relationship more a.bulllw. 
After a vto1ent Incident, It'll common for 
both the abullllle partn« and the vtctlm 
to try and maka h OK- make excuses, 
apologise, promise to change. But there 
Ia no excuse for this behevkx.r and 
Just saying sorry Is not good enough. 
SomeCJmes the violent peraon w1n blame 
the victim- ,t woUdn' happen If you did 
what I said". 
Things may Bllt11e down for a while - the 
abuser mey l8el guilty, the victim may 
cry to go along with whatevw they want. 
UauaJy it's only a matter of time before 
the build-up to violence starts again. 
8 
For someone who Is e~nclng 
violence In a relationship, 1hlngs cen 
feel very contualng. especially If INs Is 
till* first relatlonsllip. They mey cry to 
make 8)1,~ tl*1k of h as an leolated 
Incident or aomethlng that orty happened 
because their pertner was drunk or 
stressed. They may not be sl.l'e what 
behaviour to 8l\P8C1 from a partner. 
People eubjeclto violent ablMe can 
begin to think that the violence ill their 
lolA!. They mlglt start to cry to fl11n with 
whatever lhelr partner wonts, even If It 
makes them L.llCOITifortoble. They might 
feel scared that their partner will tu1 
them if they cry to leave. 
r 1111t1 • aou t18nd hlidiOOI Clllllld Rachol. 
w ....... qutt. good Monds thtoUgh-
lltld 1111, ..,.,.. She m&l Moreus. ,_was 
• pop<Mkr IJ'IY l>Ut lllld a - tttlfM'. II 
_,. ptrltry a- 1/18t hi> was laloclla'1g 
IW810111d. n.- -·d ,.. '-" to 
Mplatl 1M,__.. paU..tic. She WoOS 
..ways mMi'1g-=--Tor Nm. 81» was • 
rwly12rfgt!t g/11/JUI\OtiiHI ~#du~ 
llar5/le }Ust want to pl«»s. 81» droppacl 
OUoiiiiiM>d-'4"MI!IIOf!ltltln. 
.., ..... jUSt ... -.:us.--
-to .... -...,, dllooww "'Y 
- It -ltlf'OSflble to ... ,.., IOflholjf 
tan Oeohg lrOIIId IOid /HI W8S so rud._ 
I~ I fU$1 flll'l• '4" 8nd we /oct *>UCII. 
Breaking ~ any kind of relationship Is 
hard to do, but It can be pertlcular!y hard 
to leave a violent boyfria1d or partner. 
When you are frtghtoned and your self· 
esteem Is low, it can be hard to find the 
strength to leave. It's sometimes easier 
to hope that things wiH change for the 
better. Too often they don't. 
But the flrst step In changing things Is 
9 
lhl>rd tom- olc><rottw school 
-1111111an Just (Jt1f ,.,..1/tld mono 
worant But Rae/lei fu/lt coukint omg 
het:Wf to-htn - the last booartng 
was.., bad--'-" tiiiOsp/llll. 
I ,.IWII8d file CCJ118Qelo IMI! to fW 
lbout Marcus ot'/lltl) -·-loomertneswonc/8rWhllrii!OUclfl-
/lapf»>l8d IT 1119c1. Mayo. I could hiN• 
IHIOOtlagiKI hr to taft to 11» po11c» or a c- llbOclt ...,.twa fl~ppet~ln!J. 
Mll)lt» lshoUd,... l1»d to,.. rw 
~that- wasn1 tile problem 
- t/111- ....,, -10 btl lrNt8d ,,. 
thllt, and most m811 .. nol/lfa that 
to understand what's been happening 
Is v.-rong. Even If your boyfriend or 
partner saye they care about you and 
you cam about them, It's not OK to be 
treated lfke this. 
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someone 
Usten to your feelings and trus1 them 
- If somettmg doeen'l feel right. It 
probably Isn't. Talk to 80m80ne who 
cares about you. Talk to yot.r Mt..m 
or Dad, a family member. a friend, or 
aomeone in your communrty fike your 
doctor. YO\M' teacher, YO\M' local religious 
leader. or call the C811lX11on Helpline 
for conftdentlaJ advice. 
And someone you truSt and tell them 
llbo\A what's happening to you. 
Don't feel ashamed or embalrasSed. 
0 
You are not responsible lor somebody 
else's violent bellalltc:u. 
Yot.r llnu responsibility Is to yourself -
get sale and stay sale. 
If you went to talk to someone about 
your retatlonstllp or you want help to get 
safe, the contact points provided In this 
booklet wit help you ftnd the r1ght peniOI'I 
to give you support. 
Helpline 
Your call wUI be enswered by a pen1011, no -waring machines, no recorded 
mqsagee. 
The person who answers your call wUI be an B'llperienced counsellor, nat the 
pollee. not a government depertment. 
You wdl not have to give your name. 
ArtjOne who Is concerned can call this Helpline. 
You can request a mate or female counsellor. 
Alter talking 'o\ofth you about your concerns, the C0ln9811or may offer to put you 
In touch With another etganhlallon that con provide ongoing help or at.RXli'L 
10 
L/JI.e flllllfl)' cOII)fe/lo~. I -x w1t11 people 
wfiO a/9 ~domMVc­
-IIIII abel .. , IX ha..-. ·~petff>nced abel .. 
tl the past 71ley •• /USf normal peopl•, 
uperlanctng bad rwdorrSIWps. otrt111, 
,..,. wll -IM#p ..,.,. tlttlgs get 
ptryalclllly "*>>enr. 8ul ,,_,...,.. WllfTIIng 
signs - ae tltenw JealOU$Y. yelling, 
0011s!atJI puf-wns- !In/liMing 
li1olence - IIIII can lndate tlllllgs ate 
getting out or hand. 
t help peoplti tlulld sic .. to m•ntall'l 
hMIII!y retartonsht>s, 1011.,. tlO!h piii1JeS 
can communle9te will. If someone till$ 
-. a llfetm or v101enc., 1 tty ha/1:1 to 
rlill'rl'lrc• that they .. ,. not ,...,.,.,.,,. 
lot' lltlUSMtlHih/Wfour - only the aoow• 
penon/$. 
Wilen peoplti come to- me I tty to ~· 
them oprions - SOrriQifrt~.s I h.rp them 
a:rptalllwtJat haS hapJ»f*1 to 1t1a polloa 
11 
IX""""~~" cout~ullng- but 101111te,... 
stops .-.. ~Man, II) -.ys u..tr Choice. 
wea•bthlnttlllltonlyasf'llnQOI'WOdd 
flllt us. but the sadlllact W>g 1$ tNt the 
fiV/Ot1IY o1 uxuat aaMJik .,. potpetrated 
bySOtneClralllel'fcUm/lnew, ~
they thoogl!ll!lfly-,.--.. tlllllr 
llonle. •• #Hend'J p/IICe, at II'Ofk. Ill tM 
t.x:al cltb IX plb. 
So onon u.. ~ 1s hidden. FriOndS 
-,...,.,.. """"""' somellltlgts """''1o 
but cant be ll1.ft. 1 tl** lttal If somoon• 
11 up~~t~IHICtlg v~o~on<:e IX nas ,.., 
assaJned, the best lhln!/tiKiy cen do 11 tall 
to"""""""' 8tl011fn,..,..,. !My trust 
My jot> Is IO het> people lfnd a way ID laic 
- -t Is llappanfng. And tall t!n>ug/1 
the ways they ca'l ehangalnat situation, 
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It's a crime 
tt can be rn.d to accept that someone 
YQU an about has dellb4rately hu1. you. 
We're not just talking about hitting. 
Abuse can also Include using fon:e or 
1..- to make you do things that you don't 
want to do. 
Perhape more than ot 81'1 other thle n 
cxr llws. H Is a.mg aclolescenoe and the 
early adiAt yem. that we 999k out reN 
experlences which help us understand 
Who we ere and what we want. 
Sornettmes thlll can InVOlVe getting 
caught up In high-risk altuotlons. 
Forcing aomeone to have sex when they don 1 want to, or forcilQ them into huvi-og 
aex by making them trink they wil be haiTTl('(j if they don't, iu eerious crininal 
offence. 
• Tho deltnitlons end labels ditfet allght!y - In aome etatea thle offence Ill celled 
'rape',ln othenl tt Ill called 'Mxual assault', 'llexuallntercOI.IH Without cone«lt' 
or 'sexual penetration without coneent '. 
• 'SexualiiiSIIUit' In everyday language Is a general term, which lnc:kJd6s rape, 
but al8o other dfencea such as Indecent assaiL 
• Sexual assault doee not r-.ar1ly Involve violence, for example It can be 
toucllng a person In a sexual way without the person's consent. 
Sexual assault and violence against women is a signifiCAnt problem. 
&.rveys have hlghighled two dlstlrillng facts: 
• Only twenty percent ot eexual assaUts on woman sre reported to pollee. 
• Ally-eight percent of sexual 8SS8Uts are oommmed by someone known 
to the vlcttm. 
Tte~CJ'OIId .. ,_ ....,,......,__., _ _ o-.m S#lfiYUYO>f ·<Oidldld n tlttf 
2002-roon --"' ,...,. --.,..,~~~ cncdng t21'10tihl. 111&b,.,......._ 
--
12 
No means no 
n. pollee uy 1n.y 1n1 going to CNrgtl 
m• willl- IHUUII. 
I met Juf• at a perf)' -1 r~ Ill~ 11«: 
w. otiii1Cld fiOinfl 011t mA - was protty 
old..fliSIIIon~ about saK lllld SfcAr. I f1UHS I 
was alllt mo,. expert-t/WIIIIMr. 
8lle Uld- ttldn~ _,to go too ,.. n 
-~ bUflfiCld me fltat - got to makO Ql 
file- S<la -held- "'lo"that 
nlgtrl - I tfnMI)'Went 116 IIIII Wily. But I 
f<Jsllflou!1Jtll- WIS ,..,, my gtttWentt 
and relllty CJitiiCI abOUt me-OCCJitt t1Q 
_,af I WIIIIICld for a clllWI(Ie. AlhWW8n!:s. 
ahe was ,....1)' ...,..tllfld crying. but I 
!Mughl-'tt got o-ft. SINJtoltt her 
p/IAIIts and they WWII to the~. 
lw rltd to .,.In fltflt IW8S pntty crr.nr. 
b<J! IIIII pole» say lllllt'r no llfCU.M. My 
m1111 IS lllldnflllll to SGO • co...-,.,. 
guys. But I am rwa11y $CIIffKJ abOUt_,~ 
going to ,,_,. 
Being someone'a l>oyfrie"ld doesn~ give you the riglt to decide what they should do. 
And nothing gtvas you the rtot-. to use force. 
13 
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r~mmunicate 
Communlcallon Is kay tor aft relallonehlpa. 
Surveys report that boys In particular 
ore anxious about communication. Many 
feel that they ne«1 to "have a few drinks" 
before they are Sible to talk to gwts. 
Somedmes they might need help to ftnd 
more positive ways to hancle 8llynes8 
and the , ... at rejection 
~ d ("'"-• play it safe 
Sadly, most violence against women 
occurs Wlttin a relatlonshlp- that's 
why learning how to build healthy 
relationships Is 80 Important But trouble 
can happen outside relationships - with 
strangers or people you don't know wei. 
We have all heatd or re«1 about 
hon1ble ca&e8 where young people 
find themeelves In terrifytng situations 
completely outside their control. 
'Tlink about the !Nngs you can do to 
keep sate and out of trotble. 
Plan to go out end hang out In a group. 
Go With people you feel safe with and 
WhO you know have you: best lnteraets 
at heart. 
Look out fQ( y0U"881f and your friends -
good friends make sure that their friends 
are safe and make safa choices. 
14 
Wlthout comrrunlcaUon there can be no 
real retatlonll11p. If communlcaliOn Is poor 
or not valued, negotiating the boundaries 
of the relationship will be difficult, If not 
Impossible. 
Poor communication can lead to 
confllc1lng e)(!)8Ctatlore. eepec~a~y about 
eex. Sex v.ithout CCX'lS8n1 ~ eexual 
assault - there Is no room for contusion. 
Have some transporl plans to make 9U'II 
you can get there and back safely. 
Let someone know (parents, brother/ 
alsler. houeemate) where you are going, 
and when you 'I be home. If you: plans 
change let them know. 
Alcohol and sex can be a dangerous mix. 
H you are not In control of yourself, you 
won't be able to oonlrol the s!tuaUon. 
Remember if you are so drunk that 
you don't know H the other person Is 
consenting - stop. It could be rape. 
When you know that the othar person 
Ia 80 dr\l'lk they may not be capable of 
giving consent - don't do h - because 
tns INOIAd be rape. 
Aoreetng to one type of actlvlly such as 
klaalng doesn't mean there 18 a 'green 
light' for olller le)(Ual contact - remember 
h'a OK to change you: mind and eay •no• 
Ill orry lllage. 
You shouldn1 atop being ceratul(ust 
because you know tha pweon you're 
with - you may not know them as well 
as you think. 
k: St 
I was lllclty llecaUs. my frltindt Wf9 ttr«e 
loriiM-Iooltedanerme.ttwasnt/lte 
I dldnT l<llow 111m. H•'d- at 111• pU> 
before, w. lied talked • bn. Hll _,.ed an 
OK fPY. He kept IHiytng me cr/nka-
I guess I WIIS In a mood for ,_.ry/ng, so I 
kept d't*lng tllem. Way too 111111¥. way roo 
IIISI. I* k8pl t1y1r1g to {IIJI me to go out-. 
I dldnt want fO I!IJI 1W ended 14) In the 
carptri. 
I was tfg/ltene<l. I loll lie/c. ldldnT wanr to 
~ thllt'A. l<ldrll know hOW to get -.1)( 
15 
Don't be alone and ~lated wtth someone 
you don't know weU. 
If you start to feel uncomfortable, go with 
you: feeling~. end get to a safe place as 
feat as you can. 
lllnyalllld Jo had,.., k...,.ng 1111.,. on 
me. 'l'll<ly _.. worrt«J I'd llad too much 
to drltW. I'll'!' not~<:«~ I waSII'! -and 
came tooiUtlfl tor me. 
l'ltey /USl told 111m 1 wn c:t1nt and 11101' 
....,. taking me hOme. 'l'll<ly gor my b.lfl 
and me Into • tiiJC/1111<1 to<»< me nom.. 
Good-can,_ al>fg '*""""'"' 
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Parents can help 
Talking about ~and what Ia 
considered reeponeible. acceptable 
bella~ Is an ~ant part ol building 
young people 'a understanding about 
relationships. 
Most you1g people think relabonshlps 
- going together - should be lln. As they 
groN Into early adultho<xl they start to 
look to relotlonllhlps to provide support. 
allectlon. ctoeaness. 
Early on. tiler ~ ~ can play a 
Vf!1Y lnfklentlal role in detemWllng what 
Is "fun7 But perents too play on 
in"4lortant role. Family behovlou' and 
expectatlona provide on lmpor1anl model 
fOI' yomg people expetlenc:lno their ti'st 
relatlonetipa. These early experiences 
often set the pstt«n fa- Mure 
relatlonahlps eo don't be tr1ghtened to 
talk to YOU' children about relationships. 
We all need to ll'lders1and and enccuage 
the Importance of those fundamental 
values that are the foundatJon of ~. 
strong rela~: 
Respect 
Communication 
Sharing 
Independence 
Trust 
Companionship 
Honesty 
t6 
The Slql<lliencM ol your own family and 
friends can be a ...eful star11ng point 
Even televtelon programmes can 
provide examples of different types of 
relationships and how people treat each 
other. What do YOU' kids think about 
how the charact8111 react? Would they 
react the same way? Be sure to give 
them plenty of room to tell you how 
they're feeling about things. 
Try to ellCCUilQS them to stay connectad 
With their tlends and engaged in actMlles 
outalde what might be their first lnterl9e 
relationship. These networks will be an 
11!1)0rtant source ol support ~ there are 
problems. 
Y<UIQ people can be Ullll\vare of eome 
of the negatiVe consequences that might 
result from thoughtless setual bellavtoox. 
Even when someone Is legally old 
enough and gives consent, Indiscriminate 
sexual actMty can have serious 
conaaquencea - the possibility of 
aaxualy transmlttad disea-, pregnancy, 
loss of raputatloo, being talkad about, 
embarrassment and anxiety. 
Good relationships don'1 woO< without 
allactlon and raepacl 
I,_. a pr«ty good,...._., 1111111 mr 
10t1Niclt. ~. hllmr.m. Mtdl- "'-
ptOUCI ol him.~--., JCIIoo/ 
Mtd tpert Mtd /Nil a pap.l•ldd wlh 
•~SOif-aOiglhOCI<ID"-
11/m ""'*'*' on Ills mollie phone 1o 1111 
--.10meofi/Nf/11SM1/Chool 
- W'")'O'I8 - ~ lllblll«1 e/lher a 
-.u•or~. 
I don1 MWII N/ciC growtlg lfJ lo lilt* ltr8l 
- lr p.t..,. llhl ol r«<W//JJMM ac!My 
,..,., __ lohllmuts.llllti< 
,. ,. loo yoliJg for • ~ ,.,.,_.,, 
ru,. -liN!~ ..,,., ,...,_,. N/ciC 
-lo-""'ltllmcmMtd 
~--~~~~~~~ .... t.f/1111/trDWitW-~,.-Ofll 
orttNa.l..,~lltnlol'*"<at>out,_,. W«<kl,..,,_.,.,._,-
aeltr8t-orlrlat110pr_,.or~t• 
hertllo -.v-. I upl/lln«J !hot- a 
SPY,__ • gtt ......, or phyrlcally, 
,. spots -lrull.-or 
17 
,.11*1 tllfn mer have-.. Ho- ro 
urtt1-- ,,., ,. CO<Jid ~. ,...,_, 
,..,,.It,...,.., rrar t1 1t1a li.G.n gHo ,. 
twlly- _,,go OfJI-""'· 
~· fr)'t1g to-..,. lhel.,.-
Hldflaflr I7ICft. ~him __ ,_ 
IIIII gtlo m/gtlt- GIWI l*n ~ lo 
be ,_,not ,_ ro p1r1y 1t1a "f)fg man: 
lll.n.d lo ...,..._-oiU.Iq'S 1- lor IIIII--.., -.,..,. 
1-.g lo--~­
,.lptet? 1\!0 •-""'*'*' lo some or,. 
0(/lfl( coec:hes aboullllllllllng ..... Oil DOl'S 
---...,.,. acc.plltllo IJahWIOur 
- u. .orr olltoc.Qit 11"'1.,., ~ tllo If 
ll"'fdon1 I/IIPf08CII--
...,.,. I know boyl -..n1 r.• ~ 
bawsbu! --... - t)< 
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What parents can do 
Parenl8, other family members and 
friends may notice significant changes In 
behaviour when aomeone Is the victim or 
abuse. 
What to look for: 
• Is she losing Interest In ectlvn- she 
used to anJov? 
• Is she over1y won1ed about what her 
boyfriend thinks? 
• Is she mainly happy when she Is wtth 
1*11 or Is she worried and aroUcus? 
• Is She concerned that he may get 
angry about 110f1'11ltNng allher you or 
she may say or do? 
Is she makJng excuses for him 
althetlma? 
• Is she llVCJicMg friends and eoclal 
actlvitlas that don't Involve tim? 
• Does she joke about his violent 
OUI.bursts? 
• Has she had UMXplalnad ln)uriea or do 
the explanationS she glvea -m odd 
or tmplaU8l'ble? 
• Has her behovlour changed 
cramotlcally e1nca she alllrted eeelno 
tim? 
What to do: 
Encourage her to talk to you 
Yoo coUd usa this booklet as e starting 
point for a chat Try to do this when 
you're atone. not In front of har frlands 
or other family membenl. Sorreltn.s II 
can be easlar H there Is anal her locus of 
actMty such aa going for a drive toge1her, 
making a meal or doing the dlshea. Try 
to get her to do most of the talking. Ask 
open-ended qoostlona Ike "How do yoo 
leal? What do )'Olr friends lhlri< about 
yoor reletlonehlp? What do you went to 
18 
do In the fi.Cure - rYJW and long-term?" 
Uslen to her - don't be Judgemental 
If she Is In an abusive relationship she 
probably alleady feels vary clo¥m about 
herselt. Don't make her feel wcne. 
Don't blame her f~ what Is happering. 
Don't tell her what she ShoUld hOve dona 
dilferenUy- concentrate on what makes 
her happy and how she can change 
ti'ingsnow. 
Don't tell her what to do - encourago 
her to think about her options 
She has to lind her own way thrOugh 
the situation, but talking to yoo or a 
ll'Usled person can help her resolve what 
she needs to do. Yoor aim Is to help 
her become an Independent, esse<1Jve 
person. That Is the best protection 
you can give her and !he beat way of 
ensuring she does not become a victim 
of am- again. 
M3ko cloar that lho has yoor aupport 
She may be feeling vary Isolated and 
alone. Let her know that yoo cere about 
her and are concerned aboUt har safety. 
You want her to be happy and will 
aupport her In any "''BY that will help. 
Be epec!llc about why yoo are conoemed 
- "We feet bed when he soya you're 
stupid. We hate to see you nervous and 
L1'1happy. What do you think when he 
does that?" 
Holp her won. oot some naallsUc 
strategies 
What works hare depends on how willing 
she Is to see there Is a problem and hoW 
abusive the relall<>nstip haa become. 
The 24-hoUr helpllne - 1800 200 526 -
Ia there to help yoo, as well aa her, llgu8 
out a good approech. Please uae 11. 
How to get help 
Finding the 11ght time and C<Xn~<Je for yoo to talk about theee tsau. 18 tn..,atant. 
Relationships are a kay part of oor lives. 
The rvlatlonshlp axperlences or young people can oflect !heir whole Hves beclll.l8e how 
people trvat us oflects llow we feel about Oll"'laavee -not only rYJW bU Into the lutlft. 
II you need advice ~ lnlonnetlon there Is a range of servtcas and eupport available. 
You can call the 1 800 200 526 Helpltne or contact the organlsattons listed at the back 
of this booklet. 
Don't be frightened to ask for help, 88p8Cially II you or aomeona you know Is In a 'Jtolent 
ralatlonst1ip or has been eexualy aseaUied. 
Relationships may not be eesy but they shoold navw h1.11. 
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Call the confidential 24 hour helpline 
1800 200 526 
to talk with experienced counsellors. 
~ 
_ ,. 
For emergency situations that require immediate and 
urgent assistance call 000 
For young people, the 24 hour Kids Help Une may be 
a preferred choice on 1800 551 800 
Translating and Interpreting Service 13 14 50 
Callers who are deaf or have a hearing impairment 
may call through the National Relay Service on 
1800 555 677 and quote 1800 200 526 
To order extra copies of this booklet call 
1300764856 
or visit the website 
www.australiasaysno.gov.au 
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Stata and Territory Crisis and Sarvlce Numbers 
ACT Soulh Auslralla 
Dorne6bc Vtolonce 6280 0900 l>orM&Ioc: V......_. 
Sexual Assault 6247 2525 SeMual Asaoull 
~Australia 6281 3600 FWofonshlpe Australb 
M<HWw Australia 1300 78 119 78 M8nelone Australia 
NSW 
Oom"tlc Violence (DoCS! 
Sexual AsoaUt ~ 
Sexuol As-*~ 
~Aultrllloo 
Merwlne Austmli:l 
Norlh<lm Ten11ory 
1800656463 
081~6565 
1800424 017 
!1425 49911 
1300 71119 78 
eom.stic Vtolonce 1800 0 19 116 
Sexual AsS3l.4t ~ 8922 7 156 
Sexual Ana~ (Alice Spllngs) 8951 5880 
Aebtk>nthtps Au$lmlia 8981 6676 
~ Auslnllia 1300 78119 78 
OuHnoland 
eom.stic Vtolonce 
Sexual AsSOI.ft 
RobbonetMpe Australia 
~Ausb'aha 
1800 811 811 
1800 010120 
3217 2900 
1300 78119 78 
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Tasmani<l 
~lie VIolence 
Sexual Aslooll (Southom) 
StlCl.lll Asaatil ~
5Mcwl Aasault (Nih w..l) 
Aelationahlpe Auslmlb 
M..-.sllne Austmllo 
Vleloria 
OomKIIc V.,...,_ (Mel>) 
OomK!Ic VIolence (Rinl) 
SelWDI Assaull 
Relaton.hipe Au&lroJb 
Manllrw Auetmlla 
Weotem Auatnla 
OomKIIC Vtaence 
s.xuo1 Assaun 
Aelallonolipa Austr3lia 
~.Auslrole 
1800800C)g8 
1800 817 421 
8223~566 
1300 78119 71 
1800 633 937 
6231 1811 
6334 27~0 
6431 i711 
6211 ~050 
1300 78 99 78 
9373 0123 
1100 0151U 
1800 806 282 
0835 7070 
1300 78119 78 
1800 007 339 
1800 111!18U 
0411116363 
1300 78119 78 
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Good relationships t 
•
• 
. '"" '-' 
nity .. 
Our fam,f;es are the backbone of our community, so families that are based on healthy, 
happy relationships help to koop our community strong. 
But when we bring violence Into our homes, we are threatening to break that backbone, 
because relationships that are built on fear and violence destroy families. 
When someone experiences violence or sexual assault, the hurt goes beyond just cuts 
and bruises. This behaviour damages the sufferer's sense of self-worth and self-reepect 
It also puts our future at nsk. 
When a child is constantly exposed to violence and sexual assault, they learn that 
this behavoour is normal and acceptable. Our children cannot mamlatn happy, healthy 
relationships unless we show them how It can be done. 
We need to teach our children to love and respect each other and themselves. That way 
we can ensure that our future generations will be strong. happy and healthy. 
About this ookle 
This booklet has been written as part of 
a national campaign to ehmlnate violence 
against women. InformatiOn in this 
booklet will help you to idenltfy if you or 
someone you know may be Involved In s 
potentially violent relatlonshtp. 
It also contains Information on who you 
can call for help and advice 1f you or 
someone you know is betng abused. 
The stories In this booklet are based 
on real-life experiences, but the names 
have been changed. Take the time to 
read this booklet. and talk about it with 
your choldren. your parents and your 
communrty. 
A confldenllal helpline has also been 
established to make sure thai you have 
access to help and support 24 hours a 
day. I f you call 1800 200 526, you can 
speak to an experienced counsellor who 
can offer you help and support. 
No respect 
No relationship 
A healthy relationship involves two people 
who cant about each other, who share 
good 11mea and support each oth&r through 
badtlmee. 
Of course, things don't always run 
smoothly, but In a healthy relationship 
you should be able lo talk things through. 
Maintaining a healthy relationship takes 
work and commitment 
When violence and abuse become part of 
a relat•onshlp , this can lead to physical and 
emotional damage. 
There are many different kinds of abuse, 
but there are some common types of 
behaviour that are often noticeable before 
a relationship turns physically violent. 
These are: 
Possessiveness 
• When your partner checks on you all the 
time, to see when! you are. what you're 
doing or who you're with. 
• When your panner tries to control where 
you go or who you see. 
Jealousy 
• When your partrter accuses you of 
cheating or fllrt1ng for no good reason. 
• When your partner tries to Isolate you 
from your friends or family by being rude 
or making trouble. 
"VVolence ogoin.<t woman Isn't normal; ,;t 
lan ·r ""' culfure. People ""ouldn'r l>ava 
ro llvo In loar. We neod peopte lhar are 
In strong relallonshipa to show !hat you 
-:an get through rhltl - and get through •r 
togetl>at: not alone. 
uah Pul'eeft - aaylng No to violence against 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women. 
Put downs 
• When your partner makes fun of you, In 
public or in pnvate. 
• When your partner blames you for all the 
problems In your relationship. 
Threats 
• When your partner yells, sulks, or 
deliberately damages someth1ng that is 
Important to you. 
• When your partner threatens to hurt you, 
your family or fnends. 
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It's not OK 
Just because you're in a relationship, It's 
not OK lor IOI'IleOI\8 to physoeally threateo 
you, or mal<e you feel SCill1ld or unhappy. 
fl's not OK to be put down or pushed 
around. It's not OK to be hrt, slapped, 
shOved, kK:ked or punched. No-one has 
the righl to usa "'olence, or to threaten the 
use of Violence, to make you do somelhlng 
you don't want to do 
There Is no eKCuse for voolenc::e fl's not OK 
for your partner to use the excuse thet they 
aro llr'Od, stressed or womed about money 
as a reason to be violent. 
Carla 's story 
"1 think you can cloarly '" t'K' alfforonco 
b~rweon a hoalllly IJt'ld on u nll"'lllh)l 
t>ol~l.'>o ·•~•P· If ol• un~~h)'- get 0...1 
Aaron Pedensen- N)'l"'l No to violence 
.,gaon•t Al>otlglt>ool and T.,_ St1111t 
Islander women. 
ro boMn (10iniJ o11r .. rm """" tor lJ/:>oUt • year lind" hlllf. Kit haO liUC!o • Sl""" flm. IUf/IIU*' 
- - """'' OUI, lind he MIS etNIIy! fej/jng IIlii hoW S{»CiM ),.as, 
Btll thon I!G started 10 chDnge. He'd get aN p.nnold arid JU/OUS llrld lhN>k I was chM!JnQ on 
lloiiiiOr no reason. And he waa 8/Wrf" yelllnQ IU me AttoKe...,.te It felt like t couldn't do enytt.ng 
Ono limo 2ltw we'd bo«!ro this patty, we 
pot Into D hJQe fff}llf. I~ ""'d I'd bee<1 COorHng 
on to oM of Ills ,..,.,., lind ,,. slllpped me !!It'd 
~llloffK». 
Mer !flat, It JuSt QOt WMD. M.lm was rea/'y 
worrWJ llboul me. I tried to ,_ IOJ<CUSIIS for 
Matt. belt mum said the! It was him wllo had tho 
E_,lually I Qat up""',_ to .,..... 10 
• """'-*" 111 t11e 1oct11 Abo~ Medicel 
SeMce. She tOld mo that Ill was so apec/81to 
Moott. then wtry would he went to huff me? If he 
fMIIf Clll'f1d about me, he wovld ,_ hlr me. 
Breaking the 
cycle of violence 
Breaking up any kond or telahonsh p :s 
hard, but •t's partJcularty hard to leave a 
VIolent husband or boyfriend. 
A v•olent relabonshiP doesn't need to be 
violent all the lime. It may only occur when 
your partner has been dnnklng, or when 
they are under stress. Often they 
wotl be very rsorry alter It has happened, 
and promise lhet II will never heppen 
again. But there Is a strong chilllCe thiJt It 
WID happoo agrun. 
You may feell.ke you desorve to be treated 
tnls way, or thal the violence Is somehow 
your fault. lt'J not • 1t's never your fault. 
Daisy's story 
I'm 50 ~ Old, arid t'vo txlen ~~ 
to my husbond for 3.:> yeem. He can 
50mebmes be a ...,.,.t men. IJ!IPfiCillllr 
_,,., hfl~ '*-' dMu./"fl, but fur II"' Pfl>l 
thrEe yeatS he's been"' jaJJ. 
I Cl/dn 't h~& ro admot II, but wtr.'le hll war 
lor:i<ed 'IP I was QUid It was thll ftr.rt toO'fiiJ 
sinal we· .. been rr.srried that/ cJidn r hlr~ 
to Dvelnle:H 
Since nell (lefWl bRcM, I 've touna ot "'Niy 
tvmi to cope woth the •"""nee - I'd gollen 
IJSCd to fo."ee;og safe wl•!e he was gone. Now 
I don71cr.ow If I CNI hB'ICiklt! arrt more. 
But I don., W»nl to lfwwfl my comn1un•tr 
I'm an olcJor hole - /'tiC! g.,t rospon~rt'os. 
And my lrtm~t .... ,.,..., too 
One eMf I go/lallo""!JIO lh'$ WOITWJ who 
h;Jd been Ill a nc;gheounng CQtlliMCUllly, 
-they'd~~~~ up a ·"""' hCXt$0" It's 
.,,_.,,.,. 1t111 women wHJ •m c.n ,.. . q '• 
bvt not t>eve to 1- lliOir commurolfy. 
A lot ol me nw>"' tM comm"'"'Y tiM t 
••• lhll violencfl, and I 011 got friends <Nho 're 
in the same "'""I!Ot1 as me. W&\oe d«i~ 
ro 1M at:OIII n!ling up • M,. r.oooe ar thll 
nltJct communlry council mocti.'!Q. 
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Talk to someone 
II you aro exper cnclng voolenco, it IS 
ilrporta.rt to ut'dan~tand tl1at you have no 
need to fMI ~me or ~baiTl!ssment - lt"s 
not your fault 
Telk to 60meone that you trust about what 
Is happanlng to you It could be your fnmily, 
o friend, or on older. Or you con co llhe 
confidential helpl•ne 
WHEN YOU CALL THE HELPLINE: 
• Yo"' caJ1 vi II be answared by a po.rso<l, 
not o rccordoct mcs~. 
• Tna per601'1 who answe<a your call wnt 
be on expet1enc0d counGellor- not tho 
pollee or a Govwnrnent departmam. 
• You don't have to give your n.:une. 
• You can s$1< tor a ~· or a female 
counseiiO'. 
• The c:O\.nsellor can put you In touch with 
other organosatoens that c:M he'p you 
I'm a COttn$1011rx 111 my lar.RI Abongmttl 
f.ft.kJH_"-4/ SW\fiot. lwM t~t';lh paopi• whO·ve 
CJoJ)(Jrlonccd dOmcsPC or~-· 
A'<>.<! ()( the :.n .... (IIJrl(ll#t ""')' """"" 10 ,. 
lor IWp """'"/YJinga ,,.. hHiwU viuAatot. &11 
"Y IO 1_..!1 ,._,., lhal !~>ere 818 oN~ MltlS - loire j<ialousy 41><1 jiO/tong. Cit COMI.ln! ptJI· doWI7S 
-thai c.n r>dic8Je things tniQ/11 be ~g ""' olll:llld 
A 101 of p«JP1e 1 eoc.MSitl ,_.,_ """lr's ,,_ tlfUII. or rmrr IIley -c11o he ,,..hid lf!Ml 
"';~)' I~ e<PftJin fiJ8f ..... y""' not'""""'""""" fUI •·rOo'Wll boll ......... utlly 11>oi vio'llnl 
QWYIOflls. 
Tlwl<o .>ro .a /ol of d.'fferef'l Wli)IS !/>all can hMp P8CJP$ w/Nin lhey come ro ..,. " ,.. 
SO~tllrlf'lll rney fl"'' nfJIKJ ro ~ Ia """...,"" who /1 lltttB"· oot som.On,.ol con help them to 
"''" rn ""' poloce, or , ... to rn,;r ,...,.,.H abour .vt>er 118$ naopenad 
Vlolcnu Is too often tlldt»rr frwn vlfrw. f.i.a)>t>fl frler>ds or tamit,- thlr>l<. oomotr1.;.1Q m.ght be Lp, 
but lhtlf can r lutow lrY •lf'lt. TINt best IIJong 1'11111 someone CIOtr <1o If lf>Oy h.l.V bocn ~OilY c• 
,.....,.1/y tlbu!l«< Is ro ,.,. ta .,,.,..,..,. abo<lr It ~ tomeone INIY trus1 
M'//obl• to,....~ 10 t.ll<abovtwtratis"-"-""'~ WI..,, tr_,c.on '"""',.,.''''- /lwl\ 
wiHttl ,;.,. ,_ r:hcnge tilellll.nollo-t mey·,. ,, 
No 11eans no 
Sexual assault ill ag~·nsl tha law. It's moro 
than JUSt rape- saxuol OS!Illult i s lillY 
unwontOd sexu31 behaviour that makea 
you feel uncornfoftsble. frlghlilllad or 
threatened 
Sexual assa.Jit can occu• With n a 
relat.onship. Ju!ll becii.UM aomeo.,. Is your 
boyfr111nd « part nor. this does not give 
them the light to forc:o you Into havong tlex. 
rorc:•ng someone to have eex with ynu 
vmen tl'lfty don't wont to or torc:.ng 
liOITIIIOOII Into having 50X by tiYeatvning to 
hun them If they don't Ia a aat1oua Cflme 
uavpys sro 
One f1lll"tt fr')' QJL JJ w.u lt;tling., party, 
~me wxt my ffllliYS lr/f 1/rw {lfOtJ bjp time. 
One o/1113 fJfeno5, Niel</, In~ ro gl'll me to 
donee. bull _,l ffllhly '"'"'"" "' 'll>lo.>NJ if 
Slut'd""'"" o'Jt the bucl< """'mo. 
I decided ltto$ wM my clutiCe 10 gel '!Or'Tl8 
.1CI!On. I ptMd Nlck/.,a & .ark"""""' Shw 
... -~--
·~! _,_,..belr>g abu•ed. you',. go: to 
bo theA> for !l>om "' It ""'Y """" f<l" tu m 
floon olld blOOd - Wllkn often !hey.,,. H.lp 
th~n to UJI•/r !1'1-:.t rrct sfctp; mal&:.e !!'tl"t ~··')' 
~now 1!1.>! !Niy're not "'""" 
Oelvane P11rkln and Che Cockotoo-CoiDns 
- eay!no No to violence ag.atMI Aboriginal 
tJnd Torres Slmit lolllnder women. 
Thor was untJ I triod ro pul my h'tl1<1 11•ldltr 
- skort. SM <lllnttt1 J)<At/l(>g ll'flay 8nd 11!111'1Q 
m• "f'O •. She dian 1 rool:y mo.v> nc; 1- -~­
She .. ....- 't hllll'8 COtTJ<> around I/IIJ l>l'cl< \VIII> 
mo tJ she w.u"l.lnl-ted 
r pu!lllrJ Ncll cJuo>n ""'" tl'll ground a'ld 
Jl#ld seX .. tth fret; _, lf>ovg/r s/lr> /icpt SO)IIng 
no ;,no str.l/l'np IW Mild !he whOH> '""" 
WhN>I/Jr1.,,/y let IIW flO sllfJ .. 'BS ctying, >0 I 
10(111 ull,/d<k>~ lhlt>lflt WO$ 0 big ~I; I h.>dr>~ 
StnltCICOC1 ncr ¥Ouno or /lllyt.'wng An)'Wll)'. 
t hgiJred Sl>!t wn•JJ<Jn 1 sar anyi/IJngllbout 11 
'*"A.-tr'o be roo 1>'!1 a shamo JOIJ. 
I got tiro bogges/ltloc' wllen p<>lir-s """"' 
IJIOUI'IO ltlld IMI ,_ ...,:;~o 'lfii<J I'd r..;Nd tv; 
Whl• I ..,... on tlJII I /".o;Jtd 1M1 Nicki lllt<f 
QOI'e oil,.,.,., , / fo>lt pn;rlty blld tel (I'U>'"' "'' 
Wtrtf NtCift anrt tJUN ~IO"ti 1o1r t0'.\11 ~re she 
fo>e4 too shamiJ to srny rtlet'& 
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Play it safe 
Allnough most violence agalns1 women 
hnppe<lS Within n relationship, It can also 
hiiPPen with 1omeone you don't know wan. 
Think about things you can do to koop 
ycuraolf sate. If you're going out. go wtth 
a group of friends that you trull. Don't be 
alone with someone you don't know wall. 
II you stcrt to feel unc:omfortcl>'e, trust your 
f .. ftngs and gel to a sale place 
Organise safe transport to get you therw 
30d Dock, and let someone know .,.here 
you're goi"'!! and when you~l be back. 
Ag'U8•ng to one type of actrvlty, sucn os 
Iossing, doesn ·1 mean that you have 10 
agrH to erry ott- sexual contact. It's 
a~Nays okay to say no. 
• Join us In O<Jr flgltt ro step .-<X' In our 
COfT'II'TJCMlltG!i .· 
--. ..-.ng I"'J8U*' lo My No to 
VIOlence egall'llll WOIT*I. 
II )'OU C)( anyone you l<now na. e>q>eiW'Iced 
-nc:e Of' ..xuatiiSSII\Jl, teport II 
~--no"""""' to,..,. ohame • calllhe 
eonllc»ntllll helpiJne on t800 200 5211. 
I'm O<iglrwlly /rom country \lie!""'" but 
wiiM ltumMJ 20 I triOWO to Bnsbane for 
WOtk. I'd been"*- ll , __ wh6tt I 
mfll ttu f111Y atiCJ ,.. went on 11 C.t!<i. 
1\4> hOd • rew drfnlrs O'lef" d'Mcr. ona 
•tt-tCS ""' wont OGci< 10 his pi~ tor 
eolfH I. oHmed ._,. e ric» OVY I ""'" 
prelly lltu•c:.a ta n.m. DUll dodnl .. Wlf 
011yl/llng scrlovs, 'c.wso I'd Jo;!t come out 
of • /ong·rerrn re•arxxuh<p. Bur W'len I 
trifid to-N QOtll/1 med. and ukJ lhlll 
I'd been leltdll!g him on. 
Hetned ro gn~b me and piiSilrN 
down on ,,. lounoe. end he """ pumno 
Ills lvlnd:t •Mi<Ht rny e'ollw:t. I hMJ ro fi(}hr 
ll/m off, and lucJ<,'Itl mo~ to gee out 
otl/lete 
ltM~s• now tlvl/1 pcJt myu!f"' • 
don(}crous $iAAINOn I $hould nerer hzrve 
been ,.,., with hun. bec8voe I IUIIy oidn ~ 
A11o .. hn rtt.r IWII I guoss I'm I<K.Ay thai 
I tniN>:oged top« eway befOffl a~~J(f>,ng 
ffJIII!y oMoua happen.U 
Now wNII I go out I atl'o'it)''s miJI<e sure 
,.m woth PfiOPie tl>atiA'lOW end trust. lls 
/1111.1 not vi<XIh laiW'{/ IIIII n.i<. 
Families can help 
Fam•IY behavtOIJf plays on rnponant ro·e fOf young people wno Bl'll experienclCI!] their finn 
ratationah•P• The way a famr•y treats each other csn !181 the pa~am a1 a cn•ta's behevlout 
In 1\.olura l•fe. So lt'a Important for a fnml'y to lre:lt eoct1 other w•th ro&peet, trust lind honesly. 
Commun•cation '' e"enllal- don't be fr·ght.,ed to ta'k to each olher eboul relatlonahlpa. 
But makil eure you g'v• young people pltlllty of room to tell you how they'ro feeling. 
EncoLOQe them to etay connected w •th their friends and fam•ly out soda of what might be 
their flrttlntanae relationship. Friends alld ramify maka up a vltaleupport not work - ono 
that CM offer gu<danee and help If aometh•f'l9 goe& wrong. 
Young people can BIBO be unaware of how dangercu1 thoughtlan eexual behaviour 
con be Careless eexualactv<ty can have serious consequences - aexuatly transmitted 
d.aease. ~nancy. a '-1 reputat.on, embanassmen1 and anxiety. 
What families can do 
You may notice slgnlfoc:ant changes 1n ochavoour when somoone 1s the vte:•m of aouse 
WHAT TO LOOK FOR: 
• Is sheloslr>g int«asl In ectlvttles she 
used to enfoy7 
• Is she 011erty worried about whet her 
boyfroend thinks? 
• Is sho only h.lppy whon she Is wrth 
1\lm, or is she WOfr1ed and anMious7 
• Is sho! scared that he mll)ht get angry 
about something one of you says Of 
docs? 
WHAT TO DO: 
• Encourll(ltl her 10 ll 'k 10 you 
• Uston to her- don't be judgmental 
• Don 'I teU her what 10 oo- encot.rage 
her to think obout 1\er options 
• Is sl\e CIU!king eMcuses lor h·m ell the 
time? 
• Is she avoid ng har fnonds ond soclof 
actlv•tles that dOn't Involve hm? 
• Does she JOka about his temper Of 
violent ou1bursts7 
• Has ,r.,o got unoxploonoct bruises or 
lnlunes, Of does she giv41 strange 
excuses fOf them? 
• MOko sure she understands that she 
has yo..r aupPOrt and lha\ you're not 
ang-y with her 
• Help her to work out the bes: way 
to deal w 1h thlCI!]s 
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How to get help 
It can be hard to find the courage to talk about violence or 
sexual abuse. But you should never be frightened to ask for 
help, especially if you or someone you know is in a violent 
relationship or has been sexually assaulted. 
If you need advice or information, there Is a range of services 
and support available for you. You can call the confidential 
helpline on 1800 200 526, or you can contact one of the 
organisations that are listed at the back of this booklet. 
Rememb<olr Relationships may not bo easy, but they should never hurt. 
Call the Confidential 24-hour Helpline 
1800 200 526 
to talk to experienced counsellors. 
• For emergency situations that require immediate and urgent 
assistance call 000 
• Young people may prefer to call the 24-hour Kids Help Line 
on 1800 551 800 
• Translating and lntorproting Sorvice 13 14 50 
• Callers who are deaf or have a hearing impairment can call 
through the National Relay Service on 1800 555 677 and 
quote 1800 200 526 
• To order extra copies of this booklet call1300 76 46 56 or 
visit the website www.australiasaysno.gov.au 
• State and Territory Crisis and Service numbers 
ACT NT 
Dome811c Violence 62800900 Oomastlc Vlolonce 1800019t16 
Sexual Assault 6247 2525 Sexual Assault-Darwin 8922 7156 
Rclotlonships Auatrella 13003642n Sexual Assault-Alice Springs 8951 5880 
Mensline AustraOe 1300 78 99 78 Relationships AuS1rollo 1300 364 2n 
Mensltna Australia 1300 78 99 78 
SA 
Domestic VIolence 1800 800 098 VIC 
Sexual Assault 1800 817 421 Domestic VIolence (Melb) 93730123 
Relationshlpe Ausl raJ Ia 1300 384 2n Domestic VIOlence (Rural) 1800 016188 
Mensllne Austrnllo 1300 78 99 78 SoJCual Assault 1800 806 292 
Aelationllhlps Australia 1300364 2n 
Mensllne Australia 1300 78 99 78 
NSW 
Oomestlc Violence (DoCS) 1800 656 483 
Sexual Assault (Syd) 9819 6565 QLD 
Sexual Aasault (RuraQ 1800 424 017 Domcr.tlc Violence 1800811811 
Relationships Australia 1300364 2n SeKual Aaaault 1800 010120 
Mensllne Australia 1300 78 0978 Ralatlon5hlps Austrnlla 1300 384 277 
Monsllnc Australia 1300 78 99 78 
TAS 
Domestic VIolence 1800633 937 WA 
Sexual Assault (Southern) 6231 1811 Oomeetic V'10lence 1800 007 339 
Sexual Assault (Northern) 63342740 SaJCual Assault 1800199 888 
SolCUol Assault (Nth West) 6431 9711 Relationships Australia 1soo 364 2n 
Aelatlonshlps Australia 1300384 277 Mensllne Australia 1300 78 99 78 
Mensllne Australis 1300 78 09 78 
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Across Australia there is a network of Aboriginal Medical 
Services that provide health and medical assistance to the 
community. Many also offer counselling services and support. 
These are listed below. 
ACT Manindee 
Alnsl•e 068091 4237 
CQ 6247 1(1.l 1 Mor .. 
NSW 026752 1099 
Alrda Mt Drultt 
02A6284637 02 98.12 I 3f:o6 
Annldale Norooma 
02 6771 1344 02 4A7G2155 
Bourke Nowra 
02 6872 3068 02 4-428 6(.~ 
Broken Hill Purlleet 
00 1!081! ~•I 02 6551 744-4 
Coroona Redfern 
02 6747 48.'~ 02 93195623 
Condobolin SoulhTaree 
02 6895 4311 026552215'1 
Oubbo WoggaWagga 
0? MP.H \? 11 O'l G921 72"..Yl 
Grafton Walgctt 
();! 664:! :! I!YJ 026!!261611 
Kempaey Wellington 
02sse:>6733 02 6845~5 
1:> 
Wollongong Maroochydora 
02 42299<:95 07 5-14.."\ 3~1'19 
OLD Mount lsa • Children and Youth 
Damaga C7 4 / .¢() 2! '2n 
C7 4009 :!184 Nonnonton 
Burleigh Heada 07 47451673 
C7 !>020 6799 North Stradbroka 
C81rns 0734099596 
07 3812 :!843 Rockhampton 
Char1avtlla 07 4921 3000 
074654 32n Sarlna 
CUnnarnulla 07 4956 2609 
074!;55 1231 Toowoomba 
Dalby 07 4632 0338 
07 400? 5GA4 Townavtlla 
EArlvflla 07 47504000 
or 4oso 1000 West End 
Qladatono 07 3844 22il3 
or 497:.7066 Woolloongo.bbo - Bnabane 
lnnlafllll 07 33930065 
07 4061 <1477 NT 
lpawlch Aflce Sprlnga 
07 3812 3343 08 0961 4400 
Mockay Ayars Rock 
07 4951 2833 0669562054 
Moreeba Darwin 
01 ~0923428 OSA'l3G 1717 
13 
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Kathorlno Monmo 
080071 182[1 03 5(16() 3."43 
Nhulunbuy Mooroopna 
088987 11'1? 03582r. 2 ... Filzro~ Crossing SA 
Tennant Creek North Geelong Cf3 0. Q3 0003 Adelaide 
0889622b33 035277 0044 Gnowangerup 
CVUl??'l t;? 17 
VIC Orboat 009027 1 ~88 Cedunall<oonlbba 
Ball:~r.~t 03 !>1:,4 2,33 HilliS Creek 06 Sfl?!) 3699 
03 5331 53-1·1 Roblnvalo 00 9168 fi?66 CooberPedy 
BDJmsd3lo 0350264329 J'.galong 08&172 5<155 
03 5152 5..'141 &Ito 0691 75 7~7 Polnl Pearce 
Bendigo 03 51~3 1644 KalgoOt'lle 0888J67U4 
0.154~? 4<1.17 Wangoom 0690'l1 ~ I !)!J Port Augusta 
Dandenong 035007 mo Kununurra 086642 9929 
039794 5933 Watm:lmbool 089 168 1200 Port Unc::oln 
Echuca 03 5561 &'164 Midland 0666630,~ 
03 54823075 WA 08 9·121 3!JOO Yal~ta/Coduna 
Fitzroy Albany Rangoway 08 Rf.?!i 11237 
00 94 19 ..lOOO 00~27777 06 OOS6 66.'\S TAS 
Heywood Broome Rooboumo Capo Barron 
005527 2051 08 UI!M li04:J 08 9182 1400 0363593500 
Horsham Bun bury South Guoldlord/PIIbara Cygnet 
0053825033 089791 7668 08 9219 4306 03 6?ll5 Cl004 
LakeTyers Derby South Hodland East Devonport 
00 j1!i6 fi~~)61 069 193 1090 0891402922 03 642"1 IXX31 
Mlldura East Perth T]unljuntjarm Flinders Island 
03 50:>2 I 852 0894213888 OR 9037 1102 0:163593532 
Wiluna Hobar1 
06 0001 700..1 o:; V231 3527 
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Cooynoht2004 O"ice for I'IO!M!l 
t111p ' . .-.w-..laa)-11"•'1 06-!00So.;<ll'IAM 
Wak:ome 10 the olflaal webslla foe the Yrolet1C8 
Agaml Women • .4UstJ'Ma Says No C11111P8VIIhet 
was laulc.hed JtN 6 2004, 
This ste provllles clllllled lnfonna.IOII about lhe 
cempoJgnas well as IICCIISS lD lhe asmparJn bookie! 
.Ued "Vooolnce AQallst Women, Au""".a Says No" 
This booklet IS 8'<8llobllln allllllbar ol formals ond 
n 1• ~ You con also Ol'dw a copy ollhe 
bOOklet bV ~ 11 an OldiW loml on thls • , 
You1 eko find easy l8f9rence to lhe campaq~'s 
conlldecUJal 24 hour helpme seMte, otcng With 
coni8Ct inlormabon foe other n11Mal s.MCIIS 1\ your 
State and TemlOiy 
& Search the Lifeline 
W database '8 
355 
Viol•nc• A~•insr Womtn - Ausu;,li> S.)~ I C>mpo'IP' bool:ltt 
Home 
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Campaign Resources 
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Order Online 
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V1ew Language Opt1ons 
Cooynght 2004 Office for Women 
A Search the Lifeline 
W database I'E 
Use this secbon to access the online vers1on of the V/o/~ce Against 
Women -Australia S.ys No booklet 
e booklet a1ms to ra1se awareness about the harm caused when 
1al relationships become violent. It also provides inl'ormation 
bout who to contact tor help and adVice If you, or someone you 
now. IS being abused 
The booklet conta1ns stories based on people's real life expenences. 
Note: the people In the photographs used in the booklet and throughout 
this srte are models. 
Format. 
English: View online 1 .Download 1 Order 
Other Languages: Download Order 
I -
bltr:!;,..,..,. au>trotioso)"W>O ~' .a<>bookkulndu.hbnl 0()1200S b 32 ~5 AM 
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Home 
Getting Help 
State & T_erritory Crisis 
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Other language 
o tions 
Campaign Resources 
Ca_!Tlpaign Booklet 
View Online Booklet 
Order Online 
.. ~_,..:. .. ~ Hr-.t~t!'-~• 
IJ·:~~ ¥~_; ..,r-,•; 
VIew La ua e Opuons 
A, Search the Lifeline 
W database ~ 
Use this pege for lnformetlon and details on emergency and counselling 
services that are available nationally. Inducing a Conlldentlal He~ine. 
emergency contact detatls, Information for~ people and translation 
and Interpretation services • 
lnformabon ls also ava•labl& on services within your Sta!U![_ 
Terrlt~ and in other language_s. 
Confidential Helpline 
Anyone experiencing violence cen eel the 24-hour Conftdentlal 
Helpline on 1800 200 526. When you call the helpline you can have a 
conftdentlal discussion with an 8Xplllenced c:ot.r1selor. 
Emergency Situation 
For emergency situations that require lnvnedlate and urgent ass1s1ance 
call 000. 
Young People 
For young people. the 24 hour Klds Help Line may be a prefemld 
choice on 1800 551 800. 
Translating and lnterpretmg Service 
tf you do not speak English well and you \'Ash to talk \OAth a counsellor. 
cell the Translating and Interpreting SeMce 13 14 50 and ask them to 
contact the Helpline for you. 
hllp.li~<"'W atlllmha,.ysoo~v.allil<no!lllh<lp;ind<< him (I ar211·0b ZOOS 630 II AM 
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Copynght 2004 otnce for Women 
Hearing Impaired 
Callers who are deaf or have a hearing Impairment may call through the 
National Relay Service on 1800 555 677 and quote 1800 200 526. 
hurl, wo.w aUS<r.>lwoysno ¥OV.IU.i<Utnyh<lfVInd" hun 12 or211106i~OOS to )0 II AM 
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A Search the Lifeline 
W database EO 
Use this page to access the \ifolence Against Womttn-Ausrratr• 
S~tys No campaign resources. wt11ch includes a a.~mc:~Au'n I'8SOU'08. 
booklet brochure and poster The resources COf11llemenl the campalgl 
appearing on television. radio and In magazines.. 
See below for details on how to acxess these I'8$0li'C85 Including 
downloads, pfint options and details on how to order these resa.rces. 
Curriculum Resource 
This reSO\.I'CE! aims to edUcate young Australians about how 10 !Mintan 
healthy relationships and avoid being exposed 10 abusive behavlcur. AI 
Its centrepiece Is a compelling docl.lmentary about a yomg gtf y,ilo 
was severely beaten by her boyfl1end. The documentary Is ~
by lesson plans and teaching aids. 
Format 
English: Order 
Booklet 
The booklet alms to 1111lse awareness about the harm caused when 
personal relationships become violenllt also provides Information 
about who to contact for help and advic:& if you. or someone you know, 
Is being abused. The booklet contains stories besed on people's rQI 
life experiences. Note: the people 1n the pllo(ogaphs used in the 
booklet and throughout this site are models. 
Format 
English: View online 1 Download IEngllshl 1 Ord~tr 
Oth , _ • Download I other tan~ Order. er ..... nguages. I __ 
TARGET AUDIENCE: irldivWals, conrm.rlity orgarisations. support 
services 
htor /, ,..,.'W_...,..toasoy.snoJI)•"'u .....,...,.,.indu hun ll or211 06·2005611 lS -\M 
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Brochure 
Th9 brochure Is a condensed version of the booklet contant and 
Includes Information abou1 " ilo to contact ror help and advice If you. <X 
someone you know. Is being abused. 
Format: 
QgwniQad brcx:hurliPDf.._~~kBJ 1 Order 
TARGET AUDIENCE: lndMduals. oommll'llty a-garosatlons, ~port 
services 
Poster 
The poster adVertises the Helpline and booklet avalablllty and can be 
displayed In public plac.s as an easy refer&nce 
Fotmat 
Download poster IPDF. 98kBl 1 Order 
TARGET AUDIENCE: IndiVIduals oommll'llty organisations, support 
services 
, \,.Get fi.d<lbc·~ ~doW Reader 
You need the Adobe Acrobat Reader on your 
computer to open PDF 111es. You can download a 
free copy of the Acrobat Reader tl'om the Adobe 
website. 
http/'"""' aU>tr1h><ay'"".go••U:..._...ec ,'lflde.t.htm 12 o(2JI .Of>':!OOS ld I )SAM 
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\ lolefk.< A¥-uMil Womta • AUJtrllu $,~)~ I L.ana.w.p ;.1\-ttW~t> 
Home 
Getting Help 
State & Territory Crisis 
& Service Numbers 
Other language 
o lions 
Campaign Resources 
Campaign Booklet 
View Online Booklet 
Order Online 
Download Booklet 
t1r ... •t·. • 
rmi 
L1ilfii!IIMiili 
'-\ Search th~ Lll~lln~ 
W database ~ 
If you w"'h to tol< lo o counsellor and do not speek English well. a>l Translallng and "'ltn'pn>IJnO 
Semces(TIS) 131• 50 and ask tnem ID..,.,IIIdlhe.....,.loryou. tn-.on. MPD'J& 
provides conloct detrulS end onstrucllons on hoWIO oroor e COPY olll>e bc>oklet The boold&t is 
avaolobl<lln Engksh and other languages 
~jJ ~~ .4.j . .W•·•)'t ~ y ..:..A1 }:t ..... !" ~~; ..:..:S ~~:ARABIC 
.(Helpline) •~L ...... l.l. ..... .!lli;,....:..J,..... -.;!l.IJ 1314 50 f).>- ~,..:lJ ¥-oJ 
.1300 76 4656 ~J-:)4,P ~ .)....i;E>J ::,.~~ J,......Jl 
CHINESE: m~~~~1I;JR!f,i'i ,1H~'j.iQ'J:r .. Nf. iifftt:131450~m 
0 ~&f'.'l,l't]m. ~~f!:'Mfti~Helpline • 
~lLlt~.;3t,H::-f·.:tfil1300 76 46 56 
CROATIAN: Ako !elite da govonte sa savjetnikom i imate te~oC:a 
sa engleskim jezikom, nazovite Prevodilacku slutbu {Translating and 
Interpreting Service) na 13 14 50 i zamolite ih da kontaktiraJU Helpline 
za vas. 
Za primjerak bro5ure na hrvatskom jeziku nazovite 1300 76 46 56. 
~..,.,.....s-fSJJ.() ~~;..,...J¥~ ;;..:...~~¥,,....... P, :FARSI 
:sly'it-l J J~)I.J..lj 1314 SO·J...! ~ J'li.!_,~ ...... ;.:i..loO.~ •¥>) J 
.~JI...>..S...Sl..'.,;~ 
,:.j; j; ..J...,j 1300 76 46 56.;..:.~~ ..r-~ ~..>J .hJ 
GREEK: Av on9u~dtt va IJW'JoET£ OE ou!Ja<>uAo Kat 6t ptMtt ayy'NKa 
KaM. Tl]1.t<pWVJ'jotT£ 0111 YTTI]ptoiO Mooq>po01tilv KnlllltpjJI]VtWV [TIS] 
OTO 1314 50 KOI (IJT~OT£ TOU<; VO 00<; auv6tOOUV £K !Jlpou<; OQ<; IJE TI')V 
rpoiJIJ~ 8ofi9£Ja<; [Helpline]. 
no va M~£T£ TTAI]po<pOp10K6 cpuM06to 010 £MI1V1KC TI]Atcpwv~Olt 010 
1300 76 46 56 
ITALIAN: Ch1 desidera par1are con un consigiJere rna ha difficoltl} a 
comunicare in inglese, puo chiamare il Servizio ltaduzioni e 1nlerpreb 
al numero 13 14 50 e chledere di potersi mettere in contatto con Ia Helpltne. 
Per ricevere una copia deU'opuscolo in ital!ano rivolgersi al1300 76 46 56 
KOREAN: ~Oj· ~<51-~ ~!f ~ret~~ !-~~f21'i:! ~<2t ~ ~21 Ai 
tll~ 1314 502~ ~§j-t;f()f £*~ .2~6f~AI£. 
!!~<>i ~4JAiS ~~8fAI~ 1300 76 46 562S. ~~'&'ftJAI£ 
MACEDON IAN: AKo caKare p.a paJroBapare co COBeTHHK, a He 
36opyaare Ao6po aHrnHCIG4, jaBeTe ce Ha npeoe,qy~Kara cn)')K6a Ha 
13 14 50 H H no6apajre Aa ee noap3ar co Helpline. 
3a npltMepoK Ha 6powypa Ha MaKflAOHCKH jaeere ce Ha 1300 76 46 56 
hnp·f;'w-.wau.""J1MrfW10p .a-.~lp.~hlatl orlli·~·:!OG.5to .•II I AM 
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POLISH: Jeieli chcesz porozmawiac z doradcct. a nie m6wisz dobrze 
po angielsku, zadzwon do SMby Tiumaczy pod nr 1314 50 i poproS o 
skontaklowanie ci~ z infolini~ .. 
Aby otrzymae egzempfarz broszury w j~zyku polskim, zadzwon pod nr 
1300 7646 56 
RUSSIAN: EcnH Bbl xorHre noroeopHTb c <JABOKBTOM, HO He cso5oAHo 
an<JAeeTe aHmHMCI(MM, ro o6paTHTect. 38 noMOU1biO e Cn)'ll<6y 
nHCbMBHHoro 11 ycrHoro nepeBO,Qa (Translating and Interpreting 
Service), n03BOHHB 00 Tet'I$Ky 1314 50, 11 nonpocKTB HX C8A3Bl'bCSI 
co cn}'ll<6oti Helpline 38 sac. 
AM non~eHHA 31C38MnMpa 3Toro 6YKJ1era Ha pyccKoM A3bll<e 
n03BOHI1T8 no HOMepy 1300 76 46 56 
SERBIAN: Axo JKenHTe AS pa3roaapare ca caeerHHKOM HHMare 
norewKol'la ca eHmeCI(MM jeJHKOM, no30e11re npeBO,Q1111aYKY cnYJK&J 
(Translating and Interpreting Service) Ha 13 14 50 11 38Manlne HX AS 
KOHTSKTHpajy Helpline 38 sac. 
3a KOmtjy 6powype Ha cpncKOM J93HKY r1030811T9 1300 76 46 56 
SPANISH: Si usted desea hablar con un asesor y no habla mucho 
ingles, llame al Servicio de Traducci6n e InterpretaciOn al1314 50 y 
solicrte que le pongan en contacto con Ia linea de ayuda. 
Para obtener una copia del folleto en espal'lol. !lame al1300 76 46 56. 
TURKISH: Bir dam~manla ~ro~k astemenlz ve lngillzceyi tyi 
konu~mamamz durumunda, 1314 50 numaradan Yazth ve SOziO 
Tercomanhk Servasi'nl (Translating and Interpreting Service) araytp, 
sizin i9n Helpline·a telefon etmelennl isteyinaz. 
Ktta~t~tn TOri<~ basktstnt edinmek ~in 1300 76 46 56 numaraYJ 
araytntz. 
VIETNAMESE: NAu mu6n n6i chuy~n v&i ngvOi hi.IOng danlc6 v~n 
nhvng khOng n6i th~o ta~ng Anh, xin quy vj tft~n th~t cho D!ch Vv 
ThOng Phil!n Djch s613 14 50, r~ nha hQ lian l~c vai E>vang DAy E>~ 
Th~i Trv Giup gium. 
Mu6n c6 t~p ~ch hvang dan bang tiAng Vi~t xtn <Ja~n th~i s6 
1300 76 46 56. 
~.c_.,-.,.....,.•~•,...., '~nptlp~pt.tont.hlmf1..,(2U~::ous6JIII ,\M 
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Use this page for spec111c contact details on services available In each 
State and Temtory within Australia. 
ACT 
Domestic Violence 6280 0900 
Sexual Assault 6247 2525 
Relationships Australia 6281 3600 
Mensllne Australia 1300 78 99 78 
NSW 
Domestic Violence (DoCS) 1800 656463 
Sexual Assault (5yd) 9819 6565 
Sexual Assault (Rural) 1800 424 017 
Relationships Australia 9425 4999 
Mensllne Australia 1300 78 99 78 
Northern Territory 
Domestic VIolence 1800 019116 
Sexual Assault (Darwin) 8922 7156 
Sexual Assault (Alice Spnngs) 8951 5880 
Relationships Aus1ralla 8981 6676 
Mensllne Australia 1300 7899 78 
Queensland 
Domestic VIolence 1800 811 811 
Sexual Assault 1800 010120 
Relationships Australia 3217 2VOO 
Mensllne Australia 1300 78 99 78 
South Australia 
Domest!c VIolence 1800 800 098 
Sexual Assault 1800 817 421 
Relationships Australia 82234566 
Mensline Australia 1300 78 99 78 
Tasmania 
Domestic VIolence 1800 833 937 
Sexual Assault (Southern) 62311811 
Sexual Assault (Northern) 6334 2740 
Sexual Assault (Nth West) 6431 V711 
Relationships Australia 6211 4050 
Mensllne Australia 1300 78 99 78 
VIctoria 
Domestic VIolence (Melb) 9373 0123 
Domestic VIolence (Rural) 1800 015188 
Sexual Assault 1800 806 2V2 
Relationships Australia V835 7570 
Mensllne Australia 1300 78 99 78 
htop /.'w,.,. australway""' ¥->V.IUijrc~lp'swc_l<rrorury__numi><D btm II of21t;0(>200S 6:30.3~ AM 
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Chapter 8 Appendices- The Howard Government's Approaches to 
Male Violence Against Women: Key findings from stage one 
8.1 Table Comparing the No Respect, No Relationship and Violence Against Women-
Australia Says No campaigns. 
364 
8.1 Table Comparing the No Respect, No Relationship and Violence Against Women -
Australia Says No campaigns. 
Below is a comparative table that summarises some of the key elements of No Respect, No 
Relationship and Violence Against Women- Australia Says No. This table is based on a 
summary of both stages of the study. 
No Respect I Australia Says No 
Evidence based on developmental research and I Not based on research. 
PADVand NICSA research. 
Type of violence identified as the problem - Type of violence identified as the problem -
relationship violence and sexual assault physical violence and sexual assault (i.e. 
including a range of physical, sexual and contact violence that are criminal offences). 
psychological forms of violence (i.e. a broad 
definition of violence that is not necessarily 
criminal but generally accepted as violence in 
govt publications) . 
Focus on primary and secondary prevention i.e. , Tertiary intervention I prevention i.e. focus on 
focus on preventing violence before it occurs what to do after violence has occurred. 
and targeting high risk groups (eg Indigenous, 
homeless, already victimised young people). 
Some aspects of tertiary intervention included 
there. 
Location of individual within a social context. Focus on individual as the cause I site of the 
Individual held responsible for the violence but problem. Use of pathologising language and 
located within the social context supporting their representation of perpetrators as 'different -
actions. Importance of socio-cultural i.e. bad, mad or angry'. 
understandings of violence in PADV. 
Use of gendered concepts (eg definitions, Use of gendered language but not a gendered 
structure of the campaign , dynamics of approach with gendered definitions and 
violence) around violence but not necessarily understandings. 
gendered language. 
Some collaboration with the sector however this 1 No sectoral or non-federal govt involvement. 
did tend to be more often a relationship of 
explaining what was coming. (Could be useful to 
have greater sectoral involvement especially 
from the NGO sectors). 
365 
Communication strategy main component of Media component main part of campaign with 
campaign with media strategy to support and minimal communication strategy (but only 
reinforce the communication strategy. school based resource). 
Communication strategy focused on a range of Communication strategy focused on didactic 
ways of engaging young people through popular learning through school environment. 
culture and their own peer groups. 
Inclusive of a range of relationships (eg same Explicit inclusion of only heterosexual 
sex). relationships. 
Different groups of young people targeted Young people targeted as a homogenous 
through different components and activities in group. 
the campaign. 
Explained what healthy relationships looked like Explained what violent behaviour looked like 
and skills for engaging in them. Gave the and told victims to leave. Did not deal with 
benefits of respectful relationships for both either the negatives of violent behaviour in 
parties 
-
i.e. continuing the relationship, relationships (i.e. why you wouldn't be violent) 
happiness. or what is in it for the perpetrator to not use 
violence. 
Esther Fallon: "for young people, by young By the govt for the Australian population to 
people, about young people" (Cannane, 2004). show what they are doing about violence. 
Action promoted: conduct healthy, respectful Action promoted: call a helpline after violence 
relationships, develop skills to conduct these has occurred. 
respectful and healthy relationships (eg how you 
talk to each other} , don't engage in violent 
behaviour. 
Violent behaviour in relationships is Mixed messages: violence in relationships is 
unacceptable and criminal. criminal however is also a 'problem' for which 
the perpetrator and victim both need help to 
solve. 
Focus on engaging young people and their Focus on engaging young people's families. 
peers. 
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